

RESTRICTED

# G-2 HISTORY



SEVENTH ARMY  
OPERATIONS  
IN

## EUROPE

15 AUGUST 1944 — 8 MAY 1945

RESTRICTED



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P A R T   O N E

15 - 31 AUGUST 1944

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

W.D./cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL, COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part I

15 - 31 August 1944

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPRODUCED BY  
ENGINEER SECTION  
HQ SEVENTH ARMY



# C O N F I D E N T I A L

## I. GENERAL.

By the time the German Nineteenth Army recovered from the surprise of the Allied landings on 15 August, it was too late. Although the German High Command had every reason to expect such an Allied operation, and knew in advance, from aerial reconnaissance, that the invasion fleet was underway, it failed disastrously in attempting to deduce the target area of the attack.

There are conflicting versions of just what the enemy did expect. Some prisoners, including Generalmajor PIERINGER, Feldkommandant of the Var Department, stated that the Germans were alerted for an attack in the GENOA area; others say the landings were expected west of TOULON, despite the fact that this area was not fitted for large scale amphibious assault. In any case, the enemy was not prepared in the right area.

The shock and surprise of the assault, and the resulting speed of the advance inland, so disorganized the Nineteenth Army that its commander, General Friedrich WIESE, never succeeded in assembling the bulk of his forces to attempt to contain the beachhead. By the end of August, he had lost four of the nine divisions that had been available to him, in whole or in part, on the 15th; all of the rest had suffered heavy losses in both men and equipment; he had lost the ports of TOULON and MARSEILLES; he had given up nearly 60,000 prisoners, and, faced with the threat of being outflanked and cut off by the simultaneous successes of the United States Seventh and Third Armies, he was hastily withdrawing his battered forces northward and had abandoned all of France south and southwest of LYON.

It would not be correct to say that surprise was the only factor entering into the Nineteenth Army's failure to put up appreciable resistance to the Seventh Army's northward drive. The weakness of the Riviera garrison, which made possible the accomplishment of a decisive breakthrough as early as D+2, was a result of two factors: the enemy's conviction that the attack would come somewhere else; and the fact that his overall strength in Southern France was on the decline at the time of the assault.

In early June, 1944, prior to the OVERLORD assault on NORMANDY, the enemy had disposed sixteen divisions in Southern France (South of the LOIRE) for the defense of both the Mediterranean and Bay of Biscay coasts. These — three panzer divisions, eight infantry divisions, and five reserve divisions — comprised Army Group G, the First and Nineteenth German Armies. The former was responsible for the Atlantic Coast, the latter for the Mediterranean.

However, the OVERLORD operation, and the subsequent breakthrough into BRITTANY, led to a reshuffling of these forces. The Nineteenth Army lost the 9th Panzer Division and the 271st, 272nd, and 277th Infantry Divisions; it gained the 11th Panzer (transferred from First Army), the 198th Infantry (from RUSSIA, reinforced by BOHEMIAN units), and the 716th Infantry, which had been badly mauled in NORMANDY and sent south for refit. These, together with the divisions it had retained through the shuffle, gave the Nineteenth Army nine divisions at the time of the DRAGOON landing on August 15. Their D-Day dispositions, as shown in Annex I, confirmed advance information in every particular. However, these nine divisions were hardly in such condition as to be available for immediate commitment at their full strength. The only genuinely mobile unit, the 11th Panzer Division, was missing one of its two tank battalions; the rest of the division had been on the verge of moving at the time we struck. The 338th Infantry Division had sent the equivalent of four battalions in answer to the call for reinforcements for the BRITTANY - NORMANDY front; two weak regiments were available to throw against the Seventh Army. The 157th Reserve Division, while substantially intact, had been dissipated in the mountain



strongholds of the Maquis. And the 716th Infantry Division was too recently out of the COTENTIN meat grinder to be of any offensive use to General WIESE.

Thus, in addition to the still considerable strength of the 11th Panzer, there were only five reasonably effective divisions available to the Nineteenth Army: 148th, which was cut off and shunted aside early in the operation; 242nd and 244th, which were cut off and destroyed in TOULON and MARSEILLES, respectively; 189th, which was unable to get together more than a battle group, representing only portions of two regiments, for the early phases, and whose remainder was not contacted during this period; and the 198th Infantry Division, which bore the brunt of the delaying action from BRIGNOLES to MONTEILMAR. (See Annex No. II).

The unhappy state of the Nineteenth Army was enhanced by a grave shortage of motor vehicles and fuel, which forced very large elements to rely on horse-drawn transport. Even the 11th Panzer Division, according to a prisoner, had to move some of its grenadiers to the battle area by towing them on their bicycles behind the few available trucks.

Still another factor, difficult to assess accurately at this time, probably contributed to the handicaps of the Nineteenth Army: the poor quality of much of its personnel, including many foreigners and impressed prisoners of war. Once defeat had become inevitable, its materialization was hastened by the low morale of the troops. The effect of the morale factor was heightened by the enemy's fear of the FFI. On many occasions, German troops made the most of an opportunity to surrender to Americans to forestall the possibility of having to give up to the Maquis later.

However, any or all of these debilitating factors might have been countered to some extent had the enemy correctly evaluated Allied intentions and concentrated more of his available forces nearer the assault area. He did not, with the result that he had only the equivalent of two regiments defending an area being assaulted by three divisions. To the failure of his intelligence must be ascribed a large part of his inability to prevent our speedy establishment ashore and immediate breakthrough inland.

## II. CHRONOLOGY.

### 15 August - D-Day

The three preliminary operations launched during the night of 14/15 August in advance of the main assault were successfully carried out against a minimum of opposition. The Special Service Force landing on the islands of LEVANT and PORT CROS had overcome most resistance at both places by the morning of D-Day. LEVANT was completely cleared by the night of D-Day and on PORT CROS only 60-80 enemy were still holding out.

The French Commando beachhead on the left flank of the main assault, in the Cap NEGRE - Cap CAVALAIRE area, received a counterattack during the morning of D-Day, but the enemy was repulsed with the loss of 50 prisoners.

The third pre-H-Hour operation, the airborne drop in the vicinity of LE MUY, also met little opposition.

That the assault area was held only lightly by the enemy was conclusively proved on the morning of D-Day when the main landings also encountered only slight opposition. No fire on ships or craft from coast defense guns was reported, and on the beaches resistance consisted in the main of small arms and mortar fire. Underwater obstacles and land mines were insufficient to delay the landings materially. At only one point, between ST. RAPHAEL and the ARGENS River mouth, was enemy fire of sufficient intensity to force use of an alternate beach.

On the whole, the quality of resistance improved little during the



day. Determined opposition was met only in the FREJUS - ST. RAPHAEL area, where the enemy attempted to deny us access to the ARGENS River valley, and at ST. MAXIME, where pillboxes and street barricades were encountered during the afternoon before the enemy evacuated the town. At the close of the day there was still no clearly defined front. Scattered resistance was being met at the limits of our forward advance, and small pockets were holding out near FREJUS and ST. TROPEZ.

Not until dusk of D-Day did the Luftwaffe put in an appearance. An undetermined number of aircraft released glider bombs at 2120B, sinking one LST.

Identifications among the 2,041 prisoners taken by VI Corps on D-Day confirmed previous estimates that the assault would encounter elements of the 242nd Infantry Division and the 148th Reserve Division. The 765th Infantry Regiment, of the 242nd Division, was spread over the larger part of the assault area from CAVALAIRE to AGAY, with 239th Reserve Grenadier Regiment of 148th Division on its left.

16 August - D/1

On the island of PORT CROS, a garrison of one officer and 47 men was still holding out in FORT DE L'EMINENCE at the end of D plus 1. Two other pockets of resistance had been taken during the day.

On the mainland, enemy opposition stiffened somewhat on both flanks but continued weak and uncoordinated in the center, with the exception of the FREJUS - ST. RAPHAEL area, where the enemy continued his attempt to deny us entrance into the ARGENS River valley from the east. On the right flank, a three-company counterattack was repulsed west of LA NAPOULE, and further eastward advances by our troops met increasing artillery fire. On the left flank, strong opposition was met on the coast at a strong point east of LE LAVANDOU and inland at a point south of CARNOULES.

Again, enemy air made a dusk attack in the vicinity of ST. MAXIME and ST. TROPEZ, dropping anti-personnel bombs in the latter town.

17 August - D/2

With the capture of DRAGUIGNAN by the airborne task force on the morning of D/2, with little opposition, and the penetration of beachhead forces to the same vicinity without contact, it became fully apparent that no enemy front existed in this sector. The troops assigned to defense of the area - elements of the 242nd Infantry Division - had been destroyed by our amphibious forces; and the link between 242nd Division and 148th Division on its left - LXII Corps Headquarters at DRAGUIGNAN - had been first isolated and then captured by the airborne task force, including Gen. d. Inf. (Lt. Gen.) Ferdinand NEULING and Staff.

This breach in the enemy position, and the lack of suitably disposed reserves with which to close it, had two far-reaching results whose effects the enemy continued to feel for many days. First, the 148th Reserve Division was completely cut off from the rest of Nineteenth Army and, for all practical purposes, was lost to General WIESE. It continued to fight delaying actions as it backed up into the mountains on the Franco-Italian border, and aided the Nineteenth Army, incidentally, by forcing us to commit sizeable forces to liberate CANNES and NICE and secure our right flank, but it was never again able to take part in coordinated action with the rest of Nineteenth Army. Its situation was fully appreciated by the enemy command: by the last of August it had ceased, even nominally, to be a part of Nineteenth Army and had instead been assigned to the newly formed LXXV Corps, whose mission was to defend northwest Italy against the Allied threat to KESSELRING's rear.

The second effect of the breakthrough to DRAGUIGNAN was to expose



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the left flank of the remainder of the Nineteenth Army. The enemy was unable to prevent our rapid exploitation northward with its attendant threat to his Rhone Valley supply and escape routes, and was left with no alternative to the line of action then followed: to deny us the ports of TOULON and MARSEILLES by sacrificing the troops then in those cities in a last ditch stand; and to withdraw the balance of his forces up the Rhone as rapidly as possible, fighting only those actions necessary to keep the route open. The development of this plan continued through the balance of the month of August.

At the end of D/2, the enemy had fallen back on our left flank and was covering the eastern and northeastern approaches to TOULON with elements of the 242nd Inf. Division, less the 765th Regiment, whose few remnants were scattered from the area northeast of TOULON to the vicinity of DRAGUIGNAN. In an attempt to reinforce this area northeast of TOULON, the enemy brought in from MONTPELLIER a battle group of the 189th Reserve Division, whose composition had been discovered from a document captured the previous day, and which was contacted on D/2 west of LE LUC.

On the right flank, elements of the two regiments of the 148th Division were in defensive positions in the vicinity of FAYENCE. Heavy artillery fire was being received from the Islands of STE MARGUERITE and ST HONORAT, off CANNES.

The last resistance on the Island of PORT CROS was liquidated.

Enemy air activity continued on a low scale. Six JU 88's approached the beach area at 2050B and dropped anti-personnel bombs near ST RAPHAEL and ST MAXIME.

18 August - D/3

Task Force BUTLER, which had begun late on D/2 to exploit northward through the breach in the enemy position, had reached the line DURANCE River - VALENTOLE - RIEZ by the evening of D/3.

Meanwhile, the enemy continued his policy of piecemeal commitment of forces to the sector north of TOULON. Elements of the 198th, 244th and 338th Infantry Divisions were identified, as well as additional small elements of the 189th Division battle group. In the sector of these units, as well as to the south where the 242nd Division was defending the approaches to TOULON itself, somewhat stiffer, though still uncoordinated, opposition was met at scattered points. On our right flank, the enemy was withdrawing before the US 36th Division, whose forward elements advanced in the area northwest of CANNES without making contact.

At 2030B, 2 or 3 enemy planes were over BARJOLS, but dropped no bombs.

19 August - D/4

Isolated enemy groups bitterly contested our advance westward along the coast road to TOULON, the BRIGNOLES - AIX road, and the DRAGUIGNAN - VINON road, continuing to hold out after being by-passed by our advance elements. Further elements of the 198th and 244th Infantry Divisions were identified in this sector, and virtually the whole of the second battalion of the 757th Infantry Regiment (338th Division) was encircled and destroyed in BRIGNOLES. However, the enemy was still unable to commit any new divisions as complete units, and the defensive plan appeared to lack centralized direction.

Our exploitation northward continued with little opposition, and resulted in the capture, at DIGNE, of Generalmajor Hans SCHUBERTH, CG of Feldkommandantur 792, together with his staff. On our right, house-to-house fighting was reported at CALLIAN, but again, as on the left, there was no evidence



of coordinated defense on a broad front.

20 August - D/5

Enemy pockets continued to hold out north and west of BRIGNOLES, but these were by-passed by our forward elements which advanced westward as far as AIX against increasing resistance, consisting of enemy units up to 3/400 in strength with mortars, machine guns, artillery and at least two tanks. On the coast, French elements ran into stiff resistance, supported by heavy artillery fire (probably coastal defense guns firing inland) in the vicinity of HYERES, but slightly to the north were able to by-pass TOULON and enter the outskirts of LE BEAUSSET, northwest of the city.

Northwest of CANNES, the enemy maintained defensive positions and presented strong opposition to our advance, but showed no aggressive tendencies. After a stiff fight at DIGNE, Task Force BUTLER continued its advance to the north.

21 August - D/6

The breakthrough to the north and northwest from the original beachhead continued, with elements of Task Force BUTLER reaching the RHONE River, near the confluences of the DROME, without contact. However, other elements of the Task Force had a stiff fight to capture GAP, and afterward received a counterattack north of the town. Subsequently, elements of the 157th Reserve Division were identified in this area. The division had been engaged in operations against partisans in the Alpine foothills but had not previously been contacted by American troops.

Even now it was not destined to play an important part in Nineteenth Army's plan. For, misconstruing our intentions, the enemy command was showing great concern about security of the Alpine passes, and, like the 118th, the 157th Division was withdrawn eastward to assume a purely defensive role on the border. These two divisions, plus the 5 Mountain Division from ITALY, with the 90th PG Division in mobile reserve, made up the LXXV Corps.

With his RHONE Valley routes now directly threatened, the enemy was speeding up his plan of withdrawing while there was yet time. A definite pattern of motor movement northeast from the SETE - NARBONNE area, and northward up the RHONE, began to appear in tactical reconnaissance reports. And across our line of advance toward the RHONE Delta, he attempted to cover the lower end of his withdrawal route by somewhat stiffer resistance on a line generally south from PERTUIS. After failing in an attempt to reinforce the estimated two to three battalions defending AIX, he withdrew from the town during the night of 20/21 August. Scattered groups of a few tanks and self-propelled guns were encountered in the general area west of AIX, and a prisoner identified one company of the 110th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (11th Panzer Division) west of PEYROLLES. He stated that his company was an advance guard, and was to fall back on the RHONE on 23 August.

The scheme of maneuver suggested by these reports was confirmed later by the capture of a field order of LXXXV Corps, dated 21 August. Attributing the withdrawal to "the development of the situation in Northwest FRANCE", the order stated that Nineteenth Army would disengage itself from the enemy and join up with the south wing of Army Group "B". TOULON and MARSEILLES were to be defended to the last man, "according to Order of the Fuehrer". IV GAF Corps was to command the sector west of the RHONE, and LXXXV Corps the sector east of the river. (Other orders indicate that IV GAF Corps commanded the 716th and 189th Divisions, LXXXV Corps the 198th and 338th Divisions). 11th Panzer Division, in Army reserve, was to cover LXXXV Corps front, reconnoiter roads leading into the Valley, and be prepared to counterattack enemy pressure.

Batteries in TOULON continued to shell the French advancing toward



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the city from the East who had taken HYERES after a hard fight. To the west of TOULON, the French reached the coast at BANDOL, thus completing the encirclement of the city, to whose defense the remnants of the 242nd Infantry Division had been committed.

On the extreme right flank, the First Airborne Task Force received heavy artillery fire, believed to have originated in the vicinity of CANNES.

22 August - D/7

Stubborn delaying actions on the approaches to the RHONE Delta covered continued enemy withdrawal up the valley. Air reconnaissance picked up heavy daylight movements northward from NIMES toward MONTELMAR, with indications that traffic was crossing to the east side of the river at PONT D'ESPRIT.

After a sharp fight at CORPS, elements of the 36th Division, advancing to the north, occupied GRENOBLE against only light opposition. On our right flank, elements of 239th and 8th Reserve Regiments of 148th Reserve Division engaged our forces with small arms and light artillery fire in the GRASSE - FAYENCE area, before evacuating FAYENCE and CALLIAN later in the day.

Remnants of the 242nd Division offered determined resistance before TOULON, supported by coast defense guns on ST MANDRIER Peninsula.

23 August - D/8

242nd Division elements and marines, defending TOULON, resisted stubbornly under gunfire support from coast defense batteries. Although MARSEILLES was reported captured, strong pockets of resistance, representing the 244th Infantry Division and elements of the 338th Division, were still holding out, and continued to do so for five days, meanwhile carrying out extensive demolitions in the harbor.

The enemy withdrawal northward continued, with heavy traffic reported on both sides of the RHONE. In order to keep this route open, the enemy presented strong resistance to our units in the vicinity of MONTELMAR and LIVRON.

24 August - D/9

Evidence that the enemy had already withdrawn into the RHONE Valley most of the forces which he intended to evacuate was provided by the fact that our forces penetrated on a broad salient to MARTIGUES - ARLES - ORGON - CAVAILLON without opposition. With the exception of the cities of TOULON and MARSEILLES, where enemy pockets still held out, the scene of the most intensive action had now shifted to the region between MONTELMAR and the RHONE-DROME confluence, where Task Force BUTLER and the 36th Division were in position to block the enemy's escape route northward. For the next five days, the enemy's main effort was directed toward keeping this route open, and on D/9 both the BUTLER Force and the 36th engaged enemy forces here. Again heavy traffic, including some horse-drawn vehicles, was observed moving northward through the valley, and the first sign of what was soon to become the MONTELMAR death-trap was the claim of 100 MT and two trains destroyed here by our artillery and tanks.

On the right flank, CANNES, ANTIBES, and GRASSE fell to our troops, who advanced against only light opposition.

25 August - D/10

The unopposed occupation of ARLES, TARASCON, AVIGNON and CARPENTRAS indicated that the enemy had completed the withdrawal of his forces into the Southern end of the RHONE Valley, leaving him, however, with the serious



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problem of getting them out again at the northern end.

To do so he began on D/10 a three-day series of actions against our forces in the MONTEILMAR - LORIOLE sector. During the morning of the 25th, a force of eight tanks and 200 MT, under cover of heavy artillery fire, moved eastward toward CREST against the northern flank of our positions below the RHONE-DROME confluence. The column was dispersed with a loss of three tanks. About noon a concentration of six tanks and 300 infantry was observed northeast of MONTEILMAR itself, on the south side of our position, and during the afternoon the enemy succeeded in making a small penetration onto the high ground in this area. By night of D/10 this penetration was reported "under control."

Traffic moving northward through the RHONE Valley appeared to stop in the MONTEILMAR area, indicating a pile-up of vehicles below our block waiting for enemy attacks on the block to provide them an opportunity to filter through.

The tail of the enemy column, as it withdrew into the valley, appeared to be covered by 326th Regiment of the 198th Division and by the bulk of the 110th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 11th Panzer.

Pockets of resistance were still being engaged in both TOULON and MARSEILLES and on the right flank there was only light contact in the GRASSE-CANNES area. On our Alpine flank, BRIANCON was occupied without opposition, but to the southeast of that town, in the vicinity of LARCHE Pass, there were the first of a series of indications of enemy activity which later proved to be the taking up of defensive positions by the LXXV Corps.

26 August - D/11

Continuing his actions of the previous day against our positions dominating his escape route north of MONTEILMAR, the enemy launched a number of attacks, supported by armor, one of which succeeded in breaking our roadblock on the east bank of the RHONE. To the south of our position he took and held BONLIEU for five hours before being driven out; to the north of the position 20 tanks and 800 infantry were reported below the DROME River between LORIOLE and GRANE, and a small enemy force was dispersed north of CREST. Most of the identifications in the battle area were of elements of the 11th Panzer and 198th Infantry Division.

Meanwhile the heaviest motor movements yet reported were observed in the valley, and included, in the area between MONTEILMAR and LORIOLE, a large column of tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled guns and half-tracks. The rear of the enemy force was now above ORANGE, to which our troops penetrated against only light contact.

On the right flank the enemy continued his slow withdrawal to Italy, presenting increasing resistance in the LOUP River area.

27 August - D/12

Prisoners reported that the bulk of the 11th Panzer Division had already succeeded in passing our block, but that another division (known from other identifications to be the 198th) was still to the south. Endeavoring to hold the road and the DROME River crossing open for escape of his last elements, the enemy presented stubborn and successful resistance to our assault on LA COUCOURDE in the morning, and strongly opposed the attacks which drove him out of GRANE and ALLEX in the afternoon.

On the south side of the MONTEILMAR pocket the enemy was withdrawing rapidly, but in good order and continued to put up rear guard resistance whenever contacted by our forward elements. The latter advanced as far northward as the DONZERE-GRIGNAN area.



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On the right coastal flank, there was further evidence of enemy withdrawal toward Italy, but to the north small arms fire was encountered northwest of LARCHE pass.

28 August - D/13

The climax of the fight for the MONTELIBAR pocket was reached as the enemy, taking heavy losses both in battle and in the shooting up of jammed traffic on the road, extracted his surviving elements to the north.

Advance American units moving up on the pocket from below, broke through the DONZERE-GRIGNAN-TAULIGNAN delaying line against very heavy opposition, capturing a double column of vehicles two kilometers in length, and late in the day moving on through MONTELIBAR itself, where, by then, there was little opposition.

Meanwhile, however, the enemy had resisted strongly to the east of MONTELIBAR, had attacked to the north and had forced our units to withdraw slightly in the vicinity of LA COUCOURDE. Despite the toll being taken of his vehicles by artillery and air strafing, he continued to move on the road in daylight in a determined effort to force as much materiel as possible through the hard-won gap.

His next obstacle was the crossing of the DROME River near its junction with the RHONE, and this he negotiated, first, with three fords near LIVRON, then, after floods forced a rise in the river, by a ponton bridge.

Far in the rear, the sacrifice stand of the enemy troops left behind in the ports came to an end with the formal surrender of survivors in MARSEILLES and on ST MANDRIER Peninsula, behind TOULON. Among the MARSEILLES prisoners were Generalmajor BOJE, CG of Feldkommandantur 894, and General-leutnant SCHAEFFER, CG of 244th Infantry Division. TOULON yielded Admiral RUHFUS, commanding the Maritime Defense of the Riviera.

29 August - D/14

The enemy attacked strongly north of MONTELIBAR in the morning in an effort to break out with the remainder of the 198th Division, but was beaten back and the division commander, Generalmajor OTTO RICHTER, captured.

The MONTELIBAR-LA COUCOURDE pocket then collapsed, with the enemy presenting only scattered resistance to our troops who moved in to mop up. The bulk of the personnel in the trapped units had succeeded in escaping northward, but vast stocks of equipment had to be abandoned in the pocket, including about 2,000 MT, 1000 horses, more than a hundred artillery pieces, among which were six railway guns.

Heavy fighting now developed to the northward, in the vicinity of the DROME crossings, where the enemy continued to push traffic across under our artillery fire. Although we occupied LIVRON without opposition, very heavy resistance was met at LORIOL which was later successfully counter-attacked by the enemy. Our attempts to penetrate westward of the LIVRON - LORIOL line were stubbornly resisted.

That the enemy did not intend again to be cut off as he had been above MONTELIBAR was demonstrated on 29 August when defended roadblocks were first developed at BOURG DE PEAGE and BEAUREPAIRE to the east of the LIVRON - VALENCE - VIENNE - LYON line of withdrawal. This policy of screening his future routes against our efforts to outflank them was to be consistently followed until, some two weeks later, he had succeeded in withdrawing into the BELFORT - VOSGES line.

During the battle of the RHONE Valley the enemy had also succeeded in evacuating the area to the west of the Delta. The 716th Infantry Division,



known to have been in this area at the time of the assault, had never been contacted in battle. However, paybooks confirming the presence of its 736th Regiment in the REMOULINS area had been reported on 28 August; previously, on 26 August, reports had been received of a large body of disorganized enemy in the NIMES-UZES area, but French reconnaissance to the west and northwest of the Delta on 29 August developed no contact. The division had evidently made its way northward on the west side of the RHONE.

On our right flank, the enemy's organization of his Alpine defenses proceeded at an increased pace, and developed into an attack that retook BRIANCON.

30 August - D/15

Moving northward through VALENCE in the direction of LYON, the enemy fought stubborn rear guard actions in the vicinity of LIVRON before breaking contact in the afternoon. He guarded the east flank of his movement by presenting stiff resistance to our attack on BOURG DE PEAGE, and at points southeast of VALENCE and near BEAUREPAIRE.

The straggling rear of the enemy migration was encountered by the French moving north on the west side of the RHONE in the vicinity of BOURG ST ANDEOL; to the west at VALLON a disorganized force of 3,000 enemy were reported raping and pillaging the countryside.

On the east coastal flank the continued withdrawal of the 148th Reserve Division into the mountains permitted our occupation of NICE and LEVENZO. But to the north in the Alpine pass sector, the enemy was again aggressive in his establishment of a firm defensive position. Having taken the COL de LARCHE, BARCELONETTE, BRIANCON and CONDAMINE, he burned the latter two towns, and held the CONDAMINE-ST PAUL road under artillery fire throughout the day.

31 August - D/16



On the last day of the month, the enemy was entering the final stages of his withdrawal from southern and southwestern France to the relative security of the VOSGES. By the end of 31 August all organized resistance had ceased at VALENCE and the Nineteenth Army was falling back rapidly on LYON, the last stronghold in the RHONE Valley and the pre-designated assembly area to which its retreating units had been ordered for the final retreat to the border zone. The route was screened with road-blocks and small forces on all main roads approaching westward from northeast of VALENCE to northeast of LYON.

III. SUMMARY.


Prisoners taken on the last day of the month brought the total to 57,068 since D-Day. The enemy had also lost an unestimated number of dead and wounded and large quantities of equipment; he had abandoned two divisions to their inevitable fate in TOULON and MARSEILLES, and had lost two others to guard duty on the Italian border.

But by deciding on evacuation early in the battle (the disengagement order had been issued on D/4), then carrying it out boldly despite our efforts to block the route, Nineteenth Army had salvaged a considerable portion of its strength for renewal of the fight on the approaches to the Fatherland. In particular, a large part of the 11th Panzer Division had escaped and was to be met again in subsequent weeks. The chart attached (Annex No. IV) summarizes the organization and effectiveness of the Nineteenth Army during the last two weeks of August.











ANNEX NO. III

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY  
(For Locations See Annex No. I)

ARMY GROUP G

BLASKOWITZ, Johannes, Generalfeldmarschall.

Began World War I as company commander, ended as Chief of Staff of a Hungarian Division on the Eastern Front. Promoted Major in 1921, he was on the staff of 5th Infantry Division. Commanded an Infantry Regiment in 1925, and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1926. In 1928, he was Chief of Staff of 5th Infantry Division, and became a full Colonel in 1929. As commander of 14th Infantry Regiment, he was promoted to Generalmajor in 1932. As a Generalleutnant, he was appointed Inspector of Administrative Schools in 1933; and as commander of II Army Corps, was promoted to General (Infantry) in 1936. He assumed command of Third Army Group in November 1938, and commanded during the occupation of BOHEMIA and MORAVIA in March 1939.

At the outbreak of the war he commanded 8 Army in von RUNDSTEDT's Army Group in Poland, and negotiated the surrender of Warsaw in September 1939. He won the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross in Poland, and was promoted to Generaloberst on 1 October. In 1940 he was C-in-C East, with headquarters at SPALA. He commanded First Army in France from 1941 to 1944 when he was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall and commanded Army Group G.

He is reported to have protested against atrocities in Poland and was at one time reputed to be in disfavor with the Nazi Party.

NINETEENTH ARMY

WIESE, Frederick, General. (Infantry).

WIESE served in World War I with 65th Infantry Regiment, and during 1919 was a member of the "Freikorps", composed of the extreme nationalist elements of the German Officer Corps.

He retired with the rank of Lieutenant of the Reserve in September 1919, and joined the police, rejoining the army in 1935 as a Major in 69th Infantry Regiment; promoted Lieutenant Colonel in 1938, commanding second battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, and full Colonel in 1941. Commanding an Infantry Regiment in 1942 he was awarded the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross in February, and the German Cross in Gold in March. By October 1943, he had been promoted successively to Generalmajor, Generalleutnant, and General (Infantry). As commander of 35th Army Corps, he was awarded Oak-leaves to the Knight's Cross for fighting at GOMEL and SW of ZHLOBIN, where the Russians accuse him of being responsible for atrocities. Generalmajor BIERINGER, when captured in Southern France described WIESE as a fervent Nazi. WIESE assumed command of Nineteenth Army, replacing General von SODENSTERN, in July.

IV GAF CORPS

PETERSON, General (Luftwaffe).

No biographical data available.



LXII RESERVE CORPS

NEULING, Ferdinand, General (Infantry).

Commissioned in 1906, served during World War I in 139th Infantry Regiment, promoted Captain in 1916. Awarded Iron Cross (first class) and Saxon Decoration. In 11th Infantry Regiment, 1921, and War Department 1925-29. Promoted Major in 1929, and commanded a battalion of 2nd Infantry Regiment 1930-32. Promoted Colonel 1935, commanding 23rd Infantry Regiment in 1937, Generalmajor in 1939. Commanded 239th Infantry Division and promoted to Generalleutnant in 1940. On the Eastern Front in 1942 he was awarded the German Cross in Gold (for operations against KHARKOV) and the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Later in the year appointed General Z.B.V. at headquarters of the Commanding General of the General Government and subsequently to command of the LXII Reserve Corps in POLAND. Promoted General (Infantry) in November 1942.

Captured at DRAGUIGNAN, on 18 August, he was highly indignant over the conduct of General BIERINGER, who had tried to induce him to surrender with his entire staff on first contact with American troops. NEULING had orders to fight to the last man and last bullet and claimed that he surrendered only when he found himself in a hopelessly untenable position, cut off from all communication with either higher or lower echelons.

LXXXV ARMY CORPS

KNIESS, Baptist, General (Infantry).

Bavarian, entered BAVARIAN Army as Second Lieutenant in 1908, Ended World War I as Captain, with the Iron Cross (first class), Bavarian Military Service Cross (fourth class) and Hessian Bravery Medal. Transferred to Reichswehr after the war. Served in 19 (Bavarian) Infantry Regiment from 1925 to 1927, and on the staff of Borkum Garrison in 1928 and 1929. Promoted to Major in 1928, commanded training battalion of 21 Infantry Regiment 1930-32, promoted Lieutenant Colonel 1933 and Generalmajor in 1938. Early in 1939 he was serving as Landwehr Commander HEILBRONN. Promoted Generalleutnant in 1940 and General (Infantry) in 1942. In March 1943 he was commanding LXVI Reserve Corps in France, and in October 1943 commanded Gruppe KNIESS, which later became LXXXV Corps.

11 PANZER DIV.

WIETERSHEIM, Wend von, Generalmajor.

Cavalryman, first identified with 11 Panzer Division in RUSSIA, in August 1943. Holds German Cross in Gold, Rittercross (for attack on LUGA position in RUSSIA, February 1942), Oak Leaf, and Oak Leaf with Swords.

148 RES. DIV.

FRETTER-PICO, Otto, Generalmajor.

Served in 14 Artillery Regiment during World War I, promoted Lieutenant in October 1918, and was in 5th Artillery Regiment in 1925. Promoted Captain in 1928, Lieutenant Colonel in 1937, Colonel in 1940; during this period he had served in 7th "Medical Unit" and 7th Survey Unit. Promoted to Generalmajor in 1943 and has commanded 148th Reserve Division since January 1944.

157 RES. DIV.

PFLAUM, Karl, Generalleutnant.



Second Lieutenant in 8th Bavarian Infantry Regiment in 1912; regimental service during 1914-18; awarded Bavarian Medal for Military Merit. Promoted Captain in October 1918. Serving in 21st Infantry Regiment in 1925 and on staff of 19th Infantry Regiment in 1932. Promoted Colonel in 1937; commanded an officer selection board in 1939. After commanding 19th Infantry Regiment (7th Infantry Division) in 1941, he was promoted to Generalmajor and given temporary command of 258th Infantry Division on the Central RUSSIAN Front. In October 1942 he took command of 157th Reserve Division and was promoted to Generalleutnant in October 1943.

189 RES. DIV.

von SCHWERIN, Bogislav, Graf., Generalmajor.

Second Lieutenant in 2 Guard Regiment during 1914-18; promoted lieutenant in 1924. Served in 9th Infantry Regiment from 1925 to 1932, becoming Captain in 1929. In 1938 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and the following year he was commanding a battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment. Promoted Colonel at the beginning of 1941 and soon afterward, commanding an infantry regiment, was awarded the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross for fighting on the RUSSIAN Front. Promoted Generalmajor in October 1943 and since then has been in command of 189th Reserve Division.

198 INF. DIV.

RICHTER, Otto, Generalmajor.

Captured in the MONTELIBAR pocket, RICHTER's paybook showed that he had been with 48th Engineer Battalion from 1937-40, 519th Engineer Regiment Staff 1940-42, the General Staff from 1942, and CG, 198th Infantry Division in 1944. He had been decorated with the Iron Cross (first and second class) and the German Cross in Gold. He showed himself to be aloof, arrogant, and evidently a Nazi sympathizer.

He said that when the withdrawal order was received he divided his division into two parts, sending one part north under a Colonel and himself leading the southernmost portion northward. On 29 August, he personally led the determined enemy effort to break out of the pocket and cross the DROME. When the attack failed he was taken prisoner, while attending to the wounds of another officer.

242 INF. DIV.

BAESSLER, Erich, Generalmajor.

Served in 154 Infantry Division in World War I, retired a Captain in 1919. Colonel in 65 Infantry Regiment in 1938, commanded 399 Infantry Regiment in 1941, and recommended for German Cross in Gold. Promoted Generalmajor in 1942, commanding 377 Infantry Division in KURSK sector. In command of 242 Infantry Division in BELGIUM in August 1943.

Generalmajor RICHTER of the 198th Infantry Division stated after his capture that he had met BAESSLER on the MONTELIBAR-VALENCE road where the latter was on traffic control duty after having been relieved of command of the 242nd Division for prematurely ordering withdrawal. Other PW reports say that BAESSLER was wounded on 21 August.

244 INF. DIV.

SCHAEFFER, Gotthold, Generalleutnant.

Early history confused with that of other officers of the same name.



In 1938, a Colonel serving in OKW, and in 1939 in Defense Section III, Ministry of War. Commandant of LILLE in 1943 and promoted to Generalmajor. Commanding 244 Infantry Division in May 1944. Captured by French at MARSEILLES.

Following his capture SCHAEFFER said that although his orders had been to hold in MARSEILLES until every man was gone and despite the fact that he had ammunition and supplies for some time to come, the low state of morale compelled him to give up with two thousand men. He criticized the hold to the last man orders given by the High Command and believed that his disobedience of them had finished his military career no matter what might now happen in Germany.

338 INF. DIV.

COURBIERE, Rene de L'HOMME de, Generalleutnant.

Member of an aristocratic family of Huguenot extraction which has provided the Prussian Army with many officers. In the war of 1914-18 he won the Iron Cross (first class), Wound Badge, Bavarian Military Service Cross (fourth class, with swords), Hamburg Hanseatic Cross and Lippe War Service Cross, and was promoted to Captain in 1915. He transferred to the Reichswehr after the war, served as company commander and battalion staff officer in 4 Infantry Regiment until his promotion to Major in 1928. On the staff of 2nd Division 1929-31 and commanded a training battalion of 5 Infantry Regiment in 1932. Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1933, Colonel in 1935, and appointed to command 96 Infantry Regiment. A Generalmajor in 1938, he was appointed LANDWEHR commander, GLOGAN, and the next year took command of 213 Infantry Division near BREST-LITOVSK, continuing with the division after it was downgraded to a Sicherungs Division on L. of C. duties on the Southern Front in RUSSIA. In January 1943, he was given command of 153 Reserve Division, and in January 1944 of 338 Infantry Division. He had been promoted to Generalleutnant in June 1940.

716 INF. DIV.

RICHTER, Otto, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

FELDKOMMANDANTUR 800, DRAGUIGNAN.

BIERINGER, Ludwig, Generalmajor.

Feldkommandant for the Department of VAR, BIERINGER is a career officer who has spent most his service in supply, both during the first World War and in the post-war period. He was made Captain in 1926, Major in 1934, Lieutenant Colonel in 1937. In 1935 he organized the first MT Battalion in MUNICH, and in 1937-39 he led in organizing instruction at the Army Supply School in HANNOVER. He published a book on military supply in 1937. He was Supply Chief with REICHENAU's Army in the Polish and French campaigns, and in September 1940 became Supply Chief of LIST's Army with headquarters at BESANCON. He moved with LIST to RUSSIA, and retained his post when LIST was replaced by MANNSTEIN. In March 1943 he was relieved of command of 3 Higher Supply Headquarters and given command of 5 Higher Supply Headquarters near CRACOW. In July 1943 he was promoted to Generalmajor and assigned to work with ROMMEL on organization of supply system in North Italy; relieved in September 1943 because of a dispute with ROMMEL's G-4. In November 1943 he was sent to BESANCON to understudy the feldkommandant and in March 1944 was given his own Feldkommandantur at DRAGUIGNAN, responsible for the coordination of civil affairs with military policy.



On the day of the invasion BIERINGER and his staff barricaded themselves in a villa and succeeded in holding off the FFI until 16 August. He surrendered to the first American detachment to arrive in town, and then attempted to persuade General NEULING of LXII Corps to follow suit.

FELDKOMMANDANTUR 792, DIGNE.

SCHUBERTH, Hans, Generalmajor.

Formerly Feldkommandant at TOULOUSE, where he is accused of having been responsible for atrocities. He was captured at DIGNE on 19 August, the day after he had written a report (also captured) describing the failure of his communications, the lack of information about the situation, and the difficulty of attempting to defend DIGNE.

FELDKOMMANDANTUR 894, MARSEILLES.

BOJE, Generalmajor.

Captured by French at MARSEILLES. No biographical data available.

MARITIME DEFENSE.

RUHFUS, Konteradmiral.

Commanding the Maritime Defense of the French Riviera, RUHFUS was responsible for the sector east of the RHONE, under Vice Admiral WEVER, commanding the South French Coast. He took over the latter command also after WEVER died on 10 August. The order withdrawing the Nineteenth Army from Southern FRANCE charged him with the responsibility of defending TOULON to the last man. He was taken prisoner when the remnants of the garrison surrendered to the French on 29 August.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX NO. IV

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, NINETEENTH ARMY  
15-31 August 1944

<u>Division</u>	<u>Organization in S FR, 15 Aug.</u>			<u>Overall Effectiveness</u>	
	<u>Tk Bns.</u>	<u>Inf Bns.</u>	<u>Arty Bns.</u>	<u>15 Aug.</u>	<u>31 Aug.</u>
11th Pz.	1	8 (incl 2 Fld Repl)	3	80%	75%
148th Res.		9	4 (incl 1196 Bn atchd)	75%	60% *
157th Res.		7	2	85%	60% *
189th Res.		4	1	80%	70%
198th Inf.		8	4	85%	60%
242nd Inf.		15 (incl 3 Ost & 1 Fld Repl)	3	85%	0 (Elts under 338th control)
244th Inf.		12	3	85%	0 (Elts under 338th control)
338th Inf.		4	3	50%	20%
716th Inf.		7 (incl 2 Ost of 244th Div atchd)	2	75%	75%

NOTE: Infantry Battalion tabulation includes Reconnaissance and Engineer Bns. when employed as Infantry.

\* No longer under command of Nineteenth Army.

Percentage figures are based on effectiveness of division as compared with its own T/O; they are not a basis for comparison between divisions with different T/O's.

Annex No. IV

C O N F I D E N T I A L



ANNEX NO. V

THE MARCH BACK FROM SOUTHWEST FRANCE

The divisions of the Nineteenth Army which poured out of Southern France through the RHONE Valley were only a part of the larger stream of evacuees swirling through the funnel made by the American Third and Seventh Armies. The enemy was withdrawing from all of Southwestern France, trying to get a vast miscellany of combat troops, administrative, supply, air force and naval personnel back toward the border before they were hopelessly cut off. Estimates of their total number vary, but including the straggling remnants of the Nineteenth Army itself, there were well over 100,000 still moving out of the pocket after the end of this period.

Organization of the move began a few days after DRAGOON D-Day, under control of the LXIV Reserve Corps, later joined by LXVI Reserve Corps. In addition to the 159th Reserve Division from the BORDEAUX area and the 16th Infantry Division from the LOIRE front, some of the miscellaneous units were organized into Battle Groups OTTENBACHER, BRODOWSKI, TAEGLISHBECK, and ELSTER. Four major march groups were set up to canalize the movement. As many units as possible were hastily motorized, by requisitioning all available civilian cars and buses; the rest moved themselves and their belongings by whatever means they could find, horse drawn carts, bicycles, pushcarts, or afoot. Columns lived off the land, and usually marched only at night, hiding by day. Despite this precaution, they sustained many losses of men and vehicles through Allied air and Maquis attacks.

Main axis of the movement, as indicated by the successive CP's of the LXIV Corps, was BOURGES - NEVERS - AUTUN - VESOUL. However, it was obviously impossible to maintain firm, centralized control over so many scattered elements, and so it became necessary to issue a blanket order giving assembly points which various types of units were to attempt to reach. This order, issued by C-in-C Northeastern France on 27 August, designated the following points:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Dispatch To</u>
Entire Units of at least company or battery strength	DIJON. Report to C-in-C Northeast France to request march orders.
Headquarters and staffs from Southern France	BELFORT.
Customs officials, Navy unit stragglers	BESANCON.
Russian units (including entire units)	VESOUL.
Straggler groups from First Army and LXIV Corps, and all other stragglers	LANGRES.
Air Corps units	EPINAL.
Civilians and female army employees	MULHAUSEN, to be routed over the frontier into Germany.

At the end of this period, LXIV Corps Headquarters was at NEVERS, well to the West of the narrowing gap. And large elements of the movement were still farther to the West and Southwest, with one body in the NEVERS - CHATEAUROUX - POITIERS area, and others being harassed by partisans as far south as the TOULOUSE area.

Annex No. V



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**RESTRICTED**

# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY OPERATIONS IN EUROPE



PART TWO

1-30 SEPTEMBER 1944

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**RESTRICTED**



HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

WFO/cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :


TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL, COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

  
WILLIAM A. QUINN  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part II

1 - 30 September 1944

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I.	Enemy Reaction to Seventh Army Operations (Map)
II.	Principal Enemy Commanders Opposing Seventh Army
III.	The March Back from Southwest France
IV.	Counterintelligence Summary 15 August - 31 August.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

I. GENERAL.

The month of September brought a complete reversal in tactics of the Germans facing the Seventh Army. At the beginning they were retreating, as rapidly as inadequate transport permitted; at the end they were defending, stubbornly and on the whole effectively, as their hastily reformed units turned to stand with their backs to the VOSGES, taking fullest advantage both of favorable terrain and of the extreme extension of Allied supply lines.

The transition from flight to defense involved three major phases of operations during the month:

A. RETREAT CONTINUED.

Developments of the first few days of September were merely continuation of the large-scale withdrawal which had been initiated shortly after the Seventh Army landings in Southern France. After passing through the MONTE LIMAR trap on 28 August, the battered remnants of the German Nineteenth Army continued their withdrawal up the RHONE Valley through VALENCE to LYON and DIJON, then turned eastward in the direction of BELFORT and the VOSGES. They fought only when forced to, to screen their withdrawal routes from the forward Allied units racing northward and eastward to cut them off. At the same time, the mass of combat, supply, administrative, air force, naval and governmental personnel evacuating Central and Southwestern France was trying to reach some sort of safety in the east before being cut off by the forthcoming junction of the US Seventh and Third Armies.

At the beginning of the month the German forces facing Seventh Army comprised the remnants of the same divisions that had been engaged during the preceding two weeks. Their estimated strength was:

Division	Combat Effectives (All troops capable of employment as Infantry)
11th Panzer	2350 (plus 40 tanks)
189th Reserve	1400
198th Infantry	1380
338th Infantry	3600

In addition it was known that the 716th Infantry Division from Southern France and the 16th Infantry and 159th Reserve Divisions from the Center and Southwest, were also engaged in the retreat; but except for a few stragglers of the 716th, they had not yet been contacted. Also the 148th Reserve Division (strength 2925) and the 157th Reserve Division (1250 men), both of which were retreating toward the Italian border, were still technically opposed to Seventh Army, which did not relinquish responsibility for the Alpine sector until 15 September.

B. REORGANIZATION.

By the end of the first week of September, this wholesale retreat phase of enemy operations had begun to merge with the second, or reorganization phase, during which the enemy succeeded in establishing a front and executing a vast turning movement to bring his forces into line with other German forces to the north. Since the security of the BELFORT Gap was the key to any future defensive line before the VOSGES, the Nineteenth Army's most effective unit, the 11th Panzer Division, was assigned to the



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mission of preventing an Allied breakthrough at BELFORT. The putting into effect of this reorganization plan was signalled on 8 September when the 11th Panzer Division attacked the French in the sector between the DOUBS River and the Swiss border, southwest of MONTBELIARD. The attack brought to a halt the race for BELFORT and made possible the establishment of defensive positions before the gap which still had not been breached at the end of the month.

The Nineteenth Army, with its left flank thus secured, was strung out on an east-west line, generally following the DOUBS River, its amorphous right flank dangling in space far to the west. To its previous order of battle, the 159th Reserve Division had been added on 6 September, when elements of the division were committed to the defense of BESANCON. Its 716th Infantry Division had been committed on 3 September at CHALON, in an effort to hold open a gap for the estimated 100,000 enemy involved in the migration from the west. This retreating mass included, in addition to the 16th Infantry Division, a miscellany of battle groups varying from company to brigade size and constantly changing in composition as the enemy attempted to reorganize his confused, and confusing, order of battle. As many as possible of these were assimilated into the Nineteenth Army; those finally cut off by the junction of the US Third and Seventh Armies on 11 September later capitulated (See Annex No. III).

Simultaneously with the absorption of the refugees from the west, Nineteenth Army executed its turn; pivoting on the anchor position established before the BELFORT Gap, its center and right were withdrawn to the northeast, fighting delaying actions at threatened points. By 18 September, the maneuver had been completed - not, however, without considerable losses, notably the BRODOWSKI Battle Group of 1200-1600 men which had been cut off at FAYS BILLOT - and the Nineteenth Army had taken up a generally north-south line before the VOSGES.

Its order of battle and estimated strength at this time were:

IV GAF Corps

Unit	Combat Effectives (All troops capable of employment as Infantry)
159th Reserve Division	1200
198th Infantry Division	1100
DEGENER Battle Group	800
SCHRAMM Battle Group	250
GREIF Battle Group	250
LOPAU Battle Group (Remnants 338th Inf. Div.)	400
360th Coasack Regiment	500

LXIV Reserve Corps

716th Infantry Division	2500
SCHWERIN Battle Group (Remnants of 189th Res. Div.)	1500

LXVI Reserve Corps

16th Infantry Division	1500
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LXVI Reserve Corps (Continued)

21st Panzer Division	3500 (plus 80-100 tanks)
111th Panzer Brigade	600-800 (plus 25-30 tanks, 11 assault guns)
112th Panzer Brigade	600-800 (plus 25-30 tanks, 11 assault guns)
OTTENBACHER Battle Group	1800
TAEGLICHBECK Battle Group	?

LXXXV Corps

11th Panzer Division	3200 (plus approx. 35 tanks)
1st Flieger Training Division	1000
30th SS Infantry Division	3000
Sicherungs Div. 19th Army (Ost Troops)	3000
Von OPPEN Battle Group	2500-3000
MENKE Battle Group	400

Of the newcomers to this list, the 21st Panzer Division and the 111th and 112th Panzer Brigades had been contacted by the US Third Army, and were not technically on the Seventh Army front until the US XV Corps was transferred from Third to Seventh Army on 29 September. The 21st Panzer, after its defeat in Northern France, had been refitted in Germany and then recommitted on the Western Front. The 111th and 112th Panzer Brigades were results of the German High Command's efforts quickly to re-establish some kind of mobile counterattacking force for the Battle of Germany, to replace the panzer divisions which had been so roughly handled in the Battle of France.

Most of the other new arrivals were hastily formed battle groups made up of miscellaneous units which had succeeded in escaping from South-western France. The 1st Flieger Ausbildungs Division was a staff which had been responsible for the training of a number of GAF regiments in Southern France. It controlled some of the battle groups which, in mid-month, took over from 11th Panzer Division the static defensive duties of the BELFORT Gap. Battle Groups GREIF, SCHRAMM and MENKE also consisted mainly of Luftwaffe ground troops who had taken part in the great evacuation.

Battle Groups DEGENER, OTTENBACHER and TAEGLICHBECK were made up of other evacuees, including Sicherungs troops, from the West. So, too, was the 19th Army Sicherungs Division, never actually contacted as a combat division, but identified by documents which indicated that it was to be formed from the surplus Ost units which succeeded in escaping. The 360th Cossack Regiment was made up of "converted" prisoners of war taken on the Eastern Front.

The 30th SS Infantry Division was also made up of easterners - a miscellany of Poles, White Russians and Ukrainians, many of whom had been on local police and guard duty in occupied territories. They were formed into a division in August and sent to the Franco-Swiss border east of BESANCON. On the few occasions when units were contacted, they distinguished



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themselves by mass desertions, one entire battalion having given up to the F.F.I.

The other addition in the above list, Battle Group Von OPPEN, represented both of the major trends of German order of battle practice during this period; some of its units, notably the 63rd GAF Regiment, were from the abandoned areas of Southern France; others, including the sub-groups ROTH and BOSCH, were from Germany. Predecessors of the Volksgrenadiers of a later period, they were hastily-formed units scraped from the bottom of the barrel (in this case, Wehrkreis V) and thrown into the Western Front to help stem the tide.

### C. STABILIZED DEFENSE.

The third, or stabilized phase of September's operations, following the completion of the Nineteenth Army's turning maneuver, was devoted, on the tactical side, to the fighting of stubborn defensive actions against our laborious advance, and on the administrative side, to further efforts to strengthen and clarify the order of battle. The latter process was a long and complex one, and was by no means complete at the end of the month.

It was marked particularly by the acquisition of more of Wehrkreis V's hastily organized reinforcements. Typical was the "Bodensee" Regiment, or Battle Group C-V, made up of convalescents and 17 year old recruits from training units, mainly the 111th Training Battalion at KARLSRUHE and the 380th Training Battalion at HEILBRONN. It was organized early in August at CONSTANZ, but not united until it reached BELFORT early in September with an estimated 1,000 combat effectives. It was first met by the French in the DOUBS River sector on 22 September and was later committed to the defense of the southern VOSGES below LE THILLOT.

Another new addition to the order of battle on the VOSGES front during the last days of September was the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been withdrawn from the Italian front in August and sent to Northern FRANCE where it was first met on 29 August. It was in the vicinity of BACCARAT on the XV Corps front on 23 September.

Thus, with these additions to the previous order of battle the enemy had an estimated total of 13,000-14,000 combat effectives to oppose the Seventh Army (now including the XV Corps) by the end of September.

Simultaneously with the progressive reorganization of his combat elements, the enemy had also been reshuffling his higher staff and command organization. So far as known, the line-up at the end of the month was as follows: The southern sector of the Western Front, roughly from LUXEMBOURG to the Swiss border, was under command of Army Group G, Generaloberst BLASKOWITZ (himself an evacuee from Southern FRANCE), controlling these armies:

The First Army, which had retreated from the southern portion of the northern French front, and which now faced the US Third Army, consisted of the LXXXII Corps (48, 19 Infantry Divisions, 462 Administrative Division) and XIII SS Corps (17 SS Division, 3 Panzer Grenadier Division, 553 Infantry Division, 559 Infantry Division, 106 Panzer Brigade).

The Nineteenth Army in the South consisted of the LXIV Corps (16, 716, 198 and 189 Infantry Divisions), the IV GAF Corps (338 Infantry Division), the LXXXV Corps (159 Reserve Division plus the 1st Flieger Ausbildungs Division and most of the miscellaneous battle groups). Unlocated and elusive were the LXVI Corps and the 30th SS and 19th Sicherungs Divisions of the Nineteenth Army reserve.

Sometime during September the Fifth Panzer Army, the ghost of



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Tunisia, had been resurrected and squeezed into the line in Lorraine between the First and Nineteenth. It comprised the XLVII Panzer Corps (15 Panzer Grenadier Division and 21 Panzer Division) and the LVIII Panzer Corps (11 Panzer Division and 405 Administrative Division). The 11th Panzer had been pulled out of the line about 17 September, as soon as it had completed its mission of sealing the BELFORT Gap, had been at least partially refitted in the rear and recommitted 25-28 September in the XV Corps sector. The 405th Administrative Division was never contacted as a combat unit; evidently its mission was the administration of replacements or of troops working on fixed defenses in the rear.

With the offensive power of the Wehrmacht long since dissipated, except for whatever harassing effect V-1 and V-2 might have, and with the quality of his troops declining sharply, the enemy was forced to rely more and more on natural obstacles and prepared defenses to bolster his battle line. As a forward bastion for the Rhine-Siegfried barrier, the VOSGES were an ideal position and as soon as withdrawal to that line became inevitable the enemy began supplementing its slopes and forests with man-made obstacles. Agent reports and photo interpretation revealed an extensive system of works in progress from the Saar to Switzerland.

There were some defensive works west of the VALOGNES - MORTAGNE River Valley from GERARDMER to RAMBERVILLERS, and a heavier continuation of this line from RAMBERVILLERS through BACCARAT and BLAMONT to RECHICOURT. Farther east another general line was prepared along the MEURTHE River from BACCARAT southeast to FRAIZE, with strongpoints at BACCARAT, RAON L'ETAPE, MOYENMOUTIER, HURBACHE, ST. DIE, STE MARGUERITE and FRAIZE. This line was a series of strongpoints so located that they effectively blocked the east-west entrances into and through the VOSGES Mountains. The strongpoints consisted of anti-tank positions across the corridor, machine gun and anti-tank positions, and numerous fire and communication trenches.

From FRAIZE south through GERARDMER to LE THILLOT, fewer positions were observed, but enough to suggest that they were coordinated with those of the BELFORT corridor for defense of the RHINE Valley. In the BELFORT Corridor there was a general defensive system being organized in the GIROMAGNY - CHAMPAGNY - CHAVANNE - MONTBELIARD - SELONCOURT - DELLE area, consisting of anti-tank ditches, numerous small trenches and strongpoints. The center of this position appeared to run generally from GIROMAGNY south to a point approximately three miles west of BELFORT, thence to MONTBELIARD, thence generally southeast to the Swiss border. Of the 21 French-constructed forts ringing BELFORT, nine, generally east and south of BELFORT, showed major military activity.

Such were the defenses, and the forces to man them, on which, at the end of September, rested the responsibility for executing the Fuehrer's order that the NANCY - BELFORT line must be held at all costs.

## II. CHRONOLOGY

1 September - D+17

As the month of September opened the enemy was still engaged in his headlong flight from Southern France. Most of what remained of the Nineteenth Army had already passed LYON, and its rear elements were drawing into the city from the south. Our pursuing units advanced rapidly behind them, meeting negligible rear guard opposition until encountering mortar and tank fire late in the afternoon within a few miles of the southeastern outskirts of LYON itself. On the west side of the RHONE, French forces were advancing northward without contact.



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Two routes of further withdrawal were available to the enemy, LYON-CHALON-DIJON and LYON-BOURG EN BRESSE-BESANCON, and he was using both of them, with primary emphasis on the former. Roughly paralleling the latter route, and to the southeast of it, a screen was thrown out to cover the retreating columns. Roadblocks, groups of infantry and armored elements from the 11th Panzer Division were encountered by our forces shortly after crossing the AIN River.

A counterattack drove US reconnaissance elements out of CHALAMONT and the enemy occupied FARAMANS, MONTLEUL and DAGNEUX. Throughout the afternoon, a second counterattack was pressed against MEXIMIEUX, with six to eight tanks supporting the enemy infantry. A prisoner reported that 30 tanks were scheduled to attack MEXIMIEUX, but no such strong attack materialized.

2 September - D/18

LYON was entered by American troops who found the portions of the city south and east of the RHONE River clear; the enemy, however, continued to hold the triangle between the RHONE and the SAONE. Southwest of the city, the French advanced above ST ETIENNE without contact.

The screen covering the enemy withdrawal was shifted somewhat northeastward as the forces requiring cover were moved farther in that direction. At its lowest point, opposite LYON, the position was abandoned as the enemy broke contact at JANNEYRAIS; but at its other extreme, east of BOURG EN BRESSE, US reconnaissance elements were engaged in a fire fight early in the morning. At the center of the covering line, a road block supported by infantry and tanks was encountered at CHALAMONT and another to the east across the AMBERIEU-BOURG road.

During the morning, four enemy tanks were observed in CHALAMONT and 12 on the road north of the town; during the afternoon an unknown number of them were fired on by our artillery between CHALAMONT and BOURG. However, prisoners from the 209th Engineer Battalion said that the 11th Panzer Division had withdrawn to BELFORT and that the division reconnaissance battalion had been left to fight a rear guard action.

3 September - D/19

During the night and morning, the enemy fought delaying actions, supported by artillery, in the area east and south of BOURG EN BRESSE; and later enemy tanks moving north from BOURG engaged our reconnaissance which had entered MONTREVEL. But by the end of the day, not only BOURG itself, but also LONS LE SAUNIER and CHAMPAGNOLE, far to the northeast, had been occupied without further contact. However, on our extreme right flank, French forces moving northeastwards close to the Swiss border met stiff resistance at MOREZ. On the extreme left, other French forces reached VILLEFRANCHE, northwest of LYON, without contact, and U.S. patrols in LYON found the section between the RHONE and SAONE clear.

Clearing weather made possible observation of the extremely heavy movements taking place on the MACON-CHALON-DIJON axis. A column of 500 horses and carts was attacked north of CHALON by fighter bombers who claimed the destruction of 300 and the damaging of the rest. Other columns of from 40 to 200 vehicles were observed, including at least one large column moving eastward from the vicinity of NEVERS. The large forces in danger of being trapped to the west were still trying to get out before the US Seventh and Third Armies joined (see Annex No. III).



C O N F I D E N T I A L

4 September - D/20

The enemy withdrawal to the north and northeast appeared to be nearing the general line of the DOUBS River; his main body was not contacted by our forces at any point during the day, despite advances on a broad front extending from west of the RHONE River nearly to the Swiss frontier. Agents reported an enemy force of 1200, mostly non-Germans, in PONTARLIER, close to the border. Both air and agents' reports told of heavy movement in the LOUHANS-BESANCON-DIJON triangle, with traffic moving both northward through DIJON and eastward through DOLE to BESANCON.

5 September - D/21

The enemy began to slow down his withdrawal as he neared the positions on which he planned to reform his front. In order to establish a stable line in conjunction with other forces to the north, he had to have a firm anchor position on his left flank, before the BELFORT gap; this began to appear on 5 September in the area between BESANCON and the Swiss frontier.

During the morning French troops were involved in heavy street fighting in PONTARLIER, and engagements continued through the afternoon in the vicinity of LE VALDAHON and L'HOPITAL. At BESANCON itself, US troops met increasing resistance during the day and by nightfall a heavy fire fight was in progress, with the enemy using machine gun, mortar and tank fire to hold the bridges on the southern outskirts of the town. Heavy traffic moved eastward into BESANCON throughout the day, and included sixty tanks.

To the southwest of BESANCON contacts and fire fights were reported, and in the vicinity of the DOUBS-LOUE River junction and the town of DOLE, defensive positions with 1500-2000 enemy were reported.

On the left flank, French armored units occupied CHALON-SUR-SAONE without opposition, but met stiff resistance north of the town.

6 September - D/22

Now that the enemy had reached the general line of the DOUBS River, his plan for the future began to become apparent. His problem was two-fold: to make a stand somewhere before the German border; and to save as many as possible of the troops retreating from the southwest, incorporating them into his defensive position. His solution also had two aspects: to turn the main body, pivoting on the left before BELFORT and bringing the center and right back to the VOSGES Mountains, in line with the German armies in the north; meanwhile to fight a rear guard action with part of the escaping force in the west and feed the balance of it into the main body as rapidly as possible.

The force that was to begin the turning maneuver, with the DOUBS river as the line of departure, consisted of the remnants of the original Nineteenth Army - the 11th Panzer Division in the vital pivot position on the left, the remnants of the 198th Infantry Division, the 716th Infantry Division, and battle groups of the 338th Infantry Division and the 189th Infantry Division. To these were added, on 6 September, elements of the 9th Reserve Regiment of the 159th Reserve Infantry Division, finally at the end of their long trek from the BORDEAUX area; they were immediately thrown into the defense of BESANCON, where the enemy was opposing our entry with small arms, mortar and machine gun fire, supported by a few tanks and self-propelled guns. By the end of the day, however, high ground south of the town had been cleared against heavy resistance.

West of BESANCON, however, the turning movement was already underway and there was no contact with the enemy's withdrawing right flank south of DOLE.



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But meantime the enemy was fighting a stubborn rearguard action northwest of CHALON, protecting the southern flank of the units attempting to squeeze through the closing door before it slammed shut. Here, too, were elements of the 159th Reserve Division still coming in from the west, together with straggling portions of the 189th, 338th and 716th Divisions from the south; within a few days the 16th Infantry Division, from the LOIRE front, was also to be identified in this area.

7 September - D/23

At BAUME, the enemy continued to hold stubbornly; a counterattack supported by six tanks forced our outposts to withdraw. At BESANCON, which was now virtually isolated, small groups of enemy presented scattered but stubborn resistance, particularly at the forts in the city. Along the DOUBS River line to the west the only contacts reported were below DOLE, where reconnaissance units encountered a road block and a force of 75/100 men, supported by an anti-tank gun and an armored car. North of the DOUBS River in this vicinity, Tac/R picked up heavy troop movements northeastward, probably further elements of the 159 Division and other units arriving from the southwest.

South of BEAUNE, enemy flank guards for this evacuation were still putting up strong resistance, and were reported still holding DIGOIN, DOMPIERRE and MOULINS still farther to the west.

8 September - D/24

The enemy left flank had now withdrawn as far as it could safely without uncovering the BELFORT Gap; that it was to be withdrawn no farther was proved on 8 September when a large column including Panther tanks moved south from MONTBELIARD and attacked the French in the corridor between the DOUBS River and the Swiss border. GLAY, near the frontier, was recaptured, and heavy engagements took place in the vicinity of BLAMONT. Other towns in this area - GLAINANS, PONT DE ROIDE, VANDONCOURT and HERIMONCOURT - were all held strongly.

Establishment of this anchor position on the enemy's left was facilitated by his stubborn defense of BAUME, where he resisted heavily our crossing of the river and later counterattacked to retake the town. BESANCON, however, was captured by American troops after heavy fighting against elements of the 159 Reserve Division, several Sicherungs regiments and miscellaneous Russian units. Further advances to the north and west of BESANCON were contested with small arms, mortar, tank and artillery fire.

Above our extreme left flank it was estimated that there were still 40,000 to 60,000 enemy making their way eastward toward DIJON. Their flank guards continued to oppose the advancing French in the MONTCHANIN-CHAGNY-BEAUNE area, although the latter town was being mopped up on 8 September.

9 September - D/25

On our right flank French units succeeded in recapturing PIERREFONTAINE, BLAMONT and VILLARS LES BLAMONT, but reported that the enemy still held strongly at PONT DE ROIDE and GLAINANS. In the BESANCON-BAUME sector, the last remaining pocket was cleared up in the former town, and some infantry supported by anti-tank guns were in the latter; but at both points US forces advanced on the north side of the DOUBS River, meeting stiff but scattered resistance.

On the left flank, French units, after sustaining a counterattack at



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MEURSAULT and contacting the enemy in the COUCHES - ST GILLES area, penetrated to AUTUN, which they found strongly held.

10 September - D/26

The enemy continued to offer strong resistance southwest of MONTBELIARD, holding stubbornly to the pivot of the turning movement that was now well under way farther to the west. North of the DOUBS River, he was falling back on VILLERSEXEL and VESOUL, but fighting stiff rear guard actions, particularly in the RIOZ-VESOUL area.

In their advance on DIJON, French units reached PERRIGNY, south of the town, but met determined opposition at GENLIS, to the southeast. Southwest of DIJON, they encountered resistance at NUIT and BRAZEY, but pushed on to ARNAY and SAULIEU.

11 September - D/27

Continuing defense southwest of MONTBELIARD was accompanied by a marked increase in artillery fire. Resistance was again met by our forces advancing on VILLERSEXEL and VESOUL, and there were indications in FFI and agent reports that the enemy would make a stand in the VILLERSEXEL area. Only light scattered resistance was offered by the enemy's rapidly withdrawing right flank west of VESOUL and north of DIJON. The latter town was occupied by the French, and the last remaining opposition was mopped up in AUTUN, where 3200 prisoners were reported taken.

Elements of the United States Third Army were contacted by the French 1st Armored Division near SOMBERNON, west of DIJON, during the night 10/11 September. Thus vanished the last hope of escape for the large forces still making their way laboriously eastward from Central and Southwestern France. And even the forces which had escaped - narrowly - could not yet consider themselves completely safe; for their position constituted a deep salient between the Seventh and Third Armies. Still further slices could be cut from the salient, unless it was withdrawn rapidly; this the enemy attempted to do, but without complete success, during the next seven days.

12 September - D/28

Resistance continued strong on the enemy left, diminishing progressively toward the right as the line was swung back farther toward the VOSGES. Counterattacks were launched against the French west of PONT DE ROI DE (where there were indications that the infantry of the 11th Panzer Division was being relieved by elements of the 1st Flieger Ausbildungs Division) and against the Americans in the vicinity of VILLERSEXEL and at PORT SUR SAONE. VESOUL was taken, despite strong resistance and many road blocks on the approaches to the town. Slight contact was made during the afternoon at OYRIERES and CHAMPLITTE, north of GRAY; but no enemy was located by reconnaissance to the northwest of these points at LONGEAU and RECEY.

13 September - D/29

The enemy continued to hold stubbornly to his left flank position blocking the BELFORT Gap, launching numerous local counterattacks supported by artillery. On the north side of the DOUBS River, in the vicinity of L'ISLE, stiff enemy resistance, road blocks and barbed wire defenses were encountered, but farther north VILLERSEXEL was occupied without opposition. Contact was light north and northeast of VESOUL, but to the northwest, in the sector from VILLERS-SUR-PORT to FAYS-BILLOT, the enemy held strongly in an effort to protect his right flank until forces in the salient to the west could be withdrawn. The town of LANGRES was occupied without resistance, but the enemy held out in the citadel until evening, when the



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garrison surrendered.

14 September - D/30

There was no important change in the enemy plan, of holding on his left and withdrawing on the right, except that the withdrawal of the right flank did not proceed rapidly enough to prevent the cutting off of a large body of troops. South of FAYS-BILLOT, the French 1st Armored Division ambushed an enemy column evacuating from the GRANDCHAMP area, killed 200 Germans and took 160 prisoners; liquidation of further elements cut off in this area proceeded for the next three days. Comprising the Battle Group BRODOWSKI, the 1200-1600 troops involved were the second battalion of the 221st Grenadier Regiment (from the 16th Infantry Division); fourth battalion, 200 Sicherungs Regiment; 615th Ost Battalion; 354th Reserve Battalion; elements of the 1316th Artillery Regiment, 1198th Artillery Battalion, 95th Anti-Aircraft Battalion and 157th Antiaircraft Battalion - all part of the evacuating mass from Southwestern FRANCE. Generalleutnant BRODOWSKI himself was captured.

Holding firmly at ECURCEY, south of MONTBELIARD, the enemy proceeded with the withdrawal of the balance of his line while fighting delaying actions. Patrols entering L'ISLE reported no contact in the town, but to the northwest of VILLERSEXEL the enemy offered strong opposition at BOREY, and counterattacked at FLEUREY, northwest of VESOUL. On the western flank, beyond the sector where the BRODOWSKI battle group was being engaged, reconnaissance toward CHATILLON and MONTBARD made no contact.

15 September - D/31

Consolidating his anchor position south of MONTBELIARD, the enemy was reinforcing advance positions and digging in. He counterattacked with tank support in the direction of AUTECHAUX, and used considerable artillery fire against the area VERMONDES - PONT DE ROIDE - BLAMONT - PIERREFONTAINE.

Resistance continued west of MONTBELIARD and north of L'ISLE. Small arms fire was met on the main route LURE-LUXEUIL, and the enemy held at BAUDONCOURT, south of LUXEUIL. In the sector northwest of VESOUL, JUSSEY was reported strongly held by the Germans, and patrol contact was made south of BOURBONNE. During the afternoon French reconnaissance elements pushed forward from LANGRES to CHAUMONT.

16 September - D/32

Local counterattacks southeast of MONTBELIARD again featured the enemy's defense of his anchor position; in the L'ISLE-VILLERSEXEL area artillery was again active and an estimated battalion of infantry, supported by tanks, offered strong resistance in the vicinity of GENEVY.

Both LURE and LUXEUIL were occupied, but the forces which passed through LURE met organized resistance three to four kilometers north of the town, and those moving northwest of LUXEUIL were engaged in a fire fight at ST LOUP. Delaying actions were fought at road blocks in the vicinity of FAVERNAY, northwest of VESOUL. The enemy's right flank was fighting only weak rearguard actions at MONTIGNY and BOURBONNE, as the deep westward salient was pulled back toward the MOSELLE. Now deep in our rear, several hundred survivors of the BRODOWSKI Battle Group were still being mopped up at FAYS-BILLOT.

17 September - D/33

On the stabilized front to the right of the Seventh Army, where the French Army had on 15 September come under direct control of Sixth Army



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Group rather than Seventh Army, enemy patrols and infiltration attempts were repulsed.

On the American right flank, in the L'ISLE sector, heavy enemy resistance, including one local counterattack, were encountered in the vicinity of GENEY, north of L'ISLE, decreasing somewhat during the afternoon. North and northwest of LURE stiffening resistance was offered by infantry and considerable artillery fire, in addition to road blocks. On the Seventh Army left flank, the enemy was forced out of ST LOUP but increasing resistance was met to the east in the FOUGEROLLES area. All entries to the latter town were covered by road blocks or artillery fire, and the village of CORBENAY, on the approaches to FOUGEROLLES, was reported to be strongly defended, with bypasses in the vicinity heavily mined and covered by fire. The evident purpose of the pronounced resistance in this area was to prevent our cutting off the enemy's deep westward salient, whose narrowing base was the general line ST LOUP - EPINAL. The latter town had been reached by troops of the United States Third Army.

Southwest of this salient, the last elements of the BRODOWSKI Battle Group were mopped up in the vicinity of FAYS-BILLOT, with the capture of 500 prisoners.

18 September - D/34

No material changes were reported in the French Army sector nor on the right of the US VI Corps, where the enemy limited his activity to patrolling and harassing artillery fire. On the Corps center and left the heavy resistance of the previous day was continued early on 18 September; however, enemy action decreased rapidly during the day and by the end of the period contact had been lost in this sector. Reconnaissance to BAINS LES BAINS and DARNEY without contact indicated that the enemy had completed the withdrawal of his salient in this area and had pulled back to a line roughly paralleling the MOSELLE River below EPINAL.

Thus, just a month after beginning the withdrawal from Southern France, the enemy had finally succeeded in establishing the shortest possible continuous defensive line on the approaches to Germany. The Nineteenth Army, having held its left flank successfully before the BELFORT Gap, had completed its turning maneuver, withdrawing its right flank to join with the newly constituted Fifth Panzer Army to the north.

19 September - D/35

Continuing to hold on his left flank south of MONTBELIARD, the enemy withdrew the rest of his front toward the MOSELLE and the VOSGES, covering the withdrawal with demolitions, mines and roadblocks. He reacted sharply to our patrolling east of LURE, cutting off one patrol in the vicinity of LA COTE and forcing our forward elements out of PROTEY LES LURE. On the approaches to EPINAL a patrol was held up by a roadblock and strong small arms fire.

20 September - D/36

In the sector to the east and northeast of LURE, the enemy resisted strongly with artillery, self-propelled gun, mortar and small arms fire, and stiff opposition was met south of REMIREMONT. However, between this town and EPINAL, to the north, only scattered resistance was encountered as the enemy continued to fall back on the MOSELLE. North of EPINAL, the XV Corps of the US Third Army was advancing on the east side of the MOSELLE.

21 September - D/37

With his back to the VOSGES, where a main line of resistance was al-



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ready in preparation, the enemy was now in a position to abandon his general withdrawal in favor of a more vigorous defense. By the end of 21 September his line in front of Seventh Army ran generally along the MOSELLE from EPINAL to REMIREMONT, thence south to the DOUBS River and southeast to the SWISS border. Aided by the rugged terrain, he was able thenceforth to contest all Allied advances against this position.

Against the French on his left, the enemy threw counterattacks which retook COLOMBIER, VERMONDANS and GRANDBOIS; and to the north he held the roads north and northeast of MELISEY with infantry, artillery and mines. On the right of US VI Corps, the enemy defended stubbornly in the vicinity of MELAY, and launched a series of counterattacks, ranging from platoon to company strength, west of ESMOULIERES; houses along this front were observed being converted into mutually supported strongpoints. Roadblocks and stubborn enemy resistance were encountered on the approaches to REMIREMONT; and north of the town, where units of the US 36th Division had succeeded in crossing the MOSELLE, their bridgehead was brought under heavy artillery fire. A second crossing, just south of EPINAL, encountered enemy patrols, and on the approaches to the town itself the enemy appeared to be strengthening his roadblocks. The fact that three bridges at EPINAL were still intact indicated that a large body of enemy was still on the west side of the river at this point.

22 September - D/38

In the French sector at the southern end of the line the enemy was patrolling actively and consolidating his positions in the area east of LURE. Northeast of that town, in the southern portion of the American sector, two platoon strength counterattacks were launched as the enemy further strengthened his position on the approaches to LE THILLOT; a prisoner reported that another line of dug-in positions was being prepared in the rear of the one the enemy was then holding in that area.

After heavy fighting on the southwestern approaches to REMIREMONT, the enemy had been forced out of two-thirds of the town by the end of the period; the bridgehead across the MOSELLE north of REMIREMONT received relatively light enemy pressure, but the second bridgehead, south of EPINAL, was counterattacked strongly but unsuccessfully in the vicinity of ARCHETTES. Strong delaying actions opposed our forces advancing against EPINAL from the west and the north; but heavy traffic indicated that the enemy was evacuating at least that portion of the town on the west side of the MOSELLE, and late in the day the remaining bridges in the town were destroyed.

23 September - D/39

While the situation of the enemy's left flank remained unchanged, his center and right were forced back somewhat in the MOSELLE River sector. American troops advanced toward the river between LE THILLOT and REMIREMONT, after overcoming stiff resistance at a fort west of RUPT. REMIREMONT and ELOYES, to the north, were both cleared, as the bridgehead across the MOSELLE in this sector was both broadened and deepened against generally light opposition. In the EPINAL sector, strong opposition faced our units on the east side of the river north and south of the town, and on the west side opposite the town itself.

24 September - D/40

Along the DOUBS River, east of L'ISLE, the enemy was forced back somewhat by the French advance through ST MAURICE, but elsewhere along the enemy's left flank no change was reported. At the southern end of the Seventh Army's front, our forces overcame strong delaying actions to penetrate to the MOSELLE at RUPT, where they captured a bridge intact despite



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the fact that it had been prepared for demolition; later in the period they crossed the river at this point, meeting heavy small arms and machine gun fire on the high ground to the east.

Consolidation of other American bridgeheads to the north meant that the enemy had now lost his forward defensive line on the MOSELLE along the entire front north of RUPT. However, he continued to offer stubborn resistance to further eastward advances, particularly in the vicinity of EPINAL, which had been taken against strong opposition early in the day and where snipers were still active after our occupation.

25 September - D/41

Some of the previous day's gains in the DOUBS River sector were lost as enemy counterattacks, supported by strong artillery fire, succeeded in retaking COLOMBIER and ST MAURICE. Southeast of LURE advancing French troops forced the strongly resisting enemy out of PALANTE and MAGNY D'ANIGON.

Roadblocks and stubborn delaying actions were encountered on the approaches to LE THILLOT, where further enemy build-up was reported. Farther north, troops advancing eastward from the MOSELLE occupied ST AME after overcoming heavy resistance which included small arms, mortar, self-propelled and some tank fire. Roadblocks established east of the town after its capture were subjected to scattered enemy small arms and mortar fire.

In the area east of EPINAL, heavy opposition was met in the capture of JEUXEY; later, CHARMOIS was taken without contact.

26 September - D/42

French forces occupied MELAY, northeast of LURE, against stiff opposition, and reported increasing resistance, including a continuous enemy defensive line, in this sector. Farther north, at the point where the front crossed the MOSELLE, west of LE THILLOT, American troops found principal terrain features strongly defended by infantry with artillery support. Scattered resistance in the vicinity of DOCELLES, east of EPINAL, was insufficient to prevent capture of the town. However, troops attempting to occupy TENDON were strongly opposed.

27 September - D/43

On the approaches to the BELFORT Gap, the enemy launched a vigorous counterattack in the vicinity of PONT DE ROIDE and maintained strong defensive positions elsewhere in the southern sector. He continued stubbornly to defend the MOSELLE Valley west of LE THILLOT, and launched three counterattacks in the area south of the river. In the vicinity of TENDON, the strong resistance of the previous day was repeated during the early part of the period, but later slackened and US troops were able to move farther eastward. Resistance was lighter north and northeast of EPINAL, in the direction of RAMBERVILLERS, and GIRECOURT and DOMPIERRE were occupied without resistance; however, opposition stiffened in this sector late in the period and developed into local counterattacks in the vicinity of DESTORD.

28 September - D/44

Although relatively light resistance was encountered in the occupation of FERDRUPT, on the MOSELLE below LE THILLOT, opposition was considerably stronger to the north where the enemy was stubbornly blocking the approaches to GERARDMER, in the vicinity of ST AME. A body of 200/300 infantry,



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supported by mortars and self-propelled guns, was contacted north of ST AME.

Heavy resistance from high ground in the vicinity of TENDON, and artillery fire from the area southwest of BRUYERES slowed our advances in the center of the VI Corps front. West of GRANDVILLERS, the enemy's defense against our eastward penetrations included two counterattacks supported by mortar and artillery fire; however, despite strong resistance, we lost ST HELENE, PIERREPONT, and GUGNECOURT. On the extreme north of the Corps front, only light opposition was met southwest of RAMBERVILLERS, which was reported unoccupied.

29 September - D/45

Covering the approaches to the VOSGES, west and northwest of BELFORT, the enemy launched several counterattacks, one of which was supported by six tanks and succeeded in taking CHEVESTRAYE. Later, however, he withdrew from the town and the situation was restored.

Farther north, on the east side of the MOSELLE, stiff fighting continued during the early part of the day, but decreased somewhat as the enemy confined himself to defensive operations. A heavy enemy artillery barrage forced a slight withdrawal in the vicinity of TENDON. On the extreme left of US VI Corps, south of RAMBERVILLERS, stubborn resistance was offered; nevertheless the enemy was forced out of AUTREY.

The US XV Corps, which came under command of Seventh Army on 29 September, was at this time engaged in the sector north from RAMBERVILLERS to the MARNE-RHINE Canal, against the left wing of the Fifth Panzer Army. The latter had been wedged into the line between the Nineteenth and First Armies, covering the northern half of the VOSGES. Since the fall of LUNEVILLE, on 20 September, the enemy in this sector had been forced back on a broad salient on both sides of the MEURTHE River southeast of that town and was in contact with the French 2nd Armored Division to the west of the general line RAMBERVILLERS-BACCARAT-MANONVILLER. Northeast of LUNEVILLE, however, he was holding strong positions in the FORET DE PARROY, and on the day it came under Seventh Army control the US 79th Division of XV Corps was already engaged in the bitter battle to dislodge him, which was to extend well into October.

30 September - D/46

Stubborn enemy resistance was encountered along almost the entire front and included four counterattacks, one against the French near LARMET northwest of BELFORT, two against the VI Corps south of TENDON and one at AUTREY. Defending the approaches to BROUVELIEURES and BRUYERES, the enemy resorted to street fighting in GRANDVILLERS. However, only light resistance opposed our occupation of RAMBERVILLERS. On the north flank, the defenders of the FORET DE PARROY were forced back about 400 yards from the western edge but continued to offer heavy resistance with small arms, mortar and artillery fire.

### III. SUMMARY

By the end of September the total of prisoners taken by Seventh Army since D-Day, 15 August, was estimated at 88,900, an increase of 31,832 over 31 August. This total included 49,150 taken by First French Army, 3,699 by 1st Airborne Task Force, and 379 by the 1st Special Service Force, while those units were still under Seventh Army command prior to 15 September.

However, despite this loss in prisoners and the unknown attrition in



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
dead and wounded, the enemy at the end of the month had more combat effectives facing Seventh Army alone than he had had against it and the First French Army combined at the beginning of September. Three major factors accounted for this apparent paradox: First, many German units from the West, whose mission at the beginning of the month had been to avoid contact with the Seventh Army, had been committed against it by the end; second, the stream of reinforcements and replacements which was to continue to flow to the front from Germany during subsequent months first came into contact during September; third, the assumption of command over U.S. XV Corps necessarily resulted in Seventh Army's being faced by some enemy units which previously had been in the zone of U.S. Third Army.

In addition to making up his personnel losses during September, the enemy had also traded his exposed position in Southern FRANCE for the ideal defensive terrain of the VOSGES Mountains. He had, further, fallen back to a point where he no longer had to be seriously concerned with defending his rear areas against partisan attacks.

Thus, although he had decisively lost the battle for FRANCE, he could face the coming battle for GERMANY with the assurance that it was not quite lost - yet.



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ANNEX II

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

BLASKOWITZ, Johannes, Generaloberst.

For detailed biography, see G-2 History for August. Since publication of that history, captured high ranking German officers have reported that BLASKOWITZ had not been promoted to Generalfeldmarschall as previously believed, but remained Generaloberst (literally Colonel General, equivalent to U.S. General). His failure to become a Field Marshal is said to be due to his being in disfavor with the Nazi Party.

FIFTH PANZER ARMY

MANTAUFFEL, General der Panzer Truppen.

Succeeded GEYR von SCWEPPEBURG as commander of Fifth Panzer Army (then known as Panzer Gruppe West). Previous to this he was reported in command of the "GROSSDUESTCHLAND" Division, which command he assumed after having gained experience in the African campaign and as CO of the 7th Panzer Division in Russia.

NINETEENTH ARMY

WIESE, Frederick, General (Infantry).

See G-2 History for August.

IV GAF CORPS

\* PETERSON, General (Luftwaffe).

XLVII PANZER CORPS

von LUTTWITZ, Freherr, Generalleutnant.

Generalleutnant von LUTTWITZ comes of an old Prussian military family. Was commissioned to the 24 Dragoons as an Ensign in 1914, was wounded three times during World War I. After the war he was transferred to the 7th Cavalry Regiment in the REICHSWEHR. At the outbreak of this war he held a staff appointment, later received the command of the 12th PGR in 4 Panzer Division. He held this command for nearly two years and was cited for exceptional work on the Russian front. In April 42 he was appointed to command 4th Motorized Brigade and on 10 July 1942 to command the 23rd Infantry Division which under him was reorganized as the 26th Panzer Division which fought and is still fighting in ITALY. Was reported late summer 1944 as Commander of the XLVII Panzer Corps. One of the first German soldiers to be awarded the German Cross in Gold, he also has the Ritterkreuz with Oakleaves.

LVIII PANZER CORPS

\* KRUGER, Generalleutnant.

ANNEX II



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LXIV CORPS

\* LASCH, General (Infantry).

LXVI CORPS

\* LUCHT, General (Infantry).

LXXXV CORPS

KNISS, Baptist, General (Infantry).

See G-2 History for August.

1 FLIEGER AUSBILDUNGS DIVISION

Commanding Officer Unknown

11 PANZER DIVISION

WIETERSHEIM, Wend von, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for August.

16 INFANTRY DIVISION

HAECKEL, Ernst, Generalleutnant.

HAECKEL (54), an infantry officer from Bavaria with seniority from 1 October 1942, has commanded this division (which was the former 158th Reserve Division, upgraded) since it was a depot unit in Germany late in 1942.

15 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

RODT, Egerhardt, Generalleutnant.

RODT was born in Munich on 4 December 1895. He served in World War I as a Second Lieutenant in the 2 Bavarian Regiment. Passed through successive stages as a cavalry officer and in 1940, as a Lieutenant Colonel, was in command of 25 Reconnaissance Battalion of 25th Panzer Division, and in June of that year was awarded the Knight's Cross for action in Belgium. On 1 September he was promoted to Colonel, and on 1 March 1943 he became Generalmajor. In March 1943 he commanded a formation in 22 Panzer Division, and in August 43 he was given command of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division in Sicily (then known as 15th Pz Div). It is believed that his present rank dates from 1 September 1944.

19 SICHERUNGS DIVISION

Commanding Officer Unknown

21 PANZER DIVISION

FEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

Previous to his taking command of the 21 Panzer Division FEUCHTINGER



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was reported as being in command of a "Sonderstab" of Panzer Gruppe West at Rennes in May 1942. Prior to that he was reported as a Colonel commanding the third battalion of 26th Artillery Regiment, 26th Infantry Division.

30 SS DIVISION

\* ZIEGLING, Obersturmbahnfuhrer.

159 RESERVE DIVISION

DERNEN, Colonel.

Little biographical data available, but he was reported as commander of the 9th Reserve Grenadier Regiment of 159 Reserve Division as early as June 1944. Believed to have assumed command of the division during the middle of September.

189 RESERVE DIVISION

DEGENER, Generalmajor.

Little biographical data available. Believed to have taken command of the 7th Sicherungs Brigade after Generalmajor Jesser was reportedly killed late in September 1944. Elements of this Brigade then became known as Battle Group DEGENER. He apparently received command of the 189th Division, succeeding Generalmajor BAUER, during its reorganization into a VOLKSGRENADIER formation. Elements of his former Battle Group were used in the reorganization. (See August History for original commander Generalmajor Graf von Schwerin).

198 INFANTRY DIVISION

SCHIELE, Generalmajor.

A Colonel commanding 326 Grenadier Regiment; assumed command of the 198th Division in September, succeeding RICHTER, who had been captured above MONTELMAR; and promoted Generalmajor late September.

338 INFANTRY DIVISION

ASCHMANN, Generalmajor.

Succeeded Generalleutnant L'HOMME de COURBIERE as commander of this division during the middle of September. Was killed 14 November in the vicinity of ONANS while inspecting the troops of his newly reorganized division which was in line in the Belfort Gap area.

405 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Commanding Officer Unknown

716 INFANTRY DIVISION

\* RICHTER, Otto, Generalmajor.



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MAJOR BATTLE GROUP COMMANDERS

BRODOWSKI, Fritz von, Generalleutnant.

A 57-year old Prussian Junker, BRODOWSKI comes from a family which has furnished German Army officers for 150 years. He volunteered in 6 Kurassier Regiment in 1904, attended the War Academy in 1912-1914, and was a battalion CO during World War I. After the war, served in G-2 and G-3 of the General Staff, and was an advisor on POLAND and RUSSIA to the War Ministry. He commanded 16 Cavalry Regiment in 1931, and in 1934 was Inspector of Army Replacement Forces at ULM, and later at STUTTGART.

In August 1941, he was sent to Russia with a field reserve division, and in October 1942 to a reserve division in DRESDEN. Commanded a training staff in HOLLAND in July 1943 and later that year went to KIEV as Feldkommandant.

After a brief tour in the generals' reserve pool early in 1944, he became Chief of Administrative Headquarters 588 at CLERMONT-FERRAND. On 25 August, during the mass evacuation of Central and Southwest FRANCE, he assumed command of a battle group whose initial mission was to attempt to hold open a gap for the junction of Nineteenth Army coming up the RHONE and the LXIV Corps evacuating from the West. He was captured by the FFI on 19 September after his battle group had been destroyed in the vicinity of FAYS BILLOT 14-17 September. His war diary revealed details of many atrocities committed against both partisans and civilians between February and August 1944. He admits 100% conversion to National Socialism.

OTTENBACHER, Generalleutnant.

Early history unknown, but he commanded a march group or sub-group in the withdrawal from Southwest FRANCE. Later this battle group, which included many miscellaneous security units, was committed against our forces in the EPINAL area, apparently operating under the command of the 16th Infantry Division. Later acted as temporary commander of 189th Infantry Division just prior to DEGENER's assumption of command. Last reported as possible successor to Gen. d. ART. LASCH as commander of the LXIV Corps.

TAEGLICHSBECK, Generalleutnant.

Was commander of March Group Middle in the withdrawal from Southern FRANCE. Last reported as STOART (Artillery Staff Officer) for the Westwall Liaison Command of the LXIV Corps.

\* Von OPPEN, Generalmajor.

\* No biographical data available.



# C O N F I D E N T I A L

## ANNEX III

### THE MARCH BACK FROM SOUTHWEST FRANCE

The Seventh Army's invasion of Southern FRANCE on 15 August 1944, coupled with the disastrous defeat being suffered by German arms in Northern FRANCE, led to the enemy High Command's decision to attempt an evacuation of the Central and Southwestern portions of the country. The G-2 History for August discussed some phases of the great March Back, which was well underway by the end of that month, reached its climax during the first two weeks of September and then came to an end as its participants either rejoined their compatriots or surrendered.

A large proportion of the civilian and military personnel involved did succeed in slipping through to the east of the point where the Third and Seventh Armies were to join the night of 11-12 September. Of these the combat units - whose major elements were the 16th Infantry and 159th Reserve Divisions and several large battle groups such as BRODOWSKI and DEGENER - all made their appearance sooner or later in the order of battle of enemy forces opposing the Seventh Army.

However, another very large body of miscellaneous personnel was still floundering in the west when the Seventh and Third Armies joined to close their escape corridor. This was the March Group under command of General-major BOTHO-HENNING ELSTER which, hopelessly cut off, was surrendered on 16 September at BEAUGENCY.

General ELSTER's interrogation, in which he supplemented his memory by reference to personal notes and a file of orders, gives the most complete available story of the March Back. A condensation of his report to his captors follows:

The machinery for the evacuation of Southwest FRANCE was set up 18 August 1944 by an order of the LXIV Corps under the code name "Herbstzeitlose" ("Meadow-Saffron"). The announced objective of the operation was to clear the area TOURS - BOURGES - MONTLUÇON - PERIGUEUX of all resistance groups; but the massiveness of the move was obviously disproportionate to such a mission. All troops and all German citizens in the Corps Area were to take part in the expedition except the garrisons of the GIRONDE Forts North and South and the garrisons defending the LA ROCHELLE area. (NOTE: These were still holding out many weeks later.)

The remaining forces were gathered into 3 groups: Group South under the CG of 159th Reserve Division, Generalleutnant NAKE; Group Middle under the District Commander NIORT (651st District Command); and Group North under the CG of 16th Infantry Division. Group South consisted of 159th Reserve Division (less elements attached 16th Infantry Division); all other troops of all three Services present in the Division area, including District Commands BORDEAUX (529), ANGOULEME (887), DAX (541), PAU (732), and PERIGUEUX (730), together with their service units; elements 12th AA Brigade, Fortress troops, customs guards and customs offices at BIARRITZ and LOURDES, Transport Command BORDEAUX, Naval and Air Force Hospital BORDEAUX, and Army Hospital LE LANOT.

Group Middle contained 950th Infantry Regiment (British Indian), 1 Reinforced Battalion of the LA ROCHE garrison, 1 Engineer Company of 16th Infantry Division, 2 AT Companies of 159th Reserve Division; District Commands POITIERS (677), NIORT (651), and LA ROCHE (505), together with their service units; all naval personnel stationed between PORNIC and ROYAN, elements 12th AA Brigade, Railroad Transport Service LA ROCHE, Army Hospital BORDEAUX (situated in POITIERS) and Army Hospital NIORT.



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Group North contained 16th Infantry Division, including Group "Tillenssen" (less 1 Reinforced Battalion of the LA ROCHE garrison), 360th Cossack Regiment; all other troops of all three Services present in the Division area, including District Command BLOIS (641), TOURS (788), ANGERS (595) and NANTES (518), together with their service units; elements 12th AA Brigade, Railroad Transport Service POITIERS and Ost Hospital PARTHENAY.

All civilians employed or stranded in the area were to be attached to the March Groups and evacuated. To provide reconnaissance and flank security for the columns, a "Sperrverband Welsel" was organized under the command of Col. WELSEL. It consisted of staff of Col. WELSEL, with elements of his regiment, 602nd Schnelle Abteilung, 608th Schnelle Abteilung, 1 Battalion of 16th Infantry Division (motorized as much as possible), 1 Battalion of 159th Reserve Division (motorized as much as possible), 1 Artillery Regiment (two mixed battalions; each consisting of two light and one medium Battery), 4 AT Companies, GHQ AT Battalion, and a Mixed AA Group.

Each group was to place itself in march order in the designated area: a reinforced regiment first; the mass of the troops in the center; and a reinforced battalion bringing up the rear. The assembly of the groups and their motorization so far as possible was to be completed by the end of August; but it proved necessary to advance that date considerably. All possible weapons and materiel were to be taken along; everything left behind was to be destroyed.

The 159th Reserve Division immediately issued an order to organize the troops under its command. Effective 20 August, it provided for the formation of three March Groups, under the command of Lt. Col. von der KAMMER (CO, 251 Reserve Grenadier Regiment), Lt. Col. WURZER (CO, 9 Reserve Gernadier Regiment), and Brig. Gen. ELSTER. Each March Group bore the name of its commander.

Each March Group provided itself with a rear guard of reinforced company strength, and motorized or bicycle-equipped. Their chief task was to secure against tank attacks from the left flank, using AA guns for the purpose, as very few AT guns were available. The rear guards were to clear the GARONNE bridge at BORDEAUX (WURZER), the DORDOGNE bridge at LIBOURNE (ELSTER) and the DORDOGNE bridge at ST ANDRE (v.d. KAMMER) by 2000 hours 26 September. At each of the three bridges one platoon of the 15th Engineer Battalion was waiting to blow up the bridge and attach itself to the rear guard. The original time schedule, however, could not be held to because of the unwieldiness of the units involved; and, as a further complication, the miscellaneous Naval personnel of BORDEAUX under command of Rear Admiral WEBER marched out the day after the three March Groups cleared the area, and formed a fourth March Group straggling along behind the others.

The weakness of these forces, the increase of FFI activity, and the rapidly closing escape route, forced the adoption of Draconic measures. While the subgroups of Group North were still on the march to their third assembly area near POITIERS they were ordered to sort out their personnel into three further groupings; a Kampfgruppe (motorized), divided into slow and fast motor vehicles; a Kampfgruppe (bicycle); and a foot column. The two Kampfgruppen were to include all men fit and equipped for combat and were immediately to be organized into companies and battalions. All motor vehicles and bicycles were to be turned over to these new formations without regard to property rights or prestige value. The former owners of the vehicles were to walk; and any excess baggage was to be dumped on the road or destroyed. The horse-drawn transport of the infantry units was to be turned over to the foot columns for the transport of its essential food and ammunition only. The order to this effect was issued 27 August; the reorganization was to be accomplished by 2 September. Despite the



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great difficulty of reorganization while on the march, the subgroups did their best to carry out the order.

The new plan of 28 August called for the abandonment of the three old March Groups. In order to try to salvage what was most worth it and perhaps — as a very long shot — hold an escape route for the whole mass, the combat-worthy, mobile troops already sorted out in each March Group were separated from the immobile, ill-armed, and largely helpless melange of service troops. Generalleutnant NAKE and Col. SEIZ took over the Kampfgruppen (motorized) and (bicycle); Brig. Gen. ELSTER was handed the remainder.

Gen. ELSTER renamed his agglomeration "Foot March Group South" in order to avoid having his name associated with so odd a mixture of troops. On 31 August while the foot elements of the old March Groups were still enroute to the assembly areas, Kampfgruppe NAKE pulled out of the POITIERS area headed E; and on 1 September, Kampfgruppe SEIZ followed suit. Gen. ELSTER wished his friends god-speed, stood watching them roll off with all the heavy weapons and most of the combat troops. Then he returned to the task of bringing his March Group up into the area vacated by the Kampfgruppen before the FFI could possess themselves of it and block his escape route. On 3 September the main elements actually did reach the POITIERS area. The group immediately continued its march with the projected route ISSOUDUN-CHATEAUNEUF-LEVET-DUN-BLET-DECIZE, where it would come under control of March Group Middle. By 5 September it was stretched out between POITIERS and CHATEAUROUX.

From that time on the confusion increased; the column began to suffer attacks from the air and the FFI; the assigned march distances were never covered and had to be changed continually. The tenseness of relations with the civilian populace had been increasing all along. To Gen. ELSTER, the handwriting on the wall was plain. He was short of supplies, would run out of gas before reaching the LOIRE, was helpless against air attack, was threatened by increasing FFI activity, was completely out of communication with the preceding Kampfgruppen, and realized that his group would never be able to get through to GERMANY even if the combat troops were able to punch a hole in our line.

With this realization before him, he took advantage of a contact with the 329 I&R Platoon on 7 September, and sent a parlementaire to see what terms he could get if he surrendered. While continuing to issue orders for the prosecution of the march toward GERMANY, he called a special meeting of all the senior officers under his command for 9 September, at CHATEAUNEUF. The hopelessness of the situation was pointed out by Gen. ELSTER, his actions of the past few days detailed, and his recommendation made. There was no immediate unanimity, and a number of opinions were expressed which split the officers into mutually resentful camps. The feelings aroused were so strong as to lead Gen. ELSTER to insist in later negotiations that he and his staff would at all times remain separate from the other officers. In the end, the General's decision prevailed, and (after a conference with an American representative at ISSOUDUN) was published to the troops the next day in a remarkable communication:

Foot March Group South

10 Sept 44

1. The present military situation has resulted in the fact that it is no longer possible for Foot March Group South, abandoned as it is in central FRANCE without communications and without supplies, to reach the German border.

2. Foot March Group South is not a combat unit. It is in no state to force its way back through regular troops by force of arms, equipped as



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it is with inadequate weapons and scanty ammunition. Completely defenseless, it is at the mercy of the enemy's Air Force.

The two short air attacks of 7 Sept caused stunningly high casualties and severe damage to horses, vehicles, trucks, as well as rations, weapons, and ammunition. The remaining rations are enough for only a few days. In brief, the situation can lead only to disintegration and disaster.

3. Being aware of the situation, the Third American Army, in position on the LOIRE, has made the following proposals:

1. All units will halt at the towns reached.
2. Units will march to designated assembly areas with weapons and full equipment.
3. Units will pass in review before an American Infantry Regiment at present arms.
4. German units will be admitted to American occupied territory N of the LOIRE after they have laid down their arms.

The Third American Army has given notice that it has ordered air attacks to be held up for the duration of a short truce to consider these terms. It has also let us know that if the terms are rejected, its Air Force has been ordered to bomb and strafe the column out of existence.

4. Realizing the situation and the clear fact that to march on and join the German troops around BELFORT as reinforcements would merely result in the useless shedding of priceless German blood on the march, out of consideration for each individual under my command and in order to preserve the worth and honor of the German Army, I have been constrained to accept these terms.

5. As Commander of Foot March Group South, I order

1. The suspension of the march
2. The suspension of hostilities against the regularly organized forces of the American, British, and French Army and Air Force.
3. Order, discipline, and especially obedience to all superior officers. The eye of the German Army is upon us all!
4. March orders will follow separately.

ELSTER  
Brig Gen

In accordance with the agreement, the subgroups were turned in the direction of the LOIRE and on 13 September dispatched to their respective crossings: Subgroup Burgert to ORLEANS; Subgroup Lueder/Gebauer to BEAUGENCY; Subgroup Weber to MER. The original schedule called for the subgroups to reach the LOIRE by 16 September, but the hostile and uncooperative attitude of the local inhabitants toward the undertaking slowed the whole process. It was only through energetic efforts on the part of the several liaison officers that the columns were kept in motion. The area to be traversed by the columns had been cleaned out by preceding German forces, and feeling ran rather high as a result. Isolated attacks on the columns after they were set in motion continued until the LOIRE was reached. Major unpleasantness, however, was avoided by strict discipline. In order to relieve the strain as much as possible, Gen. ELSTER tried to make good



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some of the damage caused by preceding German troops. In the Departement Indre, for example, which had been plundered by the "Freies Indien" Regiment of British Indians, the General turned over the sum of 8 million francs to the local prefect as reparation.

As the surrender march began, elements of the earlier March Groups left behind for one reason or another attached themselves to Gen. ELSTER's group. Immediately after the news of the surrender was announced, a few diehards left their units, put on civilian clothes, and attempted to make their way to GERMANY. Others, the Volksdeutsche, ripped the national insignia from their uniforms, sang the "International", and deserted.

On 16 September, Gen. ELSTER and his staff reached the LOIRE bridge South of BEAUGENCY, and surrendered his command. The news was formally imparted to the troops in a farewell message:

Foot March Group South

Chene Mareau  
near RAMORANTIN  
18 Sept 1944

On the day of surrender to the American Third Army I resign my command of Foot March Group South.

I thank all Officers, Civilian Employees, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Enlisted Men for their exceptional accomplishment and the exemplary discipline maintained on the march.

May the road through captivity to return to our Homeland be short.

Hail the Fuehrer!  
Long live Germany!

CG March Group South

ELSTER  
Brig Gen.

The total number of prisoners admitted to the BEAUGENCY cage was 19,605.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX IV

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

15 - 31 AUGUST 1944

The enemy intelligence had failed to discover Allied intentions for the invasion of Southern FRANCE. Consequently, the disposition of German forces, including their espionage agents was based more on Weltanschauung than on facts discovered by the German Intelligence Services. He had prepared against Allied landings in the vicinity of MARSEILLE and GENOA, and, further relying on guesswork, against an initial landing of French rather than American forces "for psychological reasons."

However, the enemy's planted espionage system, timed for delayed-action effectiveness, was not so quickly disorganized as were his armed forces. The German Intelligence Services (Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst) had made extensive preparations for a stay-behind espionage net to deal mostly with operational intelligence. These agents had been placed in the areas of MARSEILLE and the main French Riviera cities of CANNES, NICE and MONTE CARLO. The effectiveness of this espionage system depended on its being overrun, which the Allies obliged by doing, albeit too precipitously.

The agents selected for this purpose were of high grade type, trained at espionage schools and equipped with radio transmitters. All but a few were Frenchmen who had received military training in the French Army. They remained inconspicuous, living with their families in comfortable surroundings. They took no part in collaborationist politics, nor were they informers to the Gestapo in the unremitting German efforts to infiltrate the resistance groups or identify its leaders. They were well paid, and therefore were not under the economic necessity of finding other employment. In one case, where the agent was employed, his occupation was that of commercial radio operator, with the result that his neighbors took for granted his interest in radio. The agents of this type (Abwehr Abteilung I) who were caught confessed that they had accepted their espionage assignments because of the high rate of pay.

The enemy's reliance on the permanence and effectiveness of his stay-behind system was shown by the fact that he had also placed along the Riviera long-range agents who were to be part of the German system even after the war.

During the first two weeks after the landing two espionage agents were arrested. One had applied to the Counterintelligence Officer of Seventh Army for a job as interpreter and informant. After interrogation he admitted that he was an agent employed by Abwehr Einz Luft, and that he had a radio transmitter.

The Germans had also made extensive preparations for sabotage in the rear of Allied armies in EUROPE, having established numerous sabotage dumps in FRANCE. One sabotage school run by the Sonderkommando organization, a Waffen SS unit, was found at AVIGNON. Its students were mostly young Frenchmen recruited, often by press gang methods, from the South of FRANCE. During the period no American installations were sabotaged.

Despite the rapid disorganization of his forces which resulted in the loss of many operational documents, the enemy took better care of his security records and documents. Non-operational intelligence documents were systematically destroyed or removed. At MARSEILLE, for example, the file rooms of the Gestapo Headquarters were found burned.

In summary, the carefully planted espionage net bore little fruit for the Germans during this period. Information gathered by German agents during the first two weeks was of little aid to their employers, who found themselves in no position to take positive action based on this information.

C O N F I D E N T I A L


ANNEX IV



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART THREE

1-31 OCTOBER 1944

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~RESTRICTED~~



HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 750 US ARMY

JTD/cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE  
REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTH-  
ORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5,  
15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED  
AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL,  
COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Quinn*  
WILLIAM A. QUINN  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part III

1 - 31 October 1944

\* \* \*

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I.	Enemy Forces Opposing Seventh Army
II.	Enemy Dispositions on Seventh Army Front
III.	Principal Enemy Commanders Opposing Seventh Army
IV.	The Battle of PARROY
V.	Counterintelligence Summary 1 September - 31 October

\* \* \*

C O N F I D E N T I A L



## C O N F I D E N T I A L

### I. GENERAL

Ensnconced in the hills and forests of the VOSGES foothills, and backed up by the prepared line that extended from the MARNE-RHINE Canal to BELFORT, the Germans demonstrated during October that the Wehrmacht had lost little of its old ability to exploit favorable terrain to the fullest advantage. Mountains and forests went far to make up the enemy's deficiency in men, materiel, and morale.

Holding to a relatively stable front, the German's marked shortage of motor transport was no longer crippling - by the end of the month he was withdrawing what few mobile units he had had at the beginning, and replacing them with horse-supplied infantry. And his troops, who had degenerated well below the standard of the past, nevertheless were capable of proving that even a 4-F can fire a gun from a well-sited position.

The two major Seventh Army operations of the month - the clearing of the Forest of PARROY, and the penetration of the hills west of ST DIE - while successful, were not carried through cheaply. With few exceptions, each American advance drew a sharp reaction, the enemy's stubborn defense being supplemented by frequent local counterattacks, sometimes supported by a few tanks or self-propelled guns.

However, taking the Army front as a whole, the month's actions demonstrated a complete lack of initiative on the part of the Germans. When Allied forces pushed forward, heavy fighting usually developed; but in sectors where friendly forces remained quiet (the French Second Armored Division zone west of BACCARAT, for instance) the enemy followed suit. At no time did he launch a large scale attack or display any general purpose other than continued defense. And on one occasion - the extension of our attack on BRUYERES and BROUVELIEURES into a deep and broad penetration beyond those towns - he appeared slow to appreciate the magnitude of the operation and to commit reserves to the sector.

While doing his best to contain Allied penetrations of his position, the enemy at the same time continued his attempts to solve the difficult order of battle problems which had been carried over from the previous month. During the early part of October, he was still absorbing into more substantial formations the battle groups which had been employed as stop-gaps during the September reorganization. The absorption of Battle Group OTTENBACHER by the 16th Infantry Division virtually completed the liquidation on Seventh Army front of the miscellaneous groups which had retreated from Southern France; most of those that remained were on the First French Army front to the south. Most of the panzer brigades which had appeared during September as emergency counter-attacking reserves also disappeared again as they were assimilated into panzer and panzer grenadier divisions.

Thus the enemy order of battle on our front early in October began to have a well-ordered appearance, for the first time since the August landings. From south to north it consisted of: the 338th, 189th, 198th, 716th and 16th Infantry Divisions, the right wing of the German Nineteenth Army; the 21st Panzer, 15th Panzer Grenadier and 11th Panzer Divisions of the Fifth Panzer Army.

Having regularized the divisional structure, the enemy then began to shuffle entire armies. By the end of the month the Fifth Panzer Army had been withdrawn to form a mobile strategic reserve available for commitment anywhere on the Western Front; the Nineteenth and First Armies, be-



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tween which it had been sandwiched, thus again had a common boundary, in the BACCARAT area. First of the Fifth Panzer Army divisions to leave our front was the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which went to KARLSRUHE for refit shortly after the Battle of PARROY; it was replaced by the 553rd Infantry Division, moved down from the METZ zone of the U.S. Third Army front. Pending arrival of the 553rd, one regiment of the 19th Infantry Division was moved down from the U.S. XX Corps front to hold a portion of the sector being vacated by the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Having accomplished this short term mission, it was again withdrawn. Later in the month, the 11th Panzer Division (most of which, however, had been on the Third rather than Seventh Army front) was also withdrawn, to be replaced by the 361st Infantry Division. The latter had been formed in September, and as part of Himmler's total mobilization program was to have been designated 569th Volksgrenadier Division. However, it was used instead to reconstitute the 361st Infantry Division, which had been virtually destroyed in RUSSIA, and as such was first identified on the Third Army front on 29 October, and on Seventh Army front on 30 October. Thus at the end of October, the only armored unit left to oppose Seventh Army was the 21st Panzer Division. It, too, was to leave during the next month.

The only other divisional change on the VOSGES front during October was the arrival of the 269th Infantry Division. However, it too faced a neighboring army rather than the Seventh, having taken up positions about 25 October in the VEMPRON-CORNIMONT sector opposite the First French Army. After taking part in the French campaign of 1940, this division had been in DENMARK, the northern sector of the Russian front, and then in NORWAY before leaving OSLO for the VOSGES on 17 October.

Of the non-divisional units available as stop-gaps and reinforcements on Seventh Army front, two, the 360th Cossack Regiment and the 19th SS Police Regiment, were old acquaintances which had been encountered previously to the west. However, other separate units were available in the German rear to the east, and a number of these were brought into the VOSGES front during October. Included were five Fortress Machine Gun Battalions and one Fortress Infantry Battalion, originally intended as garrisons for the West Wall - their early commitment was evidence of the German intention to hold on the VOSGES, rather than on the Siegfried Line, for as long as possible. Two GHQ Mountain Battalions, 201st and 202nd, organized in the SALZBURG area from convalescent former members of mountain divisions together with some naval and Luftwaffe personnel, were also moved to the front from AUSTRIA. They were committed late in October against our advance west of ST DIE. Two Landesschutzen Battalions and two Field Punishment Battalions (291st and 292nd) were also included among the miscellaneous units. All of these units, except 360th Cossacks, were subsequently either withdrawn, as in the case of the 19th SS Police Regiment, or absorbed into divisions as part of the general order of battle stabilization.

Simultaneously the Germans returned to a more normal replacement system, attempting to maintain their reconstituted divisions at a relatively constant level. The enemy's evident intention was to maintain the forces facing Seventh Army at a total of 13,000 - 14,000 combat effectives (including infantry and such other units as were available for infantry employment at the front, but excluding artillery and rear area services). To do so despite the attrition of operations required a flow of an estimated 4,600 replacements from GERMANY to the front during the first two weeks of October. A large portion of these, as well as of veteran troops, became casualties in short order; thus, to maintain the level, an even larger flow of replacements was required during the last half of the month, when an estimated 7,300 troops were shipped to the Seventh Army front. The high proportion of older men among these drafts, and the absence of first rate young troops, were especially noticeable - but not until the opening of the Germans' "Christmas Offensive" against the U.S. First Army two months later did the whereabouts of the 1-A's become fully apparent.



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(For enemy dispositions and strength before Seventh Army, see Annexes I and II.)

II. CHRONOLOGY

1 October - D/47

As October opened the enemy in front of the Seventh Army was holding a north-south line from the Forest of PARROY, near the MARNE-RHINE Canal northeast of LUNEVILLE, to the vicinity of LE THOLY, west of GERARDMER. The loss of EFINAL on 24 September had ended his hopes of using the MOSELLE River as a forward position, and he was now backing up, slowly and under pressure, through the VOSGES foothills east of the MOSELLE.

RAMBERVILLERS had fallen on the last day of September. On 1 October the enemy reacted vigorously by reconnaissance in force and by bringing heavy artillery down on the town. There were indications of reinforcements northeast of RAMBERVILLERS. To the south, house to house fighting was in progress in GRANDVILLERS, and to the north the enemy was bitterly resisting efforts to force him from the Forest of PARROY.

2 October - D/48

Stubborn enemy resistance continued along the entire Army front. In the north the enemy clung to the Forest of PARROY, although forced back in parts of it. A counterattack for ANGLEMONT northeast of RAMBERVILLERS by an estimated 1,000 men with support of 8 tanks was repulsed, and severe fighting southeast of RAMBERVILLERS also included one local counterattack. Enemy army was especially active in the XV Corps sector to the north.

3 October - D/49

Resistance continued stubborn along the entire Army front, but the German attitude was generally defensive rather than aggressive as during the previous few days. Opposition continued east and southeast of RAMBERVILLERS, but GRANDVILLERS was finally cleared. A weak counterattack took place west of LE THOLY. XV Corps continued to report heavy fighting in the Forest of PARROY, but only light contact south of the Forest.

4 October - D/50

The enemy attitude remained defensive except for local counterattacks which bolstered his resistance on the approaches to LE THOLY, southeast of BRUYERES, and east of RAMBERVILLERS. He still defended stubbornly in the Forest of PARROY using mines and road blocks extensively.

Photo reconnaissance indicated that during these stubborn delaying actions the enemy was further developing the main line of resistance in his rear. A network of fire trenches and anti-tank ditches, supplemented by pillboxes, road blocks and strong points, was being constructed from HEMING, in the north, southward through BLAMONT to BACCARAT and thence along the MEURTHE River valley to ST DIE and FRAIZE. The line was designed to cover the main approaches into and through the VOSGES; its greatest density was at STE MARGUERITE, and here covered the trans-VOSGES route through SAALES and SCHIRMECK toward MOLSHEIM and STRASBOURG.

5 October - D/51

The enemy attitude remained unchanged. U.S. 3rd Division reported him driven from a quarry to northwest of LE THOLY, where he had held out for several days, and making a local withdrawal in that vicinity. Heavy resistance was encountered in the center of the VI Corps zone, and on the left



45th Division repulsed two local counterattacks and reported the high ground from FREMIFONTAINE to BRUYERES tenaciously held. In the XV Corps sector contact was light on the right but still heavy in the Forest of PARROY on the left. At one point in the Forest the enemy launched a counterattack supported by four tanks.

6 October - D/52

VI Corps encountered stubborn holding actions on its right and center, while on the left, west of BROUVELIEURES the enemy continued to be aggressive, with considerable artillery fire and strong infiltrations supplementing his resistance. XV Corps continued to meet opposition in the Forest of PARROY including a local counterattack. On the Corps' right, however, the enemy was comparatively quiet.

7 October - D/53

A strong counterattack by the 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (11th Panzer Division) against the U.S. 45th Division, south of FREMIFONTAINE, was supported by heavy artillery fire and six to ten tanks, but was beaten off with heavy losses to the enemy. Prisoners of the 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment said they had been refitting at SARREBOURG when orders came to move south against the 45th Division's penetration and retake the lost ground, which they were to hold for four days before withdrawing. South of this point the enemy continued to hold at most points, but lost CREMANVILLER and VAGNEY. In the north, the Germans still held the eastern portion of the Forest of PARROY.

8 October - D/54

The failure of the attack against 45th Division on 7 October was followed by a marked decrease in activity in this sector, but a corresponding increase in enemy efforts on VI Corps' south flank, where the 3rd Division received a counterattack from the southeast toward VAGNEY. Strong resistance was met in the LE THOLY - HERPELMONT sector. Contact was light in the northern half of the Army front during a brief lull in the battle for the Forest of PARROY.

9 October - D/55

VI Corps encountered stubborn resistance at SAPOIS in the 3rd Division sector and in the vicinity of HERPELMONT in the 36th Division sector, where heavy artillery concentrations fell. The 45th and 2nd D.B. fronts were comparatively quiet. However, after renewed attacks by the 79th Division in the Forest of PARROY, the enemy was forced back 1000-1500 yards on the flanks and 3000 yards in the center.

10 October - D/56

The previous day's attack had broken enemy resistance in the Forest of PARROY. Patrols on 10 October found that the enemy had withdrawn hastily from the center of the Forest, leaving unburied dead, abandoned equipment and booby traps behind; contact was reestablished only at the eastern edge of the Forest. To the south the enemy was still blocking approaches into the VOSGES, holding strongly along the ridge line before BRUYERES and BROUVELIEURES and to the south as far as LE THOLY and SAPOIS.

11 October - D/57

Enemy activity along the entire Army front showed a noticeable decrease, corresponding to the temporary lessening of U.S. pressure against him. VI Corps reported its sector comparatively quiet except for continued stubborn



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resistance south and east of GRANDVILLERS and particular alertness on the part of the enemy to patrol action by the U.S. 45th Division. The XV Corps front was also quiet with only a patrol clash reported in the 2nd DB sector. In the 79th Division sector the enemy was believed to have withdrawn from all but the northeastern section of the Forest of PARROY.

12 October - D/58

The enemy continued to hold strongly before LE THOLY. Farther north he launched a local counterattack in the vicinity of HERPELMONT, and a stronger attack, by two companies of infantry and 2 tanks, northwest of BRUYERES. There was no contact in the BACCARAT sector, and only patrol contacts on the Army left flank, where the enemy was observed digging east of the Forest of PARROY.

13 October - D/59

Only in the area west of BRUYERES and BROUVELIEURES was there any marked activity. Here the probing of friendly patrols drew sharp reactions, and one fire fight developed into a local counterattack. Contact was very light both north and south of this sector.

14 October - D/60

American forces were pushing forward in two sectors - northwest of BRUYERES and east of the Forest of PARROY - and in each case met determined resistance. In the former sector, 45th Division found enemy infantry defending with considerable mortar and artillery support, and U.S. patrols drew anti-tank and tank fire. On the northern portion of the front, the enemy was well dug in on the hill mass east of the Forest. Elsewhere contact was again light.

15 October - D/61

The pattern of enemy operations was unchanged, with his forces defending strongly where threatened by American advances but remaining generally quiet in sectors where friendly troops exerted little pressure. The Germans yielded ground slowly and stubbornly west of BROUVELIEURES and held to strong delaying positions east of the Forest of PARROY. On the right the U.S. 3rd Division encountered only scattered resistance except in the town of LE THOLY where stiff close-in fighting took place. In the 36th Division sector the enemy appeared to have executed several local withdrawals, as two towns were found unoccupied. Light contact again took place in the 2nd DB sector but there was a definite increase in artillery fire in that area.

16 October - D/62

The attack on BRUYERES resulted in a strong enemy reaction. One local counterattack between CHAMPDRAY and REHAUPAL was preceded by intense artillery and mortar preparation, and north of BROUVELIEURES, a two-company counterattack, also preceded by artillery and mortar concentrations, was beaten off. In the immediate vicinity of BRUYERES opposition included fire from all types of weapons, and mined road blocks held up U.S. armor. Later in the day a company-size counterattack was launched west of the town. In the north, U.S. advances east of the Forest of PARROY also met continued resistance, and one counterattack supported by 6-12 tanks.

17 October - D/63

Enemy continued active along the Army front except on the extreme right and in the 2nd DB sector where the situation remained comparatively quiet.



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The 36th Division experienced two counterattacks, each by about 100 men, and subsequent heavy resistance slowed its advance on BRUYERES. The 45th Division also encountered heavy opposition above BROUVELIEURES including considerable barbed wire, covered by small arms fire. On the Army left, 79th Division reported a pre-dawn counterattack and continued resistance on ridge east of the Forest of PARROY.

18 October - D/64

The nature of enemy activity remained much the same as for the past few days. Very light contact was made in the southern sector, and by the end of the period had been lost in that area. Opposite the 36th Division the enemy continued to defend BRUYERES, although losing two hills before the town, and launched a small counterattack east of FREMIFONTAINE in the 45th Division area. Two enemy companies, supported by an estimated five tanks, counterattacked the 79th Division in the north. Only scattered contact was made in the 2nd DB sector.

19 October - D/65

After heavy fighting, BRUYERES was captured. Only sniper fire was then met by U.S. troops advancing to the hills east of the town. To the north, stubborn resistance continued along the line BROUVELIEURES - FREMIFONTAINE, and included a small counterattack. Contact was very light from here north to the MARNE-RHINE Canal.

20 October - D/66

Enemy forces east of BRUYERES stiffened again and put up strong small arms and mortar resistance along the BRUYERES - BELMONT railroad. A counterattack by infantry and seven tanks was attempted from the direction of BELMONT, but was stopped by friendly air attack. A small counterattack was repulsed northwest of BROUVELIEURES, and fierce fighting with automatic weapons and handgrenades took place along the MORTAGNE River from there to FREMIFONTAINE. The northern half of the front was again quiet, although at points opposite the 79th Division the enemy appeared extremely sensitive to friendly patrols.

21 October - D/67

The U.S. 3rd, 36th and 45th Divisions, of VI Corps, were all now devoting their major efforts to exploitation of the potential breakthrough along the BRUYERES - ST DIE axis, opposed principally by the German 16th and 716th Infantry Divisions. The latter, according to prisoners, had been ordered to hold its present positions to the last man, or until defenses then under construction in the VOSGES were completed. However, the enemy's loss of BRUYERES on 19 October was followed, on 21 October, by his being forced from BROUVELIEURES and from VERVEZELLE, despite defense by machine guns, small arms, mortars, self-propelled guns, and a few tanks. In the north, the U.S. 79th Division continued to receive heavy opposition from dug in positions northwest of BLAMONT covering the enemy's main defensive line farther east.

22 October - D/68

BELMONT was cleared in the developing salient east of BRUYERES, and it appeared that the enemy defense was becoming disorganized. A few strong points had to be cleared by heavy fighting, but on the whole resistance in this sector was scattered. However, on the northern shoulder of the salient, east of FREMIFONTAINE, the enemy succeeded in making a stand on the MORTAGNE River and repulsed the 45th Division's attempted crossing.



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Farther north, patrols of the 2nd D.B. met resistance west and northwest of BACCARAT. 79th Division patrols also ran into opposition, and the division sector received unusually heavy artillery fire.

23 October - D/69

Further penetration of the forested hills northwest of ST DIE carried the advance to BIFFONTAINE which was mopped up at the end of the day. Along the BRUYERES - ST DIE road, enemy resistance stiffened late in the day in the vicinity of LES ROUGES EAUX, where a company-strength counterattack was launched. East of FREMIFONTAINE, the MORTAGNE River was crossed but small arms, mortar and artillery fire slowed further advances. Resistance was strong in the town of MORTAGNE. On the Army's left, east of the Forest of PARROY, the enemy showed more aggressiveness, counterattacking three times in battalion strength with six tanks in support.

24 October - D/70

In the north, another counterattack in battalion strength, supported by ten tanks, was repulsed. Elsewhere on the front the enemy appeared to be still disorganized by the rapid advance, although he did succeed in launching several small counterattacks against forward elements of the 36th Division near BIFFONTAINE. Only scattered resistance was met by the 3rd Division in the vicinity of LES ROUGES EAUX, and the 45th Division reported finding evidence of a very hasty enemy withdrawal near MORTAGNE.

25 October - D/71

On the south side of the BRUYERES salient, enemy infiltration through the extended U.S. front succeeded in harassing supply lines to our forward units. Along the main road to ST DIE, the village of LES ROUGES EAUX was cleared, despite heavy shelling against 3rd Division troops and one counterattack which had forced a temporary withdrawal. Northward expansion of the salient was slowed by small arms, machine gun, mortar and self propelled artillery fire and by organized dug-in positions near HOUSSERAS. At the northern extremity of the Army front, below the MARNE-RHINE Canal, the enemy continued his counterattacks, one of which succeeded in making a temporary penetration of U.S. lines.

26 October - D/72

Except in the extreme northern sector, the enemy again remained defensive. In the salient east of BRUYERES elements of the 36th Division began to encounter stiffer resistance in the FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP, north and northeast of BIFFONTAINE. An enemy infiltration cut the road behind one of its forward battalions. The 3rd Division pushed forward without contact to overlook ST. DIE but the enemy remained on both flanks and appeared to be reinforcing LA BOURGONCE, on the north, with tanks. Heavy artillery fire again fell on the Division's forward elements. In the 45th Division zone, the northern shoulder of the salient, enemy resistance appeared decreasing and scattered, and HOUSSERAS was cleared. During the night of 25/26 October a further three counterattacks, supported by tanks, were received in the 44th Division sector on the Army's left.

27 October - D/73

Enemy attitude was again defensive except on south side of BRUYERES - ST. DIE salient, where a local American penetration stirred the enemy into making three counterattacks supported by tanks. The 1st Bn of the 141st Infantry Regiment remained cut off by the enemy who kept the battalion's route of withdrawal under observed fire and maintained a roadblock covered by an estimated 150 men between the battalion and the main body. Despite



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the previous day's indications of reinforcements at LA BOURGANCE, the town was taken without resistance. The 3rd Division experienced one local counterattack but only light resistance elsewhere. At only one point, northeast of HOUSSEAS, did 45th Division meet determined resistance. The enemy appeared to have abandoned his program of counterattacks northwest of BLAMONT and the XV Corps sector again became quiet.

28 October - D-74

South of BRUYERES, operations on the shoulder of the salient resulted in the unopposed occupation of JUSSARUPT, but in the FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP efforts to relieve the "Lost Battalion" again were prevented by strong enemy resistance. Along the BRUYERES - ST DIE road the enemy had bolstered his defense by the commitment of two separate mountain battalions and by moving up from the south two regiments which had been operating with the 338th Division farther south. Here, strong infiltrations and determined fighting slowed further progress, and one counterattack west of ST DIE was repulsed only after five hours of severe fighting. Scattered but sharp fire fights delayed reduction of the northern shoulder of the salient, east of RAMBERVILLERS. Only patrol activity was reported from the northern portion of the front.

29 October - D-75

Heavy opposition in the FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP prevented relief of the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment. Possible enemy reinforcements were observed moving into the forest from the south. West of ST DIE, the 3rd Division encountered stubborn resistance from scattered groups and a counterattack with heavy artillery fire. East of RAMBERVILLERS, the 45th Division reported possible indications of the enemy's withdrawal northeastward, as BRU and JEANMENIL were occupied without resistance. XV Corps reported the enemy executing local reliefs opposite 2nd DB and strengthening his front lines opposite the 44th Division.

30 October - D-76

The "Lost Battalion" was relieved after strong enemy resistance had been overcome and his roadblock reduced. Heavy fighting continued in the eastern portion of the salient and a two-company counterattack seized a hill near LES JUMEAUX, northwest of ST DIE. The base of the salient was broadened by the capture of LAVELINE, on the south, and ST BENOIT, on the north, after sharp fighting in both cases. A small enemy counterattack in the northern zone was broken up by artillery fire.

31 October - D-77

The enemy appeared to have been taken by surprise by 2nd DB's attack above BACCARAT. Mining was extensive but little artillery or AT fire was received, and by the end of the period MERVILLER, northeast of BACCARAT, had been cleared and forward units had reached the outskirts of BACCARAT itself, although the enemy was still dug in west of the town. In the VOSGES salient VI Corps reported continuing enemy defense of key terrain features west and southwest of ST DIE and determined opposition in the ST BENOIT sector, where strong mortar and artillery fire supported dug-in positions.

### III. SUMMARY

October had been primarily a month of preparation for future actions, both the Allies and the Germans on the Western Front using the period to regroup and resupply for the more decisive battles of November and December.

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# C O N F I D E N T I A L

The attacks of the Seventh Army in the Forest of PARROY and the Western VOSGES, as well as that against BACCARAT on the last day of the month, fitted into this general scheme, for they had the purpose, and the ultimate effect, of depriving the enemy of his forward defensive positions and pushing him back on his main line of resistance even before the opening of the November offensive.

The attrition of October's limited operations, during which the enemy lost 7,122 prisoners and an unestimated number of dead and wounded, also helped to weaken him in advance of the offensive. In particular, the German 16th and 716th Infantry Divisions, charged with defense of the Central VOSGES, were so reduced that they could hardly hope to hold the VOSGES passes against a determined assault. The 16th was whittled down from a combat effective strength of 3,000 to 900 during October, the 716th from 1600 to 1000, and their replacements and reinforcements were consumed as fast as they were committed. As a result they were unable to prevent the crumbling of the VOSGES "bastion" the following month.

## ANNEX I

### ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY


	<u>Strength in Combat Effectives</u>			
	<u>1 October</u>	<u>11 October</u>	<u>21 October</u>	<u>31 October</u>
11th Panzer Div.	* 4000 (40 tanks)	* 4000 (40 tanks)	* 4000 (40 tanks)	Withdrawn
15th Pz Gren Div.	3500	3000	2800	Withdrawn
16th Inf. Div. (incl. BG OTTEN-BACHER)	3000	2200	2400	900
19th Inf. Div. (One Regt Only)			800	450
21st Panzer Div.	3200 (20-25 tanks)	2800 (20-25 tanks)	2250 (20-25 tanks)	2200 (20-25 tanks)
189th Inf. Div. (incl. BG SCHWERIN)	1100	** 800	** 600	** ?
198th Inf Div. (less one Regt operating w/338th Division)	1000	1000	1300	** 1300
338th Inf Div. (incl BG LOPAU, and one Regt from 198th Div)	600	** 1800	** 1800	1400
361st Inf. Div.				* 3500
553rd Inf Div.			1600	2800
716th Inf Div.	1600	1500	1250	1000
Misc Separate Units	900	900	900	1700
Reserves not in contact:				
30th SS Division	3000	3000	3000	3000
405th Inf. Div.	3500	3500	3500	3500

\* Bulk of unit on U.S. Third Army Front.

\*\* Bulk of unit on French First Army Front.



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ANNEX III

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

BALCK, General der Panzer Truppen.

Son of a Lieutenant General, BALCK saw action as a Lieutenant in World War I on both the Western and Italian fronts. Transferred to the Reichswehr after the war, and had reached the rank of Oberst by September 1940, when he was reported commanding a brigade in France. In August of 1942, shortly after he received command of 11 Panzer Division in Russia, his promotion to Generalmajor was announced, followed, on 1 January 1943, by promotion to Generalleutnant. In June 1943, BALCK was reported commanding Panzer Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND for a short time, and in March 1944 he commanded XLVIII Panzer Corps at TARNOPOL. In August he was commanding the Fourth Panzer Army in Russia. Subsequently he was known to be on the Western Front, where, according to the German press, he was in command of a Panzer Corps. Reported to be a favorite of Hitler, he is believed to have taken command of Army Group G in October, succeeding BLASKOWITZ.

FIRST ARMY

von KNOBELSDORFF, Otto, General der Panzer Truppen.

Born in 1885 in Berlin, the son of an officer, KNOBELSDORFF was gazetted Leutnant in 1906, and in 1914 was adjutant of the 94th Infantry Regiment. During World War I he served in a regiment of 242 Royal Wurtemberg Division, and later served on the division staff. He received the Iron Cross, First Class, the Wound Badge, the Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Ernestine, Lippe and Austro-Hungarian decorations. On 31 July 1914 he was promoted to Oberleutnant and became Hauptmann on 22 March 1916.

After the war von KNOBELSDORFF transferred to the Reichswehr and in 1941 was serving on the staff of 6th Division. During 1925-28 he was on the staff of the division artillery commander and later on division staff, 2 Infantry Division. Promoted to Major 1 February 1929, he commanded a troop in 9 Cavalry Regiment. In 1930-32 he was on the staffs of artillery commanders of 3 Infantry Division and 2 Infantry Division. Promoted to Oberst on 1 July 1935, the next month took command of 102 Infantry Regiment and in November 1938 was commanding 101 Infantry Regiment. On 1 January 1939 he was promoted to Generalmajor, in May 1940 was commanding 19 Infantry Division and on 1 December 1940 became Generalleutnant. He continued in command of 19 Division after it was converted to 19 Panzer Division, and in September 1941 was awarded the Knight's Cross for action in the central sector of the Russian front.

In June 1942 he commanded XXXIX Panzer Corps on the northern sector of the Russian front, and was promoted to General der Panzer Truppen on 1 August that year. From February to November 1943 he commanded XLVIII Panzer Corps in the DONETZ area and later west of BIELGOROD, where he was awarded Oakleaves for distinguished service. In June 1944 he commanded XL Panzer Corps in the JASSY area, and on 22 September 1944 was awarded Oakleaves with Swords. He assumed command of First Army on the Western Front in October 1944. He is reported to have objected to Nazism in the Army, and to have refused to have officers with Nazi principles in 102 Infantry Regiment before the war.



**FIFTH PANZER ARMY**

MANTAUFFEL, General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for September.

**NINETEENTH ARMY**

WIESE, Frederick, General der Infanterie

See G-2 History for August.

**IV GAF CORPS**

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

Born about 1891, gazetted Leutnant in 1910, and served during 1914-18 in 163 Infantry Regiment, receiving the Iron Cross, First Class. Transferred to the Reichswehr after the war, and promoted to Hauptmann in 1922. Reported in 6 Infantry Regiment in 1925 and on the staff of 2 Infantry Division in 1932. He next appeared as an Oberstleutnant commanding a battalion of 27 Infantry Regiment, and on 1 January 1938 he was promoted to Oberst in the same regiment. In February 1937, he commanded 125 Infantry Regiment at SAARBRUCKEN.

PETERSEN transferred to the GAF on 1 September 1941 and was promoted Generalmajor a month later. The following February he was promoted commanding 7 Flieger Division which then controlled all parachutist units. During 1942, he was promoted twice, to Generalleutnant on 1 February and to General der Flieger on 1 November. In June 1943, he was reported in command of IV GAF Field Corps in Southern FRANCE. He held this command at the time of the DRAGOON landings, and participated in the retreat to the VOSGES. Although little is known of his party connections, he is said to be a favorite of Hitler. There are reports of dissension between GAF and Army officers in his headquarters during July 1944.

**XLVII PANZER CORPS**

von LUTTWITZ, Freiherr, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

**LVIII PANZER CORPS**

KRUEGER, Eugen Walter, General der Panzer Truppen.

No biographical data available.

**LXIV CORPS**

LASCH, Generalleutnant.

As an Oberstleutnant in the pre-war Reichswehr he commanded a battalion of the 3 Infantry Regiment. Promoted Oberst in 1942, Generalmajor late the same year, and Generalleutnant 1 June 1943. German newspapers called him the "Liberator of Riga." Reported commanding 349 Infantry Division in December 1943, and relieved General Sacks as commander of LXIV Corps in October 1944.



## LXXXIX CORPS

von und zu GILSA, Werner Albrecht Freiherr, General der Infanterie.

Born 1889. Commanded 9 Infantry Regiment in Reichswehr and it is believed he commanded this regiment in Poland. Became Generalmajor in February 1941, and commander of 216 Infantry Division in Russia in January 1942. Awarded Knight's Cross in August 1942 and promoted Generalleutnant the next October. Took command of LXXXIX Corps in Belgium in July 1943.

## 11 PANZER DIVISION

WIETERSHEIM, Wend, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for August.

## 15 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

SIMON, Oberst.

Colonel SIMON was commander of 33 Panzer Artillery Regiment, reported by prisoners to be in temporary command of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division.

## 16 INFANTRY DIVISION

HAECKEL, Ernst, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

## 19 INFANTRY DIVISION (59 Grenadier Regiment)

SILBERNABEL, Oberstleutnant.

Lt. Col. SILBERNABEL commanded the one regiment of the 19 Infantry Division which was on our front briefly during the relief of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division by 553 Infantry Division.

## 21 PANZER DIVISION

FEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

## 189 RESERVE DIVISION

DEGENER, Generalmajor

See G-2 History for September.

## 198 INFANTRY DIVISION

SCHIELE, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for September.



338 INFANTRY DIVISION

ASCHMANN, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for September.

361 INFANTRY DIVISION

PHILIPPI, Generalmajor.

Was in the Reichswehr before the war, and served in 73 Infantry Regiment and in an unknown capacity on the General Staff. On 25 May 1943 was awarded the Ritterkreuz as commander of 535 Grenadier Regiment. In February 1944 he commanded 210 Coastal Defense Division KIRKENES in Lappland, and in October was identified as commander of 361 Infantry Division on Western Front.

405 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

SEEGER, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BRUHN, Hans, Generalmajor.


A native of Schleswig-Holstein and a professional soldier who served in World War I and continuously ever since. His entire service, which includes two years on the Russian front, was in artillery, until he assumed command of the 553 Volksgrenadier Division on 24 September. He was captured about 20 November by the 2nd French Armored Division during the breakthrough to Strasbourg.

716 INFANTRY DIVISION

RICHTER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available. However, a captured document reveals his first name to be Wilhelm, rather than Otto, as previously reported.





The Forest of PARROY is a vicious tangle of second growth timber and underbrush, about six miles long and five miles wide, blanketing some low ridges northeast of LUNEVILLE, between the MARNE-RHINE Canal and the VEZOUSE River. It is traversed by an east-west road, generally following the crest of a low ridge, and by a number of tracks and firebreaks, including the abandoned roadbeds of old World War I narrow gauge railways. Here, at the end of September and during early October, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division attempted to make a stand blocking the eastward advance of the US XV Corps.

The town of LUNEVILLE had fallen to the XV Corps on 20 September, and during the next five days the MEURTHE River to the southeast was crossed, the Forest of MONDON between the MEURTHE and the VEZOUSE, was cleared, and reconnaissance northward toward the latter river entered CHANTEHEUX, CROISMARE and MARAINVILLER.

However, during reconnaissance northeast of LUNEVILLE into the west and southwest edges of the Forest of PARROY, patrols of the US 79th Division drew fire and encountered mines and a roadblock on 25 September. The western extremity of the east-west road that traversed the forest appeared to be held by approximately a company of infantry, well dug in. Meanwhile, reconnaissance by the 106th Cavalry Group (consisting of the 106th and 121st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons) along the MARNE-RHINE Canal west of the north edge of the forest, found all bridges across the canal blown and received fire from the forest.

The general stabilization of the front, in contrast to the highly



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fluid condition of preceding weeks, led to the decision to attack and clean out the forest, preparatory to further advances, rather than to attempt to bypass it. The plan called for a heavy preliminary aerial bombardment of entrances into the woods and of road junctions inside it.

Bad weather delayed the bombing, and therefore the attack, for three days. In the meantime vigorous patrolling was carried out on the western edge of the forest, and drew equally vigorous reactions. A combat patrol of the 315th Infantry Regiment entering the edge of the forest near the main road entrance, on 26 September, was counterattacked by two enemy platoons supported by four tanks. Patrols of the 313th and 314th Infantry Regiments approaching the forest from the southwest, received mortar fire while crossing the open ground between the VEZOUSE River and the woods. On the 27th, patrols to the northwest edge also drew mortar fire. The enemy was keeping the towns of CROISMARE and MARAINVILLER, on the VEZOUSE, under artillery fire.

On 28 September the weather cleared sufficiently to permit the planned bombing attack, which however was not carried out in as great strength as had been hoped and which, according to prisoners, did not have serious effects on the enemy. It did have the result, however, of enabling the attacking infantry to reach the edge of the forest without serious opposition.

The 315th Infantry and 313th Infantry attacked from the west, the former north of the main road, the latter to the south. After entering the woods resistance stiffened; both regiments reported the enemy using tanks in support of his hastily dug in infantry positions. This employment of armor (mostly Mark IV's) despite the difficulties of maneuver in the thickly wooded terrain was to become one of the outstanding features of the enemy's defense of the forest. While the density of cover frequently forced the tanks to keep to roads and firebreaks, full advantage was taken of any opportunity to deploy off the roads wherever a clearing or thinning of growth made it possible. As a rule tanks were kept mobile, but at times a few were spotted and camouflaged, notably at the principal road junction in mid-forest (Point No. 4) where the decisive battle was to take place later.

Advancing slowly against increasing resistance on 29 September, both regiments received counterattacks, one of which forced the 313th to fall back until an additional battalion could be committed to regain the lost ground. Heavy artillery fire was brought down on units in the western edge of the woods throughout the day. The very high proportion of tree bursts throughout the battle in the forest increased greatly the lethal effect of enemy artillery fire, and troops soon learned that foxholes had to be covered to provide overhead protection. Whenever possible logs were laid across the trenches; as enemy positions were over-run it was seen that he was taking the same precaution. In many cases the Germans saved themselves the trouble of digging by utilizing old World War I positions for this purpose, throwing logs and dirt over them to provide personnel shelters.

Resuming the attack on 30 September, both regiments advanced about 1000 yards eastward despite heavy artillery and mortar fire. The thickness of forest cover, by drastically limiting visibility to the flanks as well as to the front, forced attacking units to maintain close physical contact with each other; thus the speed of the advance was generally held down to that of the unit that faced the stiffest resistance. The same condition made it necessary to keep the tail of the advance closed in.

The 314th Infantry Regiment, which had been held at CROISMARE during the beginning of the battle, was committed on 1 October and advanced north-eastward into the forest against dug-in enemy positions on the south edge to a junction with the 313th on its left. During the next two days it was to cross the sector of the 313th, pinching it out and joining with the 315th



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along the main east-west road. Again the division advanced about 1000 yards on 1 October, with the 315th reporting heavy mortar and artillery fire but only moderate small arms fire. It appeared that the enemy's tactics here were to keep his main body well back of the nebulous "front", holding only small groups forward where they could hear, if not see, the attackers coming toward them through the woods. These observers could thus bring down accurate fire on the attack without endangering their own MLR. The scattered small arms fire occasionally met was believed to come from these forward observers attempting to escape at the last moment.

In addition to continuing mortar and artillery fire, the next days' advances encountered strong pockets of resistance, held by units of about company strength. One of these, at the clearing (Point 5) covering one of the enemy's supply routes into the forest from the direction of LA NEUEVILLE, was a strong position, with barbed wire and minefields, most pockets of resistance, however, lacked this degree of development and consisted mainly of infantry foxholes. In addition, the enemy's defensive works included profuse mining of roads and tracks, frequently extending some distance into the woods on either side; all such well-defined avenues of approach were also registered by artillery, which kept them under interdicting fire.

Heavy enemy fire from the strong point in the clearing (Point 5) on 2 October forced the 314th Infantry to withdraw to the west edge of the clearing, from where the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the regiment continued to face the enemy throughout the remainder of the battle for the forest until the position was evacuated on the night of 9/10 October. The 2nd battalion continued northward to pinch out the 313th Infantry and link up with the 315th Infantry on the main east-west road.

Early on 2 October, the 315th had advanced without opposition except for the intense automatic fire met by patrols on its left flank approaching the road junction at Point 1, where they had also drawn fire the previous day. However, in the evening, a strong counterattack in estimated battalion strength was launched against the 315th at a second junction farther eastward (Point 2).

To cover the division's exposed left flank, where the enemy's defense of the road intersections indicated a potential threat of attacks from the north, the 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron entered the forest on 2 October preparatory to clearing out these enemy pockets. The 121st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, meanwhile, was covering the sector between the forest and the MARNE-RHINE Canal and receiving mortar and artillery fire from enemy positions in the northwest corner of the forest.

A further few hundred yards were gained on 3 October against continuing mortar and artillery fire, despite a local counterattack against the 314th in the morning by a company of infantry and two tanks. A road block consisting of a long row of trees felled across the road and covered by machine guns was met at Point 3 to the west of the forest's principal junction. To reduce it, it was necessary for the light tanks attached to the 314th Infantry to cross the road into the 315th sector to outflank the block from the woods.

It was planned that on 4 October both regiments would advance abreast on the enemy's positions in the vicinity of the main junction in the heart of the forest. While the left flank did succeed in advancing to and beyond the north-south road above the junction, the units operating closer to the main axis were stopped short of the objective. The 2nd battalion of the 314th Infantry received a spoiling attack just before the time set for its own attack which therefore had to be postponed. The enemy attack was carried out by a company of infantry supported by six tanks; two of them advanced



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against the battalion under supporting fire from the other four which occupied positions in the vicinity of the junction. One of the attacking tanks was knocked out by bazooka fire.

After taking the rest of the morning to reorganize, the 2nd battalion of the 314th was to attempt another attack at 1300; this, too, was forestalled by enemy tank fire down the road accompanied by a strong mortar concentration. A second enemy infantry attack then broke a gap in the battalion position.

Meanwhile during the afternoon of 4 October, the 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had attacked the road junction at Point 1 in the northwest of the forest. Fighting as infantry, with a platoon of light tanks in support, they had outflanked and cut off the enemy holding the road center and clearing, had captured 51 and killed ten at a cost of three casualties.

On 5 October, the 315th Infantry north of the junction, moved its 1st battalion through its left flank and then southeastward across the east-west road in an attempt to cut this road behind the enemy strong point at the junction. Enemy infantry supported by three tanks broke through the battalion on the road; part of it was cut off to the south of the road and the rest was held north of it. The following day this forward battalion northeast of the junction was engaged by elements of the 11th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. A strong enemy patrol probing the 1st battalion's defenses was driven off during the morning, and in the afternoon enemy tanks and infantry were engaged. One tank penetrated to the battalion CP before being stopped by bazooka fire. On 6 October the 1st battalion of the 315th was withdrawn from its exposed forward position back across the north-south road and both regiments began conducting vigorous patrolling activity in preparation for the renewed attack which was to come on 9 October. The 106th Cavalry Group, meanwhile, continued its clearing out of the northwest portion of the forest.

Thus the dispositions on the eve of the attack of 9 October were as follows: On the division's right the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 314th Infantry still faced the enemy across the clearing in the southern portion of the forest; to their left was a sizeable gap, beyond which the 2nd battalion held positions before the crucial road junction, with its left flank on the main east-west road; north of the road, the 3rd battalion of the 315th was also closely investing the junction; to its left were the 1st and 2nd battalions.

When the attack was launched, the latter two battalions moved due eastward, the 2nd battalion overcoming strong resistance with the aid of its supporting tanks, and by the end of the day had advanced deep into the eastern portion of the forest without further contact.

The two battalions immediately before the junction, however, faced strong opposition from an estimated two battalions of enemy infantry with tank support. However, the line of an abandoned narrow gauge railway ran southeastward past the flank of the enemy strongpoint and the 314th succeeded in working its supporting medium tanks and tank destroyers down this track and then northward to the main road behind the enemy position. Meanwhile, the enemy tanks at the junction had been neutralized by smoke.

This maneuver broke the enemy position at the road junction and in effect ended the battle for the forest. The 313th Infantry, from division reserve, exploiting toward the southeast through the 314th, reached the south east corner of the forest, delayed only by mines. And that night the sole

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remaining enemy strongpoint, that facing the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 314th in the clearing on the south side of the forest, was abandoned. The following day patrols to the eastern edge of the forest found it clear.

The enemy had committed an estimated 2,000 men to defense of the forest; on several occasions he brought fresh units in during the night and committed them immediately in the morning. Approximately 650 prisoners were taken by 79th Division. They represented the 104th and the 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiments, 115th Tank Battalion, the 33rd Artillery Regiment, 33rd Signal Battalion, and 33rd Replacement Battalion, all from the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division; the 16th Bicycle Battalion and 16th GAF Engineer Battalion; elements (four tanks) of the 2111th Tank Battalion of the 111th Panzer Brigade; the 11th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion of the 11th Panzer Division; and the 2113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 113th Panzer Brigade.

Intelligence officers who had taken part in the battle generally agreed afterwards that the bold use of armor in the forest, despite the thick cover, had been the outstanding feature of the enemy's - and later of our own - tactics during the operation. On occasion, tanks had even been used as supply vehicles when the rain-sodden tracks had proved impassable for other types of transport.

They noted, however, that the impossibility of visual observation through the forest cover forced enemy artillery to resort largely to map fires and that armor as well as infantry should therefore make every effort to advance through the woods rather than on mapped roads and tracks. Accurate fires, of either mortar or artillery, could be brought down on sectors off the tracks only by keeping the main body well to the rear of the outposts and bringing the latter back to the MLR just prior to the concentration.

Also pointed out was the necessity for operating on narrow fronts, against limited objectives, to overcome the difficulties of control and orientation in thickly wooded terrain.



ANNEX V

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

A. 1 September - 30 September 1944

During this period the German Intelligence Service had to accommodate itself to rapidly varying situations. In the beginning of the month, when the retreat to the North and Northeast was headlong, the enemy had to be content with the agents he had planted along the Riviera and in TOULON and MARSEILLE. It was the mission of these agents to report intelligence by radio. One Abwehr agent, whose mission was to report on ship and troop movements in MARSEILLE, spoke five languages and used this linguistic ability as a wedge to obtain work as an interpreter for the American Army. In a few weeks he had succeeded in having himself employed in a position of considerable trust. He was arrested immediately prior to the arrival of three divisions.

With the retreat at its height in mid-September, the enemy was obliged to teach his old agents some new tricks. A powerful Abwehrstelle (Head Abwehr Office) in DIJON, with a branch in BOURG-EN-BRESSE and strong connections in PARIS and BELFORT, had been at work against the French resistance movements and the police, and had also succeeded in penetrating the British Intelligence in PARIS. These Abwehr agents were given the new role of collecting intelligence on the American Army. Wireless transmitters were installed and hidden, and a letter-drop was established. Many members of the DIJON-BOURG ring moved to Alsace-Lorraine, since a considerable number of the agents were Alsatian by birth or related to Alsatian families by marriage. However, the remnants who were left behind were apprehended with the aid of the agent who had recruited them.

During most of the period, proximity to Switzerland increased the enemy's opportunity to infiltrate agents posing as refugees. Conversely, because of Allied use of Switzerland as a point of entry for agents, the Germans tightened up on their screening methods. All Swiss nationals entering Germany were subjected to careful interrogation and observation.

During the retreat the enemy had had to depend for his intelligence on a patchwork stay-behind system composed both of agents trained for this purpose and of those improvised as the German forces withdrew from an area. However, the stabilized situation that developed along the MOSELLE and in the VOSGES near the end of September gave him a chance to fill up the holes in his system caused by the capture of his agents. The first line-crosser was dispatched with the mission of gathering tactical information and then returning across the lines. He was dressed as a priest and had instructions to attempt to ingratiate himself with the Americans by offering them tactical information on the German forces. He was apprehended and executed by the French.

Attempts at subversion in the form of German psychological warfare pamphlets began to show up early in the month. Two examples are notable: The first was a leaflet bearing the counterfeit signature of the Franc-Tireurs et Partisans Francais, a Communist-dominated resistance organization. The leaflet foretold a Stalin-dictated France. It asked Frenchmen to oppose the bourgeois Anglo-Americans and to participate in a civil war for the Communization of France. The second was a leaflet containing reproductions of Allied military currency with a text claimed that it was valueless, unredeemable and Jewish-inspired.

Captured agents revealed several outstanding features of the operational procedure of the German Intelligence Service. In recruiting French



nationals for espionage or sabotage work, the Germans drew from collaborators, black market dealers, men and women whom they could blackmail, and criminals whom they freed from prison in exchange for their services as agents. In operational missions two standardized methods became apparent: Radio sets were carried in standard-type suitcases; agents were paid with new currency in numerical sequence.

Systematic destruction or removal of non-operational intelligence documents was very efficient. Several days before the Germans left LYON about 300 cases of documents were shipped out of Gestapo headquarters there.

Information from captured agents revealed an increasing use of PARIS as a center for espionage, sabotage and counter-espionage activities. Evidence indicated that the enemy was trying to tie together in the capital the cut strings of his French intelligence net. This was facilitated by the fact, discovered from captured agents, that many of the collaborators who had quit PARIS for Germany had left definite contacts behind.

No sabotage against Allied installations occurred during the month of September.

The scope of the enemy espionage and sabotage effort is indicated by the following tabulation of the 17 enemy agents apprehended during the month:

	<u>French</u>	<u>Luxemburger</u>	<u>Russian</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Espionage	15 (1)	1	1	17
Sabotage	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL*	15	1	1	17

(Figure in parentheses indicates number of women included).

\* Ten agents were apprehended with radio transmitters.

#### B. 1 October - 31 October 1944

With the development of a stabilized front which began in late September, German Intelligence Services prepared to increase their espionage and sabotage efforts. The result, however, was that the Germans had to enter on the debit side of the October ledger four major setbacks: (1) the break-up of the DIJON Abwehrstelle (see September history), (2) the cleanup of important stay-behind agents on the Riviera, (3) the apprehension by Seventh Army roadblocks of line-crossing espionage agents, and (4) the arrest at a roadblock of the leading figure in the sabotage squad that had been sent to blow up Allied pipelines.

Of the twenty-five agents captured during the month:

- Eleven belonged to the DIJON Abwehr ring, a part of whose mission was the infiltration of Allied Intelligence Agencies.
- Four were Sicherheitsdienst stay-behind agents in Monaco, including the German vice-consul there.
- Five were Abwehr agents operating radio sets on the Riviera and in MARSEILLE.
- One was a Sicherheitsdienst stay-behind agent in EPINAL, who was awaiting a radio transmitter.
- One was a Swiss journalist working for the Swiss paper "Journal de Geneve" and also the Abwehr.
- One was an Abwehr line-crosser and one a Sicherheitsdienst line-crosser who was dressed as a priest.



- One was a Sicherheitsdienst Amt VI/S agent who crossed the lines to sabotage Allied pipelines.

The first line-crossers caught had all been instructed to pose as refugees and to contact American Military Police or officers in order to offer tactical information. The mission of these line-crossers was primarily the gathering of operational intelligence. One agent had the additional mission of reporting on FFI developments and on the general economic and political situation in France.

The large subversive organizations, such as the Milice Francaise, the Legion des Volontaires Francais, the Parti Populaire Francais, the Francisme Movement, and numerous smaller collaborationist groups had for some time been streaming across France toward Germany, which, however, was hesitant about admitting them. Many had been put to digging fortifications in the Vosges and Alsace. About 25,000 Miliciens left the Schirmeck and Struthof Camps, stayed briefly in STRASBOURG, and finally arrived in ULM and SIGMARINGEN. About the middle of October the LVF (Legion des Volontaires Francais) was incorporated into the Waffen SS. No matter what might be the military value to Germany of these traitors, German Intelligence found itself with a ready-cut crop of potential agents. Many members of these subversive groups were sent to espionage and sabotage schools. Some of the better-known of these schools were located at WIESBACH, OSNABRUCK, HUNDSBACH, the HUBACKER-HOF in the Black Forest, at FREIBURG-IM-BREISGAU, and in the vicinity of FRANKFURT. The Hubacker-Hof school specialized in training young Frenchmen, mostly Francistes, and included parachute and radio training. The largest school, which was probably for the Milice, was the one at FREIBURG. Many PPF members had assembled in ST. DIE, previous to their retreat to Germany. An agent of the Hubacker-Hof school stated that PPF members had been organized in ST. DIE to cross the lines and act as a chain of agents from the Vosges to PARIS, reporting on Communistic activities and retaliatory measures taken against PPF members and their families.

ST. DIE during October developed as a center for dispatching agents against the Seventh Army. All line-crossers apprehended in this period (and many later) had false papers which were issued there. ST. DIE was the headquarters of an Abwehr III office, staffed by personnel of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 353. Meldekopfs (small Abwehr offices) were also established in various Vosges towns including REMIREMONT and FRAIZE.

Other methods employed by the enemy during the period included freeing imprisoned patriots and mixing agents with them as the patriots attempted to return to the Allied lines; confiscating French passports for use of agents passing through Switzerland; employing the guinea-pig technique of sending low-grade agents through the lines to reconnoiter for future agents; and exploiting minority nationalities to recruit agents. The tried and true methods of recruiting were continued and black market operators and political and criminal prisoners found themselves confronted with a choice of prison or becoming German agents.

The Sicherheitsdienst also decided to go in for sabotage on a large scale. Brigadier General SCHELLENBERGER, chief of Amt VI of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, ordered the sabotaging of the Allied pipeline crossing France and provided a well-trained agent with one million francs to do it. This agent, a Swiss, recruited two others, Frenchmen, who were to join him in or near PARIS. Hidden sabotage dumps were to be used for the purpose. All three were caught by Seventh Army roadblocks shortly after they had crossed the lines.

Roadblocks also turned up large numbers of Gestapo informers, subversive French nationals, collaborationists and other types of security hazards



who were trying to circulate within the Seventh Army area.

The Germans, too, increased their travel control systems, and continued to exercise the strictest surveillance over persons crossing into Germany from Switzerland.

Enemy attempts to influence the morale of our troops were confined to leaflet propaganda which compared the lot of the front-line soldier with that of service troops in the rear and 4-Fs in the United States. There was sporadic use of public address systems in which units were addressed by name and various details of their history given as a prelude to exhortations to surrender.

Again the scope of the enemy espionage and sabotage efforts for the period is indicated by the following box score of apprehensions:

	<u>French</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Danish</u>	<u>Swiss</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Espionage	19 (3)	1	2 (1)	1	1	24
Sabotage	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL*	19	2	2	1	1	25

(Figure in parentheses indicates number of women included)


\* Five agents were apprehended with radio transmitters.



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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART FOUR

1-30 NOVEMBER 1944

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

W.D./cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :


TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL, COLONEL, AGD, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

  
WILLIAM A. QUINN  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

\* G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part IV

1 - 30 November 1944

\* \* \*

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II.	Enemy Reaction to Seventh Army Operations
III.	Principal Enemy Commanders Opposing Seventh Army
IV.	Counterintelligence Summary

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C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

I. GENERAL.

The Seventh Army's breaking of the VOSGES position during November was a demonstration of one of the oldest of military maxims - that there is no such thing as an undefended obstacle.

Historically, the VOSGES Mountains are an "impregnable" position. Supplemented, as they were during September and October, by an extensive system of prepared obstacles and weapon emplacements, they constituted, on paper, an effective barrier before the frontiers of the Reich. But the position was nevertheless broken, in an assault whose decisive phases lasted hardly more than a week.

The explanation for the Germans' failure to hold a line on which such hopes had been pinned, and such labor expended, is not difficult to find: the High Command failed to man the position with enough troops to transform the appearance of strength into reality. Overpowered and outmaneuvered, the enemy found hills and anti-tank ditches no substitutes for manpower and firepower.

When the final Seventh Army attack began, on 13 November, the enemy was attempting to hold the front with six infantry divisions, with a total strength in infantry combat effectives of not more than 10,000 men. Against these were thrown six American infantry divisions, with another in reserve, a reinforced French armored division and a combat command of an American armored division.

There were three principal reasons for the Germans' inability to match Allied strength on the VOSGES front:

First, threats against other sectors had necessitated dispersion of his forces. The best mountain division on the front, 269, on arriving from Norway in October, had been committed at once against the French First Army's penetration of the VOSGES south of GERARDMER, which, if unchecked, threatened to outflank BELFORT from the north. And during November, the French assault of the BELFORT Gap, exposing the southern ALSACE Plain, drew off the 198 Division as well. Its movement to MULHOUSE left the Central VOSGES, before Seventh Army's VI Corps, very thinly held.

In the north, the armored divisions, 11 and 21, covering the approaches toward SARREBOURG and SAVERNE, were drawn off by what the enemy evidently considered the greater threat of a US Third Army attack on the METZ front. When the Third Army attack did materialize, just prior to our own, still another division from Seventh Army front, 553, was ordered north to meet it. It was just beginning its move when it was caught by the Seventh Army attack.

Second, two of the remaining divisions, 16 and 716, attempting to hold the MEURTHE River line before ST. DIE, had been badly cut up in their continuous engagement with the US VI Corps since late September and by the middle of November disposed an infantry combat effective strength of only 600 and 1,000 respectively.

Third, the German High Command was already beginning to plan its December offensive in the Ardennes and its best reserves and reinforcements were earmarked for that build-up. The extremely low level of reinforcements arriving on our front during the first half of November demonstrated that it no longer held a high priority. Of the 5,000 infantry reinforcements who arrived during those two weeks, 3,200 were accounted for by a single division, the 708 Volksgrenadiers, who replaced the departed 21 Panzer and thus made little contribution to a net increase in strength.



(708 Volksgrenadier Division was a reconstitution of the 708 Infantry Division which had been mauled in the Normandy breakthrough). Despite their anemia, the 16 and 716 Divisions received no transfusions, and no other division received more than 400 reinforcements.

Thus when the assault came, coordinated with attacks the full length of the Western Front, the enemy was in no position to plug all of the gaps which opened simultaneously. The three infantry divisions (elements of 361, 553 and 708) which opposed the US XV Corps in the north were split and scattered. 361, on the enemy right, was forced out of its defensive positions northwest of BLAMONT and squeezed northward into a salient between the US Seventh and Third Armies, from which only remnants escaped. 553, caught unprepared as it was about to leave the sector, was driven eastward before the XV Corps drive, decimated in its attempts to make a stand, and finally virtually liquidated in the envelopment of the SAVERNE Gap. And 708 was shouldered southward into the VOSGES, and into the path of the US VI Corps advance.

The enemy front against VI Corps, also originally held by three divisions (716, 16 and 198), fared no better. 198 was dispatched to MULHOUSE in an attempt to contain the French advance. 716, holding the MEURTHE River line, was outflanked from the north by VI Corps' exploitation of the previously won breakthrough at BACCARAT. Thus exposed in the ST. DIE sector, the weakened 16 Division could not stand up to the frontal assaults across the upper MEURTHE, and fell back to the east, burning the VOSGES towns as it went. In the eastern VOSGES, the remnants of 16 and 716 were joined by 708 and took up positions along the northern sector of the "COLMAR Pocket."

With the breaking of the VOSGES position an accomplished fact, and Allied troops on the RHINE at both STRASBOURG and BASLE, the enemy devoted the balance of November to attempts to prevent further exploitation of the breakthrough. The COLMAR pocket was stubbornly held, denying the Allies access to the central ALSACE Plain, and a new front was hastily built up along the Seventh Army's northern flank to oppose a drive in this direction toward the PALATINATE.

The enemy had short-lived hopes of being able to cut off the forward elements of US XV Corps which were extended through the SAVERNE Gap to STRASBOURG. A battlegroup of the 130 Panzer Division "LEHR" moved in from reserve and accompanied by elements of the 11 Panzer Division and the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division from Third Army front, counterattacked southward toward SARREBOURG on 23 November. The counterattack was forestalled by the intervention of armor from the Third Army and the enemy reverted to the defensive in the face of renewed Seventh Army attacks northward toward the REICH.

## II. CHRONOLOGY.

1 November - D/78

On the last day of October, the French 2nd Armored Division had launched its limited attack to clear BACCARAT preparatory to the full-scale offensive scheduled for mid-November. Simultaneously the US 45th Division was pushing northward and northeastward from ST. BENOIT toward BACCARAT and RAON L'ETAPE. By the following day BACCARAT had been cleared by the French, who advanced farther to BERTRICHAMPS, and contact had been made with the 45th Division on the BACCARAT - MENIL SUR BELVITTE road. In the forested hills west and southwest of ST. DIE, the enemy continued to oppose US advances into the LES ROUGES EAUX valley, and broke up our attack on Hill 616 on LES ROUGES EAUX - ST. DIE road. He withdrew from Hill 526



from which he had forced US troops two days previously, and where close fighting had been in progress on 31 October.

2 November - D/79

The enemy presented somewhat stronger opposition to further exploitation of the advances of 2nd DB and US 45th Divisions in BACCARAT sector, particularly northeast of BACCARAT, where the French penetration threatened to breach the main enemy defensive position before the VOSGES Mountains. Advances east of VACQUEVILLE and northward toward BLAMONT were strongly opposed and armor was reported in MONTIGNY area. Southeast of BACCARAT, the enemy defended his bridgehead on the west side of the MEURTHE River by resisting our advances on RAMBERVILLERS - ST. MICHEL - RAMBERVILLERS - RAON L'ETAPE and LES ROUGES EAUX - ST. DIE roads. Elements of the 716 Infantry Division (in which were reported incorporated the remnants of 189 Infantry Division) were met in this area, to which the 716 had moved from its previous sector south of ST. DIE.

3 November - D/80

The enemy continued stubbornly to defend the approaches to ST. DIE from the west, and elsewhere in the ST. DIE - BACCARAT sector presented scattered resistance supported by mines and artillery to our advances toward the MEURTHE. To the north he straightened his line west of BLAMONT and appeared to be strengthening his defenses, shelling HERBEVILLER and concentrating tanks at DOMEVRE.

4 November - D/81

Despite continuing stubborn resistance on the western approaches to ST. DIE, the enemy lost LE HAUT JACQUES. He fought scattered delaying actions supported by artillery, tank fire and mines against our further advances toward the MEURTHE in the area east and south of RAON L'ETAPE. Only patrol actions and mopping up were reported from the northern portion of the front.

5 November - D/82

Demonstrating growing concern about US advances toward the MEURTHE River south of RAON L'ETAPE, the Germans attempted to bolster the 716 Infantry Division in this sector by the addition of the 951 Infantry Regiment, detached from its parent 361 Infantry Division on the northern flank. The town of THIAVILLE, northwest of RAON L'ETAPE, was strongly defended, as were the southwest approaches to ST. DIE, where the enemy still held Hill 616. Prepared defensive positions were also developed south of BLAMONT.

6 November - D/83

The enemy continued to hold stubbornly to his narrow bridgehead west of MEURTHE River between ST. DIE and BACCARAT. Although he withdrew to the river at the southern end of the bridgehead near ST. MICHEL, he continued to hold out in houses, woods and on favorable terrain from here north to THIAVILLE, launching a counterattack south of RAON L'ETAPE and holding our advance on THIAVILLE with many automatic weapons and considerable artillery fire. Southwest of ST. DIE he lost his long defended position on Hill 616 on the LES ROUGES EAUX - ST. DIE road, and despite continued resistance was forced out of other positions in the southeastern portion of FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP.

7 November - D/84

Activity was generally lighter in the FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP except



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at points immediately west of ST. DIE where strong resistance continued. Between ST. DIE and BACCARAT the enemy continued to maintain a defensive position west of MEURTHE River, where his defenses on the approaches to CLAIREFONTAINE were supported by intermittent artillery fire, and northwest of THIAVILLE by nebelwerfer fire. There was no contact on the Army's left.

8 November - D/85

Although the enemy presented resistance at only scattered points along the edge of FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP west and southwest of ST. DIE, he stubbornly defended his bridgehead before the MEURTHE, northwest of the town. Houses, woods and dug-in positions were used in defense against our advance towards the river, with enemy infantry receiving support of 120 round artillery concentrations in the DEYFOSSE - LE MENIL area. In the northern zone enemy appeared to be strengthening his positions in the BLEMERY area but could not be contacted in the vicinity of LEINTREY.

9 November - D/86

Enemy continued to demonstrate his reluctance to give up the FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP resisting particularly in the southeast corner where local counterattack was launched. Although he lost LE MENIL and DEYFOSSE he continued to fight delaying actions west of the MEURTHE River in this zone, and strong opposition forced US forward elements to withdraw south of LA FOSSE. On the Army's left his reoccupation of forward defensive positions in the BLEMERY - LEINTREY area was possibly a reaction to US Third Army's offensive, which had begun the previous day.

10 November - D/87

The FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP was cleared, although the enemy continued to present some resistance east of forest on approaches to ST. DIE. In CLAIREFONTAINE - RAON L'ETAPE sector, he was withdrawing across the MEURTHE River, giving up LA FOSSE, ETIVAL and PAJAILLE as well as positions on high ground south of RAON L'ETAPE. Contact continued light in the northern part of Army zone.

11 November - D/88

There was only limited contact at scattered points along the Army front. Some opposition developed northwest of GERARDMER and on the western approaches to ST. DIE. Enemy withdrawal beyond MEURTHE River, northwest of ST. DIE, appeared virtually complete.

12 November - D/89

Scattered resistance was offered to advances against principal terrain features on the Army's right flank. The center of VI Corps zone was generally quiet, except for harassing artillery fire, and civilian reports indicated that the enemy withdrawal beyond the MEURTHE River southeast of BACCARAT was complete. North of the river scattered strongpoints and pockets of resistance were met in eastward advance of 100th Division. The 708 Volksgrenadier Division was identified in this area where it had relieved the 21 Panzer Division. There was little ground contact in the XV Corps sector but the enemy attempted to interdict lines of communication eastward from LUNEVILLE toward BADONVILLER and BLAMONT with shell fire, bridge demolition, and bombing, as US troops took up positions for the attack scheduled for the next day. US Third Army reported identification of elements of the 553 Infantry Division, which was thus known to be in process of moving away from the XV Corps sector on the eve of the Corps' attack.



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13 November - D/90

XV Corps met strong resistance, mainly small arms and mortar fire, to the attacks by the US 79th Division toward STE. POLE and ANCERVILLER, and by the US 44th Division east and northeast of LEINTREY. In the latter area the enemy was using some old World War I positions.

An enemy counterattack was launched unsuccessfully in the vicinity of THIAVILLE and some resistance was met west of ST. DIE; there were indications that the enemy was improving defensive positions on the hill mass south of ST. DIE. Unopposed occupation of important terrain features on Seventh Army's right flank, coupled with civilian and PW reports, indicated that the enemy was falling back in the area northwest of GERARDMER.

14 November - D/91

Although both US and French patrols reported contact at LE THOLY, the enemy continued to fall back from his salient on Seventh Army's right, northwest of GERARDMER. The only enemy activity reported on ST. DIE front was road movement in area north of city. In the north, the enemy's reaction to breaching of his main defensive positions at ANCERVILLER was surprisingly weak, but he presented very strong resistance along the main LUNEVILLE - SARREBOURG axis.

15 November - D/92

For the second successive day the enemy failed to react vigorously to the 79th Division's breakthrough south of BLAMONT, and lost both HALLOVILLE and HARBOUEY. In the north, the defensive positions covering the LUNEVILLE - SARREBOURG axis, which held out stubbornly throughout the previous period, were broken.

After falling back slightly in the woods east of BACCARAT, enemy again presented some opposition in area of the RAON L'ETAPE - NEUFMAISONS road. Very little activity was reported on Army's right where the enemy continued to fall back, conducting only scattered delaying actions along the approaches to GERARDMER.

16 November - D/93

In XV Corps sector deep penetrations both north and south of BLAMONT again failed to elicit any enemy reaction other than the withdrawal of his resulting salient along the OGEVILLER - DOMEVRE - BLAMONT road. Lack of opposition to the occupation of THIAVILLE and deep penetration of the woods north of RAON L'ETAPE indicate enemy withdrawal in this sector as well. Although a screening position was met northwest of GERARDMER and stubborn opposition received in hills southwest of ST. DIE, the burning of several villages and portions of ST. DIE itself indicated that the enemy was preparing to fall back on Seventh Army's right when pressed.

17 November - D/94

On the Army's right, the hill mass southwest of ST. DIE was occupied against weakening resistance, and further towns were abandoned and burned by the enemy as he continued withdrawing deeper into the VOSGES Mountains. On the Army's left, the 708 Division was forced back to the VOSGES Mountains, losing BADONVILLER and BREMENIL; but attempts to envelop BLAMONT were stubbornly opposed by elements of 553 Division both before the city and at the bridgehead across the VEZOUSE River to the east. Resistance was light northwest of BLAMONT where a local counterattack to reestablish the AVRICOURT - MOUSSEY line failed.

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18 November - D/95

Only scattered resistance was met in GERARDMER - ST. DIE sector and only slight enemy activity was observed by US patrols which penetrated close to GERARDMER. At ST. DIE the enemy withdrew from the portion of the town south of the MEURTHE River. Increasing resistance met attempts at further penetration north of RAON L'ETAPE, and an attempted crossing of the PLAINE River was strongly opposed. In the northern zone, the enemy lost PARUX, PETITMONT, FOULCREY, RECHICOURT and MOUSSEY, but resisted stubbornly efforts to expand the 79th Division bridgehead across the VEZOUSE east of BLAMONT.

19 November - D/96

In Army's northern zone efforts of 553 and 708 Divisions to organize behind the HEMING - BLAMONT - VEZOUSE River line had apparently collapsed. FREMONVILLE and ST. GEORGES were cleared after heavy fighting. The bridge at CIREY was captured intact. Farther south, elements of 708 and 716 Divisions continued to offer stubborn opposition in heavily wooded area east of RAON L'ETAPE. On the southern flank the advance continued to the east, with no enemy contact reported in the area north of GERARDMER.

20 November - D/97

The French 2nd DB, which had been recommitted in XV Corps zone to exploit the enemy collapse, continued its rapid advance to the east against a disorganized enemy; new identifications indicated that enemy service units were being overrun. WALDSHEID and VOYER were cleared after a stiff fight, and the advance continued to the east, reaching DABO and HAZELBOURG unopposed, thus threatening to bypass the prepared defensive position before SAVERNE Gap. Light resistance was being encountered by 44th Division in SARREBOURG and small towns to the north at close of the period. In the center, the enemy remained alert to any threat to the CELLES - LUVIGNY highway from the BADONVILLER region. Farther south, elements of 716 Division did not oppose crossing of MEURTHE River in the ST. MICHEL area, but offered resistance from high ground east of CLAIREFONTAINE and HURBACHE. On the south flank, the US advance continued slowly, following enemy withdrawal.

21 November - D/98

Identification of elements of the 16 Division north and south of GERARDMER indicated that this unit had spread out to cover the sector vacated by 198 Division; the latter had moved to the MULHOUSE sector to attempt to contain the First French Army's breakthrough to the RHINE through the BELFORT Gap.

Additional crossings of the MEURTHE River north and south of ST. DIE were only lightly opposed by elements of 16 and 716 Divisions, indicating that the enemy was attempting only to delay in this sector. Advance in broken hills east of HURBACHE met only light scattered resistance from enemy snipers and patrols.

In Army's northern zone, enemy resistance continued scattered and poorly organized. The main portion of the organized SAVERNE Gap position was developed before PHALSBOURG, where enemy showed signs of fighting from behind an extensive AT ditch. To south, however, this position was outflanked as the enemy opposed only lightly the 2nd DB's exit from the VOSGES in the BIRKENWALD area.

22 November - D/99

Resistance increased before FRAIZE where elements of 16 Division were defending from well-prepared positions. ST. DIE was cleared and efforts of 716 Division to keep open the STE MARGUERITE - SAALES road came to naught as SAALES was entered. Farther north, elements of 708 Division were



forced back on the VOSGES from MOYEROUTIER to ST. QUIER.

In the Army's northern zone remnants of 553 Division stubbornly defended the area north and south of PHALSBOURG. However, the previous day's outflanking of this position was further exploited as SAVERNE and nearby towns in the enemy rear were taken against negligible opposition. Contact with elements of 11 Panzer Division on the northern flank, in the vicinity of EYWILLER, indicated that this division had moved eastward from the US Third Army zone; this was the beginning of enemy armor activity, lasting through the next three days, whose primary purposes appeared to be first to screen the withdrawal of 361 Infantry Division from its exposed salient back to the SIEGFRIED Line, and second to counterattack southward against US XV Corps' extended left flank to cut off the forward elements east of SARREBOURG.

23 November - D/100

In the Army's southern zone elements of 16 and 716 Divisions, after first offering stubborn opposition, showed signs of withdrawing farther into the VOSGES. By the end of the day resistance was reported generally light and scattered. To the north remnants of 553 Division were unable to hold PHALSBOURG after being completely surrounded. Concurrent with its fall to US 79th Division, the advance of the French 2nd DB from the SAVERNE area continued virtually unopposed to STRASBOURG. The enemy was unable to offer any organized opposition in this area, and STRASBOURG was entered. Sharp fighting for bridges over the RHINE River was in progress at the close of the period.

On the northern flank, elements of 130 Panzer Division "LEHR" appeared in the same general area where 11 Panzer had been identified the previous day, and EYWILLER and GUNGVILLER were retaken.

24 November - D/101

Events at STRASBOURG had their effect on the 16 and 716 Divisions, who were withdrawing eastward as rapidly as possible. The only serious opposition encountered was at BOURG - BRUCHE where a reported 700 enemy reinforcements, concerned over the threat to SELESTAT, attempted unsuccessfully to slow the advance. At STRASBOURG mopping up operations were completed and several thousand PWs taken, although the enemy continued to defend the STRASBOURG - KEHL bridge. Reconnaissance was pushed toward HAGUENAU against little or no opposition. In the area north of SARREBOURG the Panzer "LEHR" Division's battlegroup was very aggressive and forced slight withdrawals of US troops before being met by armor from US Third Army.

25 November - D/102

130 Panzer Division "LEHR" resumed its offensive in the sector north of SARREBOURG, and retook RAUWILLER and VECKERSWILLER, and reached within about five miles of SARREBOURG before being stopped. Infantry and armor were active in reconnaissance south of HAGUENAU where elements of 256 Volksgrenadier Division were first identified on arrival from HOLLAND, and in STRASBOURG the enemy held stubbornly to his bridgehead west of the KEHL bridge. In the southern zone, remnants of 16, 716 and 708 Divisions continued their withdrawal behind scattered delaying groups.

26 November - D/103

With the loss of MUTZIG, ROSHEIM and MOLSHEIM, 708 Division had been virtually driven out of the VOSGES, but to its south 16 and 716 Divisions stiffened their resistance on the approaches to SELESTAT, thus giving the first indication of what was to become the stubbornly held ALSACE bridgehead. At STRASBOURG, the enemy still held on the west bank, and in the HAGUENAU sector confined himself to patrolling.



North of SARREBOURG the enemy appeared to have lost his enthusiasm for the attack, withdrawing under pressure to the north. Identification of elements of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division in this area, in conjunction with the reported movement to the southeast of 50 tanks from WINGEN to INGWILLER indicated the shifting of 130 Panzer Division eastward into the INGWILLER - HAGUENAU area.

27 November - D/104

In the southern zone the 16 and 716 Divisions, falling back on COLMAR and SELESTAT, again offered delaying action, but in the center, as the advance broke out into the ALSACE Plain, only scattered contact was reported with remnants of the 708 Division. 256 Infantry Division and elements of 130 Panzer Division remained on the defensive in the HAGUENAU area, as did the elements of 25 Panzer Grenadier Division which were holding strongly on the WOLFSKIRCHEN - OTTWILLER line north of SARREBOURG.

28 November - D/105

The 16 and 716 Divisions resisted along all routes out of the VOSGES into SELESTAT, while efforts of friendly armor to push south in the ALSACE Plain met a strong reaction from remnants of the 708 Division in the BARR - ERSTEIN area. XV Corps' attack northward, between the RHINE and the SARRE, met strong resistance and occasional counterattacks in some sectors, lighter opposition in others. On the eastern half of this front, east of the HARDT Mountains, 245 Infantry Division arrived to join 256 Division in defense of the southern approaches to GERMANY. On the western half, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division appeared to be offering most of the resistance. Elements of 130 Panzer Division "LEHR" were in support on both sides of the HARDT Mountains.

29 November - D/106

US VI Corps' progress out of the VOSGES and south in the ALSACE Plain was slowed as the 16, 716 and 708 Divisions, reinforced with several new miscellaneous units, became more aggressive. Several well-supported counterattacks, aimed at the 2nd French Armored and 103rd Divisions, were beaten off. Stronger opposition continued to develop to XV Corps' attack northward, with enemy infantry being supported by tanks, self-propelled guns and artillery.

30 November - D/107

The enemy continued to contest all advances into the ALSACE Plain throughout the morning, but later in the day there were some indications that he was slowly withdrawing south and east under pressure. Demolitions and flooding hindered the movement of armor south of ERSTEIN. On the north, the enemy displayed a stiffening defensive attitude, defending from well dug-in positions and offering strong resistance in all villages in the path of the advance. Small groups of armor operated along entire front east of the HARDT Mountains.

### III. SUMMARY.

The enemy's vain attempt to hold the VOSGES Mountains - the last barrier between the Seventh Army and Germany - cost him 23,623 prisoners during November. It also cost him the operational unity of Army Group G, which was split apart by the Seventh Army attack and forced to take drastic measures - including the importation of two divisions from as far away as Holland - to reform its front.



As a result, Seventh Army faced an enemy order of battle at the end of November materially different from that which it had faced at the beginning.

The breakthrough by US XV Corps had taken place along the boundary between the German Nineteenth and First Armies. Nineteenth, on the south, was forced eastward and southward through the VOSGES, and taking four of our original six opponents with it (16, 198, 708 and 716 Divisions), holed up in the COLMAR area. There it was bequeathed to the French First Army, by a readjustment of Allied boundaries early in December; although it continued to be a potential threat to Seventh Army's rear it was no longer an immediate tactical problem.

The German First Army, which had held the extreme northern portion of the VOSGES front, had its left flank shattered, losing all of the combat effectives of 553 Division. Out of the debacle it salvaged part of the 361 Division, which at the beginning of the battle had been astride the US Seventh and Third Army boundaries, and by the end of the month had slipped eastward so that its entire bulk opposed the Seventh Army. It was the only one of the six starters still in contact at the end of the month.

To make up the deficiency the enemy committed all or part of four new divisions:

25 Panzer Grenadier Division, originally the 25 Infantry Division, motorized in the fall of 1940 and sent to the central Russian front where it was destroyed. Following reorganization it was first contacted by US Third Army on 12 November and by Seventh Army on 24 November.

130 Panzer Division "LEHR", which had been reforming in Westphalia after suffering heavy casualties in Normandy, where it had been committed in the CAEN sector. Only a token force from each of LEHR's regiments was actually dispatched to the Seventh Army sector in November, to act as a mobile reserve to cover the reorganization of the First Army's front; the bulk of the division remained behind to continue training for its role in the offensive scheduled for 16 December.

245 Infantry Division, which had been stationed at DIEPPE at the time of the NORMANDY landings and then moved to ABBEVILLE; after the BRITTANY break-through it was continuously committed in HOLLAND until mid-November, picking up a few replacements before being moved to the south.

256 Volksgrenadier Division, a reorganization of the 256 Infantry Division, which had been a victim of the operations at SMOLENSK, and had later been committed against the First Canadian Army before being moved southward in November to defend the PALATINATE.



ANNEX I

ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY


Strength in Infantry Combat Effectives

<u>Unit</u>	<u>1 November</u>	<u>14 November</u>	<u>21 November</u>	<u>30 November</u>
16th Inf Div	900-1000	600	600-700	750
19th Inf Div	* 450		Moved to US Third Army Front	
21st Pz Div	2200		Moved to US Third Army Front	
25th PG Div	From US Third Army Front			* 500
30th SS	From French First Army Front			** 600
130th Pz Div	From Reserve Army Group D			2800
198th Inf Div	500-600	1300	Moved to French First Army Front	
245th VG Div	From Holland			1900-2000
256th VG Div	From Holland			2200
338th Inf Div	1400	Moved to French First Army Front		
361st VG Div	* 900	* 350	* 300	1050
553rd VG Div	2800	2600	700-800	Destroyed
708th VG Div		3200	1400-1500	500-600
716th Inf Div	1000	1000	600-700	400
360th Cossack Regt	380	375	375	375
Misc Units	2500-3000	1750	2170	2625
Reserves not in contact:				
405th Inf Div	3500	3500	3500	3500

\* Remainder of division on US Third Army Front  
 \*\* Remainder of division on French First Army Front

ANNEX I





Annex No.2 ENEMY REACTION TO SEVENTH ARMY OPERATIONS



ANNEX III

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

BALCK, General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for October.

FIRST ARMY

von KNOBELSDORF, Otto, General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for October.

NINETEENTH ARMY

WILHE, Frederick, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for August.

XIII SS CORPS

PRIESS, Hermann, SS Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

Now 43 years of age, PRIESS formerly commanded the 3rd SS Panzer Division "TOTENKOPF" in RUSSIA and on 2 May 1944, received the Oak Leaf with Swords for his service in the BALTIC PROVINCES. He had previously received the Ritterkreuz. Promoted to his present rank on 20 April 1944, he has had command of XIII SS Corps since September 1944.

LXIV CORPS

THUM, Helmut, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data available.

LXXII CORPS

MOERKHUSEN, Walter, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

LXXIX CORPS

von und zu GIESA, Freiherr, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for October.

IV CORPS (Previously IV GAF CORPS)

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

See G-2 History for October.



16 INFANTRY DIVISION

HACKEL, Ernst, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

19 INFANTRY DIVISION (59 Grenadier Regiment)

SILBERNABEL, Oberst.

See G-2 History for October.

21 PANZER DIVISION

FEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

25 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

MAASENBACH, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

130 PANZER DIVISION "LEHR"

BAYERLEIN, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

198 INFANTRY DIVISION

SCHILL, Generalmajor

See G-2 History for September. Correct spelling of this officer's name now believed to be SCHILL rather than SCHIELE.

245 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

KEGLER, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

256 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

FRANZ, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

338 INFANTRY DIVISION

von OPPEN, Oberst.

Commander of a battle group in the withdrawal from Southern FRANCE to the VOSGES, von OPPEN took command of 338 Infantry Division after General-major ASCHMANN was killed on 14 November.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

361 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

PHILLIPPI, Oberst.

See G-2 History for October.

405 INFANTRY DIVISION

SEEGER, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BRUHN, Hans, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for October.

708 INFANTRY DIVISION

KRIEGER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

716 INFANTRY DIVISION

RICHTER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.



ANNEX IV

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 November - 30 November 1944

Almost fifty percent of the enemy agents captured by Seventh Army during November had been sent across battle lines on important espionage or sabotage missions. This was the logical and the easiest method for the German Intelligence Services, since, for the major part of the month, the front was a continuation of October's well-defined, almost static lines. Frontaufklaerungstrupp 353 in St. Die was busy preparing the dispatching agents, while Nests/Strasbourg and Cologne occupied themselves with readying stay-behind agents in case of Allied occupation of Alsace and Lorraine. This occupation came near the end of November, with sufficient suddenness to disrupt GIS espionage and sabotage plans. A further result of the abrupt Allied overrunning of the frontier areas was the arrest of the Police President of Strasbourg, SS Oberfuehrer Carl ENGELHARDT, together with most of his staff.

Of the eleven agents captured during the month:

- Two were saboteurs of French nationality working for Amt VI/S as assistants to Ludwig NEBEL (captured on the last day of the preceding month) whose mission was to blow up Allied pipelines crossing France. The trio, after crossing the Allied lines, were to meet in Paris, and, after pooling information and contacting GIS agents there, were to secure their sabotage materiel from hidden dumps in the Paris area.
- One was a French boy, 17 years old, who had crossed the lines on a tactical espionage mission for the Sicherheitsdienst. He had been trained at an espionage school at the Hubacker-Hof in the Black Forest which specialized in the training of young Frenchmen belonging to French Fascist organizations.
- A member of the Legion des Volontaires Francais, who had been a cook in the Hubacker-Hof espionage school and had been dispatched by the SD on a short-range tactical mission.
- An Abwehr agent who had been sent from St. Die and had crossed the lines to accomplish a long-range espionage mission in Paris. He was to discover V-2 damage, logistical data and activities of Communists and Communist-dominated resistance organizations in France.
- An Abwehr III agent, member of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 353 and of the Intelligence Service of the Parti Populaire Francais, who had worked for both the SD and the Abwehr in the St. Die region on counterintelligence missions.
- A French national whom the SD had intended to use as a long-range financial and industrial agent after the war.
- A former delegate of the Vichy Government's Service des Societes Secretes who had worked for the SD.
- A 19-year-old Frenchwoman who had worked for the Legion des Volontaires Francais and as a courier for the Sicherheitspolizei.
- A Frenchman who had performed espionage for the Germans at the beginning of the war, having furnished them with information on airfield activities.

ANNEX IV



C O N F I D E N T I A L

The efficiency of Seventh Army travel control in apprehending German agents resulted in the GIS warning its agents to avoid road blocks in the Seventh Army sector. It is also known that the enemy's discouragement was so great that he had planned on two expedients to infiltrate agents into France: the first was to take advantage of a commercial treaty between Switzerland and Spain whereby food supplies would be exchanged between the two countries. The GIS was planning to install agents as truckers on the Spain-Switzerland run. The second dodge was to fly German agents to Spain by air. This was to be arranged by the retired French Cavalry Captain CAVALLIE, who was the principal recruiter in Strasbourg of agents to be used against Seventh Army. CAVALLIE had worked for the French during the Spanish Civil War and for the Germans in this war in Greece, Bulgaria and Italy.

The Germans continued to train French subversive groups which had escaped from France with the German Army. However, personnel were not selected indiscriminately for training at espionage and sabotage schools. For example, Milice members, by far the largest group, were given a short indoctrination course and then incorporated into the Charlemagne Division. All former members of the Milice Intelligence Service and selected members of other French subversive groups were sent to espionage and sabotage schools. At the beginning of November almost 200 students were assembled at Ulm/Donau for training. This training was conducted by the SD and appears to have been mostly concerned with sabotage and terrorist activities.

The NSDAP was quick to prepare for an evacuation from Alsace of personnel and institutions which would endanger its security in case of Allied occupation. On 3 November the Chief of Civil Government of Alsace issued an order for the gradual evacuation of prisoners of war, foreign workers, Italian internees, persons and institutions previously moved from Germany into Alsace, and Alsatian women and children. In case of a quick occupation of Alsace all Party members or those connected with Party organizations, with their families, were given priority. This evacuation order also included instructions on the destruction of documents and files of value to the Allies, including rosters of inhabitants and records of economic administrations.

Subversive propaganda in the form of leaflets continued to exploit nostalgia of the front-line soldier. There was an increased emphasis on inter-Allied disagreements and the danger of Communism.

The predominance of agents of French nationality employed against Seventh Army since D-Day developed into a monopoly during November as shown in the summary below:

	<u>French</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Espionage	9 (1)	-	9
Sabotage	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	11	-	11



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RESTRICTED

# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART FIVE

1-31 DECEMBER 1944

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RESTRICTED



HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758. US ARMY

WFO/cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL, COLONEL, AGD, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Quinn*  
WILLIAM A. QUINN  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part V

1 - 31 December 1944

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II.	Enemy Strength
III.	Enemy Commanders
IV.	Counterintelligence Summary

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C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

I. GENERAL

The enemy's operations on the Seventh Army front during December were conditioned by two basic factors: the need to stabilize his front and take up an easily defensible position to prevent northward exploitation of Seventh Army's November breakthrough to the RHINE; and plans for winter offensives, first in the ARDENNES on 16 December, and then against ALSACE on 1 January. These general purposes affected both his tactics and his order of battle.

Tactically, the first half of December was marked by the German First Army's fighting withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line. Its broken left flank had been partially reconstituted late in November by the addition of the 245 Infantry and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions to the surviving 361 Volksgrenadier Division. But these three divisions, even with help from elements of 25 Panzer Grenadier Division and later from elements of 21 Panzer as well, could hardly hope to contain the full weight of a Seventh Army attack and all were ordered to withdraw to the WEST WALL between 13 and 17 December. The 11th Panzer Division, opposing the right flank of U.S. Third Army on our left, was also ordered to withdraw to the Line on 17/18 December.

Fighting against the enemy's delaying actions, which at times were stubborn and effective, especially in MAGINOT Line positions in the HARDT Mountains, Seventh Army troops (45, 103 and 79 Divisions) crossed the German frontier on 15 December. By the 17th, however, they had come against the pillboxes, wire and entrenchments of the SIEGFRIED Line. Thenceforth the enemy offered the stiffest resistance of which he was capable, laid down increasing artillery fire, and launched frequent local counterattacks.

This phase was short-lived, however. For on 16 December the ARDENNES offensive had begun. In order to free U.S. Third Army for its counter-attack, Seventh Army extended westward, taking over a portion of the Third Army sector. Executing only a defensive mission on this longer front, Seventh Army then halted its drive against the SIEGFRIED Line. Contact with the enemy thus decreased sharply during the last week of December, and was limited to patrolling and scattered local attacks. In the last days of the month the enemy was regrouping for his 1 January offensive, and Seventh Army was preparing defensive positions and deploying reserves to meet the attack it knew was coming.

The certainty with which the New Year's offensive was predicted was primarily a result of the close watch that had been kept on the many and extensive changes in the enemy's order of battle on our front during December.

The first was an outgrowth of changes in our own dispositions rather than the enemy's. This was the dropping from contact of the German 16, 30 SS, 198, 708 and 716 Divisions on 5 December when the redrawing of the Army boundary in the STRASBOURG sector gave the entire "COLMAR pocket" to the First French Army. U.S. VI Corps, which had been operating against the northern portion of the pocket since the VOSGES breakthrough, was withdrawn and recommitted on the right of Seventh Army's northern front, facing the PALATINATE. On the SAAR-PALATINATE front at that time were, from the RHINE westward, the 256, 245, 361 Divisions, elements of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 11 Panzer Division, most of which faced the U.S. Third Army. The 130 Panzer Division LEHR, part of which had appeared briefly to

C O N F I D E N T I A L



screen the reorganization of the German First Army's left flank, dropped out of contact on 9 December to return to its reserve position in preparation for the ARDENNES offensive. Thus by 11 December, the enemy's strength in combat infantry effectives facing Seventh Army, estimated at 4,650, had dropped to the lowest level it ever reached in FRANCE.

The recovery from this low point began simultaneously with the withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line. On 12 December, an old acquaintance, 21 Panzer Division (See G-2 History for September and October), reappeared on our front south of WISSEMBOURG, although it sent only elements eastward, most of it remaining in contact on U.S. Third Army front or in reserve. On 19 December, shortly after the SIEGFRIED Line was reached, the 257 Volksgrenadier Division, arriving from POLAND, replaced 11 Panzer Division, part of which moved to the ARDENNES to take part in the three day old offensive. Two days later, Seventh Army's westward extension brought it into firm contact with those portions of 257 which had previously been west of the Army boundary. By the same shift we also inherited 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 36 Infantry Division and 347 Infantry Division.

This order of battle was not to remain stable for long, however. For with the slowing down of his ARDENNES offensive, the enemy raised the SAAR-PALATINATE sector from lowest to highest priority and began preparing for the campaign to retake ALSACE. One after another, divisions were withdrawn from the line to refit in the rear. First to leave was 559 Volksgrenadier Division, which pulled out of the Third Army front to reform on 19 December. Soon afterward, it appeared that 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division had only a shell in the line; the bulk of the division was reorganizing and receiving new tanks and assault guns. Its former sector on the line was taken over by 19 Infantry Division. The 21 Panzer Division and 25 Panzer Grenadier Division were maintaining only token forces on the line, and were rebuilding the balance into a mobile reserve for the attack. And on 27 December, 36 Infantry Division also dropped out and fell back for refit.

To the reserve thus being built up was added another formidable asset: 6 SS Mountain Division, with a strength in infantry effectives of 3500 men, was assembling in the PALATINATE at the end of December. Although this was not definitely known at the time, the division was known to be en route to the Western Front from DENMARK, so its subsequent participation in the January attack was not a complete surprise.

Thus the enemy line-up on New Year's Eve was: on the line, from the RHINE westward - 256 Volksgrenadier, 245 Infantry, 361 Volksgrenadier, 257 Volksgrenadier, 19 Infantry and 347 Infantry Divisions; in the rear awaiting the signal to attack - 21 Panzer, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier and 25 Panzer Grenadier, 36 Infantry, 6 SS Mountain, and 559 Volksgrenadier Divisions.

The enemy's recovery from the early December low point was no less marked in terms of combat infantry effectives than it was in terms of available divisions. Counting both the newly arrived divisions and reinforcements for those already present, the enemy brought to this front during the last half of December an estimated total of 25,000-26,000 additional infantry effectives. Since contact was generally light during most of that period, he suffered relatively few casualties, and thus on New Year's Eve had available an estimated total of 31,000 infantrymen. About 13,000 of these comprised the infantry element of the six divisions and additional fortress units holding the line; the remaining 18,000 were waiting to open the New Year with the offensive which aimed to present ALSACE to the Fuehrer by 30 January to mark the anniversary of his coming to power.



## II. CHRONOLOGY

### 1 December - D/108

The enemy continued to offer stubborn resistance throughout the northern front, employing tanks and self-propelled artillery in close support of his infantry. He strongly contested all attempts to penetrate the gap between the HAGUENAU Forest and the HARDT Mountains. At STRASBOURG, he still held stubbornly to a small area covering the western end of the KEHL railroad bridge, and a small force was still holding out in a fort north of MUTZIG. On the southern front resistance was weaker and advances on SELESTAT from the west and north encountered generally scattered, light opposition.

### 2 December - D/109

All advances northward in the U.S. XV Corps zone again met strong enemy opposition although armored support appeared to be on a reduced scale. Patrols across the MODER River, west of HAGUENAU, encountered small arms and mortar fire. In the ALSACE PLAIN the enemy was fighting a stubborn delaying withdrawal against U.S. VI Corps which met stiffening opposition from enemy armor and was engaged in house-to-house fighting in SELESTAT.

### 3 December - D/110

Enemy opposition moderated somewhat in the eastern portion of U.S. XV Corps zone, but was stubborn and aggressive farther west. At WINGEN he was attempting to deny access to the INGWILLER Pass and the attack of the U.S. 44th Division on the Army left drew three counterattacks, of which one at DIEMERINGEN succeeded in retaking about half the town. On the southern front, resistance to the VI Corps was particularly strong in the SELESTAT area. A light counterattack with tank support was repulsed west of the town, and the enemy stubbornly blocked southward movement in this region.

### 4 December - D/111

On the last day of VI Corps' commitment against the enemy's ALSACE bridgehead, SELESTAT was cleared of enemy resistance except for scattered snipers. On the northern front - which henceforth was to be the only Seventh Army front - the enemy continued to contest advances northward between HAGUENAU Forest and the HARDT Mountains. In the mountains, he held no continuous front line, but resisted at strong points and in the towns of WINGEN, MEISENTHAL and SOUCHT and mounted a local counterattack between the latter two towns. He defended stubbornly, but not aggressively farther west, and lost VOLKSBERG and DIEMERINGEN.

### 5 December - D/112

Marked resistance was developed only in the HAGUENAU - HARDT Mountain sector, where the enemy clung tenaciously to the northeastern portion of MERTZWILLER and fought aggressive delaying actions before NIEDERBRONN. On the western half of the front, U.S. XV Corps overcame delaying action at WINGEN and then lost contact with the enemy as he withdrew rapidly along the entire sector, giving up MEISENTHAL, GOETZENBRUCH, REIPERTSWILLER, BUTTEN and RATZWILLER. Deep in Seventh Army's rear resistance finally ceased in the long-isolated fort north of MUTZIG, where small elements of 708 Volksgrenadier Division had held out ever since the breakthrough to STRASBOURG nearly two weeks before.



6 December - D/113

Early in the day, enemy opposition was confined almost entirely to artillery activity in the VI Corps zone, with particular attention being paid to the MERTZWILLER area. Later the enemy again offered strong, aggressive resistance throughout the region west of the HAGUENAU Forest, but was generally quiet to the east. On the XV Corps front, contact was again made with the enemy at LEMBERG and near MONTBRONN during the afternoon, and light to moderate resistance was developing at the end of the day.

7 December - D/114

VI Corps' attack against GAMBSHEIM, on the RHINE flank, met heavy small arms and mortar fire. Heavy artillery concentrations were repeated in the MERTZWILLER area during the morning, and a small counterattack was launched before NIEDERBRONN. On the XV Corps front moderate resistance was offered in the ENCHENBERG - LEMBERG - MOUTERHOUSE area as the enemy attempted delaying action on this line. Organized resistance ended in MOUTERHOUSE by the end of the day, but scattered firing continued until the next morning.

8 December - D/115

On the right flank, GAMBSHEIM was cleared by noon, except for scattered snipers. On VI Corps' left, resistance to the 45th Division's attack was mainly mortar and artillery fire, although close fighting developed west of REICHSHOFFEN. Since VI Corps was not exerting pressure in the center, the enemy followed suit, and the HAGUENAU - MERTZWILLER sector was generally quiet.

In the XV Corps zone, the enemy remained on the defensive in the HARDT Mountains and continued his delaying action in the LEMBERG Valley. Mortar and small arms fire continued in MOUTERHOUSE until 1000A. Organized resistance was broken at LEMBERG, although scattered street fighting continued in the afternoon; and the enemy still held most of ENCHENBERG at the end of the day. High ground before ROHRBACH was held by strong infantry forces with mortar and artillery support.

9 December - D/116

The enemy was evidently taken by surprise by the VI Corps attack on BISCHWILLER, for the town was entered against only light opposition and the bridge was seized before the prepared demolition charges could be set off. However, resistance stiffened later in the day and entrenched infantry were delaying the advance on HAGUENAU. On the Corps left only light resistance opposed the clearing of NIEDERBRONN and high ground to the north, but a small counterattack developed in the afternoon. Farther west the enemy continued to hold the ROHRBACH - ENCHENBERG - LEMBERG line against XV Corps although ENCHENBERG itself was taken; and east of LEMBERG staged a two-company counterattack which forced a slight withdrawal of U.S. troops.

10 December - D/117

Advance toward SCHIRRHAIN, on the right, met only light resistance, but house to house fighting developed at HAGUENAU where the Germans held positions east of the railroad tracks. In the MERTZWILLER sector resistance stiffened as the attack developed and late in the day two counterattacks were repulsed southeast of the town. A counterattack was also



launched northeast of NIEDERBRONN. The ground taken by the enemy was later regained and the advance continued against moderate opposition.

On the XV Corps front, little enemy activity was reported during the advance south of BITCHE and LEMBERG was mopped up. However, defense continued along the railroad between ENCHENBERG and MAIERHOFF during the day, and was particularly strong in the vicinity of HEILGENBRONN. South of GUISING the enemy's main effort was intermittent, accurate artillery fire of light caliber, supplemented by scattered small arms fire from concealed fortifications and pillboxes of the MAGINOT Line. ROHRBACH was taken at 1500 hours against small arms, antiaircraft and artillery fire.

11 December - D/118

The enemy's northward withdrawal on the eastern half of the front was now in progress. He pulled out of his forward positions during the night of 10/11 December and the light resistance met on the 11th was in marked contrast to the stubborn holding of the preceding day. HAGUENAU was occupied without resistance and only scattered contact was reported from the HAGUENAU Forest. The enemy was still holding in the HARDT Mountains, however, occupying positions along the line PHILLIPSBURG - FOURNEAU-NEUF; and west of the mountains he defended from MAGINOT Line positions.

12 December - D/119

The enemy order of battle changed for the first time with the arrival of the first elements of 21 Panzer Division to bolster the 256 and 245 Divisions on the eastern half of the front. A prisoner said the First Battalion, 192 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, had been trucked to the sector south of LEMBACH with the mission of counterattacking our advance. A counter-attack by an estimated 100 enemy actually did materialize in this area on 12 December.

On the RHINE flank, however, 256 Division continued its withdrawal. After resistance was broken at SOUFFLENHEIM the advance continued against negligible contact until reaching SELTZ, where some opposition was again offered. In the HARDT Mountains enemy resistance remained generally light to moderate with the principal opposition encountered west of BITCHE. There was no contact south of BITCHE at the close of the period, and on the extreme left flank several towns were occupied unopposed except for light artillery and mortar fire.

13 December - D/120

The crossing of the SELTZBACH River was opposed in SELTZ with small arms, mortar and heavy artillery fire, while farther west along the river, crossings at first met generally light resistance near NIEDERROEDERN and SOULTZ. As the day progressed, resistance increased there and in the 21 Panzer sector near LEMBACH, where MAGINOT pillboxes were manned. In the west 361 Division was generally quiet south and east of BITCHE, but northwest of the town strong resistance was encountered throughout day with two small enemy counterattacks repulsed.

14 December - D/121

The withdrawal to GERMANY continued in the eastern sector, covered by rearguard actions. The LEMBACH area was again the scene of the stiffest fighting but resistance north of the town had been broken by the end of the day. The western half of the line continued to be held from MAGINOT positions.



15 December - D/122

Advance to the borders of GERMANY in the RHINE Valley and eastern HARDT Mountains met stiffening resistance as the enemy attempted to stabilize his front and prepare his defense north of the LAUTER River and farther to the north in the SIEGFRIED Line. Advance elements entering GERMANY south of BOBENTHAL met only light small arms resistance. In the HARDT Mountains, farther to the west, the enemy continued to hold MAGINOT Line defenses, with SCHIESSECK and SIMSERHOFF Forts contributing strongly to the resistance. With this stubborn opposition, a certain amount of aggressiveness was shown northwest of BITCHE where several small enemy counterattacks supported by some armor were broken up.

16 December - D/123

Resistance in the RHINE Valley and eastern HARDT Mountains continued light and scattered as the enemy withdrew into the SIEGFRIED Line, losing BERG, LAUTERBOURG, WISSEMBOURG, SCHWEIGEN, RECHTENBACH, BOBENTHAL and NOTHWEILER. In the western HARDT Mountains, stubborn resistance continued in the area south and northwest of BITCHE where the enemy offered strong opposition from MAGINOT Forts and strong points.

17 December - D/124

Having reached the SIEGFRIED Line, coincident with the opening of the ARDENNES offensive, the enemy on 17 December halted his withdrawal in the RHINE Valley. Pillboxes, dug-in and wired positions, dragons teeth and heavy fire were met by troops north of the German border. Close contact with the outer defenses of the West Wall also brought down increasing artillery fire on the east flank from positions across the RHINE. In the west the enemy continued his stubborn resistance, although he lost some of his MAGINOT positions, including Fort FREUDENBERG, west of BITCHE.

18 December - D/125

In RHINE Valley, 256 Volksgrenadier and 21 Panzer Divisions offered heavy fire from infantry weapons as SIEGFRIED Line positions were developed. On the eastern slopes of the HARDT Mountains, 245 Infantry Division was unable to prevent entry into the SIEGFRIED positions at BUNDENTHAL but fought stubbornly there while counterattacking in two-company strength near NIEDERSCHLETTENBACH. Farther west, before BITCHE, resistance offered by 361 Volksgrenadier and 25 Panzer Grenadier Divisions from MAGINOT positions decreased as the enemy was forced out of a number of forts and blockhouses, including most of Fort SCHIESSECK.

19 December - D/126

Strong resistance continued from the SIEGFRIED Line, where advances were contested with small arms, machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. Two armor-supported counterattacks were launched northeast of LAUTERBOURG; two other attacks were repulsed north of BOBENTHAL, and heavy enemy pressure forced forward US elements out of OBEROTTERBACH. On the Army left, the enemy still held Block No. 2 of the SCHIESSECK Forts although during the night of 18/19 December he withdrew from strong points at Fort SIMSERHOFF and HOTTVILLER. Later in the day, however, resistance stiffened and the enemy was improving defensive positions in the DOLLENBACH - URBACH area. On the Seventh Army-Third Army boundary 257 Volksgrenadier Division arrived from POLAND to relieve the 11 Panzer Division for participation in the ARDENNES operation.



20 December - D/127

The enemy defended aggressively at vital points in the VI Corps zone. Intense mortar fire forced the withdrawal of forward elements before SIEGFRIED positions northeast of WISSENBURG, and a tank-supported counterattack by 150 enemy was launched against 103d Division farther west. Attempted crossings of the LAUTER River near BUNDENTHAL failed in the face of heavy fire. The enemy continued improving his positions in the XV Corps zone. Patrols were engaged in skirmishes at Fort SCHIESSECK, where the enemy put down 500 rounds of mortar and light artillery.

21 December - D/128

In the RHINE Valley and Eastern HARDT Mountains on VI Corps front, the enemy continued alert in defense of his SIEGFRIED Line positions. Some aggressiveness was shown west of DORRENBACH, where two enemy counterattacks were repulsed, one of them supported by two tanks and one half-track. Heavy machine gun fire again frustrated attempts to cross the LAUTER River near BUNDENTHAL, and persistent enemy pressure caused the abandonment of NIEDER-SCHLETTENBACH. Farther west in XV Corps zone, the enemy remained on the defensive except north of PHILIPPSBURG, where an attack in two-platoon strength, supported by artillery, forced a slight withdrawal of friendly troops. Westward extension of the Seventh Army's left flank, to take over the former sector of Third Army's XII Corps, brought us into contact with the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division in the SARREGUEMINES area and the 36th Infantry Division on its right. On the eastern portion of the front, 21 Panzer Division had dropped from contact and was reforming in the rear.

22 December - D/129

The enemy remained on the defensive along the entire front except for two small counterattacks near BALCHEN, east of SARREGUEMINES. Elsewhere action was limited to patrolling and placing artillery and mortar fire on forward troops. As he had for the past three or four days, the enemy put patrols across the RHINE on our right flank to ascertain strength and dispositions.

23 December - D/130

The entire front was generally quiet during the first part of the day, but later patrolling and harassing artillery fire increased somewhat, with one mortar and artillery concentration of 1200 rounds reported near BERG during a two-hour period. Enemy air activity increased, with strafing reported near BITCHE and on roads north of STRASBOURG. Again enemy patrols crossed the RHINE.

24 December - D/131

Local counterattacks and fire fights took place at various points on the front. Two counterattacks each were launched against the 45th Division north of WISSENBURG, Task Force HUDELSON in the EGUELSHARDT area and the 44th Division in the vicinity of HAEKIRCHEN, the latter supported by tanks and temporarily forcing withdrawal of the friendly outpost line. Elsewhere, the enemy limited his action to patrolling and to firing on friendly patrols. Artillery was generally light, but air was again active with strafing missions being flown over the VI Corps sector. The enemy again demonstrated his interest in the RHINE flank by sending patrols across the river. Another inheritance from the Third Army, 347 Infantry Division, was identified on the left flank.



25 December - D/132

During the early part of the period the enemy remained generally inactive throughout the entire zone. Later in the day some aggressiveness was shown in the region of ERCHING, where attacks north and northeast of the town were made. One, by an estimated 18 infantry supported by one tank, was repulsed, but another, estimated at two platoons in strength, forced U.S. troops to withdraw, and the enemy occupied ERCHING. In the area south of GERSHEIM a German attack in company strength forced a friendly outpost to retire. Elsewhere patrol clashes were reported and enemy continued to improve his position. No RHINE River patrolling was reported, but enemy air was again active.

26 December - D/133

The enemy continued generally quiet along the entire Army front, with activity confined mostly to improving his defenses and to scattered patrolling to probe our positions. The most aggressive enemy action occurred near RIMLING, where an estimated 100 enemy made a feeble attempt to move toward friendly positions and were dispersed by artillery fire. The RHINE River sector was quiet with only a three-man patrol observed south of ROPPENHEIM and some intermittent small arms, machine gun and mortar fire along the river from the east bank. Enemy aircraft were again active over the Army area.

19th Infantry Division was identified in what had been the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division sector. The latter, withdrawn to the rear for refit, was preparing for the 1 January offensive. 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, not satisfactorily contacted for several days, was also regrouping in the rear.

27 December - D/134

Patrol activity and light small arms resistance characterized enemy operations. Close contact was maintained on the western half of the front but there was no aggressive action. The enemy continued to improve his positions before the VI Corps, making use of mines and tree roadblocks. Action in the RHINE sector consisted of sporadic small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire with one heavy artillery concentration east of BISCHWILLER. Enemy air activity continued at its comparatively high level, with over 30 aircraft over the area during the night of 26-27 December and about 37 planes during the day. 36th Infantry Division now joined the growing reserve refitting for the SAAR offensive.

28 December - D/135

One company-strength counterattack against the 45th Division in the OBERSTEINBACH - SCHONAU sector, and an unsuccessful attempt by two enemy platoons to attack friendly armor near FORBACH were the enemy's only aggressive actions. Elsewhere only patrols and dug-in enemy positions were encountered. XV Corps units heard tracked vehicle movements at various points on the front, and the 44th Division received harassing fire from tanks or SPs. Enemy sensitiveness to observation in this sector was reflected in heavy anti-aircraft fire against artillery observation planes.

29 December - D/136

The enemy was quiet throughout most of the Army front with only minor patrol action being reported. Small attempts at infiltration north of NIEDER-



C O N F I D E N T I A L

STEINBACH were repulsed and a friendly observation post southeast of BITCHE, occupied by the enemy during the night, was retaken after a fire fight. Some vehicular movement was reported in the area of BITCHE, NIEDERGAILBACH and REINHEIM during the morning. Harassing fire from a 280-mm railroad gun fell near SARRALBE.

30 December - D-137

The enemy displayed aggressiveness only in the BITCHE area, where several attempts to penetrate our forward positions were repulsed. Only patrol action occurred in the BIENWALD Forest and eastern HARDT Mountains. In the eastern SAAR Valley there was a general increase in patrol activity and vehicular movement, and the enemy was reconstructing bridges over the BLIES River and its tributaries, preparatory to his attack, now only two days away. After lessening the preceding two days, enemy air was again active and included at least 12 P-47s, evidently enemy manned, which bombed and strafed points in both the eastern and western sectors of the front.

31 December - D-138


Although the anticipated strong attack did not materialize until early the following morning, the last day of 1944 was marked by increasing preliminary activity as the day progressed. Strong combat patrols and attempts at infiltration developed in the VI Corps sector and enemy movement was observed all along the front. Movement by a number of small enemy elements and vehicles was seen and heard on XV Corps front. Late in the day patrol fire fights developed and several small attacks were launched on our left flank. The largest of these consisted of 200 enemy and succeeded in reaching high ground south of WEHRDEN.

III. SUMMARY

The taking of 9,461 German prisoners during December raised to 129,531 the total taken by the Seventh Army and Allied troops under its command since D-Day.

December's operations had seen the achievement of a long-sought goal, the border of the REICH itself. The event did not pass unnoticed, but was overshadowed by the more important fact that despite the loss of FRANCE the enemy was far from ready to admit the loss of the war. One great German counter-offensive had already been opened; a second, to which the minor actions of late December were only a nervous prelude, was soon to come.







C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX II

ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

Strength in Infantry Combat Effectives

	<u>1 December</u>	<u>11 December</u>	<u>21 December</u>	<u>31 December</u>
6th SS Mtn. Div.				3500
16th Inf. Div.	750	On First French Army front		
17th SS PG Div.		On Third Army front		2200
19th Inf. Div.		On Third Army front		1800
21st Panzer Div.		On Third Army front	* 900	3000
25th PG Div.	* 500	* 600	* 600	2500
30th SS Div.	** 600	On First French Army front		
36th Inf. Div.		On Third Army front		2400
130th Panzer Div.	2800	Reassembling in First U.S. Army sector		
198th Inf. Div.	600	On First French Army front		
245th VG Div.	1900-2000	800-900	600	1400
256th VG Div.	2200	1800	1700	2100
257th VG Div.		Reorganizing in Poland	1500	3000
347th Inf. Div.		On Third Army front		2000
361st VG Div.	1050	450-500	700	2300
559th VG Div.		On Third Army front		1900
708th VG Div.	500-600	On First French Army front		
716th Inf. Div.	400	On First French Army front		
Misc. Units	3000	850	1450	3100
TOTAL :	14,500	4,650	7,450	31,200
Equiv. Bns.:	18	5-6	9	39

\* Elements only in contact (balance on Third Army front or in reserve).

\*\* Elements only in contact (balance on First French Army front).

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX II



ANNEX III

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

BALCK, General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for October.

FIRST ARMY

von KNOBELSDORF, Otto, General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for October.

NINETEENTH ARMY

WIESE, Frederick, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for August.

RASP, Siegfried, General der Infanterie.

Now 47, General RASP was born in MUNICH on 10 January 1898. Son of a manufacturer, he joined the military early, and in 1916, when 18, became a Lieutenant in 1 (Bavarian) Infantry Regiment and served therein for two years. After the war RASP transferred to the Reichswehr and his career was obscure for several years. In 1925 he is known to have been with 19 Infantry Regiment with the later Genobst SCHOERNER. RASP became Oberleutnant on 1 April 1925. In 1932 he was serving on the staff of the 3 Division.

During the ensuing years of rising Hitlerism RASP, while laying a military foundation, apparently "saw the light" politically and seems to have become a good Nazi. This, plus the fact that both he and HIMMLER came from MUNICH, may help explain his meteoric rise in the Army. Promoted to Major on 1 April 1936, he was on the staff of the 17 Division two years later. He became Oberst (Colonel) on 1 July 1941. On 1 November 1943, RASP was promoted to Generalmajor (U.S. Brigadier General) and a month later was reported commanding 335 Infantry Division on the southern Russian front. For this he was awarded the German Cross in Gold during February 1944, and by May had also received the Knight's Cross for "distinguished service" on the lower UKRAINIAN BUG River. His promotion to Generalleutnant (U.S. Major General) followed.

General RASP took command of the Nineteenth Army in January 1945, or thereabouts, and his promotion to General der Infanterie must have been very recent. His position is similar to General BALCK's in that he has been elevated over officers far senior to him in rank - and one can conclude only that his hometown friend HIMMLER must have had a hand in the unusual appointment to the command of an Army of an officer who had not had a Corps.

XIII SS CORPS

PRIESS, Hermann, SS Gruppenfuhrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for November.



SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuhrer und General der Waffen SS.

This 45-year-old general, who rose from Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant General in ten years, joined the SS in 1933 to organize SS concentration camp guards, and his subsequent activities have resulted in the Russians now listing him as a war criminal for atrocities at KHARKOV.

Born in BRESLAU on 6 January 1899, he fought in MACEDONIA and on the Western Front in World War I. On 9 November 1934, a year after joining the SS, SIMON was appointed SS Untersturmfuhrer (Second Lieutenant); on 30 January 1935, SS Obersturmfuhrer; on 16 February 1935, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer; on 15 September 1935, SS Sturmbahnfuhrer (U.S. Major); on 12 September 1937, SS Obersturmbahnfuhrer; on 11 September 1938, SS Standartenfuhrer (U.S. Colonel).

From 1939 to 1941 he participated in the Polish, Western and Russian campaigns, and on 1 September 1941 became SS Oberfuhrer (British Brigadier). In the spring of 1942 SIMON was made commander of the 3 SS Panzer Division "TOTENKOPF" but was soon relieved because of ill health. In the fall of 1943 he reappeared in ITALY as commander of the 16 SS Panzer Grenadier Division "REICHSFUHRER", having been promoted sometime earlier to SS Brigadefuhrer (U.S. Brigadier General). He retained this command until October 1944, meantime being elevated to SS Gruppenfuhrer (U.S. Major General) on 19 April 1944. In November 1944 he appeared as commander of the XIII SS Corps and is reported to have been since raised to the rank equivalent of U.S. Lieutenant General. On 17 October 1944 General SIMON was awarded the German Cross in Gold, and is reported to have received the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross.

LXIV CORPS

THUMM, Helmut, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data available.

LXXXII CORPS

HOERNLEIN, Walter, Generalleutnant.

A general for three years, the 52-year-old HOERNLEIN is typical of the younger German officer set who managed to be loyal to two German gods at once. While there is little or nothing to identify General HOERNLEIN as a prominent Nazi, the fact that he has remained in command of "GROSS DEUTSCHLAND" Division for over two crucial years suggests that his party affiliations have been helpful behind the scenes.

Native of KARSTEDT, PRUSSIA, he was born 2 January 1893, and on 27 January 1912 entered 140 Infantry Regiment as an officer cadet. His blossoming military career was nipped during the first war when the French took him prisoner and held him until 1918. On 20 June 1918 he was promoted to Oberleutnant. It is known that he served in 1925 with the 4 Infantry Regiment, and became a Hauptmann on 1 February 1927. As a battalion C.O. in the 20 Motorized Division, he was promoted to Major on 7 April 1936, to Lieutenant Colonel on 1 April 1937 and, continuing his steady rise, to Colonel in April 1940 while commanding the 69 Infantry Regiment.

For action as commander of the 80 Infantry Regiment east of BREST-LITOVSK, he was awarded the Knight's Cross in 1941, and that September was made



C O N F I D E N T I A L

commander of an infantry regiment of the "GROSS DEUTSCHLAND" Division which operated on the central Russian front. He was promoted to Generalmajor on 2 April 1942 and to Generalleutnant on 1 January 1943. For commanding this division west of BYELGOROD, HOERNLEIN was further honored with the Oak Leaves on 17 March 1943. He helped command the division until 1943, and in October 1944 appeared in command of the LXXXII Corps on the Western Front, replacing General der Artillerie SINNHUBER.

LXXXIX CORPS

HOHNE, Gustav, General der Infanterie.

Now 51, General HOHNE was born 17 May 1893 near KRUSCHWITZ, POSEN. Commissioned a Second Lieutenant in 1912, he served with distinction in World War I, winning the Iron Cross I, the Hohenzollern Order with Swords, and the Hanseatic Cross, all while serving with the 150 Infantry Regiment.

He became a Captain 1 May 1922, and it is known that he served in 1925 with the 2 Infantry Regiment and in 1932 with the 6 Infantry Regiment. In October 1937 he was a Lieutenant Colonel commanding the 3rd Battalion, 90 Infantry. On 1 May 1938 he became Colonel, and in November 1938 was given command of the 28 Infantry Regiment (8 Infantry Division), which command he retained into 1940, during which time his regiment took part in the French campaign.

HOHNE was elevated to Generalmajor 1 August 1940, and as commander of the 8 Light Infantry Division won the Knight's Cross in July 1941, for storming GRODNO on the central Russian front. On 1 August 1942 he was promoted to Generalleutnant and in November of the same year was given command of a battle group holding the land link to the fortress at DENJANSK. He was raised to his present rank 1 May 1943, and as commander of a Corps on the northern Russian front was awarded the Oak Leaves. It is known that in January 1944 he commanded the LIV Corps and in the summer of 1944 the VIII Corps. HOHNE succeeded General der Infanterie von und zu GILSA as commander of the LXXXIX Corps in December 1944.

11 PANZER DIVISION

von WIETERSHEIM, Wend, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

17 SS PANZER GRENADEIER DIVISION

OSTENDORFF, Werner, SS Brigadefuhrer und Generalmajor der Waffen SS.

Native of KONIGSBERG, this 42-year-old general is reportedly a good friend of HIMMLER. He originally joined the Luftwaffe but later transferred to the Waffen SS. In 1935 OSTENDORFF was an SS "OCS" instructor at BAD TOELZ.

As G-3 and Chief of Staff of the 2 SS Panzer Division he was awarded the Ritterkreuz in 1941. From February to November 1943 he was G-3 and Chief of Staff of II SS Panzer Corps and in April 1944 was promoted to his present rank. Wounded in NORMANDY in June 1944, he was hospitalized but returned again in October 1944 to command the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been his command from April 1944 until he was wounded. In December he was returned to BERLIN for a new assignment, and his job was tossed in quick succession to three others. SS Standartenfuhrer MULLER succeeded him as commander of the 17th for one day, being replaced by SS Standartenfuhrer Hans LINGNER (see below), who was to keep the job rotating by being captured 2-3 January.



LINGNER, Hans, SS Standartenfuhrer.

Only 29, this former commander of the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division "GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN" was captured 2-3 January 1945. LINGNER joined an SS regiment in 1934 and attended "OCS" in DRESDEN two years later. At the outbreak of war he held SS rank equivalent to Captain. In 1940 and 1941 he participated in the Western, BALKAN and RUSSIAN campaigns. He was assigned to the General Staff of Division "DAS REICH" in February 1942 and later, from June to December 1943, attended the G.S.C. "KRIEGSAKADEMIE", being promoted to Major after graduation. He then returned to his division as G-4 and later became the G-2 and Chief of Staff.

Serving in NORMANDY in 1944 with the 10 SS Panzer Division "FREUNDSBERG", he was wounded for the fourth time. In September 1944 LINGNER became a regimental commander in the "GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN" Division and later the G-3 and Chief of Staff. After the recent departure of SS Brigadefuhrer OSTENDORFF, the division's commander, for a new assignment, LINGNER became acting division commander. He reached his present grade 30 November 1944.

LINGNER was replaced temporarily by SS Obersturmfuhrer (Lieutenant Colonel) FICK, who in turn was replaced soon by Standartenfuhrer (Colonel) KLINGENBERG.

#### 19 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BRITZELMAYR, Karl, Generalmajor.

Originally commissioned some time after 1914, BRITZELMAYR saw service in World War I with the 16 Infantry Regiment (Bavaria) and retired afterward, with the rank of lieutenant. Nothing is known of his earlier background, or, presently, of his personal characteristics or associations with the Nazis.

He apparently returned to the Army about 1929-30, since he is known to have been promoted to Major 1 August 1937. The following year he served on the staff of 62 Infantry Division, and on 1 December 1940 he was made Oberstleutnant. On 28 October 1941, he was appointed commander of the 217 Infantry Regiment on the southern RUSSIAN front, and on 1 March 1942 he was promoted to Oberst. Two weeks later his award of the Ritterkreuz was announced. In February 1943 he was awarded the German Cross in Gold.

BRITZELMAYR (then Oberst) succeeded Generalleutnant WISSMATH as commander of the 19 Infantry Division in October 1944, which position he still holds. PWs stated he was promoted to Generalmajor in December 1944.

#### 21 PANZER DIVISION

FEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

#### 25 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

MAASENBACH, Oberst.

No biographical data available.



36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLM, Generalmajor.

Nothing is known of the early history of General WELLM except that he may have been in the Police and transferred to the Army with the rank of Hauptmann. In 1938 he was reported serving at Headquarters of the Troop Manoeuvre Area WAHN (Wkr. VI), after having previously served in the 37 Infantry Regiment.

Neither is much known of the general's activities in the present war. However, there is the following record of three promotions: To Major 1 March 1940, to Oberstleutnant 1 April 1942 and to Oberst 1 December 1942. When he was first reported as commander of the 36 Division he was called Oberst, but since November 1944 he has been definitely referred to as a Generalmajor. Nothing is known of his personal characteristics or of any connections with the Nazi Party.

130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION

BAYERLEIN, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

245 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

KEGLER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

256 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

FRANZ, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

257 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

SEIDEL, Oberst.

Holder of Knight's Cross. No biographical data available.

347 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

TRIERENBERG, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

361 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

PHILLIPPI, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for October.



405 INFANTRY DIVISION

SEEGER, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUETTER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available. However, he replaced BRUHN, who was captured near PHALSBOURG in the November breakthrough, and was charged with rebuilding the division east of the RHINE.

559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

von der MUEHLEN, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

This 40-year-old veteran of service on the RUSSIAN front was born 22 January 1905 at ULM, WUERTTEMBERG, the son of an officer, and was commissioned a lieutenant 1 February 1927, and assigned to the 13 Infantry Regiment, where the late General ROMMEL was then a Hauptmann. von MUEHLEN was made an Oberleutnant 1 April 1930 and two years later was still serving in 13 Infantry Regiment. On 1 August 1935 he was promoted to Hauptmann.

Freiherr von MUEHLEN served in 75 Infantry Regiment some time in 1938-1939, and on 1 February 1942 was promoted to Oberstleutnant. In November 1942 he was awarded the Knight's Cross for action south of LAKE ILMEN (RUSSIA) while commanding a regiment of the 5 Light Division. He became Oberst 1 March 1943. During the first half of 1944 von MUEHLEN faded from the limelight and nothing was heard of him until he appeared on the western front commanding 559 Volksgrenadier Division. He may have been convalescing from the effects of his service in RUSSIA. In November 1944 he was first referred to as Generalmajor, and on 9 January 1945 he was awarded the Oak Leaves for action southeast of METZ as commander of 559.

Nothing is known of his personal characteristics or of his connections with the Nazi party.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX IV

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 December - 31 December 1944

The apprehension by Seventh Army of nine sabotage and twenty-one espionage agents during the month of December indicated the scope of the efforts made by the German Intelligence and Sabotage Services operating against Seventh Army. Subsequently espionage and sabotage efforts dwindled and not until Seventh Army troops were across the Rhine did the German Intelligence Service reappear in its last desperate attempts. The missions of agents captured by Seventh Army in December evidenced the enemy's desire to retake Alsace. Half the agents apprehended were Alsations. Espionage missions were predominately tactical and coincided with the areas against which the Germans were massing their troops for the subsequent attack.

The Allied occupation of Alsace had been foreseen and prepared against by the German Intelligence Services as early as the summer of 1944. A Sonderfuehrer in Frontaufklaerungstrupp 251 recruited Alsation railway workers to plant explosive coal in coal piles used by the Allies, principally in those piles used for stoking locomotives. This explosive coal was in large lumps, consisting of a plastic explosive coated with black lacquer and a camouflaged detonator inserted into the explosive. The coal was to be planted simultaneously, after the Allies were operating the Alsation railway system.

The nine sabotage agents apprehended were:

The organizer of the explosive coal ring, a German Sonderfuehrer of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 251, who was authorized to recruit agents on the spot.

Six Frenchmen from Alsace, and the wife of one of them. The men were all railway workers who had accepted varying amounts of the explosive coal and 10,000 francs each in the late summer and early fall of 1944. None of them had used the coal for sabotage, either through fear or lack of instructions from their recruiter.

One Alsation member of the German Army, working for Abwehr II, apprehended at a roadblock. He divulged the location of delayed action demolitions in ST. DIE.

The twenty-one espionage agents apprehended included:

A ring of three wireless transmitter operators of Ast/Strasbourg whose mission was to transmit tactical intelligence on radios installed in Strasbourg. The leader was an Alsation woman who was also to recruit informers. She had carried a transmitter for the second member of the ring, who belonged to Frontaufklaerungstrupps 120 and 123, but had abandoned it before she entered our lines. The third member was captured while attempting to enter our lines with his radio.

An agent of Abwehr III H, Nest/Lille, arrested at a roadblock after he had volunteered to supply information about the enemy. He requested to be returned to Germany with a radio in order to furnish the Allies with intelligence. He had been engaged in espionage against the French in 1939, had been a penetration agent in Belgium against an Allied escape organization and had caused the arrest of two British aviators.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

An agent of Abwehr III, member of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 360, French national and Nazi Party member, who had crossed the Rhine on a tactical espionage mission. He was also to find out why Frenchmen preferred to join the American Army rather than the FFI. He was posing as an escaped French worker and tried the standard unsuccessful dodge of offering free information on German troops.

Two Abwehr espionage agents whose operations were frustrated by the rapid taking of Strasbourg by the Allies. The first, a French PPF member, had worked against the French Resistance. He was to have accomplished an espionage mission in Belfort. The second, posing as an escaped French worker, had already left for Metz on a tactical and "popular attitude" mission, but returned to Strasbourg and enlisted in the FFI.

One German regular army Colonel assigned to the Abwehr since 1929, Chief of Ast/Strasbourg, who claimed to have worked primarily in Abwehr III R (Security of Heavy Equipment).

An official of Abwehr III of Ast/Dijon and Frontaufklaerungstrupp 353. A Swiss national, he had worked for the French and Polish Intelligence Services against the Germans, then for the Gestapo and Abwehr. As chief of the Abwehr Meldekopf in Remiremont he had dispatched several agents into Seventh Army territory, including the three whose mission had been to blow up the pipelines.

A French espionage agent who had crossed the lines with the three-day mission of proceeding to Strasbourg and gathering information on civilian attitude, Allied policy and proclamations and reporting on identities and dispositions of Allied units.

A member of the Legion des Volontaires Francais who had crossed the Rhine to report Allied troop movements and in particular Engineer stockpiling and preparations for a crossing of the Rhine by Seventh Army. Also apprehended was his contact man in Strasbourg in whose home a telephone was to be installed for transmitting intelligence to the enemy across the Rhine River.

An Amt VI espionage agent whose mission was to set up a radio-equipped espionage net in the Paris area, to prepare for receiving parachuted agents and materiel, to infiltrate radio technician agents, particularly PPF members, into Allied radio installations and to contact a French Captain regarding microfilmed plans of a new anti-aircraft device.

An SD espionage agent, arrested at a roadblock after crossing Allied lines on a tactical mission.

A member of SD Amt III A at Strasbourg and graduate of an espionage-sabotage school near Frankfurt, captured at a roadblock when trying to escape from Strasbourg.

A French member of the Waffen SS, 15 years old and a Franciste, who was on a tactical espionage mission against French forces and had been instructed to enlist in the French Army if necessary to his mission.

An LVF member whose mission was to cross the lines near Haguenau and bring back tactical information on American troops. He had been trained in espionage at Wiesbach.

A Canadian, naturalized German and Nazi Party member who had accepted a political espionage mission for the SD in Iran and had been involved in foreign espionage for the Abwehr.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

An espionage agent who had worked as an interpreter for the Gestapo and had attended a radio espionage school in Brussels.

A French espionage agent with a previous history of border-smuggling and opium-trafficking. He had been jailed in unoccupied France in 1942 on charges of working for the SD, and subsequently was released by the Germans.

The wife of the chief agent of Nest/Cologne, who had left her in Strasbourg after carrying away all incriminating evidence. She was familiar with her husband's acquaintances, movements and had accompanied him on several official trips.

A letter found among mail impounded at Schirmeck Concentration Camp disclosed the probable presence in France of an assassination organization composed of members of the Jeunesse Populaire Francaise and directed against French Government officials and Communists. The letter also disclosed an intensified drive by Jacques DORIOT to propagandize the two million Frenchmen and Frenchwomen in Germany and revealed that the Legion des Volontaires Francais was now incorporated into the Waffen SS.

German attempts to secure tactical intelligence of Seventh Army dispositions did not appear to have had detailed success judging from a captured operations map of LXIV Corps Headquarters in Strasbourg. The map, which had been kept up to date until seized by Seventh Army troops, disclosed that the Germans were unaware of one newly arrived infantry division of which major elements were in the line, an armored division which was in assembly areas immediately behind the line and correct locations of command posts of corps and higher headquarters. Since their espionage efforts had not been successful the Germans, according to a prisoner interrogated at the Seventh Army Detailed Interrogation Center, obtained most of their information by monitoring Allied radio communications. This prisoner stated that his Division Ic was in possession of almost all codes used by the Allies. A group of Seventh and Third Army officers and enlisted men, liberated prisoners, revealed that German interrogation Essential Elements of Information during the period had indicated sabotage intentions. The specific location of a gasoline pipeline from the South of France and means of troops transportation were stressed in interrogation.

There was no successful sabotage act accomplished against Seventh Army during the period. An attempt was made to demolish the two-kilometer railway at Arzwiller on 26 December. Three American 81-mm mortar shells were found fastened to the railroad track so as to be detonated by the wheel flange of a passing train.

Attempts to influence the morale or cause the surrender of Allied troops through the use of propaganda leaflets followed familiar lines: mainly those contrasting the lot of the front line soldier with rear echelon troops and with troops and civilians in the United States.

In summary, the extent and character of the German Intelligence Services' effort during December can be seen from the table:

	<u>French</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Swiss</u>	<u>Canadian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Espionage	17(2)*	2	1	1	21*
Sabotage	8(1)	1			9
Total	25(3)	3	1	1	30

(Figures in parentheses indicate number of women)

\* Including 2 W/T agents.

Total number of agents apprehended by Seventh Army between 15 August and 31 December 1944:

Espionage	73
Sabotage	12
Total	85



**CONFIDENTIAL**

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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART SIX

1 - 31 JANUARY 1945

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

W.D./cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. SANDWELL, COLONEL, AGD, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Quinn*  
WILLIAM A. QUINN  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2



R E S T R I C T E D

### INTRODUCTION

The German attempt to recover ALSACE in January, in addition to its immediate tactical significance, provided the best possible "laboratory test" of the accuracy and completeness of the intelligence available to American troops and commanders from all sources - front line units, prisoner interrogations, captured documents, visual and photographic air reconnaissance, and clandestine agencies. Therefore this report on the enemy offensive contains several features not normally included in this series of G-2 monthly histories.

Shortly after the ARDENNES offensive began on 16 December 1944, the Seventh Army G-2 Section began studying the possibility of a second major German attack, directed at ALSACE. During approximately ten days of checking all available information, G-2 concluded that such an attack was highly probable, and published its opinion as G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation No. 6, 29 December 1944. This estimate is reproduced verbatim as Annex III. On 20 December 1944 a rough work map had been prepared to highlight the probable lines of action and objectives of the enemy in ALSACE; it is reproduced herein as Annex IV, together with a map showing in schematic form the actual development of the German offensive.

Following the end of hostilities, an enemy historical report on the ALSACE venture became available, and is reproduced as "The German Version", Annex V. The Seventh Army G-2 History of the operation, based on information which became available during and immediately following the offensive, had already been drafted when the German report was received; it has not been revised in the light of the later knowledge and is printed in its original version in Sections I, II and III, and Annexes I and II. Thus, when read in conjunction with "The German Version", it provides an interesting comparison between our own and the enemy's evaluation of the operation. It may be pointed out that the two reports agree on all major points, both as to enemy intentions and as to the German divisions involved.

R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part VI

1 - 31 January 1945

\* \* \*

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R E S T R I C T E D



I. GENERAL

The last German offensive effort on the Western Front in World War II was that against the Seventh Army in January. When it failed, as the ARDENNES offensive had failed before it, the enemy had no recourse but to revert to a desperate defensive.

There are many ways to gauge the importance attached to the January attacks by the German High Command: The pledge to present ALSACE, or at least STRASBOURG, to the Fuehrer to mark his 30 January anniversary; the presence of the infamous Heinrich HIMMLER himself on the Alsatian front as Commander of Army Group Upper Rhine; the loudspeaker addresses to the populace of STRASBOURG advising them to prepare for the Wehrmacht's return; the code name for the operation, "10 May 1940", commemorating HITLER's victorious crossing of the French frontier. But the best indication of the operation's importance is the size and quality of forces employed. In all, 16 different German divisions were employed by the German First Army between SAARBRUCKEN and the RHINE during January; three of them were SS divisions; the total included two panzer, two panzer grenadier, a parachute and a crack mountain division, in addition to ten run-of-the-mine infantry and volksgrenadier divisions.

At the same time the German Nineteenth Army was using nine divisions against the First French Army in an effort to develop the COLMAR bridgehead into an effective threat to STRASBOURG from the south.

The First Army's operations on the SAAR - RHINE front fell into four major phases during a month of probing for a breakthrough:

THE SAAR

Hoping to be able to slice off all of Northern Alsace and destroy all Seventh Army forces between the SAAR and the RHINE, the enemy attacked first against the western half of the Seventh Army's front. 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division spearheaded the attack, its initial objective the town of ROHRBACH in the eastern SAAR valley. It was supported by five other divisions, 36 and 19 on its right, 559, 361 and 256 on its left. The mission of the latter three divisions was to penetrate the HAARDT Mountains\* and protect the left flank of the attack by sealing the HAARDT passes. If 17 SS Panzer Grenadier succeeded in breaking through, additional mobile divisions, 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier or both would doubtless have been committed to exploit, but 17 SS did not succeed. Stopped by the U S 44th and 100th Divisions, and jolted by the belated discovery that the French 2d Armored Division was in position to counterattack, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division never went beyond ACHEN and GROS REDERCHING. Together with its right flank companions, 36 and 19, it suffered heavy losses and the offensive in the SAAR valley was abandoned.

- - - - -

\* The term HAARDT Mountains is used here to describe the extension of the VOSGES north of the SAVERNE Gap. That portion south of the French-German border is often referred to as the LOW or LITTLE VOSGES, that north of the border as the HAARDT. To avoid confusion, the latter name is here applied to the entire chain.



However, the three divisions on the left (256, 361 and 559) fared better, achieving substantial penetration through the HAARDT Mountains southeast of BITCHE. The enemy promptly began to exploit this gain.

#### THE BITCHE SALIENT

Reinforcement of the salient in the HAARDT Mountains began immediately after the penetration first developed. On 2 January, the 257 Volksgrenadier Division was committed to the attack and the first elements of 6 SS Mountain Division were identified. On 4 January the nose of the salient had been pushed as far south as REIPERTSWILLER and WINGEN, cutting one of the main trans-HAARDT passes. But although the enemy was unable to penetrate beyond this point, he fought stubbornly and effectively against U S efforts to straighten the front and clear the pass.

Success of the initial attack in the SAAR Valley or further extension of the BITCHE salient toward the SAVERNE Gap would have endangered the position of the entire U S VI Corps east of the HAARDT Mountains, a danger increased greatly by the possibility of attacks across the RHINE against the Corps' right flank. Therefore on 2 January, VI Corps had undertaken the first of the two major withdrawals it was to execute in January, falling back to MAGINOT Line positions from the HAARDT Mountains to the RHINE.

The enemy was quick to follow up with a determined effort to turn the withdrawal into a retreat. Thus the third phase began, and although operations continued in the HAARDT salient, they became merely a part of a much larger operation.

#### THE ALSACE PLAIN

On 5 January an enemy battalion succeeded in establishing itself on the west bank of the RHINE in the vicinity of GAMBESHEIM. During succeeding days it was reinforced by additional miscellaneous units, all of whom turned out to be under the control of a reconstituted 553 Volksgrenadier Division, whose original combat elements had been destroyed before the SAVERNE Gap in November.

Thus, in effect, the front now consisted of two salients: One was the German-held one in the HAARDT Mountains; the other our own in the ALSACE Plain, its flanks threatened on the west by the enemy in the HAARDT Mountains and on the east by the GAMBESHEIM bridgehead. The enemy attempted to liquidate the VI Corps salient by exerting relentless pressure against the flanks and simultaneously attacking strongly against the nose. On 7 January, the 21 Panzer Division was identified attacking the U S 79th Division. Two days later, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division was also identified, apparently operating under command of 21 Panzer in operation "Feuchtinger", an attempt to break through in the HATTEN-RITTERSHOFFEN sector to join forces with German troops pushing out from the HAARDT and from GAMBESHEIM.

Desperate fighting continued in these sectors until 20 January. On 15 January, 7 Parachute Division from HOLLAND joined 21 Panzer and 25 Panzer Grenadier in the attack on the nose of the salient. On the 19th, 10 SS Panzer Division appeared in the GAMBESHEIM bridgehead. It had been destined for the SAAR front but the enemy's early failure there had led to its being switched to the more successful RHINE Valley front. The bridgehead and the main



Alsation front linked up on the 19th as a result of the attack on DRUSENHEIM. Meanwhile, the effort against VI Corps' left had been strengthened by a reshuffling of divisions in the HAARDT salient whose final result, by 20 January, had been the relief of the weakened 361 Division and the switching from west to east of 6 SS Mountain Division.

Efforts to dislodge the stubborn enemy were unavailing. A battalion of U S 45 Division attacking on the left was cut off; a battalion of the 79 Division was surrounded in DRUSENHEIM; a tank battalion of the 12 Armored Division was lost somewhere near HERRLISHEIM.

On 20 January, VI Corps withdrew to the MODER River.

THE MODER

The withdrawal left seven German divisions out of contact on the right half of the Seventh Army front. As they moved forward to regain contact they were reshuffled to bring the main weight to bear on the HAGUENAU sector, and were joined by a newcomer, 47 Volksgrenadier Division, from COLOGNE. 245 Division remained behind. Coming up to the MODER River they lined up, with the 553 Division still on their left, in this order: 21 Panzer, 10 SS Panzer, 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier, 47 Volksgrenadier, 36 Volksgrenadier, 6 SS Mountain.

The night of 24/25 January, they attacked across the MODER in the last phase of the January offensive, and the last serious German attack of the war. In all, three bridgeheads were established, one east of HAGUENAU, by 10 SS Panzer, one west of HAGUENAU by 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 47 Volksgrenadier, and one at MULHAUSEN by 6 SS Mountain. All were contained the first day of the attack and liquidated the next.

Meanwhile, 12/14 January, the massive winter offensive of the Red Army had begun. By the time of the failure of the MODER River attack on the 25th, the need for reserves for the eastern front had become so great that it seemed highly unlikely that the enemy would again take the offensive against the Seventh Army. And indeed, the withdrawal of forces for the east began very soon. By the end of the month, 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division and 21 Panzer Division were all out of contact; the first went to HOLLAND, from where it had come, the other two to the eastern front, where both were identified by the Russians during February.



## II. CHRONOLOGY

### 1 January - D/139

About midnight the enemy opened a large-scale attack in the HAARDT Mountains and SAAR Valley, along the general line NEUNHOFFEN - BANNSTEIN - BITCHE - SARREGUEMINES. Six divisions took part - from east to west, the 256 Volksgrenadier, 361 Infantry, 559 Volksgrenadier, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier, 36 Infantry and 19 Infantry. The 347 Infantry Division put in a holding attack in the vicinity of LUDWEILER, west of SAARERUCKEN, but took no major part in the operation.

In the mountain sector, a breakthrough was developing by afternoon with enemy troops infiltrating DAMBACH and fighting in progress at BAERENTHAL. Farther west enemy troops occupied the College de BITCHE. The 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division was attacking in the vicinity of ERCHING and RIMLING, with 40 to 60 tanks reported active. RIMLING was taken, but the enemy here was mopped up at mid-day. Repeated attempts to force a crossing of the ELIES River northeast of SARREGUEMINES succeeded in getting one company across by midnight.

### 2 January - D/140

257 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 6 SS Mountain Division were identified in the HAARDT Mountain sector, bringing to eight the total of divisions being employed by the enemy. Penetration southward through the mountains continued to meet substantial success and forward enemy elements driving toward the INGWILLER Pass were engaged at REIPERTSWILLER, with fighting also in progress near WILDENGUTH and SARREINSBERG.

In the LEMBERG - BITCHE area, enemy attacks made initial gains but were later contained. Enemy pressure continued in the ERCHING - RIMLING area, where several infantry attacks, each supported by armor, were repulsed. The company which had crossed the ELIES River about midnight was forced back a few hours later.

### 3 January - D/141

256 Division continued its strong pressure in the PHILIPPSBOURG - BAERENTHAL area, while the 361 Division in the REIPERTSWILLER - WILDENGUTH area was consolidating its positions after its attacks on REIPERTSWILLER were repulsed. 257 Division offered strong resistance to a counterattack by U S troops at SARREINSBERG and did some unsuccessful attacking itself at GOETZENBRUCH. 559 Division in BITCHE area was not very aggressive.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division continued its attacks and two battalions, supported by tanks, self-propelled guns and flame throwers, succeeded in reaching ACHEN and GROS REDERCHING. However, they were counterattacked and forced to withdraw from both towns by dark. 36 and 19 Divisions, which had suffered heavy casualties during the previous two days, remained comparatively quiet, and 347 Division on the west flank displayed only slight activity.

### 4 January - D/142

Enemy pressure continued heavy in the HAARDT Mountains and forward elements infiltrated into WINGEN in estimated strength of 200, thus cutting the INGWILLER Pass. Other groups of similar strength reached this general area but concentrated attacks had diminished in number and intensity by the end of the day.



However, increasing pressure and strong patrol activity was reported in the BAERENTHAL - PHILIPPSBOURG - DAMBACH sector. Although scattered groups still on the north outskirts of ACHEN and GROS REDERCHING were cleared by late afternoon, enemy troops continued to hold positions northeast and northwest of GROS REDERCHING. Between there and SARREGUEMINES an enemy attempt to infiltrate was repulsed.

5 January - D/143

The quiet period on the RHINE River front came to an end with the crossing of an estimated battalion of the reconstituted 553 Volksgrenadier Division in the GAMBSHEIM - OFFENDORF area, with further small elements continuing to cross during the day. Our counterattack at GAMBSHEIM was meeting small arms and automatic weapons fire at the end of the day. Additional enemy troops were observed on the east bank of the river.

In the HAARDT Mountain sector the enemy continued to offer strong resistance on the southern portion of the salient and at WINGEN, where enemy troops who cut the INGWILLER Pass road were isolated but resisting stubbornly. An enemy attack northwest of GROS REDERCHING was repulsed.

6 January - D/144

On the RHINE River front the enemy became more active and his attacks forced U S troops to withdraw west of GAMBSHEIM. He also held OFFENDORF and HERRLISHEIM, although ROHRWILLER, SESSENHEIM and STATTMATTEN were reported clear. It was now obvious that the enemy had shifted his main effort to the ALSACE plain, for the 21 Panzer Division, which had been awaiting an opportune moment to attack, was identified in the vicinity of INGOLSHEIM, south of WISSEMBOURG.

In the HAARDT Mountains, the enemy showed some aggressiveness with three small attacks launched near PHILIPPSBOURG. Strong resistance continued north of INGWILLER Pass. Stiff opposition was offered by infiltrated groups south and east of REIPERTSWILLER and by the two battalions of 6 SS Mountain Division who were in WINGEN. North of GROS REDERCHING in the BELLEVUE Farms area the enemy resisted strongly early in the day, offering intense small arms and automatic weapons fire and employing some armor. In the afternoon he reacted aggressively, launching three counterattacks supported by armor, and our forces were compelled to withdraw from BELLEVUE Farms and BRANDELFINGERHOF Farm.

7 January - D/145

553 Division reinforced its RHINE River bridgehead with armor and continued its aggressive action. A tank and infantry attack was launched against DRUSENHEIM and ROHRWILLER in the morning, and late in the day the southern part of DRUSENHEIM was being held by an infantry battalion, with 8 to 10 tanks or self-propelled guns in support. 21 Panzer Division engaged in vigorous patrolling and delivered five tank-supported attacks near STUNDWILLER. WINGEN was cleared as isolated German groups attempted to pass through U S lines to rejoin the main enemy positions to the north. Strong resistance was offered to U S attacks against these positions.

8 January - D/146

Strong resistance met VI Corps' attack in the DRUSENHEIM area, where attempts to establish a bridgehead over the MODER River south of the town failed in the face of heavy enemy fire. However, the enemy's attempts to cross the river near ROHRWILLER also failed. To the northwest, in the ASCHBACH area, 21 Panzer Division made several unsuccessful and costly attacks,



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later withdrawing to OBERSEEBAACH for reorganization. In the HAARDT Mountains the enemy was now well-supported by artillery, and provided strong opposition to friendly attacks along the southern bulge of the salient. In the SAAR Valley, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division reassumed the offensive but was contained after effecting slight penetrations of forward positions near RIMLING.

9 January - D/147

25 Panzer Grenadier Division joined in the attacks against the U S front north of HAGUENAU Forest and the ten-day battle for HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN began. The first attack was dispersed after forcing a temporary withdrawal; but a second attempt succeeded in surrounding HATTEN and reaching a point south of RITTERSHOFFEN. An American counterattack had retaken half of HATTEN by the end of the day. Of 15-20 enemy tanks supporting the offensive, 12 were destroyed. Our attack on the enemy bridgehead west of the RHINE met strong resistance at HERRLESHEIM but succeeded in retaking a large part of the town. The enemy continued to offer stubborn resistance from dug-in positions on the southern tip of his HAARDT Mountain salient. In the eastern SAAR Valley, the attack on RIMLING was renewed and heavy fighting was in progress at the end of the day.

10 January - D/148

The enemy continued to offer strong resistance in the bridgehead area southeast of BISCHWILLER and attacked with infantry supported by two self-propelled guns southeast of ROHRWILLER early in the day. A U S battalion surrounded in HERRLESHEIM in the morning was contacted by friendly troops, but bitter fighting for the town continued throughout the day. Stiff resistance continued in HATTEN with infantry supported by armor. In the HAARDT Mountains, strong resistance continued on the outskirts of ALTHORN and along the high ground north of REIPERTSWILLER. Northwest of ALTHORN the enemy harassed our forward elements with small-scale attacks and artillery fire. In the RIMLING area he reverted to the defensive, apparently busy consolidating his gains. A limited-objective attack by American troops south of FORBACH met generally light resistance, and a counterattack in estimated platoon strength was repulsed late in the day.

11 January - D/149

As U S troops evacuated HERRLESHEIM, the RHINE bridgehead lapsed into comparative quiet and 553 Division remained inactive. Farther north, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division, which had failed to break through two days before, resumed the offensive in the same area, this time with more success. Attacking with intense artillery and mortar support, infantry and tanks reached the eastern portion of RITTERSHOFFEN. Identifications late in the day indicated that 21 Panzer Division had also rejoined the battle in this sector.

6 SS Mountain Division, in the HAARDT Mountains, also renewed its offensive, launching two attacks in the REIPERTSWILLER area, one of which succeeded in cutting the WILDENGUTH.- ROTHBACH road. Farther west the enemy was forced out of ALTHORN, despite strong resistance and an unsuccessful counterattack.

12 January - D/150

The RHINE bridgehead area continued quiet. To the north, intense artillery fire, tank and infantry action characterized heavy fighting as the enemy renewed his attacks in the HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN area. German tanks and infantry succeeded in occupying most of HATTEN and surrounding some U S 79 Division troops in the town; the enemy also continued to hold the eastern portion of



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RITTERSHOFFEN. Much of the ground taken by the enemy in the REIPERTSWILLER sector the previous day was recovered during the morning, but resistance stiffened later in the day and heavy fire and local counterattacks were met near ALTHORN and WILDENGUTH.

13 January - D/151

The RHINE bridgehead was generally quiet, although an enemy attack south-east of DRUSENHEIM forced withdrawal of friendly outposts. Heavy fighting continued at both RITTERSHOFFEN and HATTEN, where the enemy resisted stubbornly with infantry supported by tanks and flame throwers. Contact was made with U S elements cut off in HATTEN, but the enemy continued to reinforce the town from the east; the 7 Parachute Division was beginning to arrive here from HOLLAND. In the HAARDT Mountain salient, the enemy again resisted strongly our efforts to force him back toward the north. The hard-used 361 Division was being withdrawn here, to be replaced by 256 Division from farther east. 36 Division, which had moved into the mountains from the SAAR front, was taking over the 256 sector.

14 January - D/152

Heavy fighting continued in HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN with the enemy offering stubborn opposition and launching several attacks supported by tanks, self-propelled guns and flame throwers. After dark, tanks and an unestimated number of infantry forced forward elements to withdraw at HATTEN. In the HAARDT Mountain salient, our advance continued to encounter strong opposition and small counterattacks northwest of REIPERTSWILLER.

15 January - D/153

21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 7 Parachute Divisions made continuous and strenuous efforts to penetrate the main battle position. Repeated attacks led to bitter fighting in HATTEN, which was still in progress at dark. In the HAARDT Mountains, close contact was maintained and several counterattacks, including one strong one north of REIPERTSWILLER, were beaten off.

16 January - D/154

The U S 12 Armored Division, attacking the RHINE bridgehead, met very determined resistance and was forced to withdraw west of the ZORN River. The HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN sector was again the scene of heavy fighting, and another enemy attack forced a slight withdrawal in HATTEN. Northeast of REIPERTSWILLER the enemy showed further aggressiveness, launching an attack during the afternoon which achieved a slight penetration.

17 January - D/155

Beginning his attempt to establish a firm link between the RHINE bridgehead and the main front to the north, the enemy shifted elements of the 7 Parachute Division southward and committed them to an attack on SESSENHEIM, which was seized together with the neighboring towns of STATTMATTEN and DENGOLSHEIM. SESSENHEIM was recovered in the afternoon but heavy fighting continued in the vicinity. South of this sector, 553 Division again put up strong resistance at HERRLISHEIM; and to the north street fighting was in progress at RITTERSHOFFEN and HATTEN, where two more tank-supported infantry attacks were launched during the morning. In the HAARDT Mountain salient, the enemy's strong resistance in the area north of REIPERTSWILLER was accompanied by further attempts at infiltration.



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18 January - D/156

Strong pressure by enemy infantry and armor continued in the SESSENHEIM and HERRLISHEIM areas, and the 43d Tank Battalion of the U S 12 Armored Division was lost in fighting in this sector. SESSENHEIM was retaken by the enemy. Barge movements indicated that enemy reinforcements were crossing the RHINE - probably elements of 10 SS Panzer Division, which was identified here the following day.

Fighting continued at HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN and northeast of REIPERTSWILLER, where the enemy was holding an organized defensive line.

19 January - D/157

Major elements of 10 SS Panzer Division were now identified in the HERRLISHEIM area in a large-scale attack whose apparent preliminary objective was BISCHWILLER. The ZORN Canal, west and southwest of HERRLISHEIM, was crossed in strength by enemy infantry and tanks - of which 28 of an estimated 50 employed were destroyed; these included two U S Shermans which probably were relics of the lost tank battalion.

An attack on ROHRWILLER was repulsed, but in the evening DRUSENHEIM was attacked and surrounded, resulting in the isolation of the 2d Battalion, 314 Infantry, U S 79 Division. Farther north in the SESSENHEIM area, elements of the 7 Parachute Division offered strong opposition to a counterattack by friendly troops. In the HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN area elements of the 21 Panzer and 25 Panzer Grenadier Divisions were still in action and two attacks on HATTEN were repulsed. In the HAARDT Mountains, 256 and 6 SS Mountain Divisions, heavily supported by artillery, were again aggressive. Two attacks, each in two-company strength, were beaten off north of REIPERTSWILLER, while enemy infiltration behind the 3d Battalion, 157 Infantry, U S 45 Division, cut it off from friendly forces.

20 January - D/158

An enemy attack west of HERRLISHEIM was repulsed early in the morning, but in general there was a marked lessening of enemy activity which may have been due either to the extremely bad weather or to regrouping for a resumption of the offensive. However, efforts to relieve the battalions cut off at DRUSENHEIM and northeast of REIPERTSWILLER were unsuccessful, and VI Corps began its withdrawal to the MODER River line.

21 January - D/159

VI Corps' withdrawal between REIPERTSWILLER and BISCHWILLER left most of the German divisions in this sector out of contact, except on the two flanks. Enemy probing in the east led to a fire fight near WEYERSHEIM, and armor was active near OBERHOFEN and BISCHWILLER, with one tank or self-propelled gun firing into the latter town. The enemy reacted to our patrol activity in the HAARDT Mountains, and several fire fights developed.

West of the mountains the enemy in the SAAR Valley was generally quiet, as he had been ever since 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division's last attack on RIMLING on 9/10 January.

22 January - D/160

Except for considerable observed movement and occasional patrol action, contact with the enemy was negligible as he followed up our withdrawal and regrouped his forces for a resumption of the offensive.



23 January - D/161

The enemy continued his regrouping and reinforcement against our MODER River line. Although his new order of battle was not yet completely clear, a few patrol actions and minor attacks yielded preliminary identifications. 10 SS Panzer Division sent out combat patrols in the HISCWILLER area. West of HAGUENAU the 47 Volksgrenadier Division appeared. It had come from DUREN and according to prisoners had taken part in the HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN battle on 16 January but had not then been identified by U S forces.

In the OFFWILLER sector 36 Volksgrenadier Division was active, infiltrating behind the town to capture it, and attacking unsuccessfully in battalion strength southeast of the town. ROTHBACH was occupied by the 6 SS Mountain Division, and 256 Volksgrenadier Division was reidentified in the REIPERTSWILLER area. The western half of the front remained quiet, with enemy dispositions unchanged.

24 January - D/162

Identification on this and the following day finally revealed the complete dispositions of the enemy divisions which had followed up our withdrawal: 553 Division remained on the GAMSHEIM flank; 21 Panzer Division came in next to it, in the HISCWILLER area, displacing 10 SS Panzer Division westward into the BISCHWILLER - HAGUENAU sector; west of HAGUENAU, 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 47 Volksgrenadier Divisions held a narrow sector; 36 Volksgrenadier, 6 SS Mountain and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions held the rest of the front to REIPERTSWILLER.

On the 24th, they were preparing for their last offensive. Probing action increased, and in some instances patrol activities developed into platoon- and company-strength attacks at BISCHOLTZ, MULHAUSEN and in the woods southwest of MERZWILLER. Late in the evening enemy troops crossed the canal southeast of MERZWILLER after a short artillery preparation but were driven back after a fire fight; remaining elements were still being mopped up during the night. Patrols of 15 to 25 men were active in the HAARDT Mountain area and enemy artillery increased slightly late in the day as WILDENGUTH was subjected to heavy-caliber harassing fire.

25 January - D/163

During the night 24/25 January, the front again burst into activity. Elements of 10 SS Panzer Division attacked across the MODER just east of HAGUENAU; they established a bridgehead which lasted until afternoon when they were forced back, leaving over 100 prisoners behind. Elements of 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 47 Volksgrenadier Divisions, operating in very narrow and virtually indistinguishable sectors west of HAGUENAU, were repulsed at two points but succeeded in crossing at a third, penetrating into OHLUNGEN Wood and SCHWEIGHAUSEN. Heavy fighting continued throughout the day but by evening the Germans were falling back in the woods and SCHWEIGHAUSEN was reported clear. Elements of 36 Volksgrenadier Division attacked at NIEFFERN unsuccessfully; however, small arms fire continued to be received from the two or three strong points in the town until it was destroyed by our artillery in the afternoon.

At MULHAUSEN, 6 SS Mountain Division put in a strong attack early in the morning and succeeded in reaching SCHILLERSDORF. There the enemy's forward elements were cut off and were being mopped up at the end of the day, although strong resistance continued at MULHAUSEN.

On the west flank of this last offensive, 50-75 infantrymen from 256 Volksgrenadier Division forced our outposts to withdraw near REIPERTSWILLER. The nearby town of SAEGMUHL was entered by our troops without opposition, but a subsequent enemy attack forced them to withdraw.



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Again only minor activity took place on the western half of the Army front.

26 January - D/164

The enemy failed to follow up his aggressiveness of the previous day. 10 SS Panzer Division, after its unsuccessful attempt to establish a bridgehead across the MODER River east of HAGUENAU, was completely quiet. West of HAGUENAU our lines were reestablished between SCHWEIGHAUSEN and NEUBOURG without contact, as elements of the 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute and 47 Volksgrenadier Divisions retired to the north bank of the MODER. Farther west, small arms fire was exchanged with elements of 36 Volksgrenadier Division in the MULHAUSEN - NIEFFERN area, while elements of 6 SS Mountain Division were cleared from SCHILLERSDORF.

27 January - D/165

Activity was negligible except for an exchange of small arms fire near MULHAUSEN and a fire fight at ROTHBACH in the VI Corps zone, and a 17-man attack south of ELIESBRUCKEN in the XV Corps zone. Although there was as yet no proof of enemy withdrawals from our front, the lack of activity here and the seriousness of the situation in POLAND made it appear likely that the enemy was preparing to move some of his divisions eastward.

28 January - D/166

The Army front was generally quiet with only minor contact, patrol activity and very light artillery fire reported. 21 Panzer Division was out of contact and was never again met by Seventh Army; it was enroute to the east, where it was later contacted by the Russians.

29 January - D/167

Enemy activity was again slight. Scattered small groups were observed and occasional patrol contacts reported, with artillery fire generally light. Both ground and air sources reported considerable movement behind the front facing VI Corps as the enemy continued his preparations for withdrawal of major elements.

30 January - D/168

Enemy activity continued slight throughout the entire front. Scattered small groups were again observed and friendly patrols made occasional contacts. Although 25 Panzer Grenadier Division still furnished an identification west of HAGUENAU, it was following 21 Panzer out of the line, as was 7 Parachute Division. 245 Infantry Division arrived on the line, taking up a sector between 47 and 36 Volksgrenadier Divisions. This division had remained quiet in the eastern HAARDT Mountains throughout the January offensives and had not even followed up the VI Corps withdrawal on 20 January. Apparently it was to be given a sector on the now inactive front to release stronger divisions for more urgent tasks.

31 January - D/169

Enemy activity continued negligible along the entire front throughout the day. Friendly patrols made occasional contacts.



R E S T R I C T E D

III. SUMMARY

The enemy had opened the January offensive with a total strength in infantry combat effectives of some 31,000 in the German First Army (see G-2 History for December 1944, page 2, and Annex II). During the operation he brought into the Seventh Army sector reinforcements totalling about 20,500, including both miscellaneous replacements and the infantry elements of four new divisions (7 Parachute, 10 SS Panzer, 47 Volksgrenadier, and the reconstituted 553 Volksgrenadier). Comparison of these totals with combat effectives in contact at the end of the month revealed that the enemy lost an estimated 17,000 killed and wounded during the month in addition to the 5,985 processed through the Seventh Army prisoner of war cage. In his persistent armored attacks he lost at least 176 tanks and self-propelled guns.

For his pains and losses he gained a small portion of northern ALSACE, whose villagers themselves expressed the best evaluation of the offensive when they called it "the last spam".

ANNEX I

- ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY -  
Infantry


Strength in Combat Effectives

	<u>1 Jan</u>	<u>7 Jan</u>	<u>13 Jan</u>	<u>19 Jan</u>	<u>25 Jan</u>	<u>31 Jan</u>
6 SS Mtn Div.	3500	3400	2500	2200	2000	1700
(In Reserve)						
7 Para Div.	H O L L A N D			3700	3500	0 of C
10 SS Pz Div.	D U R E N A R E A			4000	3300	2650
17 SS PG Div.	2200	1800	1800	1550	1600	1650
19 Inf Div.	1800	1500	1050	1050	1050	1300
21 Pz Div.	3000	2500	1600	1600	1400	0 of C
25 PG Div.	2500	1500	1300	1050	1000	0 of C
36 VG Div.	2400	1300	1500	1300	1300	1150
47 VG Div.	REFITTING IN GERMANY				2000	1650
245 Inf Div.	1400	1400	2800	2800	2800	2000
256 VG Div.	2100	1500	1150	1100	950	1450
257 VG Div.	3000	1600	1300	1300	1300	1450
347 Inf Div.	2000	1700	1500	1500	1500	1500
361 VG Div.	2300	750	500	400*	400*	HOLLAND
				0 of C	0 of C	
559 VG Div.	1900	1600	1200	1300	1300	1250
Misc Units - u/o						
553 VG Div.	--	--	--	2500	2500	2000
Misc Units	<u>3100</u>	<u>4500</u>	<u>4200</u>	<u>2600</u>	<u>2850</u>	<u>2400</u>
TOTALS	31200	25050	22400	29950	30750	22150


\* 361 VG Division staff and cadre were enroute to HOLLAND. However, the few surviving organic troops remained behind to become replacements for other divisions; in the last column they are included in their new units, of which the chief one was 256 VG Division.




JANUARY 1-5




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
JANUARY 10-15




JANUARY 16-20



JANUARY 21-25



JANUARY 26-31



Annex No. I - ENEMY OPERATIONS AGAINST SEVENTH ARMY



ANNEX III

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION NO. 6

Ref. No. X-1134

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
29 December 1944

I. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

A. Enemy Activities and Units in Contact.

The enemy's overall attitude has been defensive. Counterattacks have been based on limited objectives only and have not exceeded battalion strength.

In the RHINE Valley, the 256th, 21st Pz, and 245th Divisions delayed weakly back to the SIEGFRIED Line. There, reinforced and in strongly prepared positions, they offered considerable resistance. In the HARDT Mountains, the 361st and 25th P.G. Divisions were forced back on a series of strong MAGINOT Forts before BITCHE, where the enemy's determined resistance and good use of his positions and excellent observation, resulted in severe fighting. On the western slopes of the HARDT, the 257th Division, a new arrival, has not been active, probably due to the long sector it is manning. The 17th SS PG Division, along the LA ELIES River, before being withdrawn, showed aggressiveness in small counterattacks and was quick to occupy ground vacated by our troops. South of the SAAR, the 36th and 347th Divisions have been generally inactive.

Meanwhile, there have been indications of an enemy build-up in two areas: Agent reports, rail movement and PW statements indicate that one build-up area is in the East RHINE Valley and the COLMAR bridgehead. Rail movement, persistent PW statements, and photo interpretation indicates that an additional build-up is in progress in the SAARERUCKEN area.

B. Strength of Units in Contact and Strategic Reserves.

1. Strength of Units in Contact.

There are at present writing elements of nine divisions of the First German Army in contact with the forces of the Seventh U.S. Army west of the RHINE. The equivalent combat effective strength of these nine divisions, namely the 245th, 256th, 257th and 361st VGD's, the 19th, 36th and 347th Inf Divs, the 17th SS and 25th PGD's, and the 21st Pz Div, is believed not to exceed 16 - 17 battalions of American infantry. An estimated 120-130 tanks and SP's are believed to be in the area at the present time.

East of the RHINE River in the immediate sector of the Seventh Army, enemy forces are estimated at a combat effective strength not to exceed the equivalent of 8 battalions.

Contact with the mobile units of the German First Army, i.e., the 17th SS, 25th PGD and 21st Pz Div is very light and it is believed that they are undergoing reformation.

2. Strategic Reserves.

The current large scale offensive has resulted in the identification of all units of the Sixth SS Panzer Army and many other units of the enemy's carefully and cleverly husbanded strategic reserves. All mobile formations known to be in the west are now at least partially committed, but, with the "shuttle system" of the enemy in mind, it is to be expected that some of these mobile divisions will be made available if another offensive were attempted.



R E S T R I C T E D

Known to be out of line at the present time and reported to be reforming in GERMANY are the 331st, 344th, 346th, 48th, 59th and 89th Divisions.

Reported moving from the north into GERMANY are the 2nd Mtn, 6th SS Mtn and 710th Infantry Divisions. All at present are unlocated. In addition, the 559th VGD, which was reinforced by absorbing the remnants of the 48th Inf Division, has been out of contact since 16 December, and may be moving into a position of reserve.

East of the RHINE, the 553rd VGD, reported as both reforming and manning defenses in the KARLSRUHE area, is now believed to have been relieved of some of its defensive duties and may possibly be ready for commitment in the Seventh Army area.

The 216th Infantry Division is reportedly in the KARLSRUHE area, possibly responsible for a sector of the SIEGFRIED Line.

The 405th and 415th Infantry Divisions are believed to be located at OBERKIRCH and LUDWIGSBURG, respectively, and are believed to be administrative staffs controlling numerous miscellaneous units within their areas. These units appear capable of a defensive action only.

In addition to the above enumerated units, the enemy probably has at least five unidentified divisions in the process of reformation and capable of early commitment on the Western front.

C. Movements.

1. Movements.

General: During the first half of month of December only 75 missions flown, many under poor conditions of visibility with 7 days of no missions flown. Area covered included from line SARREGUEMINES (Q-5157) - ZWEIERUCKEN (Q-7372) - KAISERSLAUTERN (R-0294) - MANNHEIM (M-5400) east and south to HEILBRONN (S-0862) - STUTTGART (S-0722) - FREUDENSTADT (W-5085) - OFFENBURG (W-1686).

M/T movement was very scant and no significant pattern was developed. Rail movement was generally heavy but few trains of conventional troop size were reported. Very few carried M/T or armor and traffic did not indicate a troop or armored build-up in any specific area on Seventh Army front.

16 Dec - 26 Dec: Area coverage was increased, with change in Army boundaries to include the following area: SAARLAUTERN (Q-2980) - NORDFELD (L-5710) - KIRN (L-8032) - BAD KREUZNACH (M-0938) - BINGEN (M-1252) - FRANKFORT (M-6870) - DARMSTADT (M-6542) - HEIDELBERG (R-7090) and then as before.

Major movements reported included 4 columns M/T (N/F's 16 Dec.) approximately 17 miles in length from vic ST WENDELL (Q-5997) toward NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-5953). On 17 Dec. about 1,000 RR cars were reported idle on line from L-9700 - L-9018. No locomotives or unusual activity in area.

23 Dec. - 26 Dec: F/B's and Tac/R reported heavy rail activity in ZWEIERUCKEN - HOMBURG - NEUNKIRCHEN - ST INGHEERT (Q-5576) area with HOMBURG center of activity. Considerable two-way traffic HOMBURG - KAISERSLAUTERN to WORMS (M-4515).

On 26 Dec. 20 plus tanks reported by Tac/R scattered in field vic Q-4898. Heavy flak. Both Tac/R and F/B's report notable increase in flak in this general area in past 4 days.

Over Army front as whole rail traffic has been heavy with more than 60 trains noted each day for 24-25-26 Dec., with definitely increased activity in the HOMBURG area.

Main Routes: East of the RHINE the main N-S routes would appear to be the line HEIDELBERG-BRUCHSAL (R-6369) - DURLACH (R-5445) and south thru RASTATT (R-3259), though relatively little traffic runs below DURLACH; HEIDELBERG - HEILBRONN (via NECKAR River line) - STUTTGART and thence SW via



BOHLINGEN (R-9510) and HORB (W-7284). Main E-W routes are those running thru either BRUCHSAL, or PFORZHEIM (R-7033).

The rail bridges below MANNHEIM appear to carry traffic intended mostly for the area east of the HARDT Mtns, with relatively little traffic crossing thru the mountains south of KAISERSLAUTERN. Most of the traffic from the east of the RHINE, intended for the area to the west of the HARDT Mtns, on our front, appears to cross at or in the vicinity of MANNHEIM, especially at WORMS and in most cases to funnel thru the WORMS marshalling yards.

West of the RHINE, the net connecting LANDAU (R-2766) - NEUSTADT (R-3084) - SCHIFFERSTADT (R-4688) - SPEYER (R-5180) - GERMERSHEIM (R-4669) carries most of the traffic in this area. West of the HARDT Mtns, the major part of the traffic appears to be along the lines from WORMS to KAISERSLAUTERN and thence to the HOMBURG area, though there is also some traffic from farther north, which is not routed thru WORMS but comes down the lines from BAD KREUZNACH (M-0927).

Capabilities: There are four serviceable rail bridges over the RHINE, from MANNHEIM to KARLSRUHE (MANNHEIM, SPEYER, GERMERSHEIM, MAXIMILLIANSAU), with an adequate railnet on either side of the river. It is believed, therefore, that the enemy will be able to supply the front opposite VI Corps, even though most of these bridges are destroyed. Similarly the MANNHEIM and WORMS bridges can perform the same service for traffic destined for the HOMBURG area, as well as the bridges farther north at KASTEL (M-3758) and HINGEN (M-1152). Destruction of all of these bridges would seriously affect the enemy's supply system and destruction of some of them, particularly those to the south, would help to canalize much of the traffic and make it a far better target for our fighter bombers than it now presents.

There are constant reports of a lack of locomotives, lubricants and personnel to keep them running, but there has been no apparent abatement of the enemy's ability to carry on the majority of his supply by rail. It is unlikely that much of this task could be taken over by motor transport, which has been placed on an almost exclusively operational basis, if the very small numbers observed in both rear and forward areas are any criterion.

#### D. Component Elements.

##### 1. Artillery.

Closer contact with the SIEGFRIED and MAGNOT defenses has encountered increased enemy artillery activity. Improved visibility and general stabilization of the front has made it possible to determine many new enemy gun locations from the photo coverage of the past week.

Disregarding located AA guns, tanks and SP's, it appears that the reduced amount of divisional artillery has been reinforced by an equal amount of HQ reserve artillery. Enemy artillery is well dispersed across the front with the largest concentrations in two areas: one northeast of WISSEMBOURG (R-1548), and the other northeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q-5157). Northeast of WISSEMBOURG more than 80 gun locations have been reported in an area 5,000 meters square. Of the 581 gun locations opposite Seventh Army (22 Dec.), 89 are identified as Antiaircraft Artillery, 163 as light, 66 as medium, with 263 unidentified. A few scattered reports of heavy artillery activity have been received but no heavy gun locations have been determined.

The enemy can be expected to continue to place the bulk of his artillery fire on forward elements, especially during periods of aggressive action. In sectors of little activity, more artillery fire can be expected on our roadnets, villages and communications centers.

##### 2. Air. (By A-2, XII T.A.C.)

Although the revitalized G.A.F., greatly reinforced in the West,



has assumed large scale operations in direct support of the present German offensive, it is estimated that the S/E day fighter strength normally opposing Seventh Army has remained at the figure of a month ago, i.e., some 100 aircraft. This force is capable of flying a maximum of 100-125 sorties for any given daylight period.

It is necessary, however, to take a broad perspective of the enemy's capabilities, especially in view of the very high degree of excellence attained by the German Air Staff in the planning of air support for the present offensive in the West, and the enterprise and initiative with which it has been carried out. The following extract from IX Tactical Air Command's periodic report clearly shows that the G.A.F. is still capable of striking rather heavy blows of a tactical nature in direct support of ground units:

"A sustained air offensive on the First U.S. Army front began on the evening of 16 December at about 2030 hours. By morning the G.A.F. had flown over 200 sorties in the area, using a great variety of aircraft including FW 190's, JU 88's, HE 111's, ME 210's, DO 217's, JU 87's and JU 52's. Strafing and bombing attacks were carried on throughout the night. Towards dawn a large but undetermined number of paratroopers were dropped to disorganize communications....and the air effort did not dissipate during the day of 17 December." (It is now known that the G.A.F. flew an estimated 550-600 sorties on the 17th, the biggest day of German air activity since D-day in Normandy).

It is estimated that at present there are around 1,000 S/E day fighters on the Western front divided into five main areas dictated by the general layout of the airfields. Zone 1: TWENTE-ENSCHEDÉ/PLANTLUNNE with the groups of associated airfields; Zone 2: BOENNINGHARDT/KIRCHHELLEN; Zone 3: OSTHEIM/WAHN/EUDENBACH/BONN; Zone 4: RHEIN-MAIN/ESCHBORN/NIDDA/LANGENDIEBACH, and Zone 5: STUTTGART. While the STUTTGART area is the only portion of the G.A.F. directly opposing the Seventh Army (approximately 100 aircraft), it must be appreciated that around 400-450 S/E day fighters in Zone 4 are within operational radius of the Seventh Army front and must therefore be considered a potential supplement to any G.A.F. force operating against an appreciated ground threat from this end.

At present juncture of military developments and the obvious intention of the G.A.F. to give all possible support to the breakthrough in the West, it is not thought probable that any reinforcement in this area is likely. The fact remains, however, that the enemy has the capability of flying some 300-350 day fighter sorties against the Seventh Army according to the dictates of the ground situation. In accordance with present G.A.F. policy of "round the clock" close support operations, it must also be expected that night ground attack will penetrate into Seventh Army's sector. This effort probably will not exceed 20-25 sorties, as the main effort, both day and night, remains in the northern area.

#### E. Terrain and Weather as they Affect the Enemy.

##### 1. Terrain.

Terrain on the Seventh Army front favors the enemy. Three major features contribute to this condition:

a. The RHINE River. This broad, swift, north-flowing river forms a continuous right flank which is almost as long as the front itself. Although not in continuous physical contact with the enemy, this front is vulnerable to infiltration or penetration. Extensive patrol activity and the dissipation of considerable strength is required to keep it secure.

The swampy, twisting river bank with its numerous islands affords the enemy a flank of opportunity which is too long for our forces to hold solidly and which is ideal for continuous harassment and irritation by means of large and small patrol infiltration activity, always holding in the background the threat of an attack in force and the establishment of a bridge-head if a weak spot can be found.



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b. The Low VOSGES and HARDT Mountains. These comparatively low, rugged, heavily wooded mountains lie in a northeasterly direction along the axis of our advance and approximately in the center of our front, where they form a strong barrier to our troops to the east and west. There are few good roads across this feature. The main ones being PHALSBURG - SAVERNE, INGWILLER - WINGEN sur MODER, NIEDERBRONN les BAINS - BITCHE. Control of these roads is imperative to the coordinated command of troops on both sides of this range.

This feature provides the enemy with a natural defensive position across the center of our front which has been well improved with portions of the SIEGFRIED Line. So long as he holds this high commanding ground our advances on the low ground, east and west, must go through heavy belts of prepared positions and be subjected to flank attacks. The positions across the range allow him to hold this ground with a minimum number of men and thus allows him to release and thin out units for counterattacks without jeopardizing his line. The rugged character of the terrain running the length of the entire feature offers him a temporarily secure flank for a counterattack in force if he is willing to gamble on holding the main, cross mountain roads for a limited time, in an effort to split our forces and destroy or disperse them in detail.

c. The SAAR River. This north flowing river lies about 10 miles west of and parallel to the Low VOSGES. In the vicinity of SAARBURG the SAAR River is paralleled (about 4 miles to the west) by the Canal HOULLERE de la SARRE and a series of lakes extending north to MITTERSHEIM. The canal and the SAAR converge on SALTZERONN where they meet and follow a winding course north to SARREGUEMINES. Between these waterways and the mountains to the east lies a rolling, lightly wooded plain from 10 - 12 miles in width which extends south from the vicinity of SARREGUEMINES for approximately 30 miles to the vicinity of SAARBURG, PHALSBOURG and the strategic SAVERNE Gap.

This river, with its parallel canal and lakes, favors the enemy, particularly if he elects to make a sudden thrust on a comparatively narrow front for a limited objective. Should he elect to drive down the valley between the mountains and the SAAR, the river forms a natural right flank and the lakes and swampy woodland south of MITTERSHEIM afford excellent protection, particularly during the early stages of a rapid penetration. Should he elect to drive south from SARREGUEMINES and exploit to the southwest and west, the river affords him a good left flank line from which he could make reinforcement from east to west extremely difficult.

## 2. Weather.

Weather in general favors the enemy. Rain, mist and cloudy weather have continually reduced the effectiveness of our air superiority and have often seriously interfered with "Cub" flights and air OPs.

There can be little doubt that the enemy has taken full advantage of the opportunities afforded him by bad weather to move needed supplies to the front and to advanced supply depots. In clear weather our air superiority restricts his movement to night almost exclusively. In bad weather he can often move troops and equipment in large quantities without interference or observation.

A decrease is expected shortly in rain and clouds although cloudy conditions, adverse for air observation, will remain high with about 70% of the days favoring the enemy. A brief "good weather" cycle is now closing and will shortly be followed by at least two weeks of poor to bad weather.

Weather is expected to favor enemy operations (in regard to blinding our Air Corps) until about 10 February. The remainder of February, however, will favor Allied air operations with a preponderance of clear, cold days, followed by two months during which poor weather and rain will predominate.



## II. CONCLUSIONS.

### A. Capabilities.

1. To attack south from BITCHE - SARREGUEMINES area with 5 to 8 divisions with initial objective of seizing SAVERNE and INGWILLER Passes.

#### Discussion.

Objective of this attack would be to clear the RHINE Valley, capture or destroy the bulk of the Seventh Army, and indirectly to relieve pressure of Third U.S. Army against German forces in the EIFEL area.

This attack would probably be coordinated with a drive northward by the Nineteenth Army from the COLMAR Bridgehead and the establishment of a bridgehead in the GAMBESHEIM area (R-1010).

Terrain features favor the attack south from SARREGUEMINES area. The west flank can be rested on the SARRE River - HOUILLERES Canal line. The HARDT Mountains afford excellent east flank protection based on the blocking of the main East-West passes. Rolling, lightly wooded terrain lying between the HARDTS and the SARRE is favorable for armored exploitation to the south, where the seizure of the north bank of the RHINE-MARNE Canal between HERTZING (R-4009) and LUTZELBOURG (Q-6415) will secure the southern flank and the initial objective, as well as disrupting communications between the two Corps of Seventh Army. Holding attacks in the HARDT Mountains and the HIENWALD (WISSEMBOURG - LAUTERBOURG area) would exert pressure to hold Seventh Army units in place. The establishment of a bridgehead in the GAMBESHEIM area, and a drive north from COLMAR Bridgehead with two to three divisions, coordinated with the forces driving east from SAVERNE and INGWILLER, would, if successful, isolate STRASBOURG, cut the communications of all units in line, and complete the encirclement of Seventh Army forces east of HARDT Mountains.

The employment of parachutists, agents and saboteurs to seize key communications centers, accomplish destruction, demolitions and spread panic, must be expected.

2. To attack southwest from the VOLKINGEN - FORBACH - SARREGUEMINES area with 5 to 8 divisions and the mission of capturing METZ and securing the crossings over the MOSELLE.

#### Discussion.

The objective of this attack would be to split the Seventh and Third Armies, to drive north from METZ toward LUXEMBOURG in conjunction with a coordinated southward drive by German forces in the EIFEL area. Here again, terrain favors the enemy. The SARRE River and HOUILLERES Canal would provide East flank protection, while the SELLE River and swamp area south and east of DIEUZE present obstacles which could be economically defended in holding the southern flank. Terrain along the SARREGUEMINES - MORHANGE (Q-2037) - METZ axis is comparatively favorable for armored operations.

3. With forces currently in contact and in immediate reserve, launch a series of limited objective attacks.

#### Discussion.

The purpose of such attacks would be to keep Seventh Army units under sufficient pressure to prevent dispatch of troops to EIFEL area. Demonstrations, real and dummy para-drops, flare activity, infiltration, and other tactics designed to create apprehension, nervousness, and cause dispersion of forces in extensive patrolling, can be expected in conjunction with efforts to maintain pressure on Seventh Army units.



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4. Counterattack from BIENWALD Forest and HARDT Mountains to seize general line WOERTH - SOULTZ SOUS FORETS - SELTZ.

Discussion.

The main objective of this attack would be to retake the high ground west and northwest of WISSEMBOURG. Should this attack meet with initial success, a continuation of the attack toward HAGUENAU is a reasonable expectation. The successful accomplishment of this offensive would enable the enemy to reestablish himself on the MAGINOT Line from BITCHE Eastward. It would relieve him of the responsibility of manning 15 miles of vulnerable river line, and would further eliminate artillery fire on KARLSRUHE.

B. Favored Capabilities.

Capabilities 3 and 1 are favored in that order.

The most logical and economical employment of forces now in contact and known to be in reserve would be in demonstrations, threats, infiltrations and limited objective attacks designed to contain the Seventh Army in its present positions.

Indications of enemy concentrations and build-ups in the SAARBRUCKEN area and in the East RHINE Valley are disturbing, however, and the Nineteenth Army's determination to hold the COLMAR bridgehead may shortly assume added significance. Certainly the recovery of ALSACE, in addition to its military value, would provide a tremendous uplift to German morale, particularly if the attack in the EIFEL area fails to achieve any substantial success.

Additional confirmation of the SAARBRUCKEN and East RHINE Valley area build-ups will tend to favor Capability 1. Conversely, identification of the 21st Pz and/or other mobile units of the First German Army in the EIFEL area will be indicative of less ambitious enemy intentions in ALSACE.

The current success of the Third U.S. Army's counterattack from the South, and the enemy's apparent emphasis on operations to the northwest in the EIFEL sector, tends to discount Capability 2.

/s/ William W. Quinn  
/t/ WILLIAM W. QUINN,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

X-3



XX 15 XX 25 ? VOLKSSTURM (L OF C)  
 21 \$\$ 6MTN ?



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**HOLDING**

D+1

TOTAL  
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 106     ?

**COPY OF WORK MAP PREPARED  
20 DEC 1944 BY AC OF S G-2  
SEVENTH ARMY.**





RESTRICTED

1 JAN

1 JAN

7 JAN

24 JAN

17 JAN

5 JAN

ANNEX IV  
ACTUAL GERMAN  
OFFENSIVE

1 JAN - 25 JAN

7 JAN

21 JAN



R E S T R I C T E D

ANNEX V

THE GERMAN VERSION

(NOTE: Reproduced verbatim below is a translation of a German historical report, obtained from an officer who was an editor of War Diaries at OKW).

- - -

The "Northwind" (Nordwind)' Operation.

(The Liberation of Northern ALSACE)

(21 December 1944 - 13 January 1945)

The withdrawal of enemy bridgeheads on the SAAR led to the conclusion that the enemy had withdrawn additional forces from this sector and would probably continue to withdraw forces. On 21 December, therefore, High Command West directed Army Group G to exploit this situation, specifically through local attacks and preparations of a surprise attack to regain the SAVERNE Gap. The utmost secrecy was ordered; the preparations were to represent the imminent evacuation of Army Group D<sup>2</sup>.

On 22 December, the Fuehrer ordered two armored and three infantry divisions to attack, if possible, to the south with the object of attacking American units in the WISSEMBOURG area from the rear. The Fuehrer expected better results from this action than from an attack from the VOSGES bridgehead<sup>3</sup> which would require first the bringing up of the requisite forces. Everything was to be done to deceive and tie down the enemy along the entire front.

Instructions were given accordingly to High Command West on 22 December, which therefore rescinded its previous order of 21 December. In addition, orders were given to investigate whether with local forces the front could be shifted forward from the ORSCHOLZRIEGEL<sup>4</sup> if the left flank of the Third Army advanced. At present, 4 infantry divisions and 3 mobile task forces were provided for the initial attack against the SAVERNE Gap. The Commander of Oberrhein<sup>5</sup> was informed thereof, and asked to support this attack by shock troop operations, and to assist in the establishment of bridgeheads north and south of STRASBOURG.

A conference with Army Group G was held on 24 December.

The signal operations instructions issued on 25 December designated the new operation with the code word "Nordwind." The report of Army Group G announced that the objective of the operation was to gain the SAVERNE Gap in the PHALSBOURG - SAVERNE sector, in order to then annihilate the enemy in North ALSACE and to secure a juncture with the Nineteenth Army. For this purpose, two attack groups were to be readied.

1st Group to attack from east of the ELIES toward the south, in order to breach the MAGINOT Line at ROHRBACH and there to make a juncture with the right flank of the 2d Group for a thrust against PHALSBOURG.

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ANNEX V



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2d Group to attack east of BITCHE in several spearheads and reach the line ENCKENBERG - (in pencil; SARREINSBERG ? WIMMENAU ?) and there link up with the 1st Group, then, depending on the situation, to attack either east or west to PHALSBOURG - SAVERNE. For this operation, the 21 Panzer Division was to be prepared east of BITCHE, and committed according to the way the situation developed; the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division was to be in reserve southeast of ZWEIHRUCKEN so that it could be committed to either the 1st or the 2d Attack Group. To deceive the enemy an attack was ordered in the ORSCHOLZRIEGEL sector for 30 December.

On 26 December, High Command West informed Army Group G of the Fuehrer's request that the attack of the right attack group be undertaken in such a way that with cover against the SAAR, as well as against SAVERNE, it could quickly reach the highway to PHALSBOURG - SAVERNE. Therefore it was necessary to move the right flank of the XIII SS Army Corps westward to the ELIES at ELIESHRUCKEN, and from there, by way of WOELFING, to take quickly the highway running south from ROHRBACH. For this purpose, the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division, as well as the 21 Panzer Division were designated as reserves. They were to be so situated in the northern area that after the breakthrough, they could be rapidly shoved south, past the ROHRBACH West Group. On orders of the Fuehrer, the attack over the upper RHINE was not to begin until 48 hours after the initial attack, and the attack at ORSCHOLZRIEGEL, which had been intended to deceive the enemy, was called off.

Since the opponent withdrew further forces, the Fuehrer, on 27 December, ordered the start of the attack for 2300 hours on 31 December. The Oberrhein Army Group was to be committed only when our own<sup>6</sup> armored spearheads had reached the east exits of the VOSGES in the INGWILLER - SAVERNE area. Its mission was to penetrate the enemy front along the RHINE north of STRASBOURG and to attempt a juncture with our own forces which would be turning east from the VOSGES mountains to the HAGUENAU - BRUMATH area.

On the same day, the Oberrhein Army Group announced its intentions; namely the preparation of a further bridgehead on both sides of GAMBSHEIM by the 553 Volksgrenadier Division with limited, local attacks on the north front of the Nineteenth Army, and an attack by a battalion on the south front to tie down the enemy. An attack with further objectives on the Army's northwest front would only be possible after 3 January, since another infantry division would have to be released for this operation.

On 3 January, the Joint Operation Staff made plans for an additional operation in conjunction with the "Nordwind" operation, (the smashing of 4-5 American divisions between FORBACH and PHALSBOURG).<sup>7</sup>

On 4 January, the Oberrhein High Command received (it had been warned on 1350, 2 January) the order to attack on the night of 5-6 January, or even on 5 January if the situation warranted. It was further instructed to make immediate preparations to enable the commitment of all available forces of the Nineteenth Army in an attack to the north and northwest in order to effect a juncture with the First Army.

On 6 January, the Chief of Staff who had been driven to Army Group G, reported that our own infantry forces were partly exhausted, and that superiority over the enemy was only slowly being accomplished. The enemy, apparently, intended to keep lower ALSACE to support the MAGINOT Line. It was, therefore, impossible to have an offensive push from lower ALSACE without the addition of new forces. The result, therefore, depended on the success of the thrust by the XXXIX Panzer Corps.<sup>8</sup> In case this unit could not break through, consideration would have to be given to the desirability of seeking a decision with all the available forces in the HAGUENAU area.



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On 7 January, the Oberrhein High Command received the order from the Fuehrer to lighten the task of Army Group G by exerting steady pressure from the GAMBESHEIM bridgehead, and making the most of the success achieved at RHEINAU, in the meantime the 269 Infantry Division would be brought up and committed against MOLSHEIM.

7 January: Received notice of the arrival of large units at Army Group G if transportation situation remains unchanged:

10 SS Panzer Division by 13-14 January.

7 Parachute Division by 12-13 January.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (not ordered yet; possibly by 15 January).

Reinforced artillery by 8-9 January.

11 Panzer Division alerted for march, therefore ready immediately.

2 Mountain Division; first regimental group by 12 January.

According to the impressions gained by the Chief of Staff who was with the troops on 6 and 7 January, the morale and behavior of the troops was altogether blameless, despite the extreme physical strain and the material superiority of the enemy. After overcoming the initial shock, the enemy's planning capabilities and resistance increased. By skillfully maneuvering shock troops through the breaches, the enemy threatened our own supply routes. Because he was able to relieve troops, the enemy was always able to use fresh troops, whereas our own had to fight without rest. The terrain was not favorable for rapid advances because of the limitations of vision. The battling for heights and localities wasted our strength, which was already extended to the last measure by the necessity of living out in the open. The visible abatement of combat strength could be explained by the short and insufficient training given by the Reserve Army (Ersatzheer), by the dearth of old and proven non-commissioned officers, and able battalion and company commanders. One battalion of the 362<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division had only 15 men, another had only 60 men.

Attacks were made irregularly due to the lack of troops, and in such a way that the sectors were broadening. The intervening ground could not be cleared out so that advanced forces had to be recalled. A preliminary condition for new attacks was the availability of replacements. Even our own artillery was insufficient; advanced observation posts and radio apparatus were lacking. Supplies were available, but their distribution was difficult. The armored forces lacked spare parts; the orders for these required a considerable time.

The order by the Fuehrer on the morning of 8 January to continue the battle again repeated that the Army Group G was to contact the strongest enemy forces in the lower VOSGES (mountains) and northwest thereof, and to force a breakthrough south of WISSENBURG. The objective was unchanged: to gain the SAVERNE Gap and annihilate the enemy forces between the lower VOSGES and the RHINE.

On 9 January, the Fuehrer issued a new order to the High Command West, the High Command Oberrhein, and to the Air Forces Hq. stating that it was necessary for the next operation to finish successfully the battle for HAGUENAU and to annihilate the forces located between the lower VOSGES and the RHINE. For this purpose, all forces within the sector of Army Group G, with the exception of the 11 Panzer Division, were to be used. The aim was to complete the collapse of the enemy front north of HAGUENAU by a fast attack by the XXXIX Panzer Corps by way of SULZ on MERWEILER, and through a simultaneous attack by the 256 Infantry Division in the direction of ZINSWEILER. The 7 Parachute Division was to be used either behind the XXXIX Panzer Corps or next to the 256 in order to open the south-east exits of the lower VOSGES. The decision for this action was to depend on the activities of the following day.



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As soon as possible, contact with the bridgehead of the XIV SS Army Corps was to be established by the advance of the 10 SS Panzer Division east of the Forest of HAGUENAU. The next objective of the mobile forces of Army Group G was still the SAVERNE Gap. To attain the western exits of the lower VOSGES, it would be necessary to employ the 2d Mountain Division and the 6 SS Mountain Division. The decision as to whether and when the northern wing of the Nineteenth Army could be committed against MOLSHEIM depended upon the forthcoming situation.

On 9 January, a message was received by the Operational Staff, Hq. West, from the Commander of Army Group G, Generaloberst BLASKOWITZ. It stated that the "Nordwind" operation had become static after initial successes due to the lack of infantry troops, despite the fact that other sectors had been stripped of troops. There were insufficient infantry troops to mop up the conquered territory, nor were there enough to furnish the necessary replacements to the attacking units. The enemy had to flee as long as we had the initiative. However, his superior mobility, forces, and equipment, and his mastery of the air, would enable the enemy to reconsolidate his lines, after recovering from the initial surprise. It was, likewise, possible for the enemy to seize the initiative at a propitious opportunity.

The solution required by the situation, that of launching the XXXIX Panzer Corps through the WISSEMBOURG depression, had not had the desired results. The depletion of other fronts could only be continued as long as the enemy continued to divert additional forces from the Army Group B front, and Army Group G retained the initiative. That could only be accomplished by the employment of all available forces, within a limited area, so that tactical success would be certain. Further operational requirements could only be derived from this success.

The moment that this situation should change, the enemy would be in a favorable position to attack. Such action could have dire consequences. The Army Group, therefore advanced the thesis that the "Zahnarzt" operation could be placed on a sound basis, both operationally and tactically, only after the battle for HAGUENAU had been fought. It, therefore, considered it necessary to take the risk in the TRIER - HITCHER sector and after thorough preparation to commit all infantry forces in the VOSGES and force the exits between INGWILLER and NIEDERBRONN in order to attack the BRUMATH - HAGUENAU line. The XIV SS Corps would, likewise, have to advance against this line from the OSSENDORF bridgehead.

In order to permit no respite for the enemy, a continuation of the attack by the XXXIX Panzer Corps along the northwest edge of the HAGUENAU Forest would have to be considered, in order to divert enemy forces to this area. Then, an unrelenting attack by the 256 Volksgrenadier Division, the 47 Volksgrenadier Division, the 7 Parachute Division, the 6 SS Mountain Division, and the Combat Group of the 2 Mountain Division could take the mentioned VOSGES passages, and the 10 and 11 SS Panzer Divisions could attack HAGUENAU from the VOSGES mountains. If enough bridging, etc. material were at hand, the XXXIX Panzer Corps could be sent via SELTZ - SOUFFLENHEIM against HAGUENAU.

If the battle of HAGUENAU were over, all further operative possibilities would be on a sound basis; an attack east of the VOSGES in the direction of MOLSHEIM - SAVERNE, or an attack west of the VOSGES for the "Zahnarzt" operation. The Army Group G, therefore, asked for a consideration of the proposal that these forces be used, first, for the completion of the "Nordwind" operation, and then after being regrouped, for the "Zahnarzt" operation.

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In the event that it should be committed independently of the "Nordwind" operation, the attack against SAARALBEN - SAARUNION would require at least 4 fresh infantry divisions, and one additional division to furnish flank protection, along with the exhausted 361 and 257 Divisions. The attack would, further, require the support of 100 assault guns and tanks, since it would have to be made against 2 French Armored Division, and Army armored units of the 45 and 36 American divisions. The northern attack of the "Zahnarzt" operation from the area south of SAARBRUCKEN would require at least 2-3 armored and 2 infantry divisions, one of which divisions, together with 347 and 19 Volksgrenadier Divisions, would have to provide flank protection.

Thus, a demand for 3 infantry and 2-3 armored divisions resulted. At disposal were the following units, with full combat strength: 10 SS Panzer Division, 11 Panzer Division, 7 Parachute Division; other battle-fatigued units: 6 SS Mountain Division, 21 Panzer Division, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division and the 2 SS Mountain Division. Thus, 4-5 units were lacking.

The Commander-in-Chief noted in this connection that the decisive thrust would be conducted from the VOSGES against the SAAR and the secondary thrust from the area south of SAARBRUCKEN in a southeasterly direction. This would be ineffectual without the success of the eastern pincer. For that reason, the forces cited above had to endeavor to join the pincers from SAARALBEN. If these were not available, there remained the possibility of conducting the main thrust from SAARBRUCKEN against the line SAARALBEN - WITTRING with strong points at the right, and of forming a small counterpincers from the ELIESBRUCKEN - RIMLING sector against the ZETTING - WITTRING sector. Perhaps then the possibility of pushing forward with the eastern group eastward to RALLING and the VOSGES would arise. At the same time the eastern group would have to break through the MAGINOT Line at WITTRING in order to bring about the connection.

The Commander of the western fortifications made a concurring observation.

Order of the Fuehrer of 11 January (effective 12 January, 0145). The attack of the XXXIX Panzer Corps at RITTERSHOFFEN had bogged down, and the enemy had shifted his main effort there. For that reason, it was ordered that the 7 Parachute Division, reinforced by the 667 and 384 Assault Gun Brigades and the 10 SS Panzer Division should launch an attack as soon as possible from the area of FORSTFELD - BIENHEIM via ROESCHWOOG in the direction of DRUSENHEIM, in order to make contact with the 503<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division. The goal of this attack was to push through the HAGUENAU Forest southwards, shifting via HIRSCHWILLER to the west and, in conjunction with the attack of the First Army (6 SS Mountain Division and 256 Infantry Division) in the direction of ZINSWEILER and NIEDERBRONN, to destroy the enemy located north of the HAGUENAU Forest. If the counterattack in the direction of DRUSENHEIM succeeded, the mass of the XXXIX Panzer Corps was also to follow. Until then, the Corps was to simulate the continuation of the attack against EITSCHDORF by artillery and assault detachments. The weaker parts of the 7 Parachute Division could also be thus employed, but in such a way that they remained available for the main attack from BIENHEIM to the south.

This order was supplemented on 12 January. The forces which took up positions in the area FORSTFELD - BIENHEIM were to be subordinated to the XXXIX Panzer Corps, which in turn was to come under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Oberrhein. The Commander-in-Chief West was to rush as many Jagdtiger to the Corps as possible and - as soon as it was possible to bring them up - was to introduce the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division or the 21 Panzer Division. The attack was to commence only when sufficient forces were there to be able to exploit the breakthrough immediately. It was necessary that the attack go forward steadily. The expenditure of the infantry of the attack divisions in guerrilla battles would have to be prevented.



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The Passing of the Initiative in the Attack-areas to the enemy: 14-28 January.

On 8 January the Fuehrer had given the instruction to pull out the 6 Panzer Army in order to be able to meet an enemy counterattack and to take our own MLR back to the line DONCHAMPS - LONGCHAMPS (NW of BASTOGNE). On 14 February the Fuehrer consented to the Commander-in-Chief West's withdrawal of the bulge in the front to the line CHERAIN - directly east of HOUFFALIZE (which was to remain under fire of our own artillery) - BOURZY - old MLR south of LONGVILLY, and this was to be done promptly so that no further heavy casualties would occur in Army Group B.

On 15 January it was ordered that the I and II SS Panzer Corps were to be rested for a limited time during the period between 20 - 30 January in the area of the Commander-in-Chief West.

On 17 January it was ordered that Army Command 19 was also to be subordinated on 19 January to the Oberrhein Commander for duty. On 19 January the Fuehrer ordered the Commander-in-Chief West to assemble at the Fuehrer's disposal in the shortest possible time Panzer Army Command 6 and the Fuehrer-Grenadiers and the Fuehrer-Escort Brigade in the area EUSKIRCHEN - PRUEM - EITBURG - ADNEAU, where upon arrival these formations would become Army High Command Reserve. The rest ordered on 15 January was to be effected there. The 11 Panzer Division was to be assembled south of SAARBURG after completing its mission.

On 20 January (0205) the Commander-in-Chief West was informed that it appeared that the whole Sixth Panzer Army with the 4 SS Panzer Division<sup>1</sup> and both Fuehrer Brigades would be required on the eastern front. The decision would be given in the afternoon.

On 20 January (1855) the quickest possible shipment of the I SS Panzer Corps, with the 1 and 12 SS Panzer Divisions as well as the Corps troops, to the east via BERLIN was ordered.

On the same day (20 January) the Abt. Fremde Heere West submitted a study concerning the possible planning of the Western Powers up to 1 May.

1. Enemy situation: The enemy's intentions of attacking east of AACHEN and between LUXEMBOURG and the RHINE over the HAUFÉ were thwarted by our own attack in the ARDENNES. Next the enemy would attempt to recreate the old front, in order to prevent the flanking of the AACHEN area. A thrust into the EIFEL, which is an unsuitable area for attack, was not to be reckoned with. A cleaning-up of the SAAR - PFALZ foreplain and the elimination of the RHINE bridgeheads were possibilities. Then the preparation for an attack to seek a decision will begin. Flying weather and the condition of the terrain would decide the beginning; consequently the attack should occur about May. The British had at their disposal more than 22 major units, in May would have well over 25, if not more; the Americans more than 51, on 1 May over 69 - 75 divisions approximately; the French more than 8, on 1 May over 14; a total of more than 108 - 113, instead of the presently available 79. Indications of the hidden aims were not yet available; they could only be established as hypotheses.

On 21 January SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer HAUSSER was entrusted with the provisional command of Army Group Oberrhein, since the Reichsfuehrer of the SS had taken over the new Army Group WEICHSEL.

On 22 January a new instruction was given. The British attack south of ROERMOND, the American attack in the ARDENNES bulge, the bitter actions in



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lower ALSACE and the French attack in the upper VOSGES showed the intention of the enemy: to hinder the German command in disposing its reserves and thereby to extend the successes of the Russians until the collapse of the Reich's defenses. In order to counteract this, the Fuehrer decided to create the prerequisites for stopping the Russians and to go over to the counter-attack. For that reason the shipment of Panzer Army Command 6, both Fuehrer-Brigades, 1 Infantry Division or Volksgrenadier Division, two Volks Artillerie Korps and several bridge trains was ordered. The Fuehrer intended to disband High Command Oberrhein and to subordinate its units again to Army Group G; the Commander-in-Chief West was to announce the suitable time.

The Commander-in-Chief West received the command to regroup his forces in the center and in the north of the western front in accordance with the enemy's intentions, which were aiming at the RUHR territory and later at HOLLAND. The high land west of the OURE would be given up only step by step and under pressure. If the enemy pulled still stronger forces out of the ARDENNES to the north, Panzer Army Command 5 would have to be taken out of the front so that it could be put in again at the point of main effort.

In the lower VOSGES and on the upper RHINE the attack - with the objective previously indicated in mind - was to be continued as long as there was any expectation of destroying the enemy north of the HAGUENAU - SAVERNE line or of compelling a retreat beyond the SAVERNE Gap, and consequently renewing contact with the Nineteenth Army on the VOSGES crest.

The Luftwaffe received the mission of supporting the Commander-in-Chief West by using late-model aircraft to bomb the enemy territory, with the main effort at ANTWERP. The Army was to be supported directly only by units which were not suitable for ANTWERP, and this only within the framework of the operational situation. The fighter units were supposed to protect rear-front communications. Three fighter groups were to be shifted to the east.

Elements of the III Flak Corps were to protect the loadings of the Sixth Panzer Army and were to be shifted with it to the east. The enemy had to be kept in the dark as long as possible concerning the changed intentions. Each day was a gain. The impression had to be created by deception that the departing forces were to be employed in HOLLAND and in ALSACE.<sup>12</sup>

On 23 January (1230) the Commander-in-Chief West announced this instruction:

An attack against the Twenty-fifth Army still appeared to be improbable at that time; on the other hand, the enemy would shortly resume the attack against COLOGNE which had been interrupted in December, this time with the participation of Second British Army, and consequently also against the western front of Army Group H. The enemy could employ for this purpose about 24 formations with about 2500 tanks. In addition, an attack against the MOSELLE Gate with 5-6 units was possible, but not until the first half of February.

In lower ALSACE the enemy would hold first in the northern part, perhaps even on the line SAVERNE Gap - RHINE north of STRASBOURG. But there was no operational necessity to do this, if he did not want to save forces for another position, somewhere around SAARBRUCKEN.

2. Our own measures:

a) Army Group H: Reinforced by the 361 Volksgrenadier Division, to be rested at ZWOLLE; one Panzer Grenadier Division to be transferred from Army Group B and Heavy Heeres-Panzer Jager Abteilung 655; in addition if possible, by an Infantry Division or Volksgrenadier Division from ALSACE (all behind the front of the Fortress Army.)



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b) Army Group B: After withdrawal of all units and vehicles, defense of the line: ROER to WEIDEN - KESTERNICH - west from (illegible) - west from SCHOENBERG - OURE sector - Westwall; shifting the forces released thereby (about 3 Volksgrenadier Divisions, 3 mobile formations, the bulk of the Volks Artillerie Korps and the Volkswerber Brigades) to the AACHEN area. For this the following organizations of command:

Panzer Army Command 5 as Group ROER from the right Army Group boundary to DUREN exclusive; behind it the XXXVII Panzer Corps with three mobile formations as Army Group Reserve.

Army Command 15 as Group EIFEL - north from DUREN to BURG REULAND (exclusive) with main effort at DUREN.

Army Command 7 as Group EIFEL south - from BURG REULAND to the left Army Group boundary with main effort at TRIER (2 Panzer Division as Army Group Reserve there).

c) Army Group G: First, continuation of the attack in lower ALSACE, in order to gain at least the line INGWILLER - KILLSTEDT; if possible, to press forward to SAVERNE. The forces would not be strong enough to make the desired junction with the Nineteenth Army. After termination of the attack, pulling out of 2 mobile formations as reserves in the SAARBRUCKEN area; in addition, retaining of one mobile formation between TRIER and ORSCHOLZ.

d) Army Group Oberrhein: Coordination of actions in progress with the advance of Army Group G; assumption of command by Army Group G after the above-mentioned line is reached.

3) Successful defense in the 4th battle of AACHEN would depend upon the accelerated shifting of mobile formations there; this could be carried out, however, because of the fuel shortage, only after arrival of the eastern units in the loading areas. Difficulties were multiplied by the snow-drifts and the necessity of traveling at night, so that a delay of the Sixth Panzer Army as well as of the shift was to be feared.

4) Supply and replacement situation: Ammunition to 3 February, only 8 rounds per day per piece for light field howitzers and 5 rounds for heavy field howitzers. That is in the next battle of AACHEN only one-third of the amount used in December, when the use of artillery had been decisive, but still could not prevent considerable loss of ground. Fuel consumption for the eastern units, about 4500 cubic meters; the shift in the west, 1000 additional cubic meters; the battle in ALSACE and resulting regrouping, at least 1500 cubic meters. Therefore, in addition to the requirements for the last ten days of January (2000 cubic meters) 1000 cubic meters "Otto" fuel.

The personnel replacements were insufficient and led to a dangerous decrease of combat strength. Local replacement was effected by the taking over of Sicherheits Battalions from the EIFEL. The lack of replacements had become a problem of life or death for all divisions. Replacement of tanks and S.P. guns was vital in view of the enemy's 2500 tanks. If remedies and the timely shift of forces failed, a breakthrough to the RHINE was to be feared.

5) Transfers to the east: Except for the 9 SS Panzer Division, all units had already been relieved. Headquarters XXXIX Panzer Corps was indispensable until further notice; Headquarters LVIII Panzer Corps was available. The 11 Panzer Division was likewise indispensable. The Commander-in-Chief suggested that the Panzer Lehr Division and the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division be transferred. He



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mentioned the 189 Infantry Division (likewise after the termination of the action). He wanted to report about the Volks Artillerie Korps later. Of the 10 bridge trains,  $5\frac{1}{2}$  had already been transferred.

6) The Commander-in-Chief announced details concerning the deception measures.

7) Following the transfer of three groups, the Luftwaffe was still less than before in a position to protect the rear areas. The result was to be a further destruction of supply lines and thereby an increased consumption of fuel.

In closing, the Commander-in-Chief requested an immediate decision.

On 23 January the Commander-in-Chief received the answer to his report of 22 January. Organization of the command was approved, the only requirement being that the boundary between the ROER and EIFEL-North groups, which apparently would lie in the focal point of the defense, was to be shifted to the south. Also, the establishment of reserves was approved. The sector of the MOSELLE Gate and the ORSCHOLZ key positions were to be strengthened by more infantry, to be accomplished by shifts within Army Group G. Because of the decline of production ammunition could not be increased. Reserves had to be built up by rigorous economy in the quiet sectors. The requirement of 4500 cubic meters appeared very high for the eastern units; this use had to be lowered by improvisation (trailers, use of horse-drawn detachments, etc.); the same thing held true for the shifts in the west. A new requirement was to be submitted. The preferred transfers to the east were approved except for the 189 Infantry Division. The necessary infantry divisions had to be taken from the forces of the First Army.

On 24 January the Fuehrer issued a new command. The elimination of the German bridgeheads over the ROER was assumed to be a prerequisite of the enemy offensive against COLOGNE and the RUHR territory. The right wing of Army Group B therefore was to defend the area forward of the ROER as long as possible. The enemy was to be compelled to make renewed regroupings and attacks by our use of small bridgeheads. Each day of delay was a gain.

It was further ordered that on the evening of 24 January, the I SS Panzer Corps was to be transferred to the VIENNA area as Army High Command Reserve; assembly in the area VIENNA - WIENER NEUSTADT - ODENBURG - PRESSBURG.

On 25 January reply to the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief West of 24 January. The possibility of supplying ammunition and fuel was examined. There was to be no immediate transfer of an infantry division from Army Group G. In addition, the Fuehrer ordered that the suggested line be taken up only under enemy pressure.

Since a new defensive front had been built up by the enemy on the MODER and ROTH and forces were tied down by the continuation of our attack at a time when they were needed as reserves behind future defensive main efforts, the Fuehrer commanded on 25 January that the attack against the lower VOSGES and in lower ALSACE be suspended. According to the command given to the Commander-in-Chief West, the necessary regrouping should be carried out immediately. The transfer of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division to the east was imperative. The 6 SS Mountain Division was to be deployed in the mountains.



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On 26 January directive was to be transmitted to Panzer Army Command 1<sup>13</sup> to accelerate the disengagement of units, which was going on too slowly. However, it was not signed.

On the afternoon of 27 January, the answer of the Commander-in-Chief West to the situation reports arrived. The winter campaign had caused average casualties of 3-4000 to the Volksgrenadier Divisions and 2-3000 to the Panzer Grenadier and Panzer Divisions and the Infantry forces had been especially heavily diminished. After the bringing up of about 500 replacements to each Volksgrenadier Division in January, only 4-5 complete Grenadier Battalions could be reconstituted for each division. It could be calculated in regard to several divisions that with further losses they would be reduced to a few hundred men. They had, nevertheless, complete artillery, which by and large remained intact, and complete supply troops. Decisive reorganization measures were imperative. Supply of reinforcements remained the most pressing necessity in spite of combing out and shifting. The limit of physical endurance had been reached in the ARDENNES; all measures had been taken to provide for brief rehabilitation periods. The lowered standards of training were counteracted by additional courses and schools. The need for small arms, automatic assault weapons and heavy anti-aircraft weapons was mounting. The delivery of replacement parts was imperative following the cutting off of the supply of tanks and assault guns from the east. The condition of the horses had suffered, even though there was sufficient raw feed. The clothing situation had become strained.

On 27 January the order was given for the shipment of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division as well as both Fuehrer-Brigaden to the KOTTHUS - FRANKFURT an der ODER area, and the 27 and 28 SS Volunteer Grenadier Divisions to the Protectorate (in this order).

The Commander-in-Chief West was empowered to withdraw the weakly held ILL front to a straight line between the ILL and the RHINE, and beyond the RHINE as soon as defenses had been erected. In addition to the EREISACH bridge ferry service was to be established. The construction of a cable track was to be examined.

These formations were subordinated to the Army General Staff by an additional order; nevertheless, the Fuehrer reserved to himself the determination of grouping and employment.

On the same day (27 January) the consent of the Fuehrer was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief West that Army Group G should take over the command of the sector of Army Group Oberrhein. The staff was to be transferred expeditiously to Army Group WEICHSEL. In addition, the Fuehrer had approved the requested withdrawal of the right wing of the Nineteenth Army; nevertheless, the Commander-in-Chief West was to examine how far the front of the Nineteenth Army could be bettered by pressing forward the MLR on the line SCHLETTSTADT - MARKIRCH - COL DU BONHOMME - LE VALTIN (employment of the 6 SS Mountain Division for that purpose).

The Commander-in-Chief announced, therefore, on 28 January, that 3 heavy and 2 light cable tracks over the RHINE were available and additional equipment was allotted. Report concerning the shipment of motorized units: movement order on 20 January for the 1, 12 and 2 SS Panzer Divisions which were already relieved and in large part east of the OURE. Because of the lack of fuel, air attacks, and difficulties with the weather and roads, the march was delayed. The principal cause, however, was the short recuperation period. Only the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division marched rapidly. The loss of time had to be made up by eliminating the recuperation period after detraining.



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FOOTNOTES

- (1) Evidently the codeword "10 May 1940", revealed by a Prisoner of War, was used by a lower echelon than Army Group G.
- (2) The German report at hand is evidently a rough draft. It carries some pencil notations and includes some typographical errors. This is doubtless an error for Army Group G.
- (3) "VOSGES bridgehead" refers to the so-called "COLMAR pocket" which the German Nineteenth Army was holding against the First French Army.
- (4) ORSCHOLZRIEGEL is apparently the high ground between the SAAR and MOSELLE Rivers, south of their junction. On 22 December the Germans were evidently still unaware that Third U S Army's left flank had been shifted far to the northwest to counterattack the ARDENNES salient.
- (5) Army Group Upper Rhine, which under the command of Heinrich HIMMLER controlled XIV SS Corps and later also XXXIX Panzer Corps and Nineteenth Army.
- (6) "Our own" refers to Army Group G; evidently the initial draft of this report was written at that headquarters or at its subordinate First Army.
- (7) Doubtless the "Zahnarzt" operation referred to later in the narrative.
- (8) This was the frontal attack south of WISSEMBOURG which developed into the HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN battle.
- (9) An error in the original; 361 Division must be meant.
- (10) An error for 553.
- (11) 4 SS Panzer Division was not on the western front.
- (12) A captured document dated 21 January indicated that Sixth Panzer Army was to be split, I SS Panzer Corps going to HOLLAND, II SS Panzer Corps to the SAAR PALATINATE front. At the time, the document was suspected of being a "plant"; this passage proves that it was.
- (13) Doubtless an error for either Panzer Army Command 6 or Panzer Army Corps I, probably the latter.



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ANNEX VI

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 January - 31 January 1945

German Intelligence Service espionage and sabotage efforts against Seventh Army during the month of January were almost exclusively undertaken to forward the German offensive whose mission was to retake ALSACE. Fourteen agents were apprehended, including three saboteurs and five women. The espionage agents generally had short-term missions involving discovery of identifications and strength of Allied units. They were of poor-grade, frequently recruited on the spot; some had only a brief last-minute lecture as "training". Three agents were HITLER Jugend members whose motive was patriotism. Even a dog which may have been a courier was captured going through the lines with a too-innocent note attached to its collar.

Indicative of the increased German emphasis on sabotage, the three saboteurs arrested were, unlike the espionage agents, intensively trained. The first two were Alsatian members of SKORZENY's newly-formed Jagdverbande (companies of saboteurs and terrorists). They were members of the 6th or "North" Company who were on reconnaissance to locate sabotage targets, pathfind routes for future sabotage parties and sound out civilian attitudes in ALSACE. They were both members of French subversive organizations. They entered our lines in Waffen SS uniforms, over which they wore uniforms closely resembling those worn by American armored units. They carried the new German submachine gun, which did not look German. They admitted that their appearance was an intended deception, although a "legal" one. The Company's headquarters had been established in December 1944 near HERSBACH in the WESTERWALD. The Company was subdivided into three groups, A, B and C, each group with a strength of from 30 to 40 men. Group A was probably committed near COLMAR in the beginning of December. Group B had assembled in WALDKIRCH, northeast of FREIBURG in December 1944 for employment against Seventh Army. Its cover name was Group "EDITH". When the two members of Group B were caught, Group C was still in training at SCHOERN, near NASSAU.

The 6th Company recruited most of its members from non-Germans. Group B was 90% French, with the remainder Dutch and Polish. Frenchmen were mostly members of DORIOT's Parti Populaire Francais. They were extensively trained in patrolling, use of compass and map and had field problems in penetration and sabotage reconnaissance. The two apprehended saboteurs declared that they were to be followed by a group of 30 men, most of whom would be in civilian dress. Evidence that a small party of Group "EDITH" had attempted to infiltrate our lines unsuccessfully was found in a message taken from a carrier pigeon which disclosed that at least one of the party, apparently in uniform, had been wounded.

The third saboteur arrested was a French member of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 251, trained at two sabotage schools. He was arrested after he had crossed the RHINE with four others. He was carrying explosives which were to be placed under a tank, and in addition was to discover the size and intentions of armored units in the HAGUENAU area. His cover story was that he was an escaping Todt worker.

The 11 espionage agents included:

A French Army Reserve Lieutenant, arrested attempting to enter our lines on a tactical mission. He had been arrested by the Gestapo for his FFI activities after the Germans had re-

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captured BITCHE, and had been forced to accept an espionage mission.

Three HITLER Jugend members, all Alsations, arrested while trying to cross the lines on tactical espionage missions. Two of them had had no training, while one had been given a half-hour briefing on identification by shoulder patch and vehicle marking. The cover story all three were told to use was that they were escaping from the enforced labor of digging fortifications.

A 16-year-old French agent working for Abwehr I W1 (Economic espionage), arrested in STRASBOURG. His mission was tactical, but also included gathering intelligence on activities of Allied security agencies, civilian circulation regulations and treatment of collaborators by the Allies. He was another graduate of the very active SCHMIDT - CAVALLIE recruiting team in STRASBOURG, which drafted agents by combing Gestapo blacklists.

A native Luxembourger woman, German by marriage and a longtime Nazi Party member, who was apprehended at a roadblock after she had crossed the RHINE to accomplish a three-day tactical espionage mission. If unable to remember what she had observed she was instructed to prick the letters of a book on different pages so that the message could be read when held up to the light.

A French woman, Abwehr agent and PPF member, who was left behind in STRASBOURG, where she was to await the arrival of Allied troops, then proceed to the interior of FRANCE to find out landing points and damage caused by V-1 and V-2 and return across the lines. She was also recruited by SCHMIDT and CAVALLIE.

An Italian woman, 23 years old, arrested at a roadblock on her way to accomplish a round-trip tactical espionage mission which was to last three days. Her cover story was that she was a refugee.

A Russian woman, 20 years old, arrested at a roadblock. Her mission, which was to last three days, was primarily tactical, but also included reporting on American treatment of Alsations. She had been an internee at SCHIRMECK Concentration Camp and had been given her freedom upon acceptance of her espionage mission.

A French (Alsation) woman, 49 years old, member of the Franciste organization. She had no mission against Seventh Army, but had worked for the Germans in the early part of the war, had stolen plans of the MAGINOT Line, had been discovered and imprisoned by the French.

An agent of the Sicherheitsdienst Amt VI, alleged deserter from the German Army. He had no present mission, but had done extensive espionage in SWITZERLAND, with two short missions in SPAIN and TURKEY. In SWITZERLAND, to which he had gained entrance by faking tuberculosis, his duties involved espionage on the OXFORD Movement, the Swiss correspondent for Pravda and Izvestia, an explosives specialist, Swiss factories working for GERMANY and disposition of American planes landing in SWITZERLAND.

The increasing use of HITLER Jugend boys as agents constituted a serious security threat. Balancing or even outweighing their intelligence abilities and training were their fanaticism, their excellent knowledge of local conditions



and the large numbers available.

The immigration of French political refugees into GERMANY was beginning to be an encumbrance to the Germans. Their number had reached 50,000, and now the Germans apparently decided to get rid of them, and at the same time use them to maximum advantage. Some were to be used on intelligence missions, but the greater number would be parachuted or infiltrated into FRANCE as insurrectionists, propagandists and terrorists working among the approximately 300,000 collaborationists who were still left in FRANCE.

SS Standartenfuehrer LINGNER, the commander of the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, was captured and, upon interrogation, revealed that American soldiers captured by his division had disclosed their units to interrogators, but practically nothing else.

Despite German preparations, once again there was no case of successful sabotage in Seventh Army area. Several cases of wire cutting occurred in divisional areas, but no willful sabotage could be determined.

The variety of espionage and sabotage agents apprehended by Seventh Army during the period is shown in the tabulation below:

	<u>French</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Italian</u>	<u>Russian</u>	<u>Luxembourger</u>	<u>Total</u>
Espionage	7(2)	1	1(1)	1(1)	1(1)	11(5)
Sabotage	<u>3</u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	10(2)	1	1(1)	1(1)	1(1)	14(5)

(Figures in parentheses indicate number of women)

Total number of agents apprehended by Seventh Army between 15 August 1944 and 31 January 1945:

Espionage	84
Sabotage	<u>15</u>
TOTAL	99



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ANNEX VII

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP UPPER RHINE

HIMMLER, Heinrich, SS Reichsfuehrer.

The seriousness and dangers facing the Germans along the western front after the unsuccessful December gambles received emphasis early in the new year when HIMMLER himself assumed command over Army Group UPPER RHINE for a number of weeks.

Young in years (44) but an old-timer in the execution of Nazidom's interlocking government-party-army schemes, HIMMLER was born in 1900 and served in the last war. Later he studied agriculture, economics, chicken farming and sundry subjects without notable success, and the HITLER Putsch of 1923 found him in a prominent role. Since then his career has been a succession of rising responsibilities under his Fuehrer: 1928, Reich Leader SS; 1933, Police President and Commander of Political Police Units outside PRUSSIA; 1934, head of the Prussian Police; 1936, Chief of the German Police; 1939, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood; also, Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, Plenipotentiary-General for Administration, member of the War Cabinet, and military trouble-shooter.

Von MAUR, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

No conclusive evidence has been found for the von MAUR associated with Army Group UPPER RHINE, but available evidence indicates that an SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Heinrich von MAUR, age 81, is connected with the Army Group UPPER RHINE which was commanded by HIMMLER for a time.

Von MAUR might hold an administrative position, possibly over troops in reserve or training. Dr. Heinrich von MAUR commanded the 27 WURTEMBERG Division in World War I and was later retired. Presumably recalled to active duty, he was in 1938 an SS Colonel on the staff of the Superior Regional Command Southwest, was promoted in 1939 to Oberfuehrer (British Brigadier), later to Brigadefuehrer and in November 1942 to SS Gruppenfuehrer (U S Major General). Circumstances of his most recent rank are unknown, but his SS background indicates his eligibility for a trusted SS position.

ARMY GROUP G

HLASKOWITZ, Generaloberst.

See G-2 Histories for August and September 1944.

FIRST ARMY

OBSTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

General OBSTFELDER was born 6 September 1886, son of a clergyman in STEINBACH-HALLEBERG. After attending junior college at EISENACH he entered the 2 Thuringian Infantry Regiment in 1905 as a cadet. He has remained with the army since, being selected in 1913 to attend the War College and serving later in World War I. After the war he served as General Staff officer of the "Grenzschutz" at DANZIG. He was transferred to the Reichswehr Brigade 11 in

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KASSEL in 1919, and in 1922 was called to the Ministry of War as a General Staff officer. He had routine assignments during the peace years, a term as commandant of the fortress city of BRESLAU from 1934 to 1936 while he was a colonel.

In this war he has been active in POLAND and FRANCE under von BUSCH's VIII Corps. He became commanding general of XXIX Corps in June 1940 and remained in this capacity until the assault on RUSSIA broke loose. A command in the west followed in August 1943, and he was named commanding general of LXXXVI Corps, then under First German Army. General OBSTFELDER went to the CAEN sector on 15 June 1944, later retreating across BELGIUM and across the SCHELDT River at FLUSHING and being put into line again in the ROERMOND-VENLO area. As a reward he received the Swords to the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross. OBSTFELDER took over the First German Army on 1 December 1944.

OBSTFELDER in 1912 married the daughter of a SCHMALKALDEN lawyer, Gerda HUENER. She is believed still at SCHMALKALDEN with the only surviving daughter, who is married to Colonel Freiherr von USLAR, artillery officer on the staff of Army Group G. OBSTFELDER is a vain and proud man, and his lack of moral responsibility reportedly runs to the extreme in ruthlessness.

NINETEENTH ARMY

RASP, Siegfried, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIV SS CORPS

Von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI, Erich, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

His military record equalled or surpassed by a reputation for atrocities, von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI is an East Prussian, born 1 March 1899 and in uniform almost constantly since his youth. He volunteered for duty in the first World War, emerging as a company commander. Later he joined the frontier guards (Grenzschutz), and was an active officer in 1924 and onwards. In 1931 he became an SS Untersturmfuehrer (lieutenant). The following year he was chosen to membership in the Reichstag.

In 1938 von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI was appointed commander of SS OBERSSCHNITT SUEB OST, and three years later was named Hoehrer SS und Polizei-fuehrer in central RUSSIA. He was promoted to SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Polizei on 1 September 1941. It was after this that he was chiefly employed in anti-guerrilla work.

During the winter of 1941 he was reported at the front with SS and police units, and held the same position until April 1943, when he was appointed chief of all anti-guerrilla operations. He covered all eastern areas where unrest cropped up and is responsible for many massacres in RUSSIA - in fact, he reputedly took part personally in many shootings. When he was in charge of operations against WARSAW in the fall of 1944, the most indescribable cruelties were attributed to him in the suppression of the resistance movement. For all this, HITLER rewarded him with the Knight's Cross. (It is interesting to note that SS Oberfuehrer DIRLEWANGER, commander of SS Beawehrungs Brigade DIRLEWANGER, which specializes in mass murder, also was decorated with this same order).



Von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI was reported as having set up his headquarters in BADEN-BADEN in December 1944. It was also reported that he was to be put in charge of the postwar underground movement. On 7 January 1945 his command at BADEN-BADEN was identified as XIV SS Corps.

XXXIX PANZER CORPS

KIRCHENPAUER von KIRCHDORF, Wilhelm, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

LXXXII CORPS

HOERNLEIN, Walter, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

LXXXIX CORPS

HOEHNE, Gustav, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XC CORPS (FORMERLY IV GAF CORPS)

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

See G-2 History for October 1944.

6 SS MOUNTAIN DIVISION

BRENNER, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

General BRENNER, 49, began his military career during the first World War as an artillery officer in 5 Bavarian Infantry Regiment, ULM. After the war he joined the police, first being with the BADEN police force, later a member of the Prussian police. His services continued, still in police capacity, with the German Reich police in 1933. When the present war started he was entrusted with the command of the artillery regiment of the new SS Division POLIZEI. He led this regiment in FRANCE during 1940 and later in the eastern campaign during the battle for LENINGRAD. He contracted a severe case of rheumatism, was hospitalized for a time and after his dismissal from the hospital was given command over the ORPO (regular police) in CARINTHIA. He remained at this post until September 1944, when he was given command of 6 SS Mountain Division NORD.

Described as an all-around soldier, General BRENNER is known for his daring, tempered by sound tactical understanding. Well-liked by his officers, despite occasional spurts of anger, he has won a reputation of good German army "politics" and an ability to secure advantages for himself and his men.

While a Nazi Party member through his affiliation with the SS (which he joined when the police came under SS control), he has no reputation as a radical. He was frankly critical of the more extreme SS leaders and their measures. He still anticipated a German victory while his division was still soundly committed well inside FRANCE, but once he had joined in the general retreat toward the Fatherland he told his staff frequently that the war was lost for GERMANY, mainly because of her ever-decreasing economic potential.



7 PARACHUTE DIVISION

ERDMANN, Generalleutnant (GAF).

Awarded the Knight's Cross for distinguished service on the western front. No biographical data available.

10 SS PANZER DIVISION

HARMEL, Heinz, Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor der Waffen SS.

HARMEL was born in METZ 29 June 1906. After completing his studies in agriculture he joined the Reichswehr in 1923, and after a period in the SA, joined the Waffen SS in 1935.

As Hauptsturmfuehrer and company commander, he took part in the western campaigns, and by March 1943 had risen to regimental commander and had been awarded the Iron Cross, First and Second Class, and the Knight's Cross, to which he received the Oak Leaves in September 1943 and the Swords in January 1945. As commander of 10 SS Panzer Division FRUNDSBERG, he was praised for the manner in which he extricated his forces from the FALAISE Gap, keeping them in such good order that they were able, a few weeks later, to oppose the Allied attacks at NIJMEGEN.

17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

KLINGENBERG, SS Standartenfuehrer.

Colonel KLINGENBERG, who succeeded Colonel LINGNER (captured 10 January), was once adjutant to SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer HAUSSER when the latter was Inspector of the Waffen SS prior to the war. Described by those who know him as efficient and courageous, he has the fault of occasional arrogance, but this is said outweighed by his superior leadership.

19 INFANTRY DIVISION

BRITZELMAYR, Karl, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

21 PANZER DIVISION

FEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September 1944.

25 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

BURMEISTER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLM, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.



245 INFANTRY DIVISION

WAGNER, Oberst.

Acting commanding officer. No biographical data available.

256 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

FRANZ, Generalmajor.

A professional soldier from BOBECK, THURINGIA, General FRANZ is described as definitely no friend of the Nazi regime, but uncompromising in obedience to orders given him. The 43-year-old FRANZ, who organized the 256 Division in HOLLAND in September 1944, has a record for military coups, but by late in January he saw his outfit badly ripped apart by the U S 45 Division in the REIPERTSWILLER - LICHTENBERG sector of ALSACE. (NOTE: Later, General FRANZ was to be forced to give himself up while attempting a last-ditch stand during the final month of the war with 100 dazed men, sole remnants of his scattered division).

General FRANZ entered the Wehrmacht in 1919 at the age of 17. In the winter of 1942, after receiving his full Colonelcy, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Africa Corps. January 1943 saw him on the Russian front, acting as Corps Chief of Staff in the LAKE CHEWINOWSKY sector. It is claimed that in this sector, after having been surrounded by three Russian armies, he was successful in withdrawing 36,000 troops through a six-kilometer gap. He received the German Cross in Gold for outstanding bravery in the fighting at CHERKASSY. Later he was sent to HOLLAND, where in September 1944 he organized his present division.

257 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

SEIDEL, Oberst.

Holder of the Knight's Cross. No biographical data available.

347 INFANTRY DIVISION

TRIERENBERG, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

361 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

PHILLIPI, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for October 1944.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUETHER, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.


See G-2 History for December 1944.



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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART SEVEN

1-28 FEBRUARY 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

INFO/cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE  
REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTH-  
ORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5,  
15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED  
AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL,  
COLONEL, AGD, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Quinn*  
WILLIAM A. QUINN  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2



R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part VII

1 - 28 February 1945

\* \* \*

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II.	Enemy Dispositions on Seventh Army Front (Map)
III.	Principal Enemy Commanders Opposing Seventh Army
IV.	Counterintelligence Summary 1 February - 28 February

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R E S T R I C T E D

I. GENERAL

The German First Army never regained the initiative after the failure of its January attacks against the Seventh Army. Immediately after the final attacks across the MODER River on 25 January, the enemy reverted to the defensive and began withdrawing his more efficient divisions for employment elsewhere. This process continued into February until the enemy strength in combat effectives facing us dropped from about 22,150 at the beginning of the month to an average level of 13,000 - 14,000 which was maintained throughout the latter half of the month.

21 Panzer Division had left the Seventh Army front late in January. It was followed closely by 25 Panzer Grenadier and 7 Parachute, both of which had been out of contact the last few days of January and had definitely left the area by 1 February. 21 Panzer and 25 Panzer Grenadier both went to the Eastern Front; 7 Parachute went to HOLLAND. On 2 February, 256 Volksgrenadier Division dropped out of contact in the HAARDT Mountains, relinquishing its sector to 6 SS Mountain Division, and ultimately reappearing on the MOSELLE front of U S Third Army.

On 6 February, 257 Volksgrenadier Division, also from the HAARDT sector, turned up in the RHINE Valley during the fighting for OBERHOFFEN, where it took over from 10 SS Panzer Division which returned to BERLIN to face the Red Army. And 245 Infantry Division, which had been noted for its inactivity even during the January offensive, disappeared from view; eventually its staff returned to HOLLAND and its relatively few combat troops were absorbed into other divisions as replacements.

The 553 Volksgrenadier Division staff also returned to GERMANY, leaving behind most of the miscellaneous units it had controlled in the GAMBSHEIM bridgehead, who then came under the control of its successor, 905 Mobilization Division. The readjustment of Allied boundaries on 22 February gave this sector to the First French Army, thus further reducing the enemy strength opposing Seventh Army.

As XV Corps' attacks south of SAARBRUCKEN developed during the second half of the month, 559 Volksgrenadier Division was moved there from the BITCHE sector to bolster the defense. In its place in the western HAARDT Mountains appeared the 2 Mountain Division, a relic of the German Nineteenth Army's disastrous stand in the COLMAR pocket. However, 2 Mountain lasted only a week, then was shunted on to the MOSELLE front against U S Third Army. For a while, the BITCHE sector then fell to 6 SS Mountain Division. However, its days were numbered, too; also destined for the MOSELLE, on the last day of February it began yielding its sector to the 16 Volksgrenadier Division, another remnant from COLMAR. An old acquaintance in its previous incarnation, 16 Division had faced Seventh Army troops on the VOSGES front during the fall of 1944.

In the circumstances to which his order of battle was being reduced, the enemy could do little but leave the initiative to the Americans. Thus the degree of contact during February was determined solely by our own attacks, all of which were comparatively small scale, limited-objective operations. Where they could, the Germans defended stubbornly, notably at OBERHOFFEN and FORBACH; and they never abandoned their traditional and tested technique of defending by counterattack. But at no time did they mount an operation whose mission was any greater than to recover a bit of useful terrain lost to the Americans a day or two previously.

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II. CHRONOLOGY

1 February - D/170

The Army front remained generally quiet, as the enemy had reverted to the defensive and our own action was confined to a limited-objective attack on the east flank. There the enemy offered considerable resistance near OBERHOFFEN and later counterattacked with tank-supported infantry. The Army west flank was comparatively inactive with the main activity a company-strength counterattack launched to restore enemy defensive positions southeast of SARREGUEMINES.

2 February - D/171

There was little activity on the Army front except at OBERHOFFEN, where elements of 10 SS Panzer Division fought stubbornly throughout the day with infantry supported by a few tanks. The enemy was alert to U S patrols in the HAARDT Mountains, where contact with 257 Volksgrenadier Division was reestablished. The withdrawal of 256 Volksgrenadier Division from this sector was indicated by the westward shift of 6 SS Mountain Division. The Luftwaffe reappeared, with 16 enemy aircraft reported, most of them on reconnaissance missions.

3 February - D/172

Along the RHINE River, elements of 553 Division aided by flooded terrain provided strong resistance before HERRLISHEIM. Our attack in the ROHRWILLER area met stiffening opposition from elements of 10 SS Panzer Division, which also continued its stubborn opposition in the northern portion of OBERHOFFEN. In the HAARDT Mountains new dispositions of the 6 SS Mountain Division and the 257 Volksgrenadier Division confirmed the suspected withdrawal of the 256 Volksgrenadier Division from the WILDENGUTH sector.

4 February - D/173

German infantry, with armor support, continued to hold out in the northern portion of OBERHOFFEN. Elsewhere, active patrolling and raiding by U S troops inspired sharp local reactions. A fire fight developed at ROTHBACH before the town was cleared, and American raids at EITSCHHOFFEN and KINDWILLER were stopped.

5 February - D/174

Enemy activity was negligible along the entire front except in the EISCHWILLER area, where several heavy artillery concentrations were received. In the HAARDT Mountains, identification of elements of the 6 SS Mountain Division in the 257 Division sector, together with prisoner of war statements, suggested that 257 Division was dropping out of contact. However, it was to reappear the following day on our eastern flank.

6 February - D/175

In the RHINE Valley, HERRLISHEIM and OFFENDORF were found unoccupied as the 553 Division withdrew. In the OBERHOFFEN area, 10 SS Panzer Division was being relieved by the 257 Volksgrenadier Division, which arrived from the HAARDT Mountain sector. The front was generally quiet, except south of SAARBRUCKEN, where elements of the 347 Infantry Division offered spotty resistance to our limited-objective attack at GROSS HITTERSDORF and LIXING. OETTING was being used as an enemy strongpoint. The attack in this sector had caused a sharp increase in artillery fire.



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7 February - D/176

Again the only notable activity was at the two extremes of the Army front. On the east flank, fighting continued in OBERHOFFEN, where elements of the 257 Division provided stubborn opposition. On the west flank elements of the 347 Division made a limited attack to retake the high ground south and west of OETING, which had been lost the previous day.

8 February - D/177

House-to-house fighting continued in OBERHOFFEN, and late in the day elements of the 257 Division made a small counterattack there. U S patrols were fired on near HERRLISHEIM and DRUSENHEIM, and a raid on KINDWILLER drew heavy fire. A captured code list dated 1 February revealed that the newly-formed 905 Mobilization Division had assumed control of the miscellaneous units previously under 553 Volksgrenadier Division, which were holding the RHINE River flank.

9 February - D/178

House-to-house fighting at OBERHOFFEN marked a day which was otherwise quiet except for patrol action. The enemy was cleared from all but eight houses in the northern part of OBERHOFFEN.

10 February - D/179

Continuing its limited operations to straighten the right flank, VI Corps attacked DRUSENHEIM against strong German opposition. Elements of the U S 36 Division succeeded in penetrating into the town but were forced to withdraw under heavy pressure, with enemy infantry being supported by some tanks or self-propelled guns. Isolated pockets of resistance held out near OBERHOFFEN, and heavy small arms and artillery fire was received from north and northeast of the town. In the HAARDT Mountains the enemy outpost line was thinly held, permitting U S patrols to make deep penetrations; the enemy appeared to be concerned over this and attempted to advance his outpost line to high ground north of ROTHBACH.

11 February - D/180

In the DRUSENHEIM area the enemy offered determined resistance to all attempts to dislodge him from strong positions south and west of the town. He showed aggressiveness in the OBERHOFFEN area, where an attack in at least company strength from the woods east of town succeeded initially in penetrating American lines. Our counterattack later restored the situation with considerable loss to the enemy in prisoners of war. In the HAARDT Mountains, a broadcast by a Psychological Warfare Branch mobile unit caused the enemy to send up many flares, apparently to discourage desertion attempts. A U S raid north of GROS REDERCHING drew heavy fire.

12 February - D/181

The enemy continued to offer stubborn resistance at OBERHOFFEN, with a factory in the northwest edge of town changing hands several times, but by night the enemy had been driven from this area. Patrols in the DRUSENHEIM area again drew machine gun and small arms fire from an alert enemy. In the HAARDT Mountains strong resistance and close contact developed during a raid northwest of WILDENGUTH.



13 February - D/182

The previous night's raid northwest of WILDENGUTH failed in the face of heavy opposition from strongly-emplaced German troops. Other patrols met alert enemy forces and drew fire in the DRUSENHEIM, HITSCHHOFFEN and REIPERTS-WILLER areas. After the preceding day's fighting, the OBERHOFFEN area remained quiet throughout the day.

14 February - D/183

The enemy continued to demonstrate a purely defensive attitude. However, late in the day he staged a demonstration between SCHWEIGHAUSEN and NEUBOURG, consisting of an increase in small arms, mortar and artillery fire, whose apparent purpose was to provoke our troops into disclosing their positions. Shortly afterwards, a 30-man enemy patrol attempted to cross the MODER River west of SCHWEIGHAUSEN but was driven off.

15 February - D/184

In the RHINE Valley and eastern HAARDT Mountains the enemy remained inactive and quieted down in the SCHWEIGHAUSEN - NEUBOURG area after his demonstration the night before. XV Corps' attack in the RIMLING area encountered spotty resistance weakly supported by artillery. RIMLING was cleared during the morning, and strong resistance at ELIESERUCKEN Woods was broken shortly after noon. While considerable enemy armor was observed in the area north of RIMLING, no aggressive action developed. SAVERNE was the target for 12 rounds from a 380-mm railroad gun. A V-1 flying bomb, the only one ever reported in the Seventh Army area, fell southeast of METZ in the morning.

16 February - D/185

In the RIMLING area the enemy reacted to our advances of the previous day, attempting to restore his positions through two early morning counterattacks. The first, east of RIMLING, was broken up by artillery fire, but the second, northwest of the town, succeeded in making a one-kilometer penetration toward MORONVILLE Farm. Our lines were later restored, with the enemy suffering heavily in personnel and losing three tanks or self-propelled guns. Fifteen to 20 bunkers, manned by four or five men each, were still holding out with small arms fire in ELIESERUCKEN Woods. Near SARREGUEMINES, an enemy strongpoint at HANWEILER was reduced.

17 February - D/186

The 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, in the RIMLING sector, got some ineffective assistance when its neighboring 559 Volksgrenadier Division put in an unsuccessful battalion-strength attack southeast of EPPING - URBACH. Farther west, 19 and 347 Infantry Divisions, defending the approaches to SAARBRUCKEN, put up generally strong opposition.

U S troops pushing northward in the bend of the ELIES River north of SARREGUEMINES reached and cleared the VORDERWALD against the 19 Infantry Division, which gave up 250-300 prisoners. At dark a German counterattack in this area was repulsed with heavy losses. LIXING, KERBACH and BEHREN were taken from the 347 Infantry Division, with the enemy resisting at towns and critical road junctions and holding out at GROSS ELITTERSDORF and OETING.

18 February - D/187

In the SAAR - ELIES sector the 19 Infantry Division continued its strenuous effort to eliminate the XV Corps' VORDERWALD salient. Repeated



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infiltrations and several tank-supported counterattacks made some penetrations. West of the SAAR River, the 347 Infantry Division showed signs of being thinly spread as the high ground southeast of FORBACH was captured. Although two counterattacks, both with armor support, were mounted, they failed to prevent the loss of GROSS ELITTERSDORF, ETZLING and OETING.

19 February - D/188

The 19 Infantry Division, damaged by recent fighting, did not renew its attempts to eliminate the VORDERWALD salient. Its previous day's infiltration into AUERSMACHER was liquidated, and it was unable to prevent the loss of KLEIN ELITTERSDORF. West of the SAAR River, the 347 Division was also unable to hold a firm line. The high ground overlooking STIRING - WENDEL was captured without much opposition, and our forward troops reached the outskirts of FORBACH against small arms and mortar fire.

20 February - D/189

East of the SAAR River the enemy remained quiet while improving his defensive positions. West of the river the 347 Division got some increase in artillery support and offered somewhat stronger opposition. ZINZING, HESSELING and ALSTING were cleared against considerable resistance, but the attack on SPICHEREN met heavy opposition. Increased fire was met east of STIRING - WENDEL and in the morning a small enemy counterattack was repulsed in this area. Progress in FORBACH was very slow, with the advance into the center of town meeting heavy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire.

21 February - D/190

The U S 70 Division, attacking south of SAARBRUCKEN, continued to be heavily engaged. The German 347 Infantry Division got some much-needed help in the form of a battalion of infantry from the 719 Infantry Division holding the adjacent sector against U S Third Army. The Volkssturm, although not well organized, provided considerable trouble in house-to-house fighting in FORBACH. Strong opposition before SPICHEREN finally collapsed and the town was taken. Further advance to seize the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN produced a strong reaction from the enemy, who counterattacked in sufficient strength to cause our forward elements to effect a 1000-yard withdrawal.

22 February - D/191

U S troops again reached the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN, but the 347 Division still fought hard here and made two unsuccessful counterattacks during the day, attempting to recover the lost terrain. At FORBACH, the railroad in the center of town was reached, but the enemy continued to present stubborn opposition in house-to-house fighting.

23 February - D/192

Despite the arrival of the 2 Mountain Division in the line northwest of BITCHE, coming from the Upper RHINE sector, no appreciable change in the enemy's attitude here was noted. The reconnaissance battalion of 2 Mountain Division proceeded on to the SAARBRUCKEN front, where elements of 19 Infantry and 559 Volksgrenadier Divisions also appeared to bolster the defense. Enemy counterattacks, with tank support, at ST. ARNUAL Woods and the GIFERTWALD failed to retake this commanding terrain. The Germans still held STIRING - WENDEL and the portion of FORBACH west of the railroad.



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24 February - D/193

Further advance in the HJESRANSBACH - HUBINGEN areas encountered light to moderately strong resistance from elements of the 19 Infantry Division supported by some armor, but both towns were cleared of the enemy. Three counterattacks east of HUBINGEN were repulsed during the afternoon. South of SAARBRUCKEN the enemy continued his unsuccessful attempts to drive U S troops from the high ground with two attacks being reported during the morning. One attack supported by armor made a slight gain on the east side of ST. ARNOLD Woods but our lines were later restored. Considerable small arms and automatic weapons fire was received in this area in the latter half of the day. In the FORBACH area the 347 Infantry Division received further aid as additional elements of the 559 Volksgrenadier Division were identified, and the enemy continued to hold the ground west of the tracks.

25 February - D/194

With our own attack in the SAARBRUCKEN sector now come to an end, the enemy remained generally quiet across the entire front. Attempts to drive our troops from the high ground south and southeast of SAARBRUCKEN were not renewed, with the enemy apparently awaiting our next move. Throughout this ten-day period of XV Corps attacks on the Army left, the enemy on VI Corps front had remained inactive with only patrol contacts reported. Several rounds from heavy-caliber railway guns were placed on SAVERNE and ST. AVOLD in the early morning.

26 February - D/195

The only significant activity was at STIRING - WENDEL, where elements of the 559 Division showed some aggressiveness by launching two small, ineffective counterattacks in the morning. Repeated infiltration attempts continued throughout the day in the wooded area on high ground east of town.

For three successive nights late in February, ground troops of the U S 70 Division had observed over FORBACH, and south of the town, a blimp-like object described as being about 100 feet long, silvery gray in color, and propelled by a very quiet, smooth motor. Its appearances usually occurred between 2000A and 0300A and were accompanied by bright flashes similar to photographic flares.

Antiaircraft personnel made thorough investigations after each report. They stated that at no time had radar plots been made, although radar was working the area, and that antiaircraft batteries in the vicinity had neither seen nor heard the object. On the night of 26 - 27 February, when the "Monster of FORBACH" was again reported, radar units on the alert directed their instruments to the suspected area and still made no plots.

Speculations, based solely on hearsay evidence, identified the object variously as an observation blimp, a new "V" weapon, a cloud formation, a figment of the imagination, and the Luftwaffe's Hermann GOERING on personal reconnaissance. For lack of positive evidence, any and all of these interpretations still stand.

27 February - D/196

The front remained generally quiet except at HINTERWALD Woods southeast of SAARBRUCKEN, where the enemy made an unsuccessful attack supported by three self-propelled guns. 2 Mountain Division ended its brief sojourn on our front and was identified by the U S Third Army in the SAARBURG sector. 6 SS Mountain



Division spread northward to cover 2 Mountain's sector, leaving the HAARDT Mountain front very thinly held.

28 February - D/197

The first elements of the 16 Volksgrenadier Division were identified in the HAARDT Mountains, helping 6 SS Mountain cover the sector. Like 2 Mountain before it, 16 Division was a relic from the battle for the "COLMAR pocket". Activity was negligible throughout the front.

### III. SUMMARY

The delicate state of the enemy's situation late in February was eloquently emphasized both by the employment of Volksturm at FORBACH and by a captured German officer who expressed surprise that we undertook only a limited-objective attack. He said that the SIEGFRIED Line in the MITTEL BACH - ZWEIBRUCKEN sector was completely unmanned and that there was nothing there to stop an all-out offensive. This statement was supported by other prisoner statements that all WESTWALL Fortress battalions had had to be committed as infantry.

The vulnerability of the German line was already being tested on other sectors of the Western Front, where the drive to the RHINE was well under way. The test was soon to come in our sector as well.

Meanwhile, even the small-scale preparatory attacks were taking their toll. With little armor left to lose, the Germans gave up only 23 tanks and self-propelled guns during February. But out of the ranks of foot soldiers, they lost 4,431 prisoners and an estimated 5,500 - 6,000 killed and wounded.



R E S T R I C T E D

ANNEX I





ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

Infantry Strength in Combat Effectives

	<u>1 Feb</u>	<u>10 Feb</u>	<u>19 Feb</u>	<u>28 Feb</u>
6 SS Mtn Div.	1700	2000	2250	3100 *
10 SS Pz Div.	2650	T O B E R L I N A R E A		
16 VG Div.	C O L M A R P O C K E T			600 (Elmts Only)
17 SS PG Div.	1650	2050	1650	1500
19 Inf Div.	1300	1250	1050	900
36 VG Div.	1150	900	900	1600
47 VG Div.	1650	1600	1600	1600
245 Inf Div.	2000	2000	STAFF TO HOLLAND; TROOPS REDEPLOYED	
256 VG Div.	1450	T O T H I R D U S A R M Y F R O N T		
257 VG Div.	1450	1300	1350	1350 (Elements to First French Army Sector)
347 Inf Div.	1500	1750	1400	1250
559 VG Div.	1250	1350	1600	1500
905 Mob Div.	(Misc Units former- ly u/c 553 VG Div)	1600	1500 (Elmts E of RHINE)	First French Army Sector
Misc Units	2400	1050	850	1500
Misc Units (u/c of 553 VG Div.)	2000	REFORMING IN PFORZHEIM AREA		
TOTALS	22100	16850	14150	14900

\* Being shifted to U S Third Army front.





SCALE IN MILES  
10 5 0 10

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**Annex No. II ENEMY DISPOSITIONS ON SEVENTH ARMY FRONT**



ANNEX III

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP UPPER RHINE  
ARMY GROUP G

NOTE: Heinrich HIMMLER, who had injected himself into the management of Army Group UPPER RHINE in January, departed later in the month to take over the new Army Group WEICHSEL. On 21 January Oberstgruppenfuehrer Paul HAUSSEER was entrusted with the provisional command of UPPER RHINE. A week later Generaloberst ELASKOWITZ' Army Group G expanded to take over UPPER RHINE's sector; in the shuffle, General HAUSSEER assumed the merged command, while ELASKOWITZ went to HOLLAND to a new group.

HAUSSEER, Paul, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer.

Member of an old Prussian family and a firm believer in Hitlerism, the 64-year-old General HAUSSEER has an extensive military background, having attended military cadet school and the Kriegsakademie and being in active service before World War I. In 1913, as a Captain, he was on the General Staff and during 1914-18 he served as a staff officer in various appointments, including an Army Corps Staff. In 1918, as a Major, HAUSSEER had become a battalion commander in the 4 Infantry Regiment. By 1927 HAUSSEER had become a Colonel and regimental commanding officer, and in 1930 he was an infantry commander in Wehrkreis IV. As a Generalleutnant, he was forced to resign from the Reichswehr in 1932 and was given the honorary rank of Lieutenant General. He became an active member of the SS and SA in 1934 and by 1936 was Inspector General of the SS General Service Troops. In 1940-41 he organized the SS Verfuegungs Division and led it in the western campaign. When this division split up with the expansion of the Waffen SS, he took over command of the new SS Division DAS REICH and commanded it in the BALKANS and in RUSSIA. As Commanding General I SS Corps (now II SS Corps) HAUSSEER fought in RUSSIA and ITALY.

While commanding the I SS Corps in RUSSIA, HAUSSEER took part in the first attempt to take KHARKOV. However, the Russian counterattack forced him to withdraw. His second attempt to take KHARKOV in March 1943 succeeded and was considered an important achievement. Late in 1943, I SS Corps went to ITALY to reinforce that front while at the same time refitting, demobilizing the Italian Army and fighting guerrillas around TRIESTE. Early in 1944 HAUSSEER was reported commanding Seventh German Army, General DOLLMAN having been killed. HAUSSEER was wounded in August 1944 in the NORMANDY campaign and disappeared from the western front until recently, when he showed up in his present capacity.

FIRST ARMY

OBSTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for January.

NINETEENTH ARMY

RASP, Siegfried, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.



XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIV SS CORPS

Von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI, Erich, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

See G-2 History for January.

LXXXII CORPS

HAHM, Walter, General der Infanterie.

His age estimated at from 48 to 55, General HAHM assumed command in mid-December 1944, coming from FINLAND. His home reportedly is in central GERMANY. He is described as ruthless, selfish and willing to sacrifice any number of men. No other biographical data available.

LXXXV CORPS

KNISS, Baptist, General der Infanterie.

General KNISS, 59, is a General of long standing, having served in the old 100,000 Army. In pre-war days, as a Generalleutnant, he was Landwehr commander at HEILBRONN-NECKAR. He participated in the French campaign in 1940 and probably was in RUSSIA in 1941. By mid-1943 he was commanding LXVI Reserve Corps at ROYAT, near CLERMONT-FERRAND and remained in this capacity until early 1944, when he organized LXII Reserve Corps at DRAGUIGNAN. Later he left to organize LXXXV Corps, variously reported at TAILLADES and CAVAILLON. It is said that General KNISS drags one leg as a result of wounds received in the first World War. (Also, see G-2 History for August 1944).

LXXXIX CORPS

HOEHNE, Gustav, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XC CORPS (FORMERLY IV GAF CORPS)

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

See G-2 History for October 1944.

2 MOUNTAIN DIVISION

UTZ, Willibald, Generalleutnant.

Born about 1890 in BAVARIA, Generalleutnant UTZ saw service in the first World War in the 13 Bavarian Infantry Regiment. After the war he transferred to the Reichswehr. He had become a Leutnant on 18 April 1918.

During the period 1925-32 UTZ served in 19 Infantry Regiment and progressed to Hauptmann late in 1926. He became Oberstleutnant in 1937 and during the years 1938-39 commanded a battalion of 100 Mountain Regiment. On 1 January 1940 he was promoted to Oberst. During June 1941 UTZ was identified



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as commanding 100 Mountain Regiment (5 Mountain Division) in the CRETE operations, and in 1942 he commanded this same regiment in north RUSSIA. UTZ became Generalmajor on 1 August 1943 and the following month took command of 100 Light Division in the BALKANS, holding this particular command until October 1944. He was promoted to his present rank on 1 February 1944. He succeeded Generalmajor DEGEN (reported wounded) as leader of 2 Mountain Division. UTZ is believed to be a bachelor. He is well-liked by the men under his command, who respect him as a natural leader.

6 SS MOUNTAIN DIVISION

BRENNER, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for January.

10 SS PANZER DIVISION

HARMEL, Heinz, Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for January.

17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

KLINGENBERG, SS Standartenfuehrer.

See G-2 History for January.

19 INFANTRY DIVISION

BRITZELMAYR, Karl, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLM, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

245 INFANTRY DIVISION

WAGNER, Oberst.

Acting commanding officer. No biographical data available.

257 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

SEIDEL, Generalmajor.

Elevated from Oberst during month. Holder of Knight's Cross. No biographical data available.



347 INFANTRY DIVISION

TRIERENBERG, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUETHER, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.



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ANNEX IV

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 February - 28 February 1945

After the collapse of the enemy's attempts to retake ALSACE, the transition to more strategic espionage began and the tactical espionage agent temporarily disappeared along with the immediate need for him. Although three agents were captured during the period, only one was on a mission against the Seventh Army. Line-crossing undoubtedly continued, but the agents dispatched were either of a high grade, had plausible cover stories or our own travel control system had been compromised. Strategical elements of information, such as the use being made of the four American divisions which participated in the successful closing of the COLMAR pocket and other long-range intelligence were not the dish of 16-year-old HITLER Jugend boys, no matter how great their love for the Fuehrer.

A possible change in method of passing line-crossers was indicated by reports from interrogation of German prisoners of war that agents were being escorted through the lines by enemy patrols. Some of these agents wore U S Army uniforms, while others wore German army uniforms which may later have been discarded. It is probable that some of these groups were disbanded and nullified by our combat troops, as happened when a divisional patrol ambushed a group of three persons attempting to enter our lines, using a horse-drawn cart as subterfuge. One was leading, one riding and the third man walking behind the cart. The last man was shot and killed, while the other two escaped back to enemy lines. The dead man was found to be wearing a U S combat jacket and camouflage pants. No identification papers were found. A U S soldier, captured near EISCHWILLER on about 21 January and escaped on 31 January, stated that while a prisoner in OBERHOFFEN he had observed many enemy dressed in U S Army officers' and enlisted men's uniforms. A German prisoner captured on 1 February stated that his NCO had ordered him not to fire on four men who were passed through German outposts toward U S lines. The four men were dressed in white camouflage suits and were believed to be wearing civilian clothes underneath. The personnel involved in these three incidents could have been groups of the 6th Jagdverband Company, which began operating against the Seventh Army in January. Two members of this company arrested the previous month had stated that various groups were about to be dispatched either in uniform or civilian clothes. Indications from other Army fronts were that SKORZENY's preference for parachuting agents had finally won out, and the German Intelligence Service was increasingly using that method of passing agents. Of the three agents captured during the period, the only one with a mission against the Seventh Army had been parachuted.

This espionage agent was a Frenchman, a Franciste member, who was parachuted from an enemy-operated B-17 into the vicinity of LUNEVILLE with two wireless-telephone sets in a separate parachute. His mission was to report troop dispositions and movements in the LUNEVILLE area, as well as intelligence on travel control, new cartes d'identite, laissez-passer, etc. He was to contact Franciste members in LUNEVILLE for use as informants and set up his transmitter in the house of one of these contacts. He had no identity papers, which he attributed to the German belief (mistaken) that new French identity cards had been issued on the first of the year. He had retreated with the Milice into GERMANY in the fall of 1944 and had been recruited for his mission by the Franciste chief, Marcel EUCARD. He was trained at a radio - espionage school in BADEN-BADEN for nine weeks along with members of other French subversive organizations.

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ANNEX IV



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The second espionage agent apprehended was a French national who had worked for Abwehr III KGF (Security in Prisoner of War Camps) in the Chief Abwehr Office of Wehrkreis XII (WEISBADEN). He was arrested at a roadblock. He had no present mission but his previous missions had been of three types: Intelligence on persons suspected of aiding prisoners to escape into FRANCE, agent provocateur and counter-subversive work.

One probable saboteur was shot and killed by an American guard at a railway bridge in the vicinity of NANCY. The man had been lurking under the bridge carrying a bundle. When challenged, he jettisoned the package into the river and ran. He was wearing a U S Army uniform, but a German identity tag showed his unit as that of a reinforcement company which had been contacted by the Seventh Army on the breakthrough to STRASBOURG. The package was not retrieved.

The enemy's lack of intelligence on our tactical rear areas, indicated in former periods by captured maps, was further demonstrated by the poor briefing given to the apprehended agent who was parachuted with the mission of espionage in LUNEVILLE. This agent could not identify a Seventh Army Headquarters insignia and had no intimation of the location of any headquarters in LUNEVILLE or vicinity. One instance of wire-tapping on a line between a divisional field artillery battery and fire direction center occurred. On the same day an unknown radio station answered calls for two field artillery battalions in the divisional artillery radio command net.

An almost successful sabotage attempt was thwarted by the discovery of two British Mark I grenades which had been planted in the ELAINVILLE railroad yard, one in the coal box of a stationary loading crane, the other in the tender of a U S Army locomotive. The grenades were of a type parachuted to resistance groups in FRANCE.

Minor sabotage efforts increased during the month. Ten cases of wire cutting occurred, of which all except one could be attributed to deliberate attempts to disrupt U S Army communications.

The agents encountered during February are summarized below:

	<u>French</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Total</u>
Espionage	2*		2*
Sabotage	<u>      </u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	2	1	3

\* Including 1 wireless-telephone agent.

Total number of agents apprehended by the Seventh Army between 15 August 1944 and 28 February 1945:

Espionage	86
Sabotage	<u>16</u>
	102



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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART EIGHT

1 - 31 MARCH 1945

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**RESTRICTED**



HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

J.D/cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL, COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Quinn*  
William A. Quinn  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2



R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part VIII

1 - 31 March 1945

\* \* \*

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II.	Chronology	Page 2
III.	Summary	Page 8

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I.	Enemy Dispositions on Seventh Army Front (Map)
II.	Principal Enemy Commanders Opposing Seventh Army
III.	Counterintelligence Summary 1 March - 31 March

\* \* \*

R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E D

I. GENERAL

No crystal ball is needed to guess what happened to the enemy on the Seventh Army front during March, nor why: he collapsed, because he lacked the strength to do otherwise.

Short of manpower, short of materiel, taken by surprise at a time when the other German armies in the west were already being thoroughly beaten, and its rear and right flank thus fatally exposed, the German First Army survived the debacle in name only and with only one brief stand to its credit. This was the brief but stubborn defense of the SIEGFRIED fortifications in the western RHINE Valley, covering the escape routes across the river. By the end of the month the RHINE line, too, had been cut and Seventh Army was slicing into the heart of GERMANY.

It is unnecessary to detail the progress of the entire Allied Western Front offensive, beyond fixing several dates for reference. The Germans in the COLOGNE Plain had collapsed during the first week in March, and on 7 March troops of the U S First Army had seized intact the railroad bridge over the RHINE at REMAGEN. By 9 March troops of the U S Third Army had also reached the RHINE at ANDERNACH, after breaking through eastward north of the MOSELLE River. On 14 March they attacked southward across the MOSELLE. On the following day, U S Seventh Army attacked northward, toward the SIEGFRIED Line, and toward the Third Army.

Caught in the American pincers were two German armies, the First and the Seventh. In the ten-day melee which followed in the PALATINATE, 24 German divisions each yielded prisoners to both the U S Seventh and Third Armies. In addition, three enemy divisions were contacted only by the U S Seventh, and three others only by the Third. Of this total of 30 divisions, only a handful ever again mustered enough strength to put up a worthwhile fight east of the RHINE.

The two German armies thus liquidated were components of Army Group G. After the end of the war, the Army Group Commander, Oberstgruppenfuehrer (Colonel General of the Waffen SS) Paul HAUSSEER, was questioned by Seventh Army interrogators about his defeat.

He blamed the disaster on the policy, dictated to him from higher up, of holding and fighting to the last man. He said he appreciated the vulnerability of his position and his lack of troops in the SAAR - MOSELLE sector, but his suggestion of shortening the lines was rejected by higher headquarters. The easy capture of TRIER (which led to Third Army's breakthrough to the RHINE) followed. When the REMAGEN bridgehead was established, he recommended a withdrawal to the RHINE. Again he was refused, and the result was the annihilation of his troops and the untenability of the RHINE line as well. In speaking of HITLER, HAUSSEER expressed the highest esteem for the Fuehrer's abilities as a strategist - except that he was usually too late in ordering withdrawals!

The shortsightedness of the policy of which HAUSSEER complains was fully demonstrated during the last week of March. On 23 March the U S Third Army crossed the RHINE west of DARMSTADT. Early on 26 March, Seventh Army went over in the WORMS sector. To oppose expansion of the bridgehead, the Germans had only a miscellany of stop-gap units and a very few survivors from west of the RHINE. Much of the burden of defense fell on elements of more than 40 different anti-aircraft battalions, who first used their guns in ground support roles, then fought as infantry when the guns were destroyed; a variety of service and guard units were also committed. But, it was estimated, the divisions which had fought west of the RHINE had extricated so few men that they were unable to provide more than 15 per cent of the combat effectives met during the first few days east of the river.

R E S T R I C T E D



II. CHRONOLOGY

1 March - D/198

Enjoying a temporary respite from American attacks, the nine German divisions facing Seventh Army all remained quiet. They were, from the RHINE westward: 906 Mobilization Division, 257 Volksgrenadier Division, 47 Volksgrenadier Division, 36 Volksgrenadier Division, 16 Volksgrenadier Division (which was in the process of absorbing remaining combat elements of the 245 Infantry Division, whose staff and cadre had been withdrawn from the sector), 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 19 Infantry Division, 559 Volksgrenadier Division, and 347 Infantry Division, the latter in the SAARBRUCKEN - FORBACH sector. 6 SS Mountain Division, which had been in the HAARDT Mountains for two months, was enroute to the front of U S Third Army, whose MOSELLE breakthrough at TRIER was in progress.

2 March - D/199

The enemy remained inactive while displaying sensitivity to patrols on his left flank, in the HAGUENAU sector. Artillery was very light and scattered except in the SAARBRUCKEN - FORBACH area, where a slight increase was noted.

3 March - D/200

U S XXI Corps' limited-objective attack met moderately heavy resistance beyond the ELIES River north of SARREGUEMINES, with small arms, automatic weapons, anti-tank and 88-mm fire encountered. At FORBACH, the enemy put up strong opposition initially but late in the day was reported to be falling back under pressure.

4 March - D/201

Continuing to offer stubborn resistance, the enemy gave ground only under pressure in the FORBACH - STIRING-WENDEL region and near GUDINGEN. MARIENAU, southwest of FORBACH, was cleared only after heavy house-to-house fighting. The enemy's defensive attitude remained unchanged elsewhere. Artillery was generally light except for heavy fire in the FORBACH area and some increase in harassing fire near HAGUENAU.

5 March - D/202

FORBACH was cleared, but the enemy offered stubborn resistance with small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire in the area northwest of town. House-to-house fighting continued southeast of the railroad through STIRING - WENDEL. Elsewhere on the front, the enemy was generally quiet, with artillery light except in the FORBACH area. An estimated 1,200 French, Russian and Polish prisoners of war were liberated from a stockade near STIRING - WENDEL.

6 March - D/203

Elements of the 559 and 347 Divisions maintained strong resistance southwest of SAARBRUCKEN, where the enemy was establishing dug-in defenses. An enemy counterattack was repulsed north of FORBACH at about noon, and heavy house-to-house fighting continued in SIMON Mine and the factory district west of STIRING - WENDEL. The front was generally inactive elsewhere, with normal patrol and harassing fire reported.



7 March - D/204

Heavy resistance was met in the area southwest of SAARERUCKEN as elements of the 559 and 347 Divisions continued determined defensive fighting from dug-in positions behind STIRING - WENDEL and along the railroad toward GROSS-ROSSELN, west of FORBACH. The enemy was alert but generally inactive on the remainder of the front, with artillery light and scattered except in the STIRING-WENDEL area.

8 March - D/205

From the SAAR River east to the Army boundary, the enemy remained alert to U S patrols while continuing his defensive attitude south of SAARERUCKEN. Artillery fire was negligible except in the FORBACH area, where the enemy was supplementing his defenses by heavy artillery concentrations on roads and forward elements.

9 March - D/206

Its limited objectives on the approaches to SAARERUCKEN achieved, XXI Corps reported activity on its front now limited to scattered firing. Patrol activity was somewhat more lively east of the HAARDT Mountains, but in the SAAR Valley and in the SAARERUCKEN area the enemy remained passive. Artillery and mortar fire decreased on the west flank but showed marked increases during daylight hours at the northwest fringes of the HAARDT Mountains.

10 March - D/207

Activity across the entire Army front was negligible, with artillery very light and scattered. Rail movement did not disclose any significant pattern, although there was a slight increase in activity in the SAAR Valley.

11 March - D/208

There was no change in the enemy's attitude. He remained alert and sensitive, as evidenced by strong patrol contacts and sharp reactions to a FNB broadcast in the VI Corps sector. The only aggressive action was an attempted raid by 25 men in the HAARDT Mountains south of LEMBERG, probably with the purpose of capturing prisoners.

12 March - D/209

The enemy showed increasing nervousness, particularly west from the HAARDT Mountains to the SAAR River. Elements of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division northwest of RIMLING and of 19 Infantry Division near FECHINGEN mustered a total of 100 men to probe our positions, but did not succeed.

13 March - D/210

While remaining alert and sensitive in the central part of the Army zone, the enemy offered only moderate opposition to a limited-objective attack whose aim was to secure a bridgehead across the MODER River at HAGUENAU. Increased artillery fire there was the principal reaction. In the SAARERUCKEN area, civilians reported the enemy was evacuating the northwest part of STIRING-WENDEL and KLEIN ROSSELN, and was under orders to withdraw north of the SAAR before 2300A. Friendly patrols in this sector encountered only minor resistance, and a prisoner from the 347 Division, captured in SCHAFFHAUSEN, supported the civilian statements.



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14 March - D/211

A determined enemy effort to eliminate the bridgehead across the MODER River in the HAGUENAU area proved unsuccessful. Farther west, the enemy withdrew north of the SAAR in the SAARBRUCKEN area, leaving only isolated pockets of resistance.

15 March - D/212

Evidently appreciating that the front in northern ALSACE was threatened by the Allied breakthrough along the lower MOSELLE, the German First Army on 11 March had ordered its forces on the MODER River to withdraw to the SIEGFRIED Line, beginning 15 March. What had not been appreciated, however, was that 15 March was also the day on which our general offensive was to begin. The enemy put up only scattered resistance - though strong at a few points - as he began falling back under unexpected pressure.

The 3 Algerian Infantry Division, on our right flank, met moderately strong opposition south of CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN, and U S 36 Division was engaged in house-to-house fighting in the northern part of HAGUENAU. A number of towns northwest of HAGUENAU were cleared, but the U S 103 Division received a counterattack supported by five tanks at UTTEHOFEN. The U S 42 Division met strong resistance in the ROTHBACH - REIPERTSWILLER area, but later patrols to BAERENTHAL reported no contact. XV Corps (106 Cavalry, 71, 100, 3 and 45 Divisions) encountered spotty resistance except east of SARREGUEMINES, where enemy infantry counterattacked with armor support but were repulsed. XXI Corps (63 and 70 Divisions and 101 Cavalry Group) met no organized defensive positions on its right, where the enemy withdrew under cover of small arms and automatic weapons fire. An enemy counterattack east of the Bois de SAARBRUCKEN was contained.

To complete the picture of relative strength involved in the battle - the 6, 12 and 14 Armored Divisions were also under the Seventh Army command, to be committed later to exploit the German collapse. Also, a combat command of the French 5 Armored Division was operating with the 3 Algerian on our right flank. To meet this array of strength the Germans had nine divisions with an estimated strength in combat infantry effectives of 14,250 - the equivalent of 17 - 18 battalions - and 120 to 130 tanks and self-propelled guns.

16 March - D/213

The enemy offered only light to moderate resistance, delaying in nature, with the principal opposition coming from strong points in towns along the axis of advance. Four local counterattacks on the VI Corps front supported the delaying action. West of the HAARDT Mountains the Germans were withdrawing into SIEGFRIED positions, and were unable to prevent penetration into the south bank of the line south of ENSHEIM. Enemy troops were getting little artillery support because of the rearward displacement of batteries which was in progress. Among the towns cleared were both HAGUENAU and HICHE.

17 March - D/214

The enemy in the RHINE Valley and HAARDT Mountains continued withdrawing to the SIEGFRIED Line, delaying our pursuit with obstacles and mines. Only at GUNSTETT did VI Corps troops meet strong opposition.



West of the mountains, however, the Germans were already established in the SIEGFRIED Line, and put up stiffening resistance, supported by increasing artillery fire, as our forces advanced against the pillboxes and obstacles. A penetration into the outer belt of pillboxes near ALSCHBACH drew an enemy counterattack.

18 March - D/215

Little or no contact was reported in the RHINE Valley and HAARDT Mountains except in LAUTERBOURG, as the enemy continued withdrawing into SIEGFRIED positions. West of the HAARDTS heavy fighting continued in the SIEGFRIED Line from south of ZWEIBRUCKEN to south of ST. INGERT. A German counterattack in company strength retook BOTTENBOCH; south of ZWEIBRUCKEN a similar enemy attack failed. West of ZWEIBRUCKEN, heavy fighting was in progress in the SIEGFRIED Line on both sides of the ELIES River, where 24 bunkers were reported captured. U S patrols opened a lane in the "dragons' teeth" near WATTWEILER but met heavy mortar and artillery fire.

19 March - D/216

East of the HAARDT Mountains, the enemy lost WISSEMBOURG, but U S forces advancing across the border into GERMANY were engaged in a fire fight at OBER OTTERBACH. In the LAUTERBOURG sector the enemy put down small arms and automatic weapons fire from the north bank of the LAUTER River, and west of WISSEMBOURG the Germans occupied SIEGFRIED positions and offered increasing resistance.

West of the mountains, the enemy continued to resist stubbornly in the West Wall, and launched several small counterattacks; however, by the end of the day the main belt of fortifications had been penetrated near ZWEIBRUCKEN. The German right flank, west of SAARBRUCKEN, was beginning to be rolled up as a result of the deep penetrations of the U S Third Army in the direction of NEUNKIRCHEN. Although our first attempt to cross the SAAR River west of SAARBRUCKEN was repulsed, a later attempt near VOLKLINGEN was unopposed and the first pillboxes north of the river were found unoccupied.

20 March - D/217

The entire right wing of the German First Army collapsed as enemy troops west of the HAARDT Mountains withdrew eastward into the mountains, enroute to the RHINE. Very little opposition was met by U S troops who passed through the SIEGFRIED Line at ZWEIBRUCKEN and other points to the west. SAARBRUCKEN was cleared, with only a few snipers encountered. Both bands of the SIEGFRIED Line in this sector were pierced and contact was made with the U S Third Army.

To salvage anything at all from this debacle, the Germans had to hold their east flank firm, to cover the escape routes across the RHINE. This they did by holding tenaciously to the SIEGFRIED positions in the RHINE Valley for several more days. Part of the line north of WISSEMBOURG was being manned by miscellaneous units, including some Volkssturm battalions, organized into Division RAESSLER - some 3,000 men under command of Generalmajor RAESSLER. The 905 Mobilization Division, 257 Volksgrenadier Division, elements of the 47 Volksgrenadier Division, 36 Volksgrenadier Division, 16 Volksgrenadier Division and remnants of the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division were also holding sectors in the mountains and the RHINE Valley.



R E S T R I C T E D

21 March - D/218

Heavy fighting continued in the SIEGFRIED positions from the RHINE Valley to the HAARDT Mountains, but even here the enemy began, late in the day, to show signs of getting out. A heavy increase in artillery fire in the BIENWALD Forest, on the RHINE flank, suggested enemy artillery was also shifting eastward. In the HAARDTS resistance slackened somewhat late in the period, while a prisoner had stated earlier that the enemy was to withdraw from this area and cross the RHINE. West of PIRMASENS enemy artillery, which had been active, ceased firing after 1335A. East of HOMBURG only scattered contact was made with the disorganized and withdrawing enemy. North of SAARERUCKEN remnants of the 19, 347 and 719 Divisions were pocketed and being mopped up.

22 March - D/219

The enemy still held firmly in SIEGFRIED Line positions in the RHINE Valley, but the sector being so held again narrowed considerably as troops in the HAARDT Mountains joined the wholesale withdrawal. Southeast of PIRMASENS another segment of the West Wall was found unmanned. PIRMASENS itself was taken against only scattered small arms fire, and organized resistance was negligible from there westward. Indicative of the completeness of the collapse of the entire German Seventh Army and most of the First Army was the U S IV Corps' identification of elements of 18 German divisions during the day - none of which offered any notable opposition. In an effort to cover his withdrawing columns, the enemy stepped up his air activity, bombing and strafing roads in the area east of KAISERSLAUTERN.

23 March - D/220

The progressive collapse of resistance in the west and center portions of the VI Corps zone, together with the large number of prisoners surrendering, indicated the withdrawal of enemy forces from west of the RHINE was nearing completion. Only three German divisions, 257, 905 and RAESSLER, were still in reasonably firm contact immediately west of the RHINE. Even here resistance began to break down during the day. To the west and north only scattered remnants were being mopped up, although moderate resistance was developing in the southwest portion of LUDWIGSHAFEN late in the day. West of GERMERSHEIM, whose bridge was still serviceable, dug-in enemy troops resisted Third Army troops who were advancing toward the RHINE.

24 March - D/221

Except for scattered pockets, enemy resistance ended west of the RHINE. The last organized enemy force disengaged in the BIENWALD Forest, and German infantrymen were reported crossing the RHINE on rafts in that area. Occasional roadblocks were lightly defended, and a small pocket still held out in LUDWIGSHAFEN, although most of the resistance there was liquidated during the day. U S troops on the RHINE received scattered fire from the east bank.

25 March - D/222

The day was characterized by continued mopping-up operations on the RHINE front and in rear areas. GERMERSHEIM, PFORTZ and MAXIMILIANSAU were cleared of enemy remnants, although snipers and small pockets were still met in LUDWIGSHAFEN. Some small arms and light artillery fire continued to fall along the river front from east of the RHINE.

R E S T R I C T E D



26 March - D/223

XV Corps' crossings of the RHINE in the WORMS area met moderate to strong resistance, but by the end of the day the bridgehead was firmly established and the RHINE barrier had been breached at yet another point.

A major element in the German defense of the river was a large number of anti-aircraft weapons. Those firing from the vicinity of MANNHEIM and from a nearby island in the river laid down sufficient fire to interfere seriously with crossing operations by elements of the U S 3 Division. 45 Division crossings at first met only light resistance, but small arms, machine gun, mortar, bazooka and 20-mm fire later became intense. Artillery fire, however, was very light, indicating the seriousness of materiel losses west of the RHINE.

Three enemy counterattacks of platoon and company strength were repulsed in the SANDHOFEN - LAMPERTSHEIM area, and strong resistance had to be overcome before HOFHEIM, KLEINHAUSEN and GERNSEHEIM were taken.

27 March - D/224

Advances from the bridgehead cleared all of the RHINE Valley to the foothills of the ODENWALD against disorganized and diminishing resistance. With the fall of BENSHEIM, the north-south DARMSTADT - HEIDELBERG axis was broken and rapid advances to the northeast cleared GROSS ZIMMERN and made contact with Third Army elements at the MAIN River south of ASCHAFFENBURG.

On the southern side of the bridgehead resistance was somewhat stiffer. Evidently trying to cover the NECKAR Valley, the enemy laid down considerable fire on the approaches to WEINHEIM. Contact with small enemy units led to fire fights and one small counterattack near NEUSCHLOSS.

28 March - D/225

The enemy lost virtually all the terrain between the RHINE and MAIN Rivers in the northern portion of the zone. Evidently he intended to stand on the east side of the MAIN, for after crossing the river U S troops were heavily engaged at ASCHAFFENBURG and SCHWEINHEIM.

In the center, isolated groups and roadblocks attempted unsuccessfully to slow the advance, but in the south resistance was again strong. WEINHEIM fell only after heavy fighting and the enemy was attempting to hold a line on the west slopes of the ODENWALD. Stubborn opposition was offered at KAEFERTAL and WALLSTADT. An enemy counterattack against our bridgehead over the NECKAR between HEIDELBERG and MANNHEIM was broken up. Mortar fire was still coming from the island in the RHINE at MANNHEIM, whose mayor was engaged in telephone negotiations for the surrender of the city. The negotiations failed when the German garrison commander objected.

29 March - D/226

After the Wehrmacht withdrew during the night, the mayor of MANNHEIM succeeded in surrendering his town. Telephone negotiations were then undertaken with the mayor of HEIDELBERG.

Two more small counterattacks were repulsed at the NECKAR bridgehead. Advancing southward along the main highway to HEIDELBERG, U S troops had to overcome strong opposition at SCHRIESHEIM before the town fell. Delays due to difficult terrain and scattered resistance failed to prevent deep penetration of the ODENWALD.



Our front on the MAIN River was broadened with the clearing of WOERTH after heavy fighting. The bridgehead across the MAIN at ASCHAFFENBURG and SCHWEINHEIM expanded slowly against very stiff opposition.

30 March - D/227

The pattern of enemy resistance was unchanged. Advances south of the NECKAR River reached KETSCH and SCHWETZINGEN against opposition which included a few tanks, but HEIDELBERG fell easily. Going downhill on the east slopes of the ODENWALD, with improvised roadblocks and bazooka fire providing the only obstacles, advance elements reached WALLDURN and points beyond. Farther north additional crossings of the MAIN River in the WOERTH area failed to bring an enemy reaction, but in the ASCHAFFENBURG - SCHWEINHEIM sector the enemy continued to defend stubbornly. Three counterattacks there were repulsed.

31 March - D/228

Enemy resistance was strong on the two flanks - the ASCHAFFENBURG - SCHWEINHEIM sector, where bitter house-to-house fighting was in progress, and the HAARDT Woods, near the RHINE south of the NECKAR, where an organized defensive line was developed. However, east of the ODENWALD in the area between HEILBRONN and WURZBURG, advances continued virtually unchecked.

### III. SUMMARY

The final result of operations during March 1945 is implicit in the situation. On the 15th the Germans were holding positions forward of the SIEGFRIED Line in ALSACE; on the 31st they had still not been able to re-establish a front east of the RHINE to block the Seventh Army's drive across Southern GERMANY.

In the sparring preliminaries of the first two weeks of March, the Germans had yielded 1,092 prisoners to the Seventh Army, lost an estimated 2,500 killed and wounded and only three tanks or self-propelled guns known to have been destroyed.

During the last two weeks 38,434 prisoners were processed through the Seventh Army cages. Because of the completeness of the collapse, no accurate estimate of battle casualties was possible. Eighty-two tanks and self-propelled guns were known destroyed or captured - but these were only a fraction of the vast quantity of artillery pieces and vehicles destroyed or abandoned during the flight across the RHINE.

In the trans-RHINE phase of the last six days of the month, somewhat more accurate estimates of enemy strength and losses could be made. An estimated 14,500 infantry effectives were committed piecemeal against our eastward thrust; only about 2,200 of these were identified as survivors of the routed divisions, the balance being hastily-assembled miscellaneous units, mainly replacement training units. An indication of their unreadiness for combat is their loss of about 6,500 prisoners (an estimate, not a cage count) and 2,000 killed and wounded between 26 March and 1 April.



R E S T R I C T E D




However, it should be pointed out that the 2,200 referred to above were only the combat-effective survivors contacted within the first few days of the RHINE crossing; they by no means represented the total of German troops from the First and Seventh Armies who succeeded in crossing the river during the retreat. That overall figure, including all types of divisional troops in addition to combat infantrymen, is estimated at approximately 40,000. April, the last full month of the war, was to be well advanced before the Germans succeeded in redeploying these troops along some semblance of a cohesive front.

Meanwhile, the enemy order of battle was so nebulous that it is doubtful if even the High Command could have told with certainty what it had on the front at any given time; therefore, the usual annex, tabulating enemy strengths at regular intervals during the month, is omitted from this report.

R E S T R I C T E D



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Annex No. I ENEMY DISPOSITIONS ON SEVENTH ARMY FRONT

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ANNEX II

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

HAUSSER, Paul, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer.

See G-2 History for February.

FIRST ARMY

FOERTSCH, Herrmann, General der Infanterie.

General FOERTSCH held an appointment at the Kriegsakademie in 1938-39, and became Generalmajor on 1 February 1942. Eleven months later he was promoted to Generalleutnant, and in January 1944 was Chief of Staff of Army Group F. He served in the summer of 1944 as commander of 21 Infantry Division on the north Russian front, and for services rendered was granted the German Cross in Gold on 5 September 1944. He assumed his present command on 6 March.

The general was born in POTSDAM, near BERLIN. He has the reputation of being an able tactician. He is forward in expressing his opinions, and has been overheard criticizing some of his superiors. He is judged to be a loyal follower of HITLER, and according to his own version was to have been one of the victims of the ROEHM coup, had it been successful.

His habits as a commanding general are similar to those of most generals. After an early breakfast, the General studies the morning reports, asking the Chief of Staff for required explanations. He keeps in touch with his division commanders, generally by visiting them, while the Corps commanders often come to see him. These Corps leaders or their representatives attend the combined G-2 and G-3 briefings at the General's headquarters, whenever he is present. Two situation maps are kept up to the minute for his use. Occasionally the Judge Advocate appears in the morning to read sentences and fines meted out. This is thought to constitute a warning to would-be offenders in the officer corps.

SEVENTH ARMY

FELBER, Hans, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data available.

NINETEENTH ARMY

OESTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

Former commander of First Army. See G-2 History for January.

Left the Nineteenth Army command 25 March to succeed FELBER as head of the Seventh Army.



BRANDENBERGER, General der Panzer Truppen.

Came to Nineteenth Army as OBSTFELDER's successor late in month.  
No biographical data available.

XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIII CORPS

ORIOLA, Ralph, Graf von, General der Artillerie.

General von ORIOLA comes from an old Silesian aristocratic military family. He differs from most high-ranking German officers, however, being neither arrogant nor rank-conscious, and exhibiting a pronounced non-Nazi attitude. His knowledge of politics is slight, though he has expressed his disgust with Nazi leaders and leadership during the war. His desire to see other countries and people is passionate, while at the same time he is intensely interested in the reconstruction of GERMANY.

With 18 Artillery Regiment in 1938-39, General von ORIOLA advanced successively through the ranks of Oberst and Generalmajor to Generalleutnant between June 1940 and November 1943, and later was awarded the Knight's Cross for action at GOMEL. In January 1945 he assumed command of VI Corps on the eastern front, and on 9 March 1945 succeeded General der Infanterie FELBER as head of XIII Corps, FELBER taking command of the Seventh Army.

LXXXII CORPS

HAHM, Walter, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for February.

LXXXV CORPS

KNISS, Baptist, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for August 1944 and February 1945.

LUETTWITZ, Smilo von, General der Panzer Truppen.

Assumed command 29 March, General KNISS being retired due to illness.

LXXXIX CORPS

HOEHNE, Gustav, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XC CORPS (FORMERLY IV GAF CORPS)

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

See G-2 History for October 1944.



2 MOUNTAIN DIVISION

UTZ, Willibald, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for February.

6 SS MOUNTAIN DIVISION

BRENNER, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for January.

16 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

MOECKL, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

KLINGENBERG, SS Standartenfuehrer.

See G-2 History for January. (NOTE: Later it was learned that Colonel KLINGENBERG died shortly before the German flight back across the RHINE).

19 INFANTRY DIVISION

FRITZELMAYR, Karl, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLM, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

245 INFANTRY DIVISION

WAGNER, Oberst.

Acting commanding officer. No biographical data available.

257 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

SEIDEL, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for February. No other biographical data available.

347 INFANTRY DIVISION

TRIERENBERG, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.



559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

719 INFANTRY DIVISION

GAEDE, Generalmajor.

The 47-year-old GAEDE, who was captured 30 March, has been a Generalmajor since the end of 1943. Interrogators found him highly intelligent but extremely rank-conscious. He appeared to be a very lonely man, lacking in drawing-room manners despite much time in diplomatic life. As with so many others of his class, GAEDE appeared amazed that Allied troops did not consider him a hero for having successfully evaded capture during eight days of hiding behind Allied lines. The lack of chivalry displayed by American soldiers was incomprehensible to his Prussian mentality.

General GAEDE's military career began in 1916 when he was drafted into 45 Field Artillery Regiment as a Fahnenjunker (officer candidate). After the war he returned to civilian life and managed his private estate. This life was brief: In 1923 he was recalled to service and assigned to 2 Artillery Regiment. 1924 found him as inspection officer at an artillery school in WUENSDORF, later as physical training officer.

In 1931 GAEDE was a staff officer with 5 Infantry Division in STUTTGART, and three years later he was in BERLIN attending General Staff Officers' school. He became Oberst in 1937, and in 1939 was artillery advisor to OKH. A promotion followed and he went to FRANCE with 225 Infantry Division. He was in a G-3 capacity, and served similarly in RUSSIA with 110 Infantry Division in 1941. Shortly thereafter he was Chief of Staff of an Army Corps. He was ill early in 1942, but by June was in BULGARIA as chief of the German Training Staff attached to the Royal Bulgarian Army Staff. He reached his present rank in December 1943 and became commander of 719 Division, succeeding Generalmajor SCHWALBE, in December 1944.

905 MOBILIZATION DIVISION

KASTNER, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

DIVISION RAESSLER

RAESSLER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.



R E S T R I C T E D

ANNEX III

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 March - 31 March 1945

The attack by the Seventh Army on 15 March broke the month into two sharply divergent periods. Enemy intelligence and sabotage activities during the first half of the period were limited to unsuccessful attempts to discover the size and time of the attack which the Germans knew was coming. However, the interrogation of officer prisoners demonstrated that tactical surprise was achieved in the attack. Several enemy officers complained of the poor quality of intelligence received from higher headquarters, thereby indicating that German agents had encountered difficulty in accomplishing missions or had been almost inactive. In any case, no agents were apprehended in the first fifteen days as compared with seven espionage and two sabotage agents during the latter half of the month. The case of Grenadier Werner EHRHARDT, although not considered typical, may illustrate the type and esprit of agents. EHRHARDT had been reported by a German deserter to have made numerous successful line-crossings in the Seventh Army area. He was subsequently apprehended and interrogation of both EHRHARDT and the deserter revealed that EHRHARDT had not accomplished his missions, that, instead he had hidden in a relative's house on the German bank of the ROSELLE River and had faked reports on his missions, basing his information on the files of his own organization. His superiors had promoted him and awarded him the Iron Cross First Class. Further evidence of the failure of German Intelligence to obtain tactical information was a captured map of an unknown enemy headquarters. The order of battle of both German and Allied forces as of 18-20 March was shown on the map with numerous major errors regarding Seventh Army: one division was not identified, an armored division was located far from its actual position, one division listed as on the line actually was in reserve and a corps of another Army located in the vicinity was placed under the Seventh Army.

The reason for this comparative inactivity was not lack of interest but rather concentration on the Reich itself and on long-range activities. The trend of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt on operations outside the Reich was towards long-distance parachute operations which took priority over tactical operations. There were now enough trained parachutists of the French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourger subversive groups to continue dropping them regularly over Western EUROPE and the Sicherheitsdienst was primarily interested for its foreign operations in subversive and pro-Nazi movements in Allied-held territory, with the assassination of public figures still an assignment for its agents. Since the Abwehr lost its Kommandos and Trupps the armies had tightened control over them and the Sicherheitsdienst was not interfering with their routine work but it had certain jurisdiction in all operations due to its control of the quisling organizations from which the majority of agents was being drawn. Although it is difficult to point a finger at locations or activities of the Kommandos and Trupps whose operations resemble a blob of mercury broken into drops, certain information became known. A new espionage Kommando, Number 176, had moved from JUGOSLAVIA to the ELACK FOREST area and was reorganizing with reinforcements from Trupps formerly in the COLMAR pocket.

Stay-behind systems for Allied-occupied GERMANY preoccupied both the Reichssicherheitshauptamt and the Wehrmacht. The latter, showing considerably increased interest, was demanding that greater numbers of radio agents be trained for employment in the Rhineland. It was known that Kommando 180 had trained 30 agents for use in Western GERMANY solely for air intelligence.

R E S T R I C T E D

ANNEX III



R E S T R I C T E D

Kommando 120 was planning to emulate the short-term stay-behind network, a new development tried out successfully by Kommando 130 in the EIFEL area. Kommando 120's field of operations was to be against the Seventh Army in the PIRMASENS and SOULTZ areas. Although radio was the means of communication, this short-term network was independent of the long-term stay-behind radio agents. It was planned to counter the difficulty of supplying current for radio operation in the early days of Allied occupation by the widespread use of pigeons and couriers to supplement the usual radio communications.

The training of agents both for work abroad and inside GERMANY continued on an increased scale and in the BADEN area large numbers of HITLER Jugend were going to espionage and sabotage schools.

Evidence from our own and other sectors demonstrated that as early as September 1944 there had been a definite top-secret plan formulated by HIMMLER to establish a sabotage and subversive organization to operate under control of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt behind the Allied lines as well as after the war. This organization was called the Werewolf and was the only underground organization encountered by the Seventh Army which was worthy of the name. SKORZENY, Chief of Amt VI/S and Militaerisches Amt D, was charged with the bulk of training and supply of the Werewolf. HITLER Jugend, Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst personnel had been trained, but not on a large scale. All aid given by SKORZENY to the Werewolf was at the expense of his Militaerisches Amt D and Jagdverbaende, both in personnel and materiel and, consequently, the Werewolf suffered. However, there were enough people trained and enough sabotage dumps established to cause some concern. Three 15-year-old boys were apprehended at the end of March in possession of a pistol and four hand grenades. The boys stated that they were members of a group of 250 boys in the area of BENSHEIM who were sworn to kill American soldiers. One sabotage agent apprehended with a terrorist and sabotage mission confessed that he was part of a group of 21 other persons in the same area with similar missions. Although there existed an unfounded tendency to attribute every out-of-the-way action by irate Germans to the Werewolf, it is probable that some of the high-level planning in BERLIN, even though modified, did seep down to various regions. A Party radio network in the Seventh Army area began Werewolf broadcasts at the end of March. Messages were mostly administrative, arranging for meetings, calling on Kreisleiters for aid in organizing a local Werewolf. One of the alleged tenets of the Werewolf was not to act until some time after the Allies had occupied an area. However, it appeared that this potentially dangerous organization, although planned and staffed, existed mostly on inter-office memoranda. Time had been against it, as well as a numbed German people. GOEBBELS' private propaganda Werewolf which represented the movement as a mass, atavistic uprising of the German people with scythes and plastic explosives, was no more of a genuine threat than the dragon in "Siegfried".

Descriptions of the nine agents apprehended, all in GERMANY, are given below: a chain of four stay-behind radio operators was uncovered. The organizer was a Sonderfuehrer K (assimilated grade of Captain) in Abwehr I H who had formerly worked as an evaluator of Abwehr intelligence for Abwehr branch offices in WIESBADEN, ST. GERMAIN, ANGERS and KAISERSLAUTERN. His mission was to establish three radio agents in the Rhineland and a network of satellite informers. The three operators whom he established were discharged Wehrmacht Signal Corps enlisted men whose homes were in the Rhineland.

The fifth radio operator apprehended was a German who claimed to have been a Communist of long standing and to have deserted the German Army, been imprisoned by the Russians and later released for a parachute espionage mission in BERLIN. There he was arrested by the Gestapo, forced to continue contact with the Russians and finally sent on a stay-behind mission against Seventh Army.



He was to report all American military activities in the SAARBRUCKEN area as well as all civilian political developments affecting the war. He had not yet transmitted any military intelligence when arrested.

The two HITLER Jugend members, one 15½, the other 16 years old, were vagrants who had been arrested for lack of papers and been impressed by a Wehrmacht officer into crossing the lines to find out from civilians the types and strength of American troops and vehicles. They had no cover story and no training.

Of the two sabotage agents apprehended:

One was a German Army Lieutenant arrested in civilian clothes on his way to a camouflaged cave of a resistance movement under SS control, on the outskirts of SAARBRUCKEN. The cave, a former air raid shelter with its real entrance demolished, was elaborately furnished with complete facilities for all emergencies, including demolition materiel, arms and munitions. The cave had been established to serve as a resistance sabotage dump for operation in American-occupied territory.

The second sabotage agent apprehended was a Polish national, former Obergefreiter in the German Army, who had been working as an assistant to Military Government in the town of BRUCKWEILER and had been considered for mayor of the town. His confessed mission was to sabotage U S equipment and supplies and kill U S soldiers at night. He was also to transmit to another agent in PRIMASENS reports on troop movements, strength and insignia. He had attended two sabotage schools. Twenty-one other persons in the area had been given similar missions.

Actual sabotage was almost non-existent during the period. An enemy Schu mine was found near a bridge. Intended sabotage was indicated since the bridge had recently been repaired and the area cleared by U S Army engineers. Only one wire cut was reported, and that probably not due to sabotage. A German demolition squad expertly mined a hotel in NIEDERBRONN prior to the German retreat. A time bomb hidden in the hotel demolished it; U S troops occupying the hotel suffered 25 casualties, eight of whom were reported dead.

There was increased activity in the use of propaganda leaflets during the part of the period prior to attack. Two different leaflets distributed in the vicinity of GUDINGEN gave detailed instructions on malingering. The theme of both pamphlets was printed at the end, namely: "The most important thing about the war is to come back home alive!" The first pamphlet told, with illustrations, how to produce a simulated paralysis of the arm or leg. The cover of the second gave purported war profits of American firms and devoted the remainder of its four pages to directions for simulating tuberculosis sufficiently to give positive reaction to a sputum test.

The types of espionage and sabotage agents encountered can be seen from the breakdown below:

	<u>German</u>	<u>Polish</u>	<u>Total</u>
Espionage	7*		7*
Sabotage	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	$\frac{2}{9}$

\* Including 5 radio agents.

Total number of agents captured by the Seventh Army since 15 August 1944:

Espionage	93
Sabotage	18
Total	<u>111</u>



**CONFIDENTIAL**

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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART NINE

1 - 30 APRIL 1945

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**RESTRICTED**



HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

W.D./cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL, COLONEL, AGD, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Quinn*  
WILLIAM A. QUINN  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2



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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part IX

1 - 30 April 1945

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I. GENERAL

On 22 April 1945, Adolf HITLER, Fuehrer of the Third Reich, became convinced that the war had been lost.

That belated admission, reported by Hermann GOERING, is in itself a concise summary of the progress and results of enemy operations during this last full month of the war in EUROPE. However, the month during which defeat became disintegration still saw the enemy command demonstrating some of its old talent for improvisation, and still practicing its traditional tactics of holding critical strong points and defending by counterattack where possible. As a result, the war which had been lost long before the Fuehrer's admission did not end yet. Bitter battles were fought, and men died on both sides before unconditional surrender could be proclaimed.

General EISENHOWER had publicly stated that his intention was to destroy the German armies west of the RHINE. This had been done in March. By the first of April, American, British and French forces had shattered the RHINE position and were driving into the heart of GERMANY. Of the broken units which had survived the Rhineland disaster to take up positions on the east bank, 21 divisions and a third of a million men were cut off in the RUHR pocket on 1 April. The pocket was not liquidated until the 18th, but until then it was so completely isolated that its troops could play no part in the decisive final campaigns.

Through the great void thus left in the German center, the Allied armies swept toward the ELBE and the Russians. It soon became apparent that if the Germans were going to reform a front anywhere against the Western Allies it would have to be in the south, where BAVARIA and Upper AUSTRIA now constituted the larger part of the dwindling Reich.

Thus it happened that the reformation began on Seventh Army's right flank, which had driven southeastward through MANNHEIM and HEIDELBERG and was approaching HEILBRONN. In this sector were remnants of the divisions which had been on the SAAR-PALATINATE front in March and had escaped across the river. Holding firmly to HEILBRONN as an anchor position, they confronted VI Corps along the NECKAR and JAGST Rivers, fighting bitterly, and for a time successfully, to block our advance to the southeast.

The central and northern portions of the front, however, were much slower to reform. XXI Corps, driving due eastward from the WORMS bridgehead, met only spotty and disjointed defense as it cleared the great bend of the MAIN River, took WURZBURG, KITZINGEN and finally SCHWEINFURT. And XV Corps, fanning out from the bridgehead first to the northeast, then east, then southeast, found that the Germans had put everything they had into the vicious defense of ASCHAFFENBURG and then had little left with which to hold until they had fallen back clear to NURNBERG.

During the second week of April, Seventh Army completed its turn, pivoting on the right flank, and faced south. Opposing it, from the NECKAR River to BAYREUTH, was the only continuous front the Germans were able to construct during April. From west to east, the divisions were 246, 198, 553, 9, 212, 79, ALPEN, von HOE, 416, 256, 36 and a battle group of 2 Panzer, with 17 SS and 2 Mountain Divisions in the process of moving from their former sectors on the west flank to NURNBERG to bolster defense of the Nazi shrine. The use of divisional numbers to identify the German forces on the front is, however, little more than a bookkeeping convenience; they represented only staffs who gathered unto themselves any miscellaneous units they could lay their hands on to man a sector of the line. Included in the melange were nearly all of the replacement and training units of Wehrkreis XIII (Battle Group von HOE consisted entirely of these) together

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with a number from other Wehrkreise. Division ALPEN was one of several "name" divisions thrown together hurriedly to provide reinforcements; others were DONAU and BAYERN. They all disappeared in a manner similar to ALPEN, which gave up one of its regiments to 2 Mountain Division, the other to 212 Division.

The stubborn defense of HEILERONN, and the enforced withdrawal of our first breakthrough to CRAILSHEIM on 10 April, proved that these hard-pressed units still had some fight left. Under constant pressure they slowly fell back, finally losing HEILERONN on 12 April, and withdrawing into NURNBERG itself on the 16th; but still the front held together.

Not for long, however. The politically-inspired decision to hold NURNBERG to the bitter end required the dispatch eastward of two of the best remaining divisions, 2 Mountain and 17 SS Panzer Grenadier. The weakened NECKAR - KOCHER River sector from which they were withdrawn then became the first to crack, and VI Corps began its breakthrough north of SCHWAHISCH HALL on 18 April. On the 20th NURNBERG fell, despite the efforts devoted to its defense. And on the 21st still another breakthrough developed east of CRAILSHEIM. Southwest of NURNBERG the 2 Mountain Division fought a planned withdrawal back to the DANUBE; but elsewhere the Germans fell back in disorder, leaving large numbers pocketed in our rear.

South of the DANUBE, a few units put up vigorous fights, even counter-attacking on occasion. But never again did the Germans succeed in establishing a cohesive front. At the end of April, Seventh Army's left was in MUNICH and its right was in AUSTRIA; between it and ultimate victory lay only a few skirmishes, a few roadblocks and demolitions, and five days.

## II. CHRONOLOGY

### 1 April - D/229

The enemy's left flank, between the RHINE and NECKAR Rivers, fell back behind delaying action as far as BRUCHSAL, although he continued to hold out at WIESLOCH. On either side of the NECKAR, the Germans attempted to hinder our advance up river by resisting strongly at WOLLENBERG and on the MOSBACH - DALLAU road.

Endeavoring to halt further development of our breakthrough between the NECKAR and MAIN Rivers, the enemy established a defensive line forward of the TAUBER River athwart the road and railroad to WURZBURG. This position was out-flanked, however, and American troops reached the MAIN at WURZBURG and at several other points south of the city. West of WURZBURG the enemy counter-attacked at HETTSTADT and heavy fighting ensued before the town was captured late in the day.

The northeastward advance of our left wing was still being held up by the enemy's stubborn resistance at ASCHAFFENBURG. However, he put up only light opposition to initial penetration of the SPESSART Mountains southeast of ASCHAFFENBURG.

### 2 April - D/230

In the RHINE - NECKAR sector, enemy troops northeast of BRUCHSAL attempted to forestall the threat to HEILERONN from the west by delivering heavy fire from dug-in positions on high ground. Near BRUCHSAL they counterattacked with 200 infantry and five tanks and were repulsed only after five hours of fighting. However, a U S column advancing up the west side of the NECKAR toward HEILERONN reached the vicinity of WIMPFEN despite small arms, bazooka and anti-tank fire.



On the opposite side of the river stiff resistance was met in the ALLFELD area and U S columns also received heavy 88-mm fire from bypassed enemy in the high ground southeast of MOSBACH.

From here eastward to the MAIN River the enemy continued his efforts to contain the breakthrough - and with increasing success. Troops moving toward ADELSHEIM met strong resistance and on the TAUBER River line there was hard fighting at KONIGSHOFEN before the town was cleared. In the vicinity of OSFELD, heavy fire forced U S forces to withdraw. At the easternmost point of our penetration, the enemy counterattacked at ENHEIM, and resisted throughout the day.

On the northern half of the front, ASCHAFFENBURG was again the focal point of the fighting. A renewed attack took half of the town and 1,000 prisoners, but some strong points continued to hold out. Advances into the SPESSART on both sides of ASCHAFFENBURG met only scattered resistance, and a U S cavalry unit breaking into BAD ORB freed 6,500 Allied prisoners of war.

3 April - D/231

West of the NECKAR River the enemy fell back behind strong delaying resistance, with the heaviest fighting at ODENHEIM and EICHTERSHEIM. On the west bank of the river, dug-in enemy stubbornly opposed the advance on HEILBRONN.

East of the NECKAR, the Germans fell back to its tributary, the JAGST, there placing heavy fire on forward U S elements on the north bank. Our crossing just east of the JAGST - NECKAR junction was strongly opposed by small arms fire from dug-in enemy. The bypassed enemy elements south of MOSBACH were mopped up and ADELSHEIM cleared despite stiff opposition. Farther east, the enemy lost KONIGSHOFEN, on the TAUBER River, but continued resisting from dug-in positions east of the TAUBER in the OSFELD area. South of MARKTBREIT, on the tip of the MAIN bend, he was developing further dug-in positions.

Our crossing of the MAIN at OCHSENFURT at first met only light opposition, which stiffened later on the high ground near ZEUEHLRIED. The crossing at WURZBURG was resisted with small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and flak fire.

On our left, ASCHAFFENBURG surrendered at 0900B and was cleared of snipers by 1300B. The effort to hold the city had cost the enemy an estimated 4,600 casualties. With its loss his resistance to our advance northeastward collapsed and our drive through the SPESSART reached the general line LOHR - BAD ORB against only scattered resistance.

4 April - D/232

On our right flank the First French Army advancing southward along the RHINE cleared KARLSRUHE; between there and HEILBRONN the enemy offered scattered delaying action.

From the NECKAR eastward, however, resistance stiffened noticeably. A crossing of the NECKAR north of HEILBRONN drew an enemy counterattack which reached the river line before being halted and thrown back. The bridgehead across the JAGST also received a counterattack, and a second crossing near NEUDENAU met heavy fire.

In the MOCKMUHL - ADELSHEIM sector the enemy reacted with heavy fire throughout the day. In the KONIGSHOFEN - OSFELD area he also held dug-in positions, and counterattacked at MESSELHAUSEN. He opposed further eastward advances south of the MAIN.

The OCHSENFURT bridgehead over the MAIN still faced stiff resistance and



in the WURZBURG bridgehead the enemy was forced back to the railroad after heavy fighting.

North of the MAIN, the enemy was attempting to delay on the high ground west of the SINN River, with small towns in this sector taken only after fire fights. North of JOSSA, however, he could offer only scattered and disorganized resistance.

5 April - D/233

The enemy situation remained generally unchanged during the day as active defense of the NECKAR - JAGST River line continued in the southern part of the Army's area. The bridgehead north of HEILBRONN was again counterattacked. Resistance in the MAIN River bend south and east of WURZBURG collapsed during the day as the OCHSENFURT bridgehead broke out, and ROTTENDORF and KITZINGEN were cleared against spotty opposition. However, fighting continued in WURZBURG, where another counterattack was repulsed. The attempt to hold along the SINN River was short-lived, and only broken delaying action slowed the advance toward HAMMELBURG.

6 April - D/234

Defense of the NECKAR - JAGST River line continued unabated. A fresh crossing into HEILBRONN led to bitter house-to-house fighting and an unsuccessful counterattack, and the earlier bridgehead north of the city was also counter-attacked.

However, farther east a breach was opened in the enemy line when a U S armored column broke through to the vicinity of CRAILSHEIM against only light opposition.

The enemy was driven from WURZBURG but continued scattered delaying stands at villages north and east of the city in the MAIN River bend. Rapid exploitation northeast through the HOHE RHON was developing little organized opposition.

7 April - D/235

The Germans defended aggressively on the NECKAR - JAGST River line, counterattacking three times at HEILBRONN and also against the ODHEIM bridgehead. Two more crossings of the JAGST farther east met strong resistance.

Opposition at CRAILSHEIM was still generally light, but an enemy buildup was apparent at the base of the corridor, indicating a probable attempt to cut off our spearhead.

Limited tactical withdrawals were undertaken in the KONIGSHOFEN - BAD MERGENTHEIM area, but the enemy was still fighting an active delaying action there, and counterattacked at WEIKERSHEIM. The advance toward SCHWEINFURT from the direction of WURZBURG developed stiffening artillery, mortar and anti-tank fire. Resistance east of the HOHE RHON continued generally disorganized throughout the day; the enemy increased his armor activity somewhat in this sector, and lost 14 tanks and two self-propelled guns.

8 April - D/236

The strong defense of the NECKAR - JAGST River line continued, with resistance focusing on HEILBRONN and JAGSTFELD. The enemy fought stubbornly throughout the day to maintain his positions between the JAGST and KOCHER Rivers. Supporting his ground troops with augmented air forces, the enemy made determined efforts to destroy the units which had broken through to CRAILSHEIM. Attacks



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were launched both against CRAILSHEIM itself and against the base of the supply corridor in the vicinity of BARTENSTEIN. The advance on SCHWEINFURT from the south and west met moderate to stiff opposition, with indications that the city was being prepared as a hedgehog strongpoint. Steady progress throughout the northern zone developed only sporadic resistance, but enemy armor again was active in that area.

9 April - D/237

Determined, aggressive defense in the NECKAR - JAGST River sectors, together with further strong air/ground efforts to eliminate the CRAILSHEIM corridor, indicated the enemy's extreme sensitivity to the threat now poised at southern GERMANY. During the day he pulled back under pressure from the JAGST River to alternate positions along the KOCHER River, while maintaining his static defenses in the TAUBER River zone. The Germans continued to fall back slowly on SCHWEINFURT, offering considerable anti-aircraft fire to the south and west; photo interpretation had revealed 104 heavy and 43 light anti-aircraft guns in the city's perimeter defenses. Rapid advances on the northern flank were still developing uncoordinated and weak resistance, and had progressed so far that SCHWEINFURT was now threatened from that direction as well.

10 April - D/238

Bitter house-to-house fighting continued in HEILBRONN, following an early morning enemy attack north of the city. Strong aggressive action against the CRAILSHEIM - ILSHOFEN spearhead, and against the base of the salient, continued until our forward elements were withdrawn.

In the SCHWEINFURT area, the Germans were falling back on the city under pressure, offering heavy resistance, while to the north and east they were still unable to make a stand and were being driven back in the direction of BAMBERG.

11 April - D/239

Resistance continued stubborn and aggressive on the west flank, but our withdrawal from CRAILSHEIM had not been followed up by the end of the day. In the TAUBER River area the enemy held, but on the central front he was unable to contain the advance toward NURNBERG, which reached MORLBACH, PFAFFENHOFEN and MARKT HIBART. House-to-house fighting was in progress at SCHWEINFURT. Generally light enemy contact was reported throughout the northern zone.

12 April - D/240

HEILBRONN finally fell and to the east the enemy appeared to be withdrawing from the KOCHER River line, although sharp actions were still being fought in this sector. On the central front he was defending along the upper reaches of the TAUBER River, trying to block our penetration of the FRANCONIAN Heights. Scattered groups with armor support resisted in the southern portion of the STEIGER Wald. All organized resistance ceased at SCHWEINFURT and our sweeping left wing crossed the MAIN north of BAMBERG against only light resistance.

13 April - D/241

Despite the loss of HEILBRONN and the breaching of the KOCHER River line, the enemy maintained his delaying action in this sector and elements of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division counterattacked between OHRINGEN and NEUENSTEIN. Civilians armed with machine guns and panzerfaust assisted the defense.

In the central zone, west of NURNBERG, stiffening resistance from dug-in positions, and a counterattack at EUCHHEIM, indicated that the Germans were



probably attempting to establish a line along the AISCH River between HURGHERNHEIM and NEUSTADT.

On the northern front, south and east of the MAIN River, only scattered delaying opposition was met except at BAMBERG, where heavy fire was received and an enemy counterattack repelled north of the city.

14 April - D/242

The enemy on the west flank fell back from the KOCHER River to the high ground between HEILBRONN and SCHWAHISCH HALL, but continued to resist advances south and east from HEILBRONN and counterattacked at OBER HEINRIET. On the approaches to the FRANCONIAN Plains he displayed some aggressiveness by counterattacking at HLAUBACH and at ILLESHEIM in an apparent attempt to prevent the outflanking and breakdown of his AISCH River line. BAMBERG fell after a short but heavy fight, netting 1,820 prisoners; between there and BAYREUTH, rapid advances to the south and southeast encountered negligible resistance.

15 April - D/243

A determined and well-organized defense between HEILBRONN and NURNBERG was maintained by the enemy. In front of the VI Corps in the west he was falling back slowly on the LOHENSTEIN Mountains and WALDENBURG Hills west of SCHWAHISCH HALL. Against the XXI Corps in the center he made determined efforts to hold in the HLAUFELDEN - ROTHENBURG sector and to prevent expansion of the U S bridgehead over the AISCH River south of NEUSTADT. Artillery fire in that zone increased considerably. Advances by the XV Corps from the north toward NURNBERG found the enemy weak and disorganized, offering only delaying resistance, mostly in towns. Heavy traffic out of the NURNBERG area was taken to indicate that the city was being stripped of all unnecessary rear installations. The only major effort to halt the advance was a battalion-strength attack, supported by 15 tanks, against our east flank south of BAYREUTH, which was repelled.

16 April - D/244

Between the NECKAR River and ROTHENBURG the enemy continued his determined and well-formed efforts to hold the hill mass west of SCHWAHISCH HALL and the plains to the east. Late in the day, however, the line started to give south of NEUENSTEIN and around ROTHENBURG. In the center of the Army sector, after losing the AISCH River line, the enemy was unable to prevent penetrations in the direction of ANSBACH, which reached within 12 kilometers north of the town. Although the Germans lost NEUSTADT, they continued blocking on the western approaches to NURNBERG. On the Army's left flank, the advance to NURNBERG from the north met only scattered, disorganized resistance from roadblocks and delaying groups, but forward elements in the northeast outskirts of the city received heavy 88-mm fire. East of the city, a bridge was captured intact over the PEGNITZ River at LAUF and the town was occupied after a stiff fight.

17 April - D/245

The entire enemy front west of NURNBERG gave ground under constant pressure, although strong delaying action implemented by roadblocks, demolitions and mines slowed the advance. ROTHENBURG fell and advances reached within a short distance of SCHWAHISCH HALL and ANSBACH. The defenders of NURNBERG put up a stiff fight, counterattacking repeatedly against our advance from the east astride the PEGNITZ River, but U S troops entered the outskirts after eliminating almost a hundred 88-mm guns.



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18 April - D/246

Between the NECKAR River and NURNBERG the enemy continued to withdraw slowly under pressure, leaving SCHWAHISCH HALL and ANSBACH as the main prizes for U S troops. But late in the day his orderly withdrawal began to break down; our penetration to a point five or six miles south of SCHWAHISCH HALL was the first sign of the crumbling of the Germans' last cohesive front of World War II. From this sector between the NECKAR and KOCHER Rivers, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the remnants of 2 Mountain Division had been withdrawn three days earlier to be dispatched to the NURNBERG front. The latter went to the ANSBACH area west of NURNBERG. The former had been destined for the Nazi shrine city itself but was late in arriving and had to be committed outside it, against our enveloping flank. The shift left their former sector fatally weakened and did not for long postpone the fall of NURNBERG.

In NURNBERG the Germans were still fighting with unabated fury, defending every house and cellar with mortars, small arms, bazookas and hand grenades. The loss of so many anti-aircraft guns the previous day, however, led to a decrease in 88-mm fire. Civilian and prisoner statements, together with air reconnaissance, indicated an enemy buildup southeast of NURNBERG in the vicinity of NEUMARKT, and there were reports of an attack from this area northwestward toward FEUCHT being scheduled for the night of 18/19 April.

19 April - D/247

The enemy line in the west disintegrated rapidly as our armor driving southward from SCHWAHISCH HALL broke through across the REMS River at LORCH and established a bridgehead over the FILS River at FAURNDAU. Volkssturm had been committed to the unsuccessful defense of LORCH. On the shoulders of the developing salient, enemy delaying resistance continued.

At NURNBERG, the satellite city of FUERTH surrendered at 1030B after the garrison commander, Gauleiter and selected troops moved into NURNBERG itself during the night. There, our attacks from both the north and east made progress, the former drive capturing intact two bridges over the PEGNITZ River. Bitter fighting continued as the enemy was compressed into the walled city. To the southeast, the anticipated attack in the vicinity of FEUCHT developed as battalion-strength elements of the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division attempted to relieve the pressure on NURNBERG. The first attack at 0600B was beaten back, but a second attempt was made in the afternoon. This, too, was contained by 1615B. Farther to the southeast, NEUMARKT was entered unopposed early in the morning but a stiff fight later developed.

20 April - D/248

On our right, the First French Army, breaking out eastward from the BLACK FOREST area, reached REUTLINGEN, due south of STUTTGART. Simultaneously, our own breakthrough beyond the FILS River reached KIRCHHEIM, only about 15 miles from the French spearhead. Thus STUTTGART was virtually encircled. The enemy had attempted to block our advance on KIRCHHEIM, but when his positions to the east were overrun and the town taken, some 500 vehicles and 2,000 troops were observed withdrawing southward. Meanwhile the towns inside the pocket were reported jammed with troops threatened with encirclement if they failed to escape through the 15-mile gap.

East of the breakthrough the Germans still fought strong delaying actions in the CRAILSHEIM sector. However, KIRCHBERG fell by noon, and CRAILSHEIM was entered by dark despite heavy fire. A dozen miles to the east, FEUCHTWANGEN fell, and large columns moving southeast indicated further withdrawals in that sector.



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It was HITLER's birthday - and the Party City of NURNBERG fell. The birthday gift had been a telegraphic pledge from the Gauleiter of NURNBERG to defend the city to the last. His pledge was good for a few hours, for the troops trapped in the old walled quarter resisted stubbornly throughout the night. But in the morning they collapsed, and by 1600B NURNBERG was completely in U S hands. Its defense had cost an estimated 5,000 prisoners and probably an equal number of killed and wounded.

To the southeast, the enemy continued resisting stubbornly and counter-attacking to prevent our exploitation along the NURNBERG - MUNICH autobahn. One battalion-size counterattack forced U S troops to withdraw from OBER FERRIEDEN.

21 April - D/249

The Germans fought stubbornly against expansion of the KIRCHHEIM bridgehead over the FILS River, counterattacking near NEIDLINGEN, while trying to withdraw their forces from the STUTTGART pocket. Inside the pocket, resistance began to collapse northeast of the city as U S forces closed up to the NECKAR and REMS River at new points.

Meanwhile the enemy was faced with still another breakthrough - this one east of CRAILSHEIM, where withdrawals in the FEUCHTWANGEN sector had been noted the previous day. DINKELSBUEHL was contested by HITLER Youth who counter-attacked with small arms and panzerfaust, but when the attack was contained U S armor broke through and raced southward toward the DANUBE against only weak resistance.

South and southeast of NURNBERG stiff resistance and further enemy counter-attacks slowed our advance.

22 April - D/250

As the French reported STUTTGART occupied, the Germans were still fighting stubbornly in the KIRCHHEIM area to hold open the escape corridor. However, some of the columns which succeeded in escaping were subsequently shot up farther south, for U S armored units, driving southeastward from the KIRCHHEIM bridgehead, broke through the SWABIAN ALPS and reached to within two kilometers of the DANUBE at EHINGEN. Only moderate small arms and harassing artillery fire were met enroute.

Meanwhile, the second breakthrough farther east beat down resistance at BOPFINGEN and reached the DANUBE, which was crossed over an undestroyed bridge at DILLINGEN. The bridgehead was extended to KICKLINGEN, with small arms, bazooka and anti-tank fire encountered at FRISTINGEN. Simultaneously, U S troops advanced eastward along the northern bank of the DANUBE, taking HOCHSTADT against negligible resistance. On the way southward, an enemy horse-drawn column had been overrun and had yielded about 500 prisoners.

In the area south of NURNBERG, our forces were approaching WEISSENBURG, but were meeting stiff resistance throughout this sector.

23 April - D/251

On our right flank, west of the EHINGEN breakthrough, a large number of enemy troops without artillery or armor support still held out near URACH, despite the danger of encirclement. Bridgeheads across the DANUBE were expanded by both the EHINGEN and DILLINGEN spearheads without drawing much German reaction. In the area between the crossings AALEN and ELLWANGEN were



entered as resistance collapsed and U S units advanced toward the DANUBE on a broad front. On the Army's east flank the enemy was forced back in the WEISSENHURG sector with his resistance progressively weakening during the day. Further crossings of the ALTMUHL River were made virtually unopposed and still another breakthrough to the DANUBE was in progress.

24 April - D/252

The enemy continued his disorganized and confused withdrawal along the entire front. Nowhere was there any determined attempt to make a stand. Absence of armor, the lack of artillery support and observations of numerous columns trying to break away to the south and southeast all indicated the enemy was unable to cope with the situation.

On the west flank considerable numbers of enemy forces were cut off in the SWABIAN ALPS by a new junction of our forces with the First French Army, south of the DANUBE. U S troops moving eastward along the south bank of the DANUBE broke resistance west of ULM and cleared half the town; south of the DANUBE they reached the ILLER River at several points. The DILLINGEN bridgehead was expanded against disorganized opposition and other units reached DONAUWORTH after dealing with scattered and slight opposition. On the east flank the advance to the DANUBE was gaining momentum scarcely hindered by the enemy's rearguard actions.

25 April - D/253

The enemy was making a determined effort to hold along the ILLER River, counterattacking in battalion strength against one of our eastward crossings south of ULM. Meanwhile he attempted to extricate encircled forces from the SWABIAN ALPS and withdrew remaining troops from the pocket north of the DANUBE between ULM and GUNZBURG. ULM was cleared. Late in the day a new crossing of the DANUBE west of GUNZBURG drew a heavy counterattack, and strong enemy blocking efforts were developing in the LEIPHEIM - GUNZBURG - BURGAU area. All attempts to expand the DILLINGEN bridgehead were meeting strong German reaction. The enemy was fighting a well-organized delaying withdrawal to the DANUBE east of DONAUWORTH, with the 2 Mountain Division bearing the brunt of the action.

26 April - D/254

The enemy front on the DANUBE between ULM and GUNZBURG was threatened with encirclement as U S armor again broke loose for long gains. The ILLER River line cracked and our forces south of ULM swept on to MEMMINGEN and MINDELHEIM, engaging in brief but sharp fights in villages along the way. Farther east the DILLINGEN bridgehead broke out against sporadic, disorganized resistance, and a bridge was seized intact over the WERTACH River at HILTENFINGEN, southwest of AUGSBURG. Between these two sectors, the Germans at first continued fighting stubbornly in the LEIPHEIM - BURGAU area but at the end of the day were withdrawing from their exposed salient.

East of DONAUWORTH, fresh crossings of the DANUBE met scattered but determined resistance along the LECH Canal and at OBERNDORF. Farther east the enemy still occupied a sector north of the DANUBE in the vicinity of ZELL, where he continued fighting to hold the high ground.

27 April - D/255

Resistance was broken on the west and central portions of the front. The disorganized enemy between the LECH and ILLER Rivers was rapidly falling back south and southeast toward the ALPS as our spearhead reached KEMPTEN. Large numbers of prisoners were overrun or surrendering. Some 3,000 Germans from the



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ULM - GUNZBURG salient were bypassed at KIRCHHEIM and engaged by air and artillery. Forward troops entered AUGSBURG in the evening, receiving 88-mm fire from the anti-aircraft defenses. The LECH River was crossed near LANDSBERG, and expansion of the bridgehead was meeting no resistance. The enemy continued to withdraw slowly before the east flank north of MUNICH, and appeared better organized in that zone.

28 April - D/256

The enemy continued his rapid withdrawal into the ALPS on the south flank. The VI Corps' advance across the Austrian border at FUSSEN was developing increasing resistance at the close of the period. Meanwhile the enemy was demonstrating considerable anxiety over the threat to MUNICH from the LANDSBERG bridgehead and was making sporadic efforts to halt the advance near the AMMER See. AUGSBURG surrendered after a brief fight. The Germans were falling back rapidly on MUNICH from the north, offering only spotty delaying resistance.

29 April - D/257

Terrain and demolitions were the principal obstacles hindering the advance into the ALPS. GARMISCH PARTENKIRCHEN was entered late in the period, and other columns advancing from FUSSEN were stopped near RICHLBACH by a large crater. Troops were rapidly closing in on MUNICH from the north and west, meeting only scattered resistance and demolitions, with indications that the bulk of enemy troops had withdrawn south and southeast from the city. Over 30,000 prisoners were liberated at the DACHAU Concentration Camp.

30 April - D/258

The enemy was taking advantage of Alpine terrain in an attempt to block progress through the mountain corridors toward INNSBRUCK, employing road-blocks, large-scale demolitions and mines. The closeup to the ISAR River across the entire front developed little opposition, while no serious resistance was encountered in MUNICH. The ISAR was crossed at several points in, north and south of the city, and all resistance west of the river had ceased by dark.


### III. SUMMARY

The nearness of the end can be read in the figures for prisoners surrendered to the Seventh Army in April - 138,024 processed through the Army cage. Thus a daily average of 4,600 enemy troops anticipated the decision of their high command that further resistance was useless. From the German army's dwindling stocks of mobile equipment, 202 tanks and self-propelled guns were destroyed or captured.

But men and materiel had been lost before, from STALINGRAD and TUNISIA to POLAND and FRANCE. What was being lost now was the final gauge of disaster - GERMANY itself. The white sheets and tablecloths that hung from windows in town after town were the burghers' way of admitting the inevitable.



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Annex No. I ENEMY DISPOSITIONS ON SEVENTH ARMY FRONT



R E S T R I C T E D

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

SCHULZ, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data is available on General SCHULZ, who succeeded SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer Paul HAUSSER.

FIRST ARMY

FOERTSCH, Herrmann, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for March.

SEVENTH ARMY

OBSTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

Assumed this command 25 March, succeeding General der Infanterie Hans FELBER. For biography, see G-2 History for January.

NINETEENTH ARMY

BRANDENBERGER, General der Panzer Truppen.

Successor to OBSTFELDER as commander of Nineteenth Army, assuming the role late in March. No biographical data available.

XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIII CORPS

HAHM, Walter, General der Infanterie.

Successor to General ORIOLA. For biography, see G-2 History for February.

LXIV CORPS

FRIESE, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

LXXX CORPS

BEYER, Franz, General der Infanterie.

General BEYER, who was captured 30 April, is 55 years old. A former commander of 44 Infantry Division in ITALY, he gained his present seniority 1 January 1943. No other biographical data available.

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LXXXII CORPS

TOLSDORFF, Generalleutnant.

Succeeded General HAHM sometime during April when the latter took over leadership of XIII Corps. No biographical data available.

LXXXIV CORPS

Von LUETTWITZ, Smilo, Freiherr, General der Panzer Truppen.

General von LUETTWITZ, who succeeded General KNISS on 29 March when the latter was retired by illness, assumed command at EISENACH and found himself holding a "hot potato". His new Corps was crumbling fast in strength, and his first concern was for more fighting men. By about 10-12 April the Corps contained only the 11 Panzer Division and a few Volkssturm battalions, so on 20 April von LUETTWITZ was ordered to take over the XII Corps adjoining to the south. Von LUETTWITZ insisted that he take his entire staff with him, and did so.

General von LUETTWITZ, 49, comes from an old Catholic nobility of SCHIESIEN. He is married to Freuen von THIEIMANN (of the estate JACOBSDORF in SCHIESIEN). He entered the Army in 1914. His rapid promotion from Oberst in 1941 to his present rank is attributed to the high military esteem in which KESSELRING held him. Von LUETTWITZ held high unit posts in five Armies, fighting in POLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, BELGIUM and ITALY, and for a time was commander of the Ninth Army (September 1944 to January 1945) in POLAND. After the 1944 attempt against HITLER's life, von LUETTWITZ' stock fell, his brother-in-law (Generaloberst von HAMMERSTEIN) having been convicted and executed for a role in the affair.

Von LUETTWITZ, who was captured shortly after the end of April, is reported to be an unassuming personality. Though he has suffered at the hands of the Nazi regime more than the average German general officer, he did not seem willing as a prisoner to capitalize on anti-Nazi avowals if he did not have the chance or, perhaps, the courage, to die for them. Von LUETTWITZ is a German, but his captors and interrogators report that he nevertheless approximates the definition of a gentleman very neatly.

2 MOUNTAIN DIVISION

UTZ, Willibald, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for February.

9 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

KOLB, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

BOCHMANN, SS Oberfuehrer.

No biographical data available.



36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLM, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

38 SS DIVISION NIEHLUNGEN

LAMMERDING, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

No biographical data available.

BORCHERT, SS Standartenfuehrer.

Replaced LAMMERDING in April. No biographical data available.

47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

79 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

REINHARDT (REINHERR?), Oberst.

No biographical data available.

189 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HELLWIG, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

198 INFANTRY DIVISION

BARDE (BARTEL?), Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

212 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

ULLRICH, Generalmajor.

Succeeded the veteran commander, Generalleutnant Franz SENSFUSS, when the latter was captured on 29 March. No biographical data available.

246 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

KUEHN, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

256 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION (BATTLE GROUP FRANZ)

FRANZ, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for January.

General FRANZ was captured 10 April. There was no successor, as the unit's last remnants disappeared with the capture of the command element.



416 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

PFLIEGER, Generalleutnant.

Born about 1889, PFLIEGER was commissioned a Leutnant in 1908 and saw war service from 1914 to 1918 as an officer in the 24 (HOLSTEIN) Artillery Regiment. Afterwards he retired with the rank of Hauptmann. Nothing is known of his activities until 1 December 1936, when he was promoted to Oberst. On 21 August 1937 he commanded 19 Artillery Regiment (HANNOVER). Two years later he was reported still commanding the same regiment. His activities during 1940-42 are not discernible, but he was promoted regularly, reaching the rank of Generalmajor on 1 October 1940 and Generalleutnant on 1 October 1942. He has commanded 416 Division since August 1943. Nothing is known about his personality or whether he has any connections with the Nazi Party.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUETHER, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

719 INFANTRY DIVISION

GAEDE, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for March. Successor not immediately identified.

BATTLE GROUP VON HOBE

Von HOBE, Oberst.

No biographical data available.



R E S T R I C T E D

ANNEX III

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 April - 30 April 1945

The activities of the German Intelligence Services during the month of April 1945 cannot be characterized in any general summary. Most of its personnel were in the process of attempting to save their own skins. The Bavarian and Austrian Alps were crowded with RSHA members who had decided that the mountains were far more healthy than stuffy Gestapo and SD offices. Only one bona fide espionage agent was apprehended during the period. His mission was not against Seventh Army, but was concerned with postwar espionage in Western EUROPE. However the G.I.S. emphasis on sabotage, begun months before, was evidenced by the capture of one of a group of 28 saboteurs, who had been well equipped and trained for a two-week mission behind our lines.

Results of the German resistance planning, begun eight months previously, showed up on a small scale, as did a few hastily organized and frenetic "Save the Fatherland" groups. Doctor Robert LEY, Party Labor Leader, had been charged with the organization and command of the SS Freikorps Adolf Hitler, an eleventh hour attempt to dam the inundation. Two hundred and fifty men had been chosen from the NURNBERG area as part of the nationwide quota of 3,000. The personnel of this unit were to be equipped with pistols, hand grenades and panzerfausts and were to use bicycles for infiltrating our lines. Their purpose was to disorganize supply lines and advance units, and especially to cut off tank spearheads. No organization was achieved and the unit remained inchoate.

As can be seen from the examples given below, resistance symptoms were spotty:

An AUGSBURG Ortsgruppenleiter attempted during the latter part of the month to organize the 29 Ortsgruppenleiters of AUGSBURG into a Stosstrupp, or combat assault troop, formed of volunteers to assist in the defense of the town. In the event that the city was taken, the group was to meet later. However, the organizer did not even attempt to attend this meeting.

Three companies of HITLER Jugend were organized in SCHWABISCH Gmund, apparently to support the Wehrmacht. An attempt was made to encourage some of them to remain behind and operate as werewolves, but this appeared to have been nothing but this last-minute attempt at organization.

In mid-April ten HITLER Jugend members were arrested at BENSHEIM, all of whom were super-saturated with Nazi fervor and each of whom had sworn to kill an American soldier. They had been instructed to await secret orders concerning sabotage and assassination, to remain always good Nazis and to suppress any attempts at democratic re-education. All the boys had received instructions in the handling of various weapons.

A local werewolf was organized at NURNBERG, primarily to operate with the Wehrmacht and, after the passing of Allied troops, to incite general partisan warfare.

Two Sicherheitsdienst members apprehended had attended a sabotage school for "Spezialle Kampftruppen" in BAVARIA. They had been given a one-week course in the use of makeshift sabotage devices utilizing materiel abandoned by the retreating Wehrmacht. Students were instructed to act as Werewolf organizers.

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ANNEX III



The radio network carrying Werewolf broadcasts continued briefly and then disappeared from the air. The programs included appeals and reports on the activities of Werewolf members, most of which were fictitious. Werewolf men were urged to procure weapons, food and gasoline and to hide their booty in the woods for "der Tag". American canned food rations were said to be particularly suited for that purpose. Supplies were not to be stored at one point but to be spread over a large area.

The arrest of the Adjutant of the Werewolf organization for Wehrkreis VII, Ernst WAGNER, disclosed that HIMMLER had not ordered the establishment of a Werewolf in that district until early April 1945. Everyone connected with the project realized that the hour was too late. WAGNER attempted to contact the Chief of the General Staff in Wehrkreis VII, but was ignored. A half-hearted meeting of Nazi and police officials was held, the headquarters was evacuated from MUNICH and nothing was accomplished.

There were only three cases of wire cutting which could be ascribed to sabotage. Two boys were apprehended after they had been seen throwing a flaming rag at a boxcar containing gasoline. A probable time bomb exploded in the magazine of the Kreisleitung Building of REUTTE, AUSTRIA. Two U S soldiers were killed and more injured. The suspected perpetrator had attended a course in resistance.

As can be seen from the above catalogue of activities, rarely could the leaders and planners of German resistance find people willing to convert their plans into acts. With the entire nation sliding hell-bent, very few people wanted to play follow-the-leader.

As expected, there were few anti-Nazi organizations encountered and those were necessarily loosely organized. Former Communists and Socialists made up one of the two groups while Social Democrats, Centrists and Democrats composed the other group. This second group claimed to have opposed the Nazi regime since its inception and assisted C.I.C. in identifying and apprehending former Nazi leaders.

With all normal news channels cut off, GERMANY lay fallow for rumor-sowing. The most predominant rumor during the month was that on HITLER's birthday, 20 April, a general uprising of subversive German elements would occur in occupied GERMANY. Armed force and sabotage were to be used. The uprising would coincide with a counterattack by the German armies. According to civilian reports, each member of the Werewolf was supposed to kill an Allied soldier at any risk, as a birthday present for the Fuehrer. The origin of this rumor could scarcely have been Nazi-inspired since nothing unusual occurred on 20 April; it was more likely born of despair. Other widespread rumors concerned the fate of Nazi leaders. HITLER was said to have fled to JAPAN, GOERING was reported executed, GOEBBELS was said to have slit his arteries. A by-product of GOEBBELS' "beast" propaganda was the rumor that all children would be taken from their parents and shipped to the UNITED STATES as slave labor. This resulted in some families hiding their children until satisfied that the rumor was unfounded.

The time for organized psychological warfare was over, but the indirect, or home-brew, type of propaganda was attempted by some Germans with whom American officials and troops had contact. The points stressed by these "average Germans" were that they were taken in by the Nazis, that GERMANY and the UNITED STATES could profit much by learning to understand one another and that both GERMANY and the UNITED STATES have the Russian bear to fear.

One espionage agent was apprehended during the month. He was an agent of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt Amt III (SD Activities in GERMANY). He and a



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member of the RSHA Amt VI Kult had crossed the lines on a motorcycle, ostensibly to inform American troops on the defense plans of SALZBURG and MUNICH. He had been given the mission of aiding in the establishment of an underground movement and intelligence network in Western EUROPE after the Allied occupation of GERMANY. He had partially completed his task, which was to obtain forged Kennkarten for prospective agents and to provide cover jobs for some of them. These agents were all high-grade, experienced intelligence workers or important subversive or autonomist leaders.

The sabotage agent apprehended, one of 28 saboteurs divided into four groups, had crossed the lines with the primary mission of destroying gasoline dumps and the secondary mission of blowing up unattended tanks, halftracks and trucks, and of waylaying messengers to obtain their documents. The mission was to last two weeks, after which the men were to return to their units. The groups and individuals were very well equipped with weapons and demolitions. Members wore camouflage suits and German Army issue combat jackets, caps and shoes. They had all been well trained. This agent had attended an eight-weeks sabotage course.

The first ripples of the deluge of high-ranking Nazis and RSHA personalities to be arrested appeared in April. Four officials were apprehended. One was a member of RSHA Amt VI Kult (Cultural Matters in the Foreign Office) who had crossed the lines with the espionage agent described above. A Belgian national who had recruited and sent radio-equipped espionage agents to BELGIUM was apprehended as was a Gestapo official who had worked in FRANCE for RSHA Amt VI E 5 as an interpreter and case officer and later infiltrated agents into the French Resistance. The Chief of the Sicherheitsdienst III Office in AUGSBURG was also arrested.

Table of agents arrested during the period:

	German	Polish	Total
Espionage	1		1
Sabotage	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>


Total number of agents captured by Seventh Army since 15 August 1944:

Espionage	94
Sabotage	<u>19</u>
Total	<u>113</u>



RESTRICTED

# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART TEN

1 - 31 MAY 1945

RESTRICTED



HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

W.D/cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL, COLONEL, AGD, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Quinn*  
WILLIAM A. QUINN  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2



R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part X

1 - 31 May 1945

\* \* \*

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R E S T R I C T E D



I. OPERATIONS

By the first of May, the Wehrmacht had been so completely defeated and so much of the Reich had been overrun that there were only two questions yet to be answered about the military phases of World War II:

Would the long-anticipated "National Redoubt" actually materialize, with either the Army or the Party rallying for a final stand in the ALPS?

Would the end of the Wehrmacht come through a formal capitulation to the Allies, or through piecemeal battlefield surrenders of field commands, large or small?

Aside from the question of whether or not the Redoubt presented a deliberate Nazi plan for an heroic finale (and there were indications during the early spring that it did) it had also been looked on as the logical final phase of normal military operations. It had been reasoned that the successful development of the Allied plan to cut GERMANY in two would leave only the North German Plain and the southern mountains in the hands of the Wehrmacht; and the vulnerability of the northern flatlands would logically lead to an enemy decision to regroup in the south.

This had, in fact, happened. As has been observed in the April history, following the RHINE crossings the German Nineteenth and First Armies constructed a front running eastward from the RHINE-NECKAR sector to the general vicinity of NURNBERG. The line fell back slowly under the relentless pressure of the First French and U S Seventh Armies (later joined by the U S Third, which changed its direction of advance to join the southward drive), but it held together and for a short time succeeded in blocking the approaches to the Redoubt area. However, the enemy line began to fall apart on 18 April and Allied troops swept through to the DANUBE, and across it to the Austrian border and MUNICH, against disorganized the disintegrating German forces. The front had not been held long enough to permit organization of the Redoubt position in the rear. The simultaneous defeat of the German forces in ITALY, who might have withdrawn into the Redoubt area from the south, cancelled it out as a worthwhile military enterprise.

But while the Wehrmacht could no longer gain anything from an Alpine stand, there remained the possibility that some of the top Nazis and the SS would take refuge in the hills, waiting to be hunted down, and thus foster a "no-surrender" legend for the use of whatever jingoes might survive defeat to rebuild a future Nazism. This plan appears to have been blasted by HITLER's personal decision to die in BERLIN rather than flee to BERCHTESGADEN - but that his successors would not carry out the plan anyway could not be known at the time.

And so operations against the enemy remnants continued for a few days in May, as we made certain of the untenability of the Redoubt by seizing its vital points. On the first day of the month, the Germans were trying to prevent Allied penetration of the Alpine passes of Western AUSTRIA by executing demolitions and establishing stubbornly-defended roadblocks. The First French Army, driving on AUSTRIA's "back door" found BREGENZ, at the eastern end of LAKE CONSTANCE, strongly defended, and met an estimated battalion of SS troops attempting to block their advance up the ILLER Valley at IMMENSTADT.

The U S VI Corps, moving through the LECH Valley, south of FÜSSEN, liquidated a defended roadblock near STANZACH, then continued to advance, slowed only by demolitions. Farther east, heavy fire and a 200-yard-long cratered roadblock halted progress through the FERN Pass. Entering AUSTRIA through the ISAR Valley, southeast of GARMISCH PARTENKIRCHEN, U S troops cleared a defended roadblock near SCHARNITZ and neared the crest before INNSBRUCK.



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North of the ALPS, however, the XXI and XV Corps rolled through BAVARIA virtually unhindered. The ISAR River at MUNICH had been spanned the previous day, and the enemy was falling back to the southeast and east offering only scattered and light resistance. A Second crossing of the ISAR was made at BAD TOLZ, where Generalfeldmarschall von RUNDSTEDT was captured, and armored units advancing along the autobahn southeast of MUNICH reached the INN River south of ROSENHEIM.

The following day, rapid advances in this area continued with more American units closing up to the Lower INN River, meeting notable resistance only at WASSERBURG, and capturing the entire 9 Hungarian Infantry Division in the process. German demolition crews, mounted in trucks, were systematically blowing all bridges, culverts and overpasses behind their fleeing forces.

Turning south, XXI Corps troops advanced up the INN Valley to penetrate the Alpine Redoubt at yet another point, meeting no resistance as they reached the Austrian frontier.

In the west, the Germans fell back from BREGENZ before the French, and VI Corps' drive up the LECH Valley was delayed only briefly by a small group of HITLER Youth. At FERN Pass, however, an enemy battalion came out of the hills to attack the rear of our column which was still held up by the demolitions. Only light sniper fire hindered the advance to the crest overlooking the Upper INN Valley, west of INNSBRUCK, and negotiations for the surrender of the city were in progress at the end of the day.

However, despite the willingness of the civilians to surrender, enemy troops on its western approaches resisted until late on 3 May, delaying our debouchment into the INN Valley with considerable fire and many obstacles at LEITHEIN and ZIRL. After this resistance was broken in the afternoon, INNSBRUCK was entered without further opposition, and was found to be in the hands of partisans.

In the western valleys, the FERN Pass was finally cleared after a stiff fire fight at FERNSTEIN, and American troops then advanced toward IMST without opposition. A determined blocking action at HOHENEMS in the BREGENZ Corridor failed to prevent French advances to FELDKIRCH.

To the east, our troops reported only spotty token resistance, except at WASSERBURG, where some strong points still held out; forward elements reached the SALACH River, west of SALZBURG. Those advancing up the INN south of ROSENHEIM were now being delayed by obstacles and occasional fire fights.

Prisoners were surrendering in vast numbers; in a 24-hour period ending at 1800 on 4 May, over 40,000 were processed by Seventh Army.

On that day, the "National Redoubt" ceased to be a mystery and became a legend. The area was cut sharply in two by the unopposed advance of VI Corps troops south from INNSBRUCK through the BRENNER Pass and into ITALY. There, contact was made with units of the U S Fifth Army, whose opposition had capitulated to them on 2 May.

The operation also bisected the enemy's Army Group G. Isolated west of the INNSBRUCK-BRENNER corridor was the German Nineteenth Army, which we had first met on the RIVIERA in August 1944; with it was the Twenty-Fourth Army, never an operational command in the field, which had been on guard duty on the Swiss-German border. They surrendered the following day.



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East of the corridor was the German First Army, which marked 4 May by losing both SALZBURG and BERCHTESGADEN. Of all its divisions, only its habitual work-horse, the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, could still lay any claim to effectiveness. It stood in the mountains along the Austro-Bavarian border, northeast of INNSBRUCK, and with demolitions and fire blocked penetration of the ALPS in this sector.

However, this position was being rapidly cut off. The encirclement was completed on 5 May when our advance down the INN Valley from INNSBRUCK joined that moving upriver from the direction of ROSENHEIM. This vestigial "redoubt" was all that was left of Army Group G when it capitulated at 1400B 5 May, to take effect at noon 6 May.

Thus ended the Allies' fear that bloodshed would be indefinitely and unnecessarily prolonged by a death stand in the ALPS.

Thus also was partially answered the question as to the nature of the surrender. It was only a partial answer, however. For while it appeared at first glance that the Wehrmacht was capitulating in bits and pieces - the forces in ITALY had surrendered on 2 May, those in the Northwest early on the 5th, and now those in the ALPS on the 6th - it appeared afterwards that this was all part of a deliberate plan of the High Command and the DOENITZ Government to accomplish the maximum degree of surrender to the Western Allies before acknowledging the simultaneous victory of the Red Army. The few days' lapse between the seemingly local surrenders in the west, and the final conclusive capitulation to all the Allies enabled many German troops to move westward and give themselves up to Britons or Americans rather than to Russians.



## II. THE SURRENDER

Formal surrender of German Army Group G, which included the First and Nineteenth Armies, was agreed to at 1400B hours 5 May 1945, after some 48 hours of negotiating on the part of General der Infanterie Herrmann FOERTSCH, and became effective at noon 6 May 1945. FOERTSCH, who headed the German First Army, represented General der Infanterie SCHULZ, Commander of Army Group G, and his action was with the knowledge and consent of Feldmarschall Albert KESSELRING. The action was but one part of the surrender of all German military units, accomplished over the entire Eastern and Western fronts within a matter of some five days.

Signing of the unconditional battlefield agreement took place in the museum-like building of Prof. THORAK, HITLER's favorite sculptor, at HAAR, in the eastern outskirts of MUNICH, a scant six miles from the birthplace of Nazidom.

General FOERTSCH had first been received the night of 4 May by Brigadier General Robert YOUNG, assistant commander of the U S 3 Division, after having crossed through the American lines.

The next day as General FOERTSCH and his retinue entered the large room at U S XV Corps headquarters where they were to agree to give up, the American officers present did not rise. General FOERTSCH and his staff were told to be seated and then the general was requested to introduce the officers accompanying him. Each German officer arose and bowed. American officers were introduced. They did not rise.

Seated at a ponderous table in a room 40 feet high, in which were recently-completed heroic statues intended for new German buildings, the emissaries from the defeated enemy legions listened in grim silence as the instrument of surrender was explained to them point by point by General Jacob L. DEVERS, U S Sixth Army Group Commander.

During the four hours in which General DEVERS read and explained the document, General FOERTSCH displayed emotion only once. The word "armistice" came up, whereupon General DEVERS emphatically informed the German officers that there was to be no armistice whatsoever.

"You understand, do you not," said General DEVERS, "that this is unconditional surrender of Army Group G and of all the officers, the soldiers, the military personnel and para-military personnel within the prescribed area? Hostilities are to cease at once, although the surrender officially takes effect at noon 6 May, which is tomorrow."

General DEVERS also stated that all German military personnel were to be disarmed. At this point General FOERTSCH was unable, for a moment, to control his voice. He sat silently, with the muscles of his face working intensely. Finally he said:

"I have no power left but to accept." Then he signed.

General DEVERS signed the instrument for General EISENHOWER, Supreme Allied Commander, while FOERTSCH's signature was on behalf of Feldmarschall KESSELRING. Lieutenant General Alexander M. PATCH, Commanding General of the U S Seventh Army, and Lieutenant General Wade H. HAISLIP, Commanding General of the U S XV Corps, also signed.



Thus came about the order for the surrender - without conditions - of nearly 100,000 square miles of territory held by the German Army Group G south of Allied lines to the Swiss and Italian borders, and from the RHINE eastward, roughly, to 20 miles beyond SALZBURG.

Due to a general breakdown of enemy communications, and the rapid development of American arms and German chaos, there was such confusion during the final day that Army Group G's component Nineteenth Army (commanded by General BRANDENBERGER) took surrender upon itself. Apparently unaware of the larger negotiation, the Nineteenth gave itself up at INNSBRUCK to Major General Edward H. BROOKS, commanding the U S VI Corps, effective 1800 hours 5 May.

Immediately after the signing of surrender articles for Army Group G, however, all American and German troops were informed at once and ordered to cease firing and remain in place for further instructions.

While none but the most fanatical German SS men and diehards could have expected other than immediate and complete surrender to the Allies, the task of formally ending hostilities in an orderly manner was a staggering one.

The Germans were not certain how many men they had left in Army Group G - mass surrenders and developing seal-offs had long since made daily recapitulation impossible. Thousands of Germans, beaten and confused, had not waited for formal surrender. As the negotiations proceeded at HAAR they were streaming in from the hills in a never ending procession. Roads were jammed with German military cars, horsedrawn vehicles, bicycles; columns up to five and six abreast clogged toward prison enclosures.

They were still being processed three weeks after the surrender. During the month of May 307,707 prisoners were counted, bringing to 624,204 the total number processed through Seventh Army prisoner of war cages since 15 August 1944. This final figure includes prisoners taken by other forces temporarily operating under command of the Seventh Army - 49,150 by the First French Army, 3,692 by the First Airborne Task Force, 379 by the First Special Service Force, all between 15 August and 15 September 1944; and 3,675 by the French 2 Armored Division between 29 September and 5 December 1944.

It does not include, however, the enemy troops and auxiliaries still under German control in our area at the time of the surrender. That figure, as finally computed by the Germans themselves and submitted on 20 May 1945, stood at 272,006; a further 82,000 subsequently entered the area from ITALY. These troops, awaiting demobilization, were disposed by the Germans as indicated on the map which follows. They were then moved under American control to designated assembly areas, where they were discharged and sent homeward.

- - - -

FULL TEXT OF SURRENDER INSTRUMENT

Specifications of Surrender, presented by General Jacob L. Devers, U. S. Army, Commanding 6th Army Group, on behalf of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, U. S. Army, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and accepted by General Schulz, Commander-in-Chief, Army Group "G", Army of the German Reich.

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1. It is agreed that the territory covered by this instrument includes the areas bounded on the East generally by the line: KIRCHBERG (inclusive) -



R E S T R I C T E D

RIED (inclusive) - FRANKENMARKT (inclusive) - FREUDENTHAL (inclusive) - SOUTH CORNER ZELLER SEE\* - RADSTADT\* (inclusive) - OBERDRAUBURG (exclusive) - FLOCKENPASS (exclusive), on the South by the Italian and Swiss frontiers, on the West by the River RHINE, and on the North by the present Allied front line, which are under the jurisdiction of General Schulz. All German military and para-military forces in this area are under command of General Schulz. All these forces, including General Schulz, are bound by this instrument and shall be subject to such other specifications as may be applied hereafter by the authorities of the UNITED NATIONS.

2. All forces, including all para-military forces, under command of General Schulz, shall cease unconditionally all acts of hostilities towards forces of the UNITED NATIONS not later than 1200B hours, 6 May 1945.

3. All such forces under command of General Schulz, except as indicated in Annex A, shall disarm themselves immediately and remain in their present areas retaining all mess and transportation equipment, food and forage necessary for self maintenance and subsistence until directed otherwise by authorities of the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS.

4. Concentration of all equipment and personnel as prescribed in Annex A will be effected not later than 1200B hours, 8 May 1945, after which time offensive ground and air action will be taken by the Allied Forces against all unauthorized movement of forces affected by this instrument. Other instructions indicated in Annex A will be carried out promptly.

5. This instrument is independent of, without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the UNITED NATIONS and applicable to Germany and the German Armed Forces as a whole.

6. The official language of this instrument shall be the English text.

Signed and agreed at HAAR, BAVARIA, this 5 day of May 1945.

For General Schulz

Commanding General, First  
German Army

General Jacob L. Devers  
United States Army.

ANNEX "A"

1. Pending further orders all officers and not to exceed one hundred other ranks per division may retain their rifle, machine pistol, pistol, or other sidearm for internal security purposes. All such armed personnel will wear a 3-inch white arm band above the left elbow for easy identification. All other arms, weapons and ammunition of whatever nature will be placed in dumps of appropriate size in convenient locations in areas occupied by companies, troops, batteries, and other detachments of a comparable or smaller size. Appropriate guards will be posted on all such dumps to insure their security pending further disposition as directed by authorities of the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS. All military equipment such as telephone, telegraph and radio equipment, motor vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles and other means of transport (both ground and air), and other movable military impediments not needed for execution of these specifications will be similarly assembled and guarded in convenient locations pending their further disposition. All such dumps will be kept clear of lines of communication and axes of advance required by the Allied Forces.



R E S T R I C T E D

2. All weapons and equipment will be deposited in dumps with breech blocks, bolts, sights and/or other operating mechanisms intact.

3. Having disposed of all weapons, ammunition and combat equipment of whatever nature, all forces under command of General Schulz will stand fast in their respective areas until given further direction by authorities of the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS, and will keep clear of all highways, railroads, trails and other routes of advance which may be required by Allied Forces.

4. By hour and date indicated in paragraph 2 this instrument, General Schulz shall furnish the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, an order of battle of all major units, including Allied Prisoner of War Camps, concentration camps and similar installations under his command, and as soon as possible shall furnish the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, with a complete troop list showing by unit designation, type, strength and location, all elements of his command affected by this instrument.

5. All minefields within areas controlled by General Schulz shall be plainly marked immediately by signs and shall be outlined with white tape or other suitable means which are readily identifiable. All mines, booby traps and other types of demolition charges shall be removed from all highways and railroad bridges, tunnels, overpasses and underpasses on all lines of communication, and from all buildings and means of transport, highway, rail and air, within the areas controlled by General Schulz, and all such mines, booby traps and other means of demolitions so removed shall be rendered harmless; those mines, booby traps and other means of demolitions which cannot be removed or rendered harmless immediately shall be plainly marked and placed under guards.

\* \* \*



IV. PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

SCHULZ, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data available.

FIRST ARMY

FOERTSCH, Herrmann, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for March.

SEVENTH ARMY

OBSTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for January.

NINETEENTH ARMY

BRANDENBERGER, General der Panzer Truppen.

No biographical data available.

XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIII CORPS

HAHM, Walter, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for February.

LXIV CORPS

FRIEHE, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

LXXX CORPS

BEYER, Franz, General der Infanterie.

General BEYER (see G-2 History for April) was captured 30 April. If there was a formal successor during the remaining few days of the war, his identity was not learned.

LXXXII CORPS

TOLSDORFF, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.



2 MOUNTAIN DIVISION

UTZ, Willibald, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for February.

9 HUNGARIAN INFANTRY DIVISION

LOSKAY, Brigadier General.

General LOSKAY's division was captured intact, with a strength of 8,000 men, on 2 May. No biographical data is available concerning the Commanding General.

17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

BOCHMANN, SS Oberfuehrer.

No biographical data available.

47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

79 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

REINHARDT (REINHERR?), Oberst.

No biographical data available.

151 FIELD TRAINING DIVISION

Von BADE, Hans-Albert, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

189 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HELLWIG, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

198 INFANTRY DIVISION

BARDE (BARTEL?), Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

212 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

ULLRICH, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

246 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

KUEHN, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.



407 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BLUEMM, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

465 MOBILIZATION DIVISION

HOFFMANN, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUETHER, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944. Taken prisoner by French in May.

BATTLE GROUP VON HOE

Von HOE, Oberst.

No biographical data available.



V. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONALITIES APPREHENDED BY SEVENTH ARMY

Note: Upon advancing into the Nazi redoubt area during the war's final days, the Seventh Army unexpectedly became the captor of hundreds of prominent German personalities and their associates. Some were arrested, others deserted their refuges for the safer confines of official custody, while a few (unwilling "guests" of the Nazis) were liberated. Listed below is some of the more interesting flotsam from the shipwreck of Germany

\* \* \*

GOERING, Hermann Wilhelm, Reichsmarschall.

Successor-designate to HITLER and long one of the "Big Three" in GERMANY, GOERING was captured by the 36 Infantry Division. Organizer and leader of the SA in 1922, wounded in the HITLER Putsch, he later assumed a dazzling array of titles: Reichsmarschall, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, SA Obergruppenfuehrer; chairman of the War Cabinet; member of the Secret Cabinet Council; Reich Minister for Air; Commander-in-Chief Air Force; Prime Minister of PRUSSIA; president of the Prussian State Council; Reich Hunting Master; Reich Chief Forester; head of the Hermann Goering Industrial Concern, etc.

AMANN, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Chief of Publishing for the Party Press. Editor of all policy-making publications, leading periodicals and HITLER's book, "Mein Kampf."

SZALASI, Ferenc.

Prime Minister of HUNGARY the last half year of the war, SZALASI was among a party of 72 Hungarian government personages apprehended as a unit at MATTSEE. Others included: Geza SZOGLI, State Secretary, and Kurt HALLER, German diplomat. The group included 12 soldiers acting as guard to a safe containing the crown of HUNGARY.

HORTHY, Nicholas, Admiral.

Regent of HUNGARY until ordered jailed by HITLER six months before the war ended.

LEOPOLD III, King of BELGIUM.

King LEOPOLD, his wife and four children, with two aides and servants, all reportedly in good health, were liberated 7 May when their home near STROEL was captured from SS guards. They had been GERMANY's "guests" since BELGIUM capitulated early in the war.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi.

Japanese ambassador to GERMANY, apprehended with his family and staff.

Altogether, 127 Japanese diplomatic and press officials were detained (at BAD GASTEIN). Among them were Military Attache Lieutenant General Mituhiko KOMATSU and staff; Major General Osamu OTANI, member of the mixed commission under the Tripartite Pact, and his staff; Naval Attache Rear Admiral Hideo KOJIMA and staff; Chancellor of the Consulate General VIENNA and staff; and four journalists of Domei and Asahi Shimbun news agencies.



FUNK, Dr. Walter.

Reich Minister of Economics; president of the Bank of GERMANY; Plenipotentiary-General for Economy; member of the War Cabinet; vice-president of the Reich Chamber of Culture.

LAMMERS, Dr. Hans Heinrich, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Reich Minister, Chief of Chancellory, as such signed all State documents. Secretary of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the War Cabinet. Member of the Academy for German Law.

OHNESORGE, Dr. Wilhelm, NSKK and NSFK Obergruppenfuehrer.

Reich Postmaster General. A veteran Nazi.

Von RUNDSTEDT, Gerd, Feldmarschall.

Former Commander-in-Chief West, captured with his son at BAD TOLZ, where he said he had gone to take treatments for heart trouble. Had lost favor with HITLER after his December ARDENNES campaign failed.

KESSELRING, Albert, Feldmarschall.

Long a leading German military strategist; last Commander-in-Chief West.

CHANDLER, Douglas.

American traitor; radio commentator for Nazis under the name "Paul Revere." Native of PITTSBURGH, he once wrote feature articles in EUROPE for the National Geographic Magazine. Claims he was motivated by an "altruistic desire" to keep AMERICA out of the approaching war, but denied knowledge of the atrocities now laid at the Nazis' feet.

SKORZENY, Otto, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer (Lieutenant Colonel).

Chief of RSHA Amt VI/S (sabotage) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Famed for his exploits, such as the rescue of MUSSOLINI after the Italian dictator's fall, he prefers to minimize the more spectacular deeds of his undercover career and have himself referred to as a "ground force commander."

LEY, Dr. Robert, SA Obergruppenfuehrer.

Chief Party Organization Manager; leader of the German Labor Front; Reich Housing Commission. Led the "Strength through Joy" movement.

IMREDY, Bela.

Prime Minister of HUNGARY, 1938-39.

REIFENSTAHL, Leni.

Famed German film star and producer. Close friend and admirer of HITLER.

Von SCHIRACH, Baldur.

Leader of all HITLER Youth organizations.

WOLF, Mrs. Paula.

HITLER's sister, age 44, found in a village near BERCHTESGADEN.



WOLF, Johanna.

Private secretary to HITLER for 15 years.

SCHRODEN, Christa.

Private secretary to HITLER.

BRUECKNER, Wilhelm, Oberst.

HITLER's personal adjutant, 1930-40. Dismissed after argument with him.

Von PUTTKAMER, Karl Jesko, Rear Admiral.

Aide-de-camp to HITLER.

FERDINAND, Czar.

Ex-king of BULGARIA, who had been living in GERMANY since the end of the first World War. Taken into custody with other Bulgarian notables.

KOMOROWSKI, Tadeuz, Lieutenant General (known as "General BOR").

Hero of the WARSAW uprising of 1944. Liberated.

DELADIER, Edouard.

Former premier of FRANCE, liberated by Seventh Army.

WEYGAND, General.

French military hero, released from German-imposed confinement.

REYNAUD, Paul.

Former premier of FRANCE, liberated by Seventh Army.

GAMELIN, General.

French military leader, released from German-imposed confinement.

SCHAUB, Julius, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Personal aide-de-camp to HITLER. Took part in the 1923 Putsch.

SCHWARZ, Xaver Franz, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer and SA Obergruppenfuehrer.

Reich Treasurer of the Party.

PATIN, Dr. Wilhelm August, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer.

Cousin of HIMMLER, Dr. PATIN was in charge of Applied Ideological and Psychological Research. He was chiefly concerned with the perversion of history to suit the Nazi ideology. One of his principal services to the Nazis was to advance the contention that the Catholic Church, Social Democracy and Freemasonry had been detrimental factors in German history.

MANTEL, Ernst, Generalmajor.

Until recently the Judge Advocate General of OKH (German High Command).



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FRANK, Dr. Hanns, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Governor General of POLAND, in which post he was responsible for the deaths of millions. President of the International Chamber of Law; member of Reichstag. Dr. FRANK made several attempts at suicide after his arrest, twice slashing his wrists.

PETRI, Leo, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Major General of Waffen SS.

Chief of Supreme Executive Office of SS. Was responsible for the security of HITLER and high foreign notables. Tried to escape but was recaptured at once.

HOFER, Franz, NSKK Gruppenfuehrer.

Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Gau, TIROL-VORARLBERG.

WAGNER, Ernst.

Confessed head of the werewolf movement in MUNICH.

FRIEDRICH, Fritz, SA Obergruppenfuehrer.

Staatssekretar Reich Ministry of Finance.

Von RINTELEN, Emil.

Professional diplomat; ambassador. Deputy Chief of German Foreign Office Political Department.

Von BEHR, Karl Heinrich Max.

Waffen SS Lieutenant General and member of the General Staff.

SCHMIDT, Dr. Paul.

Chief of Press Department of German Foreign Office; personal assistant to RIBBENTROP.

MAYR, Franz.

Regierungspraesident of Upper BAVARIA.

BOUSQUET, Rene.

Secretary General, VICHY Ministry of the Interior under LAVAL. In charge of all VICHY police.

SEYDELL, Joseph, NSKK Obergruppenfuehrer.

Member of Reichstag.

WILLIKENS, Werner, SS Gruppenfuehrer.

State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture; member of the Reichstag; Prussian State Councilor.

Von DOERNBERG, Alexander, Baron, SS Oberfuehrer.

Chief of Protocol in the German Foreign Office.



R E S T R I C T E D

SCAPINI, Jean Georges.

French Minister of Prisoners under VICHY government. VICHY ambassador to BERLIN for French prisoners of war in GERMANY. SCAPINI was blinded in World War I; documents in Braille were found in his luggage when he gave himself up.

KNOFFLER, Dr. Josef Franz.

General director of all State archives.

SHEEL, Dr. Gustav, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and Generalmajor der Polizei.

Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter, SALZBURG; Reich Students' Leader. Police Chief of ALSACE, 1940; senior SS and Police Leader Wehrkreis XVIII, 1941-42.

GOERING, Albert.

Business agent for SKODA and BRNO Works; brother of Hermann GOERING.

MEYSZNER, August, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Polizei.

Senior SS and Police Leader, SERBIA. Organizer of the illegal SA in AUSTRIA.

SAUCKEL, Fritz, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter, THURINGIA. Member of NSDAP since 1921 and a Party official.

LANGE, Dr. Kurt.

Ministerialdirektor Reich Ministry of Economics. Vice-president of the Reichsbank.

BADER, Dr. Kurt, SS Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor der Polizei.

Inspector of Ordnungspolizei, VIENNA district.

NEUMANN, Erich.

Head of the German Potash Syndicate; from 1937-42, State Secretary for the Four-Year Plan.

PARSON, Herbert, NSKK Brigadefuehrer.

Deputy Gauleiter, TIROL-VORARLBERG.

FRAUENFELD, Alfred Eduard.

Former Commissioner-General for the CRIMEA; chief of VIENNA Propaganda Office. General counsel to RIBBENTROP, 1940-43. Admits the attempted Anschluss in May 1934 for which he was imprisoned six months by Austrian authorities.

ALBERT, Josef.

Generalleutnant of Police.

BRIDOUX, Eugen, General.

Secretary of State for War and Air, VICHY government.



ESSER, Hermann.

State Secretary, Ministry of Propaganda. Party Member No. 2. First vice-president of Reichstag. Party journalist.

FLESCH, Hans, SS Brigadefuehrer.

Police President of MUNICH.

KOGLMEIER, Max, SA Gruppenfuehrer.

Former State Secretary in Bavarian Ministry of Interior.

Von BARGEN, Dr. Werner.

Chief of Western European Division in Foreign Office.

SCHLUMPRECHT, Dr. Karl.

Acting Minister of Interior, BAVARIA.

EHRENSBERGER, Otto.

Chief of two departments in Reich Ministry of Interior.

HINKEL, Hans, SS Gruppenfuehrer.

Secretary-General and chief editor of Reich Chamber of Culture.

NEUBACHER, Dr. Hermann.

Special economic envoy of Reich in BALKANS; Foreign Office representative in various BALKAN countries.

HAUSHOFER, Dr. Karl.

President of German Geopolitical Society. Ex-president of the League for Germanism Abroad.

KOERNER, Paul, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Civil Service secretary with the Trustee for Four-Year Plan. Old Party member.

SPERHLE, Hugo, Feldmarschall.

Former commander of the Third Air Fleet, he was responsible for the LONDON blitz.

Von EBERSTEIN, Freiherr, Friederich Karl, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

HIMMLER's assistant; Hoherer SS and Polizeifuehrer South. Had authority to issue any special orders concerning the DACHAU Concentration Camp. Reportedly, HITLER had put von EBERSTEIN in charge of werewolf plans for BAVARIA.

FRICK, Dr. Wilhelm.

Reich Protector for BOHEMIA and MORAVIA since 1943. Leader of Nazi Party in the Reichstag. Reich Minister of Interior until August 1943. Early Nazi. As premier of THURINGIA, he had conferred citizenship on Austrian-born Adolf HITLER.



BUCH, Walter, Oberster Parteirichter (Supreme Party Judge), SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Reichsleiter. Actively assisted HITLER in organizing the Party in MUNICH between 1923 and 1927.

JUNG, Philip Wilhelm.

Mayor of VIENNA from April 1940 to January 1944. Held high offices with the Party for 14 years.

SUCHENWALD, Richard, SA Brigadefuehrer.

Founder of the HITLER movement in AUSTRIA (1926). Member of the Reichstag. Lifelong personal friend of HITLER.

SACHS, Willy.

Famed industrialist, owner and director of FITCHER and SACHS, world's largest coaster brake manufacturers, and owner of largest factory in GERMANY producing small motors. Personal friend of HITLER and GOEBBELS, and often entertained them at his estate.

STROELIN, Karl.

Lord Mayor of STUTTGART. An expert on postwar building plans.

de BRINON, Alfons.

Ambassador-at-large and special envoy from Marshal PETAIN to the German government, 1942-45. VICHY supposedly charged him with supplying the necessary quotas of forced French laborers for work in GERMANY.

REMEY-SCHNELLER, Lajos.

Hungarian Finance Minister under SZALASI (Fascist) regime.

HAYLER, Franz.

Secretary of State, Reich Ministry of Economics.

LUTHER, Dr. Hans.

Former Reich Chancellor.

POTTHAST, Hedwig.

HIMMLER's mistress. Age 33, she bore him two children out of wedlock.

OBERG, Karl Albrecht.

"The Mad Butcher of FRANCE." Senior SS and Police Leader in FRANCE during the occupation.

TIMMLER, Dr. Markus.

Legation councilor on Russian political and economic affairs in the Foreign Office. "Go-between" for RIBBENTROP, STALIN and MOLOTOV in other days.

STEANE, Anthony.

British renegade; radio commentator for Nazis.



BUTTMANN, Dr. Rudolph.

Ministerial Director in Reich Ministry of Interior; Chief of NSDAP Office for Political Education; general director of Bavarian State Library; Nazi Party Member No. 4.

SCHOENICKE, Dr. Martin.

Chief executive of German Broadcasting System.

STEPP, Walter, SS Brigadefuehrer.

President of MUNICH Court of Appeals. Chief of BAVARIA Gestapo (1935-37).

Von SCHUEERT, Conrad.

Senior Councilor of German Embassy in CROATIA. Former observer for Foreign Office in the UKRAINE.

Von EPP, Ritter.

Reichsstatthalter of BAVARIA.

WANDERER, Madeleine.

Robert LEY's 19-year-old mistress, an Estonian ballet dancer.

\* \* \*

German General Officers Captured by Seventh Army in Final Operation

* * * * *		
* <u>GERMAN RANK</u>	<u>EQUIVALENT</u>	*
* Generalfeldmarschall	-- British Field Marshal	*
* SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer	-- U S General	*
* Generaloberst	-- U S General	*
* SS Obergruppenfuehrer	-- U S Lieutenant General	*
* General der Infanterie		*
* (Artillerie, etc.)	-- U S Lieutenant General	*
* SS Gruppenfuehrer	-- U S Major General	*
* Generalleutnant	-- U S Major General	*
* SS Brigadefuehrer	-- U S Brigadier General	*
* Generalmajor	-- U S Brigadier General	*
* * * * *		

Von ALBERTI, Conrad, Generalmajor, CG Battle Area XII South (a defensive sector east of the RHINE).

ALMENDINGER, Karl, General der Infanterie, ex-CG Seventh German Army in CRIMEA.

ANGERSTEIN, Generalleutnant, Judge Advocate Department.

ARPS, Theodor, Vice-Admiral, Naval Advisor and Judge High Military Court.

Von AXTHEIM, Walter, General der Artillerie, AA officer.

BARDOCZY, Franz, Generalleutnant, Hungarian Military Mission to German Army schools.

BAYER, Alfred, General Arzt, Chief of Medical Corps, Wehrkreis VII.



BECHT, Ernst, Generalmajor, Military Economic and Armament Office.

BEHNKE, Surgeon General.

Von BEHR, Karl Heinrich Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer (?), ex-CG Guard Regiment VIENNA.

Von BERCHTOLDSHEIM, Gustav, Generalmajor, CG Replacement Inspectorate, REGENSBURG.

BERGER, Gottlob, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, Chief of Prisoner of War System; also CG  
of Volkssturm.

MEYER, Dr. Franz, General der Infanterie, CG LXXX Corps.

BINGLER, Surgeon General.

HIRON, Generalstabsrichter (U S Lieutenant General), Judge Advocate General, GERMANY.

BLOCK, Generalmajor, Judge Advocate Department.

Von BLOMBERG, Werner, Generalfeldmarschall (retired), C-in-C German Army until 1931.

BLUEHM, Oscar, Generalleutnant, CG 407 Mobilization Division.

BOEHAIMB, Hans, Generalmajor, Commandant of INNSBRUCK.

BOEMERS, Generalmajor, ammunition expert.

BOETTICHER, Friedrich, Generalleutnant, ex-military attache in UNITED STATES.

BOGATSCH, Rudolf, General der Flieger, CG IV AA Corps.

BONARTZ, Ernst, GAF (in German Air Ministry).

Von BOTH, Hans Kuno, General der Infanterie, ex-CG Operation Sector South.

BOTSCH, Generalleutnant, Chief of Staff Nineteenth Army.

BOTSH, Generalleutnant, ex-CG XXVIII Panzer Corps.

BRUCH, Hermann, Generalleutnant, from 1942-44 representative of Wehrmacht in war  
industry in UKRAINE and FRANCE.

BUFFA, Ernst Joachim, Generalleutnant, CG 21 AA Division; CG Military Court TORGAU.

BULCKE, Richard, Generalmajor, Chief of Motor Transport of the Army.

Von BUTTLER, Edgar, Generalleutnant, Signal.

BYRON, Generalleutnant, Judge Advocate Department.

Von CLAER, Bernhard, Generalleutnant, CG Wehrkreis XIII. Also CG Battle Group  
VON CLAER.

CUNO, General der Panzer Truppen, Transportation Officer OKH.

DANHAUSER, Paul, Generalleutnant, G-4 OKH.

DEGEN, Generalleutnant, ex-CG 2 Mountain Division.

DEHNER, Ernst, General der Infanterie, Officer Replacement Pool OKH.



R E S T R I C T E D

DETTING, Generalleutnant, CG 363 Volksgrenadier Division.

DIETRICH, Sepp, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer, CG Sixth SS Panzer Army.

DIPPOLD, Benignus, Generalleutnant, CG Straggler Collecting Point, LXXXII Corps.

DOERFFLER-SCHUBAND, Werner, SS Brigadefuehrer, Chief of Bureau of Officers' Reserves and Schools, Waffen SS.

DROGAND, Wilhelm, Generalleutnant, Inspector of Welfare and Veterans' Offices.

EBERHARDT, Friedrich Georg, Generalleutnant, former judge in High Military Court.

EHLING, Generalmajor, Personnel Officer GAF.

Von FALKENHORST, Nikolaus, Generaloberst, ex-CG Twenty-First Army (NORWAY).

FEGELEIN, Hermann, SS Gruppenfuehrer (?), Liaison Officer at HITLER's headquarters.

FEHN, Franz, Generalmajor, commandant of AUGSBURG.

FITZAU, Erich, Generalmajor, CG GAF Straggler Collecting Point OBERREIN.

FOERTSCH, Herrmann, Generalleutnant, CG First German Army.

FRANZ, Generalmajor, CG 256 Division.

FRIES, Walter, General der Panzer Truppen, ex-CG XLVI Armored Corps.

FUNKE, Heinz, Generalleutnant, CG Air Academy.

GAEDE, Generalmajor, CG 719 Infantry Division.

GALLAND, Adolf, General, Luftwaffe expert on jet-propelled craft.

GALLENKAMP, Kurt, General der Artillerie, ex-CG LXXX Corps.

GANDERT, Hans Eberhardt, Generalmajor, CG training camp.

GAUL, Hans, Generalmajor, Volkssturm commander.

GEHIEN, Reinhardt, Generalleutnant, ex G-2 GHQ for Eastern Front.

Von GELDENFELDT, Generalmajor, AA officer.

GELLMANN, Generalleutnant, CG Wehrkreis VII.

GERETE BALMI-CZEYDNER, Ferenc, SS Hungarian general.

GESCHWANDTNER, Generalmajor.

GEYR, Freiherr von Schweppenburg, General der Panzer, Inspector General of Panzer Troops/OKH.

GILLE, Herbert, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, ex-CG IV SS Panzer Corps.

GOERING, Hermann, Reichsmarschall, ex-Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe.

GOERITZ, Werner, Generalleutnant, ex-CG 92 Division.



R E S T R I C T E D

GOETTKE, Ernst, Generalleutnant, CG Fortress Coast Artillery.

GOLUBINTSEV, General, staff officer in VLASSOW Army.

Von GRAIM, Ritter, Air Marshal. Succeeded GOERING as head of Luftwaffe. Committed suicide after capture.

GREIFELT, Ulrich, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Polizei, deputy of HIMMLER.

GREINER, Heinz, Generalleutnant, ex-CG 362 Division.

GROOS, Otto, Admiral, Chief of the Special Staff for Economic Warfare, OKW.

GUDERIAN, Heinz, Generaloberst, ex-Chief of Staff, OKH.

Von GUNDELL, Walter, Generalleutnant, commandant OKH.

GUNZELMANN, Emil, Generalleutnant, Chief of Prisoner of War System, Wehrkreis VII.

HAUSSER, Eduard, Generalleutnant, Commander of Task Force EAST PRUSSIA.

HAUSSER, Paul, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer, ex-CG Army Group G.

HENSCHKE, Generalleutnant, CG Air Signal Replacement & Training Units.

HERBERT, Theodor, Generalmajor, GAF Collecting Staff Air District VII MUNICH.

HERMANK, Generalmajor, Chief Engineer BERLIN Air Ministry.

HERRLEIN, Friedrich, General der Infanterie, HQ Commander-in-Chief West.

HEUBNER, Kurt, Generalmajor, Commandant of ERFURT.

HILGERS, Josef, Generalleutnant, CG Technical Flying School.

Von HOEBERT, Eugen, Generalmajor, ex-CG Field HQ CRACOW.

HOEFLE, Hermann, SS Obergruppenfuehrer (Police), ex-Commander-in-Chief CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

HOFFMANN, Hans, Generalleutnant, Staff of General der Artillerie UNRUH in Air District Command XVII.

HOFMEISTER, Edmund (Georg), Generalmajor, CG BERLIN until 4 October 1944.

Von HOLTZENDORFF, Generalmajor, CG Drivers' Training School, ERFURT.

HORNUNG, Ferdinand, Generalmajor, Veterans' Administration.

Von HORSTENAU, Glaise, General der Infanterie, OKW zbV Section 3.

IBEL, E., Generalmajor, GAF.

KASTNER-KIRKDORF, Gustav, General der Flieger, member of HITLER's staff.

KEILER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, CG MONTENEGRO.

KEIPER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, Fuehrer Reserve OKH.

KEITEL, Bodewin, General der Infanterie, ex-CG Wehrkreis XX (DANZIG). Brother of Feldmarschall KEITEL.



KEPPLER, Georg, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, ex-CG XVIII SS Corps.

KESSELRING, Albert, Generalfeldmarschall, ex-Commander-in-Chief West.

KIEFFER, Maximilian, Generalleutnant (retired), Horse and Vehicle Inspector, ULM.

KITTEL, Heinrich, Generalmajor, Ordnance Department.

KLEINKAMP, Helmut, Generalmajor, ex-CG 36 Volksgrenadier Division.

KNISS, Baptist, General der Infanterie, ex-CG LXXXIV Corps.

KNOBLAUCH, Kurt, Obergruppenfuehrer, head Department V (Personnel) SS Fuehrungshauptamt BERLIN.

KOEHLER, Dr. Alfred, Rear Admiral, Naval Administrative Officer.

KOESTRING, Ernst, General der Kavallerie, in charge of training foreign troops.

KOHL, Otto, Generalleutnant, CG First Army Rear.

KOLB, Generalmajor, GAF, CG 9 Volksgrenadier Division.

KORTUEM, Generalmajor, Inspector GAF women's auxiliary forces.

KRADL, Generalleutnant, Judge Advocate Department.

KRAUSS, Robert, Generalmajor, Officer Replacement Pool, OKL.

KRIEBEL, Karl, General der Infanterie, Deputy CG of Wehrkreis VII.

KUMM, Otto, SS Brigadefuehrer, CG 1 SS Panzer Division.

LANGE, Kurt, Generalmajor, Commandant of SALZBURG.

LATTMANN, Generalleutnant, Judge Advocate Department.

Von LEEB, Wilhelm Ritter, Generalfeldmarschall, CG Army Group at beginning of Russian campaign.

LENZ, Franz, Generalstabsintendant (U S Major General), Officer Replacement Pool OKH.

Von LEYSER, Ernst, General der Infanterie, CG XXI Mountain Corps.

LICHT, Rudolf Eduard, Generalleutnant, ex-CG 710 Infantry Division Russian front.

LIEB, Generalmajor, ex-CG 112 Infantry Division.

LIEBERMANN, Generalmajor, head of five GAF hospitals.

LINN, Philipp, Generalleutnant, Inspector General Transportation Corps.

LIST, Wilhelm, Generalfeldmarschall, CG Fourteenth and Twelfth Armies.

LOERNER, Georg, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS, Chief of Supply in Central Office for SS Economic Administration.

LONGIN, Generalmajor, GAF CG WUERTTEMBERG 6 and 7.

LUETKENHAUS, Generalmajor (retired), Commandant at MANNHEIM.



R E S T R I C T E D

MACKELDAY, Lothar, Police General.

MAHLMANN, Paul, Generalleutnant, Fuehrer-Reserve OKH, ex-CG 353 Infantry Division.

Von MAHN, Ferdinand, Generalmajor, Commandant of MUNICH.

MANTEL, Ernst, Generalmajor, ex-Judge Advocate General, OKH.

MARZINKLEWICZ, G., Generalmajor, CG 14 Engineer Fortification HQ.

MATTERSTOCK, Otto, Generalleutnant, Fuehrer Reserve, OKH.

MATTNER, Generalmajor, GAF searchlight specialist.

MERZ, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, Deputy CG GAF Supply Troops.

METZ, Eduard, Generalleutnant, Artillery.

MEYER, Generalmajor, GAF.

MEYERHOEFER, Hans, Generalmajor, Armament Inspectorate.

MICHELMANN, Axel, Generalmajor, G-1 Section, OKH.

MUNTZ, Otto, Generalmajor, Air Ministry.

MUSSHOFF, Walter, General der Flieger, retired, ex-Chief of Welfare Department,  
Personnel Office, GAF.

NAGEL, Wilhelm Friedrich, Generalmajor, Inspector of Armament, Army Group S.

Von NEUBRONN, Freiherr, Generalleutnant (retired), former representative of Feld-  
marschall von RUNDSTEDT in VICHY, FRANCE.

NEUMAYR, Franz, Generalmajor, Motor Transport Procurement, Wehrkreis XIII.

OBERHAEUSSER, Eugen, Generalleutnant, Fuehrer Reserve OKH; Chief Signal Officer,  
Commander-in-Chief West.

Von OBERKAMP, Karl, Reichsritter, SS Brigadefuehrer, ex-CG SS Division PRINZ EUGEN.

OELLER, Generalmajor.

OPPENLAENDER, Kurt, Generalleutnant, ex-CG CRACOW.

PAPPE, Kurt, Generalmajor, CG 7 Volkswerfer Brigade.

PAUER, Generalstabsintendant (U S Major General), Army Administrative Office.

PETERSEN, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, Engineering School at DESSAU-ROSSLAU.

PETERSON, Hans, SA Obergruppenfuehrer, SA High Command.

PETRI, Hans, Generalmajor, CG MURNAU Prisoner of War Camp.

PILZ, Generalleutnant.

RAAPE, Generalmajor, CG 7th Volkswerfer Brigade.

RATH, Generalmajor.



RAUS, Erhard, Generaloberst, CG Third Panzer Army.

REINEFARTH, Hans, SS Gruppenfuehrer, ex-CG troops in fortifications, FREIBURG -  
Swiss frontier.

REINHARDT, Heinz, Generaloberst, CG Army Group Center.

Von RICHTHOFEN, Wolfram, Freiherr, Generalfeldmarschall, ex-CG Second Air Fleet.

RINGEL, General (exact rank unknown).

RODE, Brigadefuehrer.

RODENWALDT, Dr. Ernst, Generalmajor, Medical Corps.

ROESCH, Rudolf, Generalmajor, head of Armament Inspection Wehrkreis VII.

ROESINGER, Otto, Generalmajor, Engineer officer.

ROESSLER, Rudolf, Generalmajor.

Von ROMAN, Rudolf, Freiherr, Generaloberst.

Von ROTTBERG, General (exact rank unknown), GAF.

RUDEL, Gunther, Generaloberst, ex-Chief Air Ministry.

Von RUNDSTEDT, Gerd, Generalfeldmarschall, retired Commander-in-Chief West.

SCHAUB, Julius, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, Aide-de-camp to HITLER.

Von SCHAWEN, Erich, Generalleutnant, inspector of engineer construction.

Von SCHEELE, Hans Karl, General der Infanterie, President of Reichskriegsgericht  
(highest military court).

SCHEURLIN, Generalleutnant, GAF officer.

SCHIEDT, Generalmajor.

SCHILEST, Walerian, Generalmajor, custodian of Cossack Museum.

SCHLEICH, General der Flieger (?), ex-CG Luftwaffe in NORWAY.

SCHMID, Josef, Generalleutnant, CG Air Command 6; former CG Air Command West.

SCHMIDT, Generalmajor.

SCHNIEWIND, Otto, General Admiral, Commandant of Navy Group North, KIEL.

SCHOERNER, Ferdinand, Generalfeldmarschall, ex-CG Army Group Center. Member of  
German General Staff.

SCHULER, Generalleutnant, GAF.

SCHUMACHER, Karl, Generalmajor, GAF.

SCHUSTER, Admiral.

SEIBT, Konrad, Generalmajor (retired).



R E S T R I C T E D

Von SEIDEL, General, GAF.

SEIZ, Generalmajor, Traffic Control Officer, First Army.

SENSFUSS, Generalleutnant, CG 212 Volksgrenadier Division.

SHILENKOFF, General, Anti-Soviet Russian Forces.

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS, CG XIII SS Corps.

SOUCHAY, Kurt, Generalmajor, Military Police Commandant First Army.

SPERLE, Hugo, Generalfeldmarschal, ex-CG Third Air Fleet.

SPETH, General der Artillerie, ex-Chief of Staff Eighteenth Army. Member of  
German General Staff.

SPIES, Rudolf, Generalmajor, Chief Engineer HQ Replacement Troops GAF.

SPONHEIMER, Otto, General der Infanterie, ex-CG LXVII Corps.

STAUDINGER, SS Gruppenfuehrer, ex-Artillery officer, Sixth SS Panzer Army.

STEIGLEHNER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, Inspector Ammunition Dumps.

Von STEIN, Johann, Generalmajor, Inspector of German Railroads.

STEINBACH, Paul, Generalmajor, Fuehrer Reserve.

STEINBAUER, Gerhard, Generalleutnant, Inspector of Replacements, MUNICH.

STURM, Barthold, Generalleutnant, Chief of Military Police, Army Group G.

TAEGLICHSECK, Generalmajor, Standortaeltester (senior officer), DUERRENZEN.

THUMM, Helmut, General der Infanterie, ex-CG LXIV Corps.

TOLSDORF, Generalleutnant, CG LXXXII Corps.

TRAUCH, Generalleutnant, Transport Corps Training.

Von TREUENFELD, SS Generalleutnant, Commander of 10 SS Panzer Division.

UHL, Ernst, Generalmajor, AAA Training School at SUESUM until October 1944.

UNTERRIESER, William, Generalleutnant, Air Ministry.

VEIEL, Rudolf, General der Panzer Truppen, CG Wehrkreis V.

VERSOCK, Kurt, General der Gebirgs Truppen, ex-CG XLIII Corps.

VEYER, Generalmajor.

VOGLER, Anton, SS Brigadefuehrer, ex-SS Garrison Commander, MUNICH.

Von VORMANN, Nikolaus, General der Panzer Truppen, CG Fortress Area Southeast.

VOSS, Erich, Generalmajor, Chief of Prisoner of War System, Wehrkreis IX.



R E S T R I C T E D

WALTHER, Paul, Generalleutnant, Chief Medical Officer of Wehrkreis VIII, BRESLAU.

WARLIMONT, Walter, General der Artillerie, Deputy Chief German Joint Operations Staff.

WEBER, Friedrich, Generalleutnant, ex-CG WARSAW Division.

Von WEICHS, Maximilian, Freiherr, Feldmarschall, ex-CG Army Group F (BALKANS).

WEIDINGEN (?), General der Pioniere.

WEISS, Walter, Generaloberst, ex-CG Army Group North.

WERNER-EHRENFEUCHT, Heinz, Chief of Training Film Section, OKH.

WESTHOFF, Adolf, Generalmajor, Inspector Prisoner of War System.

WILKE, Gustav, Generalmajor, CG 9 Parachute Division.

WINCKLER, Max, Generalmajor, Artillery Officer of Fortress Area W.

WINKLER, Generalleutnant, ex-CG Replacement Units for Armored Forces.

WINTER, Paul, Generalleutnant (retired), ex-CG 9 GAF Division.

WITEK, Otto, Generalintendant (U S Brigadier General), Quartermaster Staff of  
Army Group G.

Von WITZENDORF, Gotthard, Generalmajor, GAF.

Von WITZENDORF, Hans Juergen, Generalleutnant, CG Flak Ers (Replacement) Division.

Von WITZLEBAN, Hermann, Generalmajor, Military Attache HUNGARY.

WOELSS, Generalleutnant.

WOESSNER, Eugen, Generalleutnant, ex-AA officer, OKH.

WOLFF, General der Infanterie.

WOLKS, General der Artillerie.

WOLLMAN, Generalleutnant.

ZIEGLER, Karl, Generalleutnant, Chief of Feldpost.



VI. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 May - 30 June 1945

The counterintelligence mission of Seventh Army in GERMANY involved primarily the destruction of the German Intelligence Services, the NSDAP and their affiliates. This mission in its operational phase really began after the surrender of GERMANY and continued for approximately two months, by which time most of the Party and GIS leaders were either arrested or suicides. This summary will therefore include the period from 01 May to 30 June 1945, on which latter date the occupational mission may be said to have begun. This division is necessarily rough as there was no formal surrender of the GIS or the NSDAP. The occupational mission, although still concerned with the eradication of all the children of HITLER, is primarily to prevent their renaissance under any form.

The number of persons arrested during May and June was approximately 10,000, a large percentage of whom were major counterintelligence targets. The list of the more important of these will be found at the end of this summary. Those persons arrested who are not of primary counterintelligence interest are described in Chapter V of the present History. The great majority of arrests of all types were made by CIC detachments.

Resistance remained practically dormant throughout the period. Several caches of arms and munitions, sometimes food, were found. Apprehended SD and SIPO personnel told of several planned postwar resistance groups, only one of which survived the debacle.

The surrender of a courier revealed the existence of a postwar resistance organization created by HIMMLER in January 1945. Its purpose was the continuance underground of the Sicherheitsdienst, its methods the terrorization of the population in order to prevent cooperation with occupation authorities and killing all those who threatened the existence of the organization. The organization, as planned, was staffed by 122 men and 40 women, divided into smaller groups of not more than five, with a complex system of message centers and a chain of command. Contact was to be maintained with Werewolf groups, the Sicherheitsdienst and Sicherheitspolizei as well as with a higher echelon. This organization, planned on a nationwide basis, could not at all function on that scale or even on a much smaller one, since its personnel were scattered and communication was virtually non-existent.

Fifteen fused 250-kilogram aerial bombs were placed along highways entering the town of WINSBACH, for the purpose of rendering the roads temporarily useless to American forces. The bombs were to be detonated by line-crossers after the arrival of American troops. The project had been organized by the Ortsgruppenleiter of the town, on orders of a Luftwaffe officer.

A graph of wire cuts made during the period would show a steady climb through May, a sharp increase in the first two weeks of June, which was reduced by half during the last two weeks. Still no organized sabotage was apparent, the few individuals arrested having acted independently. Many wire cuts were due to U S Army vehicles or mistakes of civilians.

About 15 training planes, Becker 181s, took off on the first of May from a hastily-organized sabotage training school at BAD AIBLING. Five of the planes were to land at HEILBRONN, five near STRASBOURG and five near NURNBERG, each plane carrying two men and sabotage materiel. The men were to place demolitions on bridges, railroads and other vital installations and then surrender to American troops. One of the group was arrested after he and his partner had



decided not to pursue their mission. Two of the other planes were found a few days later. One had been destroyed by its crew, who had escaped after burying several boxes of high explosives nearby. The second plane had crashed, killing its two occupants.

Rumors during the period were dominated by the Russian theme. During May prevalent rumors were that war was impending or had been declared by RUSSIA (sometimes in coalition with other nations) against the UNITED STATES. Although this rumor continued on a diminished scale, emphasis shifted more towards RUSSIA vis-a-vis internal German conditions rather than inter-Allied relations. Attitude toward Russian occupation see-sawed between fear and approval. Reasons given for approval were that the Russians allowed civilians more freedom of movement, good entertainment, the right to hold public meetings and to form labor unions. Disapproval was shown principally regarding alleged Russian appropriation or requisition of property. Apprehended SS soldiers continued to volunteer their services for fighting the Russians; conversely, German soldiers returning from CZECHOSLOVAKIA circulated the rumor that Russians were drafting men of military age. Confusion and wonderment at what would be their future caused Germans to speculate out loud. The most widespread rumor in this regard was that the Allies were going to forbid marriage between Germans for the next five years. It was also stated that German civilians would be sterilized and would suffer a "loss of honor" for ten years. Evidence of possibly directed rumor-spreading was seen in justification given to posters of German concentration camp atrocities. It was reported by civilians that these pictures were not authentic but were actually photographs of famine victims in INDIA or bomb victims transferred to the camps by the Americans.

With the Wehrmacht fleeing pell-mell, very little time could be spent on the destruction of valuable documents. Tactical documents flowed in waves into American hands; and strategical documents, even those for which elaborate hiding plans had been made, were picked up by the ton. Many of these documents, because of the involved processing required, will not be exploited for some time. However, it is possible to list several of the more important finds:

- Sixty-eight kilograms of Party records and documents of Reichsleitung SA discovered in a paper mill at FREIMANN. Included were all Party membership cards with photographs.

- Fifty dossiers of files belonging to Botschafter z.b.V. RITTER, of the German Foreign Office. The documents contained economic, political, military and diplomatic information gathered by the German Foreign Office on most countries of the world, on counterintelligence, Allied shipping, "Big Three" meetings, prisoners of war, propaganda broadcasts to AMERICA, liaison between the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht High Command, Allied shipping. Foreign Office organization, overlays of Allied dispositions in various theaters of operations and various other intelligence of world-wide scope.

- SKORZENY's report on activities in BERLIN following the attempt on HITLER's life on 20 July, his report on the freeing of MUSSOLINI and a part of MUSSOLINI's diary written during his imprisonment.

- Documents and other materials used by RSHA Amt VI F in a large-scale counterfeiting operation, corroborating the story of two Jewish internees released from concentration camp just prior to the end of hostilities. Since January 1945, 140 Jewish printers, engravers, bookbinders and bank clerks, all internees of concentration camps, had been assembled at SACHSENHAUSEN Concentration Camp for the purpose of counterfeiting British currency and falsification of a wide variety of foreign documents and credentials. Over 130,000,000 British pounds had been manufactured, of which 50,000,000 had been destroyed as faulty. Some 60,000,000 pounds were taken to the TIROL and 20,000,000 were already in



circulation in Allied territory. The materiel recovered included stored records of RSHA Amt VI F, blank passports of European and South American countries, sample passport pages with visas, official metal die stamps, wax impressions of foreign and diplomatic seals, American AGO and social security cards, counterfeiting materiel, including wire meshes for imitating watermarks of British currency and for the U S State Department seal.

Organized propaganda was non-existent. A German woman artist prepared and posted in two towns nine posters ridiculing and reviling Germans who now deery HITLER and Nazism and those who assist the Allies. However, this effort was merely the work of a hugh-strung and unregenerate individual.

Anti-Nazi organizations in both GERMANY and AUSTRIA began creeping back to the light of day. The best organized in GERMANY was the "Freiheits Aktion Bayern" in the MUNICH area, which gained control of the MUNICH radio station for a few hours. This action, more spectacular than indicative of genuine strength, gained the organization considerable prestige and thrust into short-lived greatness minor figures of the movement. The FAB contained a full complement of opportunists. Ritter von EPP, who started HITLER on his career, had been involved in the plotting behind the arras, but had dissimulated cleverly enough so that when the coup d'etat failed and some of its plotters were executed he was able to disclaim participation.

The Bavarian Auxiliary Police was a rather well organized anti-Nazi group. It attempted to patrol the streets of MUNICH and to propagandize the civilian population to maintain order and refrain from looting.

There was a somewhat larger and older group, though less well-organized for action: the TURICUM, claiming existence from 1933 and reorganized into its present form in 1940, which was allegedly to facilitate Allied control after victory and to promote German understanding and cooperation. Due to the loose and secret manner of organization, no accurate total of membership can be given, but the group supposedly numbered about 2,000.

A large anti-Nazi group in AUSTRIA, the Free AUSTRIA Movement, was really a composite of several resistance groups brought together by a Dr. GRUEER, a native of INNSBRUCK, who, although he joined the NSDAP prior to HITLER's advent to power, was not a supporter of the regime and was, in fact, on the Gestapo wanted list. He had begun the organization of an Austrian resistance movement in 1941. At the end of May this organization attempted to recruit the services of a U S enlisted soldier to circulate a pamphlet, in English, entitled "Austrian Movement of Liberation." The pamphlet had two apperent purposes: the first, to demonstrate that AUSTRIA was not a willing participant in the Nazi regime, but was rather GERMANY's first victim and second, to paint in glowing colors the efforts of the Free AUSTRIA Movement in assisting the Allies in their conquest of AUSTRIA. Circulation of these pamphlets was stated by Dr. GRUEER to have been made erroneously and without his consent. There was a strong possibility that this attempt was a trial balloon employed to determine how much of such activity might be tolerated by us.

Seven anti-Nazi organizations were found in AUGSBURG. The largest, called "Deutsche Freiheits Bewegung", was apparently responsible for the bloodless surrender of the town. Such organizations were instrumental, in some instances, in securing the surrender of towns and were generally cooperative with American troops, both in keeping order and informing on persons of CI interest.

In June the former pre-Nazi political parties became much more active. Communists, Social Democrats, Centrists and various anti-Fascist committees commenced to operate. The Free Labor Unions, abolished in 1933, were the backbone of these organizations.



The 17 espionage agents apprehended during the period are described below:

1. A member of the SD, Amt VI E 7 (Balkan Espionage) who had been in charge of dispatching agents to RUMANIA from VIENNA, and had later done similar work in BELGIUM, in addition to reporting on Belgian political sentiment. In 1943, under cover of working in the German Embassy in BUCHAREST, he collected political information on RUMANIA. Seven other members of Amt VI E 7 were arrested with him.
- 2 and 3. Two Luxembourgers, naturalized Germans, whose mission, given them by the Commander of the SIPO and SD for SCHWABEN, was to observe American troops in AUGSBURG and to await further instructions from a Werewolf agent who had not yet contacted them. They had previously worked for the SD and Gestapo as agents provocateurs penetrating Luxembourg patriot groups. The two agents had come to CIC, posing as friendly informants.
- 4 and 5. Two French members of the Waffen SS, who had been voluntary workers in GERMANY. Their mission was to enlist in the French Colonial troops and report to the SD.
6. An agent of Abwehr I, who had bribed his way out of the Luftwaffe into the Abwehr and continued to pay the Abwehr 500 marks a month until September 1944. Under cover of a stock brokerage and real estate business, he had traveled to ITALY on economic espionage missions and had also organized a radio network. He had worked in SWITZERLAND in 1943-44 on counterespionage.
7. A Kriminal Sekretär of the NURNBERG Kriminalpolizei who was charged with the mission of crossing American lines to observe Party members in Allied-occupied territory and to report how and to what extent they were cooperating with the Americans. The Sicherheitspolizei had been divided into two groups, according to age, and all of them charged with this mission. The project was poorly organized and this agent returned to his home.
8. An Abwehr agent who had performed minor missions in SWITZERLAND, apparently coerced because of his half-Jewish parentage.
9. A Norwegian agent who had attended a six-months sabotage and espionage school as well as radio school for foreigners. He had worked in DENMARK on the suppression of anti-German activities, and later in CROATIA reporting partisan activities. In April 1945 he helped set up two radio stations with the entire staff of Amt VI E (Middle-European Espionage) at KREMSMUNSTER and at RINN, AUSTRIA. The group was disbanded on the approach of U S troops.
10. A Russian member of Sonderkommando Ost (a special organization under the RSHA for controlling and collecting all information on Russians living in German-occupied EUROPE) and of Sicherheitsdienst Amt III D. A radio instructor and known anti-Communist in SMOLENSK when the Germans entered the city, he was included in the municipal administration and became a member of SD Amt III, reporting on economic conditions of the Russian people.
11. An OSS agent, controlled by the Germans after his arrest by the Gestapo in CARCASSONNE, FRANCE, in 1943. His double status was revealed by two American OSS agents after their release from DACHAU Concentration Camp and who had been betrayed by him in MARSEILLE.
12. A Swiss espionage agent operating for GERMANY against SWITZERLAND. As a truck driver for a Swiss freight firm, he was able to cross the border freely. His missions were to report on Swiss military installations on the frontier and to transmit reports of other German agents in SWITZERLAND.



13. An Italian woman, 52 years old, who had worked for the Gestapo as an interpreter for 11 years and had accomplished two espionage missions as an agent for the SD.

14. An Esthonian physician who had emigrated to GERMANY in 1920 and subsequently been naturalized a German citizen. At the beginning of the war he had worked for the French Intelligence Service in ESTHONIA watching Russo-German relations. After the Armistice he was recruited by the GIS and worked reporting political intelligence on French MOROCCO for the Sicherheitsdienst, Amt VI B 4 (Intelligence on SPAIN), with knowledge and concurrence of the French. Arrested by the French Territorial Security in MOROCCO, he was released by the Germans and given the mission of going to SPAIN and observing English politics in EUROPE, particularly the British Ambassador, Sir Samuel HOARE. With deportation by SPAIN of all GIS members in September 1944, he was given the mission of recruiting Russian agents for work in FRANCE as an anti-Soviet spy ring. The events of spring 1945 frustrated these plans and he was ordered to remain in MUNICH with one radio operator and to report on all Allied military and political developments during the occupation. He and other SD officials involved were to lay low for a period of one and a half to two years.

15. A member of SS Jagdverband NW, who had worked for the GIS in SOUTH AFRICA and who claimed to have been appointed by SKORZENY to proceed to Allied headquarters in PARIS and kill General EISENHOWER. Nothing further came of this and he requested false papers. Upon the approach of American troops, he arranged for the surrender of his home town and was used temporarily as an interpreter for an American unit.

16. An Abwehr agent who was forced to perform minor missions because he was Jewish. On business trips to BRUSSELS in 1940 and later in GREECE and BULGARIA he was required to report on civilian morale and airplane traffic. Twice denounced, he was finally forced to sign over his business to a Party member.

17. An agent of Abwehr III F who had performed several counterespionage missions in SWITZERLAND, although he claims that most of his reports had been faked and he had joined the Abwehr only to avoid military service.

One sabotage agent was apprehended:

He was a Belgian national, 18 years old, member of Frontaufklarungstrupp 249, mission to proceed to BELGIUM on his own with other members of FAT 249, posing as displaced persons, for the purpose of sabotaging supply lines under guise of Communistic action, and killing members of Belgian law courts, Belgian nobility and higher officers of the American Army. He had attended a sabotage school near COLENZ along with approximately 300 other agents.

During the months of May and June, Seventh Army apprehended thousands of NSDAP and RSHA members. Several hundred of these were top-drawer personalities. A list of the more important of these is contained in Section V of this History. Personalities of strictly counterintelligence interest are listed below:

Otto SKORZENY, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer.

Chief of the Reichssicherheitsdienst Amt VI/S (Sabotage and Subversion) and of the Militaerisches Amt D (former Abwehr II, Sabotage; Commanding Officer of SS Jagdverbande. "Superman" of the German Sabotage Services, SKORZENY was best known for his rescue of MUSSOLINI. He had also planned the assassination of various Allied leaders, including General EISENHOWER, and the group of Germans in U S uniforms and vehicles which spearheaded the ARDENNES offensive.



Karl RADL, SS Sturmbannfuhrer.

Personal adjutant to SKORZENY.

Freiherr Frederick Karl von EHERSTEIN, Waffen SS Obergruppenfuhrer.

Senior SS and Police Leader in Wehrkreis VII since 1939. HIMMLER had delegated him as leader of the Werewolf organization in Wehrkreis VII.

Dr. Wilhelm August PATIN, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer.

Oberregierungsrat in RSHA Amt VII (Applied Ideological and Psychological Research); cousin of Henrich HIMMLER. PATIN's job since 1934 was to rationalize Nazi misdeeds by giving them historical justification. His chief work was on religion.

Ernst WAGNER.

Kriminalrat in MUNICH Police, adjutant to von EHERSTEIN in organizing the Werewolf movement in Wehrkreis VII.

Otto LAUTENBACH.

Member of SD Amt VI C 2 (Ost), SD propaganda office; employe of the press section of the Reichsfuhrer der SS in 1942 and 1943.

Friedrich SIEKMEYER.

Captain in Abwehr III Wi (Security of German Industry). For six weeks in 1942 OKW representative to the Hungarian War Ministry.

Dr. Fritz NEUERT.

Reserve major in German Army; member of Abwehr III F (Counterintelligence). Worked in Ast/STUTTGART in 1939, helped activate Ast/DIJON and was chief of Nest/NANCY.

Heinrich BERNHARD, SS Standartenfuhrer.

Member of RSHA Amt VI B 2, BERLIN, (SD Activities in Western EUROPE). His duties were to submit daily reports on the political and economic situation in FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND, and to coordinate the BERLIN and PARIS SD offices.

Walter GROSSBAUER, SS Hauptscharfuhrer.

A member of SD Abschnitt, SALZBURG, he had been instructed to organize a stay-behind net in AUSTRIA.

Anton JANETSCHKE, SS Hauptscharfuhrer.

Chief of SD Aussenstelle Zell am See.

Johann POLONY.

In charge of organizing a stay-behind network in BELGIUM to cover the Allied invasion. In 1944 transferred to VIENNA for work with SD Amt VI E 7 (RUMANIA), where he briefed agents about to be sent to the BALKAN countries.



Reinhardt WOLFF, SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

Chief of SD Amt VI B 1 and VI B 3 of RSHA BERLIN; former Gestapo chief of FRANKFURT ON ODER and WEIMAR; Commanding Officer of Positive Intelligence Training School, "Leitstelle Siegfried" of MARBURG ON LAHN.

Friedrich BERMES.

Captain in Abwehr Ast VII, MUNICH, where he worked for III F Section, placing agents among foreign workers and prisoners of war. Transferred to the Gestapo, he continued with the same assignment and was involved in the "Siegrune" organization, a postwar resistance group organized on the assumption that part of GERMANY would continue resistance and would not become occupied.

Johanna Marie Louise FLOCK.

Abwehr and SD official. Worked in Abwehr Abteilung III F maintaining records of enemy agents and manipulating German agents, then in the special Abwehr Section VI 3 for high-level censorship of foreign mail, and thereafter with SD Section III G with the mission of investigating all high Party officials, generals and members of nobility involved in the 20 July 1944 attempt on HITLER's life.

Dr. Rudolf Hermann Ferdinand BRASCHWITZ (alias Rudolf KNEPPE), SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

Regierungs-kriminalrat; Chief of KRIPO, SALZBURG. BRASCHWITZ admits having attended meetings of the Sicherheitspolizei in SALZBURG regarding postwar resistance, but claims that plans never materialized.

Dr. Julius BUCHLEITNER.

Chief of Section III C of Ast/SALZBURG; Wehrmacht Major.

Joseph DAUSER, SS Obersturmfuehrer.

Chief of SD VI Leitabschnitt MUNICH. Chief duty was to arrange for the performance of incidental espionage missions by travelers to SWITZERLAND. He also took part in "aktion Wendig", a plan for the wholesale passing of counterfeit currency in foreign countries.

Max DORN (alias FISCHER).

Captain Ast/MUNICH, Section III F, in which he dispatched agents to various European countries.

Julius ELSASSER.

Chief of SD III D (Internal Economy) for the MOEBACH area. ELSASSER committed suicide after interrogation.

Hans GERLACH.

Commanding Officer of SS Jagdverband South-West.

Dr. Christian von GROCH.

Chief of SD Amt VI, NANCY, FRANCE. His main mission was the preparation of semi-monthly report on public opinion.



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Alfred HERB.

Technical leader in the Abwehr; Espionage Commissioner of Arming Command at ULM.

Dr. Anton HURDT.

Chief of Ast/MUNICH from 1939 to 1942. Left in 1943 for active duty as an artillery officer. Retired 1944.

George Michael HUTTERER, Lieutenant Colonel.

Dr. Wilhelm SCHWARDER, Major.

Friedrich LAUDIEN, Captain.

Horst NEUKIRCHNER, First Lieutenant.

All of Abwehrstelle South West, also known as Leitstelle III für Frontaufklärung, Army Groups F and E, which included Frontaufklärungskommando 310, AGRAM, JUGOSLAVIA. The group pretended to be infantry officers awaiting orders from American units. They had traveled to AUSTRIA to await delivery of radio equipment, consisting of approximately 18 cases of radio and teletype units. This equipment was found at LEND, AUSTRIA, and was believed to have been intended for establishing radio teletype incapable of interception.

Karl von KEDL.

Member of Abwehr I-M (Naval Intelligence). He had no mission but had previously worked in counterintelligence in KIEL and NORWAY, had observed marine traffic through GIBRALTAR and performed liaison work between the Abwehr and Naval Operations.

Christian (Graf) von KROGH.

Lieutenant in the SD in NANCY until November 1944, then with Army Group G.

George LERMER (alias Maurice Jean JADIN).

In charge of Section III B (German Welfare) at the SD Hauptausstellung, MUNICH. In April 1945, LERMER was contacted by the RSHA, BERLIN, for the purpose of organizing a pan-European underground movement based on the Maquis model for the purpose of perpetuating Nazi ideology and preparing the ground for a European revolution, to be known under the code name "Regenbogen" (rainbow). LERMER was to be leader of the Belgian group and had surrounded himself with French and Belgian fascists in MUNICH. It was his plan to be repatriated as a displaced person to BELGIUM.

Ernst LIND.

Leader of Frontaufklärungstrupp 181 L; Major; member of the Abwehr. Had worked for the HAMBURG-AMERICA Line on the liner "BREMEN". Since May 1943 he had worked with the Luftflotte III in Abwehr I-C III, evaluating reports of line-crossers. LIND was apprehended with eight other members of FAT 181 L in a house containing arms, demolitions, food and a large amount of various Allied currencies.

Friedrich von LOSSOW (alias Franz LORENZ; alias Dr. Franz AMMER).

Lieutenant Colonel; chief of Abwehr I Wi, MUNICH. His duties were the establishment of economic espionage channels in the BALKANS and Middle East, using German export firms.



R E S T R I C T E D

Alfred PIFF.

Lieutenant in Abwehr; had done counter-sabotage work at the PLOESTI, RUMANIA, oil fields. He had been in charge of agents on the south-eastern Russian front in 1944.

Erich ROESEKE.

Adjutant to GERLACH, Commanding Officer of SS Jagdverband South West.

Wilhelm RUF.

Major in Ast/MUNICH. RUF stated that Ast/MUNICH had been ordered in April 1945 to continue to serve as an underground organization in close co-operation with the Werewolf, acting in three groups of from 25 to 35 men each, but that the order was disobeyed by all except one Abwehr officer, HERMES. All the others requested dismissal and returned to their homes.

Felix RUHL, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer.

Chief of Gestapo, AUGSBURG. He had also received orders on the formation of the "Siegrune" intelligence organization.

Martin SANDBERGER, SS Standartenfuehrer.

Chief, RSHA Amt VI A, BERLIN.

Gunter SCHOTT.

Agent of SD III B, Aust/ULM. SCHOTT claimed to have worked for a British agent, sending all copies of his agents' reports to him. In April 1945, he was given general preliminary instruction on a resistance plan probably pertaining to the Werewolf, but nothing more came of it.

Kurt SENDTNER.

Lieutenant Colonel in Abwehr, Section I Wi, Ast/MUNICH. His office was mainly concerned with Southern and Southeastern EUROPE until these countries were occupied. After 1942, interests turned toward obtaining economic intelligence from ENGLAND and AMERICA through SWITZERLAND.

Friedrich SIEKMEYER.

Captain, Ast/MUNICH, Section III WI (Economic counterintelligence).

Wilhelm SPACIL, SS Oberfuehrer.

Chief, RSHA Amt II (Budget and Management), BERLIN. Posing as a corporal in the Wehrmacht, SPACIL had tried to bribe a member of an MII team with 1,000,000 marks in exchange for a discharge. His apprehension led to the arrest of his deputy and other associates, as well as the seizure of part of the treasury of the RSHA, including several millions of dollars in jewels, gold and paper money.

Stefan ULRICH.

Captain, Ast/MUNICH, Section III F. Retired in February 1944.



Lothar CZECH.

Abwehr radio specialist. CZECH had worked at an Abwehr radio station in direct contact with German patrol boats on the north English coast which sent weather reports used in planning air attacks on ENGLAND. In April 1942 he joined Frontaufklaerungskommando I in RUSSIA, where he trained 300 Russian agents in the use of radio. He was transferred to Frontaufklaerungskommando III, charged with counterintelligence, in April 1942. In the last two months of the war, the Kommando was requested to furnish volunteers for radio operators for the Werewolf, but nothing came of it and the personnel surrendered to U S troops.

Johann (Johnny) ZUANG (alias Jean ZURING; alias Hans ZIEGLER).

Employee of SD Amt VI, PARIS, where he served as interpreter, translator, paymaster and supply official. After the withdrawal from PARIS, he taught electricity and radio at a school in OFFENBURG to agents about to be dispatched into FRANCE. In April he was given a radio to use after American occupation, with an organization named "Scorpion", believed to be connected with the Werewolf plan. Instead, he disposed of the apparatus and surrendered to Military Government.

Hans Sigismund von BERGE.

Captain in Abwehr III F; Ic of 168 Infantry Division in 1939, when he was transferred to the Abwehr. He dealt with the large number of Russian agents sent into SILESIA. In mid-summer 1944 he requested to be relieved and was assigned as Ic of "Festungsbereich Sued-Ost", and in March 1945 was made aide-de-camp to the White Russian General, TURKUL.

Albert BEUGRAS (alias Paul DROESCH; alias Marcel LATAPIE; alias Andre BERGER; alias Paul Roger).

Member of the Directorate and National Corporative Secretary of the PPF; Liaison official with Abwehr I, II, III and IV; Chief of the DTF (Clandestine Work in FRANCE). Head of the PPF Foreign Intelligence; French national. In April 1943 he went to TUNIS to establish three wireless networks there, and later contacted German authorities in SPAIN in order to install agents in TANGIER. He was made Inspector General of the GIS schools training Frenchmen for underground work in FRANCE. In April 1945 he went to BREGENZ, GERMANY, from where he sent information to an OSS base in ITALY.

Peter Heinz BRODERSEN, SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

Hauptsturmfuehrer in the SS Führungshauptamt; professor at the University of FRANKFURT; consultant to the SD on radio communications and shortwave transmission.

Igor DIMITRIEW (alias George DRUMESCH; alias Gheorge DANILJEVESCHI),  
SS Obersturmfuehrer.

Official of SD Amt VI 7 (Intelligence on RUMANIA); Rumanian national. He worked for the Rumanian Intelligence Service and the Rumanian General Staff. Later he fled to HUNGARY and then was accepted for work with SD Amt VI E 7 in VIENNA, where he instructed and dispatched German agents to RUMANIA.

Erich ISSELHORST, SS Standartenfuehrer.

Commander of Security Police, STRASBOURG (ALSACE).



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Fritz KUENKELE.

Sonderfuehrer "K" RSHA Militaerisches Amt, Abteilung G (forged documents, secret writing).

Dr. Hans O'GILVIE.

Regierungs and Kriminal Rat of RSHA Amt VI, Gruppe Wi-T. He was charged with the responsibility for all technical information received from agents in foreign countries and appropriate dissemination.

Benno PAULISCHKIES (alias Fritz BECK), SS Hauptsturmfuehrer.

Member of SD Amt III, for which he worked in TILSIT, LUXEMBOURG, and DROHOBITCH (POLAND).

Friedrich PESCHKE.

Member of the Abwehr; Captain in Frontaufklaerungstrupp 126 at SAGREB, SERBIA, where his duties were to coordinate all information concerning TITO's troop movements.

Robert WAGNER, SS Obersturmfuehrer.

SD Aussenstellenleiter. Furnished the SD with information on popular reaction in INNSBRUCK, in 1939. In July 1943 he took part in the rescue of MUSSOLINI. Plans were discussed with him regarding the setting up of an SD Amt VI post in the Austrian ALPS, in order to receive reports on the Russians and turn this information over to the Americans for the purpose of ingratiating itself with American authorities.

Walter ZUEHRISTIAN.

Member of SD Section VI D (Anglo-American Sphere) since the beginning of the war. His first assignment was to analyze the British press; in July 1941 he was transferred to PARIS to deal with White Russians willing to cooperate with the Germans.

Agents apprehended during the period are listed below:

	<u>Belgian</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Norwegian</u>	<u>Russian</u>	<u>Swiss</u>	<u>Italian</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Espionage		11	2	1	1	1	1	17
Sabotage	1							1
	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>18</u>

Total number of agents captured by Seventh Army since 15 August 1944:

Espionage	111
Sabotage	20
Total	<u>131</u>



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VII. THE G-2 SECTION AND ITS AGENCIES

On announcement of the ANVIL mission in January 1944, the G-2 Section of Seventh Army Headquarters immediately put into effect the "Planning Plan" which had been drawn up during the rest period following conclusion of the Sicilian campaign. Compiled on the basis of experience gained in the invasion of French NORTH AFRICA (as Western Task Force) in November 1942, and of SICILY in July 1943, the Planning Plan consisted of job specifications and target dates for the completion of each of the many critical tasks involved in the G-2 planning for a major amphibious operation.

The Planning Plan had been based on the arbitrary assumption that approximately 90 days would be allotted to the preparation and mounting of any operation to which Seventh Army might be committed. Although the ANVIL - DRAGOON planning period was actually extended to more than seven months, the Planning Plan was closely adhered to, the time limits being extended to accommodate revisions required by the postponement of the operation.

By the time the section went aboard ship in NAPLES, G-2 plans for the landing and its exploitation were ready to be put into operation; studies of beaches, defenses and inland terrain had been made; potential enemy opposition to the beachhead had been evaluated, and reams of basic intelligence had been disseminated to units for further detailed study.

Simultaneously the G-2 section organized itself and its attached agencies for the transition from a planning to an operational role. A complex mechanism was created, and closely integrated with the G-2 facilities of other headquarters, to provide a constant flow of information on the enemy, his operations and his capabilities. The record of the work of the G-2 section and its agencies is embodied in voluminous files of correspondence, messages and published reports, and summarized in this series of G-2 monthly histories. This final chapter is devoted to the intelligence machine that provided that vast fund of information.

The G-2 Section of Seventh Army Headquarters, formed on a Table of Organization providing 17 assigned officers and 25 enlisted men, was the executive and coordinating office for intelligence and counter-intelligence activities carried out by a variety of specialized agencies which at peak strength numbered over 1,200 officers and men. In addition, it established the basic policies for the intelligence operations of three Corps and a maximum of 16 divisions, each of which had its own G-2 organization.

Under the A. C. of S., G-2, and his Executive Officer, the section was organized in four major subsections, each responsible for certain G-2 functions and each controlling or coordinating certain specialized agencies:

1. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE.

The Combat Intelligence subsection processed all information on enemy ground forces opposing us - their identity, strength, location, attitude and capabilities - and studied other factors such as terrain and weather which might affect our own and the enemy's operations. It maintained the War Room, where the situation map was hung, where tactical intelligence was interchanged by telephone with Corps G-2s and with adjacent and higher headquarters, where intelligence summaries and daily reports were prepared, and where the Commanding General and his staff were given a daily briefing on the situation.



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Incoming intelligence from all sources and agencies was screened at the Combat Intelligence subsection and important items were either given spot dissemination to interested officers or were published in the G-2 Information Bulletin. Combat Intelligence published G-2 Estimates, Target Area Analyses and special studies on various topics, and maintained a research library for the use both of G-2 and of other staff sections.

### Its agencies:

Order of Battle Section. One Major and an attached team of a Captain and two enlisted men composed the Order of Battle section. Its principal responsibility was the issuing of estimates of enemy strength, normally compiled on the basis of enemy combat effectives actually fighting as infantry on the Seventh Army front. The OB section contributed to all G-2 publications those paragraphs and overlays dealing with enemy order of battle, kept detailed records on German Army organization, disposition, materiel and personalities, and maintained a tabulation by unit of all prisoners captured.

Interrogation of Prisoners of War. The IPW detachment, which was responsible for interrogating hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, was formed from trained Military Intelligence Service personnel, most of whom were former residents of GERMANY and hence as familiar as their captives with German language and dialects. Integrated throughout the Seventh Army from Headquarters to regimental levels (one team flew in with 1st Airborne Task Force), they were able to screen and interrogate prisoners with surprising speed.

Altogether, Seventh Army IPW processed 624,204 prisoners between 15 August 1944 and 1 June 1945. Every one of this vast number was questioned for basic information; those deemed worthy of further interrogation due to their military background or specialties were questioned in detail. From this extended interrogation, Seventh Army IPW issued 989 special reports.

Early in 1945 a Target team was added to IPW, its purpose to pinpoint enemy installations, important industrial plants, communications centers and the like. Locations extracted from prisoner questioning proved of great aid to our tactical air force as well as to ground troops, and facilitated the completion of annotated town maps for occupational purposes.

Detailed Interrogation Center. Formerly known as MU 500, CSDIC (Mobile Unit 500, Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center), the Seventh Army Interrogation Center was activated in NORTH AFRICA early in 1944 and served under this designation until early 1945. By the end of 1944 the detachment had interrogated some 500 specially selected prisoners and civilians, including the majority of senior German officers captured by the Seventh Army in FRANCE.

MFIU No. 5, FID, MIS (Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 5, Field Interrogation Detachment, Military Intelligence Service) was activated 5 April 1945 and the entire personnel of MU 500, CSDIC, was transferred to this new unit. At once it acquired a rapidly-growing roster of important enemy officers and civilians, necessitating the addition of infantrymen as guards, the requisitioning of German vehicles for transporting the prisoners, and the expansion of the cadre from ten officers and 48 enlisted men to a July total of 40 officers and 110 enlisted men. As the war reached its climax, MFIU No. 5 served as the nucleus for the Seventh Army Interrogation Center, extracting valuable information from its prize crew of "guests", which included approximately 200 of the German general staff and some of the leading figures of GERMANY (see Section V).



The Center detained 1,725 persons between 1 December 1944 and 1 July 1945, securing detailed interrogations of some 450-500 of them and publishing the results. Special reports have been prepared on technical, governmental, political and military matters.

An example of the work done by the Center is seen in the totals of persons processed there: December, 69; January, 100; February, 107; March, 177; April, 163; May, 884; June, 225.

Strategic Services Section. New to U S Army organization, SSS sprang from an abstract plan in pre-invasion days to a vital, fast-moving agency preceding the 1945 spring offensive. The SSS, probably not as picturesque and sinister a group as often depicted in Hollywood and fiction accounts of espionage, provided hundreds of needed items of enemy information during the crucial last six months of the war - not without cost to its own unheralded personnel.

SSS began planning early in 1944, with 130 trained officers and men in its section. Strategic and tactical data was needed, and began to flow back the very day these American agents infiltrated into FRANCE. While sending back information for immediate use and long-range planning, these agents also began training trustworthy Frenchmen for airborne operations against the Germans, and the entire program began to pay dividends as the Seventh Army rolled northward toward EPINAL in the weeks after the ST. TROPEZ entry into FRANCE. To assure receipt of intelligence by the proper agencies while it was still new, SSS eventually secured permission to bypass routine channels; thus the reports of Frenchmen sent behind German lines and of American agents, both in the battle zone and behind the enemy, began to flash directly to interested parties without delay.

The Seventh's arrival in ALSACE changed the pattern, for the German language was needed from here on, Alsations were of mixed loyalties, and the pro-Allied citizens feared Nazi reprisals. New tactics were adopted. German-speaking agents who had completed radio training were prepared for airborne operations into GERMANY. Prisoner-of-war cages also were combed for a select number of anti-Nazi enemy soldiers to volunteer for espionage. The results were beyond hopes. Equipped with identifications and "cover", some 30 Germans who formerly had faced the Seventh Army as fighting enemies did such notable work (not one of them "doubled") that the German Army officially admitted its confusion, while Allied advances through troublesome areas were speeded by essential information which, otherwise obtained, might have cost lives and delay.

As the spring offensive got under way, divisional control of agent operations passed on to Army level, and agents began the tactics of parachuting down behind the Germans to cover assigned itineraries (parachuting halved the danger of detection in front-line crossing). Returning, an agent would be picked up and his findings published for all parties concerned. So fast did the Americans advance into GERMANY - due in no small manner to the data supplied at constant risk by these Americans and anti-Nazi Germans - that by April our agents sometimes found their assigned areas overrun by the Americans, and turned their attention to identifying the local Nazis for Counter Intelligence units. Agent reports from advance sectors continued to come back by radio up to the last, however; a few days before the end, agents sent in a valuable report on enemy dispositions in the INN Valley.

Signal Intelligence Section. Its functions reverting early in 1945 to the Radio Intelligence Department, Signal Intelligence subsection, of the Army Signal Service, this unit had as its assignment the constant monitoring of the air to intercept enemy radio signals and transmit such messages to the proper G-2 subsections - and at the same time to locate the source of such enemy signals, thus contributing to the pinpointing of enemy units by our Order of Battle section.



Close liaison with Army Group and Corps Signal Intelligence units and with flanking armies made S.I.S. a valuable link for Seventh Army G-2 functions. For example, contact with CSDIC MU 500 (interrogation center) resulted in the obtaining of valuable collaborating technical data from captured German signal personnel. It was also the responsibility of S.I.S. to see that all captured German signal documents and equipment, especially those pertaining to codes and ciphers, were turned over to the nearest Signal Intelligence unit for extraction of needed information.

G-2 Documents Section. This section (now known as the Seventh Army Documents Center, and functioning as a reference library and central collection point) consisted of some five officers and ten enlisted men, all qualified in German and/or French, who systematically catalogued and made available thousands of documents during the campaign.

Most documents handled concerned German order of battle and miscellaneous reports. However, there were major papers processed as well; for instance: original correspondence between HITLER, MEISSNER, PAPEN, RIBBENTROP and others, giving details of HITLER's rise to power and his seizure of the government; orders on what art collections were to be removed from FRANCE to GERMANY; original documents on HITLER's order to invade CZECHOSLOVAKIA, along with details; filmed top secret reports on German V weapons experiments, plans and production figures; Gestapo lists; new complete reports on the German Air Force order of battle; jet plane production figures; copies of orders and conferences of the German Army High Command; secret German list in book form giving the names of all officers in the German Army in May 1944.

During its operations, the Documents staff has processed 349 U S mail bags of documents for SHAEF, 32 for Seventh Army, 45 for AFHQ and 14 for Sixth Army Group.

G-2 Translation Section. This section translated enemy intelligence documents and French intelligence reports of wide and varied scope, most of this work being done on documents submitted by G-2 Documents Section.

In the winter of 1944-45, especially, translations were primarily of combat intelligence value: mine field sketches and descriptions of newly-developed mines and fuses; overlays for the location and removal of thousands of mines in the path of our approach; German manuals giving all data on mines and their employment; logistical data on the Germans; the identification, locations, movements and strength of German Army units; information on the Volks-sturm; location of enemy ammunition dumps and depots; use of SS and police personnel for defense; security measures against Allied airborne attacks; German light signal codes, aircraft recognition signals and unit code names; descriptions of new German armaments and field weapons; reports on the gasoline and fuel situation; the effects of air bombings; damage to German transportation systems; effects of the winter campaign on the German Army; training given to new replacements; terrain studies; enemy comments on our tactics, strategy, equipment and morale; and similar data.

Increasingly important with the crossing of the RHINE was counter-intelligence; in this capacity, the G-2 Translation Section did much research on the organization of the Nazi Party and its appendages, translations of Nazi plans and membership lists which made possible automatic arrests of certain ranks of the enemy hierarchy.

## 2. G-2 AIR.

The G-2 Air Section had as its main combat mission the coordination of air reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, and the selection of targets



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for aerial bombardment. G-2 Air turned out reams of collation maps, annotated photos and maps. A trained crew of specialists supervised the production and interpretation of the photographs and saw to their proper dissemination with a minimum of delay.

Not all targets and areas unveiled by the Air section were presented for tactical or demolition purposes. Thousands of buildings, roads, tunnels, municipal facilities and the like were photographed or studied to assist Allied units in efficient and rapid occupational exploitation of captured localities. The section's work was carried on by these subsections:

Seventh Army Photo Center. Here, for rapid distribution, were produced interpreted aerial photographs giving information on enemy organization. Information gleaned from the stereoscopic study of air photographs was disseminated through overprinted defense maps, annotated photo prints and written reports, with urgent information also sent by wire or telephone to tactical units. Combat units also received from the Photo Center stereo pairs with which to make their own studies, and aerial photos in bulk for use as map supplements. As examples of the amount of work thus accomplished: between 29 September 1944 and 22 February 1945 a total of 1,677 enemy gun batteries were located on the VI Corps front alone (with air photo interpretation alone providing 41 per cent of all locations); between 50 and 75 per cent of the area covered by Seventh Army was photographed for terrain, engineer and intelligence studies; many special missions were flown to secure interpretative photos for particular ground unit needs, and were delivered in the required quantities to the ordering units within hours of the request.

Tac/R (Tactical Reconnaissance). Using plane-to-ground radio, teletype, telephone and courier, two (later three) Tac/R squadrons reported on movements, dispositions and other activity observed behind the enemy front. As finally evolved after many experiments, each Corps was allocated a certain number of air reconnaissance mission requests daily (usually five on routine days), to be flown entirely within the Corps boundaries and at the direction of the Corps. On these flights, pilots maintained direct radio contact with Corps controllers on the ground, reporting their observations as they flew.

Photo Reconnaissance. The Photo Reconnaissance squadron flew assigned missions over enemy territory ahead of Seventh Army, to produce photographs of enemy installations for processing and interpretation by the Photo Center.

Air Target Section. This section was instituted in July 1944 to select bombing targets and to supply bulk quantities of annotated prints of targets. Major targets thus surveyed were coastal defenses, fuel and ammunition dumps, communication bottlenecks, command posts and barracks. In March 1945, special attention was given to SIEGFRIED Line defenses. During the European campaign, a total of 570 targets was prepared, 211 of which were hit by the Air Forces.

"T" Section. Established in February 1945, "T" Section collected, edited and disseminated target information to advancing field units and to technical experts who were following the troops into occupational areas. Purpose of this target information was not demolition, but seizure for exploitation. Targets thus identified included German industrial and political arteries, points of counterintelligence interest (Nazi Party offices and certain government and public buildings) and targets of tactical importance (bridges, dumps, tunnels, power dams, airfields, radio stations, public utilities, etc.). Records thus prepared proved of immense value to the Allies in exploiting and occupying the Reich.



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A total of 15,000 targets were listed, German headquarters and factories leading the list. These targets fell into 15 categories: airfields (also landing strips, hangars, etc.); barracks, hotels and schools; camps (prisoner of war, concentration, foreign worker, prisoner hospitals, prison buildings and areas); dumps (ammunition, fuel, warehouses, cold storage plants, etc.); dams; factories; headquarters (Nazi Party, Gestapo, static military); hospitals; radio stations and radar installations; utilities (electricity, water, gas, etc.); critical points (important bridges, key terrain features); mines (coal, minerals); public buildings (city halls, libraries, museums, etc., omitting postoffices); telecommunication centers and postoffices; railroad installations and ports.

3. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

Responsible for the maintenance of security in the Seventh Army, the Counter Intelligence section's task was to deny information of intentions, capabilities, operations and movements to the enemy, and further to prevent the enemy from accomplishing sabotage and other clandestine acts.

These functions were accomplished chiefly through C.I.C. (Counter Intelligence Corps) detachments holding key spots in the operations area. Coordinated from Army level, policies and operations of these C.I.C. detachments resolved into two phases, (1) close supervision of the civil population and apprehension of clandestine enemy personnel concealed therein, and (2) military security through surveillance and constant training in security measures.

Security of the civil population was effected through strict travel control in the Army area (mainly by the roadblock system) and through screening and checking of the people. Both of these measures netted many espionage agents. Military security meanwhile was doubly secured by the inspection of installation guard systems, security training of troops, checks on persons whose background indicated possible subversive tendencies, and by strict policies on revealing troop movements, operational plans and the nature of communications.

Security suspects of all types were interrogated, and C.I.C. units then made rapid dissemination of resultant target information and other target data for proper exploitation.

While civilian economic activity was disturbed at times because of restrictions on travel, and some small groups of military personnel inadvertently were handicapped in their movements because of all-embracing rules, Counter Intelligence emphasized that maximum Allied tactical effectiveness came first. At the same time, it made continuous study of the justification of all restrictive regulations against both civilians and the military.

To accomplish the above functions, C.I. divided itself into three subsections: (1) Civil Security, to keep civilians from purposely or unwittingly interfering with Army operations, (2) Military Security, to make policies for safeguarding military installations, prevent the activities of subversive personnel, and promote security training, and (3) Operations and Reports, to prepare for rapid dissemination the reports of C.I. findings along with evaluations and suggested counteractions.

Attached C.I. agencies were:

307 C.I.C. (Counter Intelligence Corps) Detachment. Its mission to combat espionage and sabotage, and in general provide military security of a



counterintelligence nature, 307 C.I.C. found its duties changing in detail but multiplying in scope as the Seventh Army rolled from the invasion beaches northward to ALSACE and later into GERMANY for victory and occupation.

Before the invasion, 307 C.I.C., busy training its agents for field work in FRANCE, also had the assignment of security training for troops. During the operational phase, the unit took on more serious responsibilities, such as the investigation of cases of enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activity; arrest of known enemy agents and dangerous enemy collaborators; investigation of harmful rumors and suspected enemy propaganda; security surveys and recommendations; internal security violations; liaison with Allied and civil authorities; establishment of informant nets at all levels; observation of civilian morale and relations between civilians and military personnel; and observation of local political and economic conditions.

Of paramount interest throughout the operations and in the present occupation has been the identification and apprehension of enemy agents, subversive and underground enemies of known present or past records. Complete file indexes have been prepared from information secured from many sources, and these are proving valuable in the progressive combing of the occupied area to remove suspects.

Other C.I.C. activities have included the supervision of installation of roadblocks and a close check there to apprehend enemy agents and others bent on missions against the Allies; a system for the spot locating of parachutist landings by radar during periods of tension; protective measures for lines of communication; and the screening of large numbers of suspects brought in through apprehension at roadblocks or through the following of "leads" from file cards or field contacts; and the training of C.I.C. Detachments throughout the Army on methods found through operational experience.

To a major degree, the effectiveness of C.I.C. Detachments within the Army was gained by recruiting and training additional agents from the ranks of combat troops.

Securite Militaire/Surete aux Armees. These French equivalents of the C.I.C., and their detachments, working closely with C.I.C. but specializing in matters which were primarily of French interest, concerned themselves with subversive French nationals, border control between FRANCE and both GERMANY and SWITZERLAND, and the detention of German agents recruited from FRANCE and French-speaking regions. The SM detachment with Seventh Army was primarily an administrative unit, while the Surete aux Armees detachment was an operational one.

#### 4. G-2 ADMINISTRATION.

G-2 Administration, a small group of enlisted men headed by two officers, has performed stenographic and clerical duties, maintained the general files, logged incoming and outgoing message traffic, and made routine distribution between the subsections and other command post installations. Included in its duties: management of official correspondence, personnel problems, preparation of the morning report as well as memoranda and duty rosters, and requisitioning of office supplies and equipment. The dissemination department has mimeographed daily and weekly G-2 publications and distributed them, and also has disseminated publications originated by SHAEF, ETOUSA, AFHQ, etc.

Seventh Army MIS Liaison Section. To handle the administrative activities of the far-flung Military Intelligence Service throughout Seventh Army G-2 units, the MIS Liaison Section has functioned as a link between Headquarters MIS, the Seventh Army G-2 Section and MIS teams in the field. Under its admin-



istrative jurisdiction have been 50 officers and 150 enlisted men and, according to the number of divisions attached to Seventh Army, some 300 to 500 other MIS personnel. First known as Detachment 2680 Headquarters Company, the administrative unit later was called Detachment 6823 Headquarters Company before assuming its present designation. The Liaison Section has shifted its teams and personnel as Seventh Army G-2 directed, and also has taken care of supplies, records, furloughs and the like for its teams.

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH.

Reporting directly to the G-2 Executive, FWB started in NORTH AFRICA in pre-invasion days, with a staff of 19 persons (U S, British and French civilian and Army personnel) who launched what was to prove a highly effective propaganda campaign against the enemy. Through radio and the medium of leaflets, the FWB aim was to strengthen and direct the French fighting behind enemy lines, and to weaken and raise doubts in the enemy's mind.

From 11 May to 30 July 1944, 21 special leaflets and 65 leaflet newspapers rolled from FWB presses, the latter at five editions weekly for each language. A total of 25,611,600 leaflets and newspapers thus showered into southern FRANCE via airplane in this period. In August 1944, FWB disseminated 60,313,200 leaflets and newspapers from planes, also sent in another half million by shell-fire.

Results were forthcoming at once. Most Frenchmen saw the pamphlets addressed to them, listing invasion behavior rules. The effect on the German enemy was doubtful at first, but the continuing pressure of events lent weight to the messages later. Satellite enemy troops were first to admit that the aerial propaganda barrages influenced their surrender; later, as the Germans themselves began coming in, half of those interviewed by CSDIC said the leaflets had specifically convinced them that further fighting was senseless. Although it became an offense punishable by death for a German to retain any of the safe-conduct passes contained in the FWB leaflet offerings, some 80% of German prisoners had them by January.

The FWB tempo was stepped up, despite the difficulties of constant moves, mechanical failures, non-delivery of paper and other unforeseen complications. The staff was steadily enlarged, and new machinery was secured. Concentrating during winter and spring on all-German literature, dropped directly into GERMANY, FWB made the following airplane dissemination each month: December, 9,843,128 units; January, 8,747,000; February, 9,515,000; March, 10,542,000; April, 23,111,000.

Artillery was used with increasing effectiveness during the winter and early spring to fire barrages of leaflets and front-line propaganda newspapers into enemy combat formations. Total rounds of leaflet-filled shells fired, by months: December, 2,968; January, 5,287; February, 5,474; March, 6,552; April, 818.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

The attached chart illustrates the basic organization of Seventh Army G-2. However, no chart can be uniformly accurate, for the section was kept flexible to meet changing conditions. Assigned G-2 personnel and attached Military Intelligence Service specialists were often interchanged; duties varied according to whether we were fighting in FRANCE or GERMANY, and whether we were deployed on a static front or pursuing a retreating enemy; and even such arbitrary factors as the physical layout of the Command Post affected internal G-2 organization.







# ORGANIZATION G-2 SECTION SEVENTH ARMY

## (SPRING 1945)

